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INTRODUCTION1
BY MAREK JAROCIŃSKI, ECB
FRANK SMETS, ECB 
CHRISTIAN THIMANN, ECB
Two years after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the ECB considered 
it opportune to review the strategic and operational decisions that central banks 
had taken to combat the crisis, counter the fallout for real economies and stave   
off  the  worst  economic  scenarios.  The  sixth  biennial  ECB  Central  Banking 
Conference, organised under the auspices of the Executive Board, provided an 
opportunity to look back at the dramatic years following the Lehman bankruptcy 
and to reflect on the resulting lessons for central banking. 
The conference was titled “Approaches to monetary policy revisited – lessons 
from the crisis” and held on 18 and 19 November 2010 in Frankfurt am Main.
This volume contains the papers presented at the conference, as well as the 
related discussions and speeches.
The contributions are grouped around five broad topics: 
monetary policy strategy,  • 
lessons from historical experiences,  • 
challenges for macroeconomic and finance theory,  • 
the international dimension of the crisis, and  • 
operational frameworks for monetary policy. • 
The financial crisis and the deep recession that followed have, in the eyes of some, 
raised doubts about the appropriateness of what Mishkin calls “flexible inflation 
targeting” strategies, which until recently were credited with bringing about in 
many countries a long period of nominal and real stability, known as the “Great 
Moderation”.  The  first  session  of  the  conference,  entitled  “Monetary  policy 
strategies: experiences during the crisis and lessons learnt”, raises a number of 
questions in this context, namely: what is and what should be the role of money, 
credit and other financial indicators in monetary policy frameworks? What is the 
appropriate horizon for the inflation target? Should central banks manage risk 
and act pre-emptively? Should they lean against asset price bubbles?
1  We would like to thank all participants of the 6th ECB Central Banking Conference for 
their contributions; the staff of the ECB’s Publishing, Events and Protocol Division for the 
conference organisation; and the staff of the ECB’s English Translation and Editing Section 
for the editing of this volume.7 INTRODUCTION
In their paper Stephan Fahr, Roberto Motto, Massimo Rostagno, Frank Smets and 
Oreste Tristani (all from the ECB) discuss the ECB experience. Their simulations 
with a structural model show the importance of the ECB’s monetary pillar and 
the advantage of the ECB’s medium-term orientation. They also present evidence 
that the non-standard policy of “enhanced credit support” has been successful in 
overcoming financial market impairments. The paper by Rick Mishkin takes a 
broader view and discusses more generally the strategic monetary policy issues 
exposed by the crisis. He argues that “none of the lessons from the financial 
crisis in any way undermine or invalidate the nine basic principles of the science 
of monetary policy developed before the crisis”. However, the crisis experience 
does warrant a rethinking of inflation targeting strategies, especially with regard 
to managing tail risks and leaning against credit bubbles. 
Insightful and, at times, provocative discussions of both papers are provided 
by Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University) and William White (OECD).2 White 
questions  some  of  the  implicit  complacency  in  Mishkin’s  arguments,  while 
Tabellini queries the motivation behind the ECB’s monetary pillar. They both 
agree, however, on the need to develop a framework in which financial stability 
is managed with policy tools other than the interest rate.
The  speeches  by  Jean-Claude  Trichet  (President  of  the  ECB)  and   
Jürgen  Stark  (Member  of  the  Executive  Board  of  the  ECB)  provide  a   
policy-maker’s perspective with regard to the strategy of the ECB. Among other 
things, President Trichet stresses the role of the ECB’s quantitative definition 
of  price  stability  in  anchoring  inflation  expectations,  which  materially  helps 
to  avoid  large  fluctuations  of  inflation  even  in  the  most  turbulent  of  times. 
Stark  reiterates  the  key  elements  of  the  ECB’s  monetary  policy  framework:   
“a quantitative definition of price stability, a medium-term orientation and a 
broad analytical framework, with money and credit playing an important role”. 
He also notes that central bankers’ past scepticism towards “leaning against the 
wind” should be reassessed.
Session 2, entitled “The financial crisis: what did central bankers forget and 
what did they learn? A historical perspective”, compares the current crisis with 
the 19th century banking crises and the Great Depression, drawing analogies and 
highlighting contrasts. Harold James (Princeton University) notes that history 
provides both constructive lessons, which were well learned (e.g. the need for 
monetary expansion in a crisis), and serious warnings (for example with regard 
to the large cost of banking crises, and the resurrection of economic nationalism). 
Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich (Freie Universität Berlin) calls for more regulation of 
financial markets. Marc Flandreau (Graduate Institute Geneva) points out that, in 
contrast to the present practice, 19th century lending of last resort was extended 
at a high interest rate in order to avoid stifling the interbank market. He also 
contrasts the Bank of England’s insistence in the 19th century on only the best 
collateral in crisis periods with the widening of collateral eligibility by many 
central banks in recent years. 
2  The third discussion presented at the conference, by Jean Pisani-Ferry (Bruegel), could not 
be included in this volume.8 JAROCIŃSKI, SMETS, THIMANN
The panel discussion in Session 3 focuses on the following question: “what 
shortcomings  in  macroeconomic  and  finance  theory  has  the  crisis  revealed, 
and  how  should  they  be  addressed?”  Jean-Philippe  Bouchaud  (Capital  Fund 
Management  and  École  Polytechnique)  argues  that  fundamentals  play  a 
relatively small role in asset price dynamics. Instead, these dynamics are mostly 
endogenous, emerging from a chaotic interaction of uninformed heterogeneous 
agents. He advocates the use of physics models of complex systems in modelling 
financial  markets.  Martin  Eichenbaum  (Northwestern  University)  responds 
to  the  post-crisis  criticism  of  macroeconomic  theory.  He  points  out  that   
pre-crisis DSGE models did not include financial markets because these were 
not needed to explain the pre-crisis macro data of advanced economies. He calls 
for the use of more heterogeneous samples, including emerging markets data. 
John Geanakoplos (Yale University) characterises the crisis as an exceptionally 
pronounced leverage cycle. He argues that the analysis of leverage cycles should 
be a central element of macroeconomics and finance.
The  international  dimension  of  the  crisis  is  covered  by  Session  4’s  policy   
panel  –  with  contributions  from  Ben  Bernanke  (Chairman  of  the  Board  of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve), Henrique Meirelles (Governor of the Central 
Bank of Brazil), Dominique Strauss-Kahn (Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund) and President Trichet – and is also reflected in Ben Bernanke’s 
keynote speech. Global imbalances endangering the current recovery are the 
common theme. Bernanke rejects the view that the United States can tackle its 
current account deficit on its own and links the imbalances with sustained foreign 
exchange interventions in some emerging market economies. 
Finally,  the  focus  of  Session  5  is  on  monetary  policy  operations,  although 
this topic arises frequently throughout the conference. The session is entitled 
“Monetary policy operations: experiences during the crisis and lessons learnt”. 
Operational  matters  used  to  be  viewed  as  a  mere  technicality.  However,   
the credit turmoil placed them at the heart of central banking and exposed many 
controversies. 
In their paper, Nuno Cassola, Alain Durré and Cornelia Holthausen (all from 
the ECB) model the central bank’s trade-off between providing liquidity and 
sustaining private intermediation in the money market. The paper by Spence 
Hilton and James McAndrews (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) explains the 
institutional and balance sheet constraints on the Federal Reserve’s response to 
the crisis. These papers reveal a contrast in policy frameworks before the crisis: 
while the ECB dealt with many counterparties and accepted a wide range of 
collateral, the opposite was true of the Federal Reserve. In the wake of the crisis 
a convergence in frameworks was observed, with both institutions dealing with 
many counterparties and collateral types.
In his contribution Marvin Goodfriend (Carnegie Mellon University) classifies 
central bank operations into two groups: “monetary policy” and “credit policy”; 
and he points out that the latter has fiscal implications that can impact on central 
bank independence. Rafael Repullo (CEMFI) distinguishes between three ways of 
managing liquidity and money market interest rates: through a structural liquidity 9 INTRODUCTION
deficit (as with the ECB framework), where commercial banks constantly borrow 
from the central bank and the lending rate is the policy rate; with an approximate 
liquidity balance (as with the Federal Reserve prior to the crisis); and through a 
structural liquidity surplus, where the policy rate is the rate paid on commercial 
bank deposits with the central bank. He calls for a reconsideration of which is 
the best framework. 
A  prominent  issue  throughout  the  conference  is  whether  the  non-standard 
monetary policy measures are complements to, or substitutes for, the standard 
interest rate decisions. In the introductory speech President Trichet reiterates 
the ECB’s view that non-standard measures are a complementary tool used to 
ensure the proper transmission of the standard measures. “We judged then –   
as we do now – that the level of our key rates was appropriate to serve the 
maintenance  of  price  stability  over  the  medium  term.  Rather,  our  view  was 
that non-standard measures were required to ensure that the stance of monetary 
policy was effectively transmitted to the broader economy, notwithstanding the 
dysfunctional situation in some financial markets”. Chairman Bernanke views 
the Federal Reserve’s non-standard measures, consisting mainly of securities 
purchases, as a substitute for the interest rate cuts that are used when the zero 
lower bound is encountered: “Although securities purchases are a different tool 
for conducting monetary policy from the more familiar approach of managing 
the  overnight  interest  rate,  the  goals  and  transmission  mechanisms  are  very 
similar”. 
In  his  concluding  remarks  President  Trichet  reiterates  that  the  ECB’s   
medium-term inflation objective of “below, but close to, 2%” and its analysis 
of credit aggregates are increasingly recognised and adopted around the world.   
Yet, more research on nonlinearities and transitory dynamics is needed. 
The  President  concludes:  “I  was  fascinated  by  the  wealth  of  discussion  that   
we have had here”. 
We trust that the reader of this volume will share this view.10
Jean-Claude Trichet11
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REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF MONETARY POLICY 
NON-STANDARD MEASURES  
AND FINANCE THEORY
BY JEAN-CLAUDE TRICHET, PRESIDENT OF THE ECB
1  INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure to open the ECB’s 2010 Central Banking Conference. 
As you know, we consider this event, which has been held every other year 
since 2000, as our institution’s flagship conference. I am therefore particularly 
pleased to see that so many central bank governors from around the world have 
taken up our invitation, as well as representatives from European institutions and 
governments, leading academics, financial market participants and many other 
friends of the ECB. This year, we also have about 30 graduate students from all 
over Europe with us. I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all of you, 
on behalf of the Executive Board and the Governing Council of the ECB. 
As ever, the goal of the conference is to bring together central bankers, policy-
makers, academics, market participants and other observers to exchange views 
on topics of crucial relevance to central banks. I am sure you will all agree that 
the theme of the conference – “Approaches to monetary policy revisited: lessons 
from the crisis” – is both relevant and timely. 
I think we have inspiring work ahead of us for these two days: the programme 
is packed with a combination of papers and panels, and I am very much looking 
forward to our discussions. 
In these opening remarks, I would like to do two things. First, I will present a 
“bird’s eye” view of the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy during the crisis, 
focusing  in  particular  on  the  distinction  between  standard  and  non-standard 
policy measures. And second, I will identify some of the main lessons to be 
learned from the crisis regarding economic analysis. 
2  THE ROLE OF STANDARD AND NON-STANDARD MEASURES
Let me start with monetary policy. The widespread introduction of non-standard 
monetary  policy  measures  has  been  a  defining  characteristic  of  the  global 
financial crisis. 
Across central banks, there has been no standardisation of non-standard measures: 
approaches are distinct, tailored to the respective economies and their structures. 
We  have  seen  enhanced  credit  support,  credit  easing,  quantitative  easing, 13 MONETARY POLICY NON-STANDARD MEASURES AND FINANCE THEORY
interventions in foreign exchange and securities markets, and the provision of 
liquidity in foreign currency – to name but a few of the measures taken.1 
These tools have been used to support the functioning of the financial sector, to 
protect the real economy from the fallout of the financial crisis, and, ultimately, 
to preserve price stability over the medium term. 
There are two distinct views on non-standard measures. 
Some view them as the continuation of standard policy by other means. Once 
nominal interest rates cannot be lowered further, central banks use other tools to 
determine the monetary policy stance – that is, to contribute in the desired way to 
economic, financial and monetary developments in pursuit of price stability.2 
Figuratively speaking, this can be compared to – once the end of the road has 
been reached – engaging the four-wheel drive. Central banks expand their balance 
sheets and inject liquidity so as to influence the structure of yields and returns 
and thereby stimulate aggregate demand. This approach would be broadly in line 
with the theoretical analyses and prescriptions of Friedman, Tobin or Patinkin. 
The logic of this approach is essentially sequential: first the standard measures, 
then the non-standard measures. If this sequential logic were also to be applied 
to the exit, it would essentially mean unwinding non-standard measures first and 
subsequently raising interest rates.
At the ECB, we have a different view of our non-standard measures. We set our 
key interest rates at levels we consider appropriate to maintain price stability, 
drawing on our regular comprehensive assessment of economic and monetary 
conditions.  In  other  words,  we  have  followed  our  standard  practice  in  this 
regard. 
But on several occasions, the monetary policy stance established in this way faced 
obstacles in being transmitted to the euro area economy. During the financial 
crisis, market functioning was impaired. In response, we acted to overcome some 
severe malfunctioning that was hampering the channels of transmission of our 
policy. We introduced measures to help restore a more effective transmission of 
our monetary policy stance to the wider euro area economy.3 
Staying with the image of the road, I would say that we sought to remove the 
major roadblocks in front of us, so that our policy stance could be transmitted to 
the economy in the intended way. The logic of this approach is therefore parallel 
and supportive: if the transmission of the standard measures is impeded in a 
very significant way, non-standard measures can offer support. This logic has 
potentially very clear implications for the exit: we consider that we can determine 
standard and non-standard measures largely independently. We consider that 
we are not bound to unwind non-standard measures before considering interest 
1  For a summary, see Borio and Disyatat (2009).
2  For a discussion of this perspective, see Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
3  For a discussion, see Giannone, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010).14 TRICHET
rate  increases;  we  could  do  one  or  the  other  or  both.  One  set  of  measures 
depends on the outlook for price stability; the other depends on the degree of 
functioning of the monetary policy transmission through the financial system and   
financial markets. 
With this overview of guiding principles in mind, I would like to discuss the three 
crucial elements of our monetary policy discussions during the financial crisis in 
more detail: the unwavering pursuit of price stability, our primary objective; the 
role of standard policy measures in pursuing that goal; and the support provided 
by the non-standard measures that we have introduced in recent years. 
PRICE STABILITY
The Governing Council has defined the ECB’s primary objective with a definition 
of inflation of “below, but close to, 2%” over the medium term.4 
As some of you will remember, initially, this quantification of our definition 
was much criticised, but over time it has become fully accepted. Some doubts 
of the critics have proved unfounded. Our definition has not constrained growth: 
during the first ten years of Monetary Union, euro area per capita GDP growth 
was comparable to that seen in the United States, at about 1% per annum. Nor has 
it hindered employment creation: between 1999 and the second quarter of 2010 
euro area employment grew by 14.2 million, which compares favourably with 
employment creation in the United States over the same period. 5 
What is more, I can say that I was also impressed by a recent speech of my 
colleague and friend, Chairman Ben Bernanke.6 When describing the longer-run 
US inflation rate and outlook, he mentioned as being consistent with the Federal 
Reserve’s mandate a longer-run inflation rate of “about 2% or a bit below”. The 
world’s two largest central banks in the advanced economies could hardly be 
more closely aligned with regard to the inflation rates they aim to establish in 
their respective economies over the medium term. 
At the same time, it seems to me that our medium-term orientation has become 
more fully understood. We need to look beyond the impact of transient shocks 
to price developments and thus beyond the standard two to three-year horizon 
of conventional macroeconomic projections. Indeed, we condition our policy-
relevant horizon on the nature and magnitude of the shocks hitting the economy. 
The nature and magnitude of the shocks faced during the financial crisis imply 
that the relevant notion of medium term might be somewhat longer than in more 
normal circumstances. 
With these definitional issues largely resolved, there are two points that I would 
particularly like to highlight today. 
4  See European Central Bank (2003).
5  Sources: Eurostat, ECB; BEA, BLS and current population survey (Q2 2010 figures for   
the United States).
6  See Bernanke (2010).15 MONETARY POLICY NON-STANDARD MEASURES AND FINANCE THEORY
First,  the  precise  quantitative  nature  of  our  definition  of  the  price  stability 
objective  has  proved  crucial  in  anchoring  longer-term  inflation  expectations. 
And, as a result, it has protected us against both upside and downside risks to 
price stability, even in these most turbulent of times. The anchoring of private 
inflation  expectations  induces  a  self-correcting  mechanism  in  response  to 
temporary  disturbances  in  price  developments,  thereby  easing  the  burden  on 
monetary policy. In short, the quantitative definition has helped to protect us 
against the materialisation of the risks of deflation, even at the darkest moments 
of the crisis. 
Second, the quantitative definition facilitates accountability. There should be 
no room for ambiguity in judging the ECB’s track record. The average annual 
inflation rate in the euro area since January 1999 has been 1.97%. This represents 
an achievement that is worth taking note of. It is, moreover, the best result in the 
major euro area countries in over 50 years. 
STANDARD MEASURES
How could these results be achieved in the face of financial crisis? Changes in the 
ECB’s key short-term interest rates – in other words, standard policy measures – 
have remained the key instrument of monetary policy in the euro area. These 
rates have always been set at levels which the Governing Council has deemed 
appropriate for the delivery of price stability over the medium term. 
In considering the implementation of standard monetary policy measures during 
the financial crisis, two issues are worth particular attention. 
First, the close relationship normally observed between the key policy rate and 
short-term money market rates assumed a more complex form during the crisis. 7 
It was important to recognise that, in times of crisis, a broader set of market interest 
rates, extending beyond the very short-term money market rates, was relevant 
in  signalling  the  monetary  policy  stance,  given  the  segmentation  of  financial 
markets, also taking into account that only a fraction of the banks had access to the 
unsecured EONIA. 8 Hence, the new positioning of the overnight money market 
rate was considered acceptable in these exceptional circumstances as a means of 
helping to offset the impaired functioning of the money market and, in particular, 
the abnormally high level of spreads on the term money market rates. 
The second point I would like to highlight concerns the question of “forward 
guidance” or “pre-commitment” regarding the future path of key ECB interest 
rates. Let me emphasise that the Governing Council has never pre-committed 
to future interest rate decisions. And it did not do so during the financial crisis. 
The main reason, in our view, is the need for the central bank to retain the ability to 
react to unforeseeable contingencies without destabilising market expectations. 
7  See European Central Bank (2010).
8  See Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010).16 TRICHET
NON-STANDARD MEASURES
But, in the challenging context of a financial crisis, standard monetary policy 
proved insufficient. Standard measures have been complemented by a variety 
of non-standard measures, which have aimed to support the effectiveness and 
transmission of interest rate decisions. 
As I mentioned at the outset, the ECB did not embark on non-standard measures 
because we thought the scope for further standard easing of the monetary policy 
stance had been exhausted. On the contrary, when the key rate was reduced to 
1% in May 2009, I remarked: “we did not decide today that the new level of 
our policy rates was the lowest level that can never be crossed, whatever future 
circumstances may be”.9 We judged then – as we do now – that the level of our 
key rates was appropriate to serve the maintenance of price stability over the 
medium term.
Rather, our view was that non-standard measures were required to ensure that the 
stance of monetary policy was effectively transmitted to the broader economy, 
notwithstanding the dysfunctional situation in some financial markets. 
Two episodes are of particular note.
First, the functioning of the euro interbank money market was impaired, to a 
greater or lesser extent, from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 through the whole of 2009. Given the crucial role of wholesale money 
markets for monetary policy transmission, dangers were immediately apparent. 
The flow of credit to the productive sectors of the economy – households and 
firms – was at risk, as banks faced massive uncertainty about their access to 
liquidity and funding, both in euro and foreign currencies. 
Concerns  about  the  impact  of  such  tensions  on  bank  credit  supply  were 
particularly acute in the euro area, given the preponderance of bank loans in 
corporate financing. About 70% of firms’ external financing in the euro area 
comes via the banking system, compared with only 30% in the United States.
To  contain  these  risks,  prompt  and  decisive  action  needed  to  be  taken:  full 
allotment, the lengthening of maturities in liquidity provision, the expansion of 
collateral, the provision of liquidity in foreign currencies and a covered bond 
purchase programme to support this systemically important market in Europe. 
All these measures were aimed at supporting bank funding and maintaining the 
regular flow of bank credit to the private sector. 
The second episode relates to the emergence of tensions in European sovereign 
debt markets earlier this year. Again, given the central role played by government 
bond markets in the financial system, dysfunctionality in these market segments 
threatened the effective transmission of monetary policy. 
9  Trichet (2009).17 MONETARY POLICY NON-STANDARD MEASURES AND FINANCE THEORY
We must remain mindful that the euro area consists of 16 sovereign states. It is not 
a fully-fledged political union or a fiscal federation, within a unified government 
bond market. The SMP programme has been designed to help restore a more 
normal functioning of the monetary policy transmission channels in countries 
where the sovereign debt markets were starting to be dysfunctional. 
In light of these different episodes, what more general conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the ECB’s non-standard measures? I would identify five principles that 
have shaped our thinking about these measures. 
First, the design and implementation of such measures remains focused on the 
ECB’s primary objective – the maintenance of price stability. 
Second, non-standard measures are not intended to “fine-tune” the transmission 
mechanism.  Instead,  they  aim  to  remove  the  major  roadblocks.  If  you  like, 
there is a “threshold effect”: the measures must address a problem of significant 
magnitude to warrant exceptional action.
Third, the instruments employed in implementing such non-standard measures 
must lie within the usual realm of central banking. While rather exceptional 
(at least in the ECB’s experience prior to the outbreak of the crisis), measures 
such as full allotment tenders at fixed rates, operations with one-year maturity 
and outright purchases or market operations in government bonds are all part of 
the traditional central bank armoury. 
Fourth, the non-standard measures, by their nature, are temporary, to the extent 
that they have to be strictly commensurate to the degree of dysfunctionality of 
markets that is hampering the transmission mechanism. The central bank must 
guard against the danger of the necessary measures in a crisis period evolving 
into dependency once conditions normalise.
This naturally leads to the fifth principle: non-standard measures must be fully 
accompanied  by  an  environment  aiming  at  reactivating  the  private  markets. 
In  particular,  the  private  sector,  regulators  and  supervisors,  and  the  fiscal 
authorities  must  face  the  right  incentives  to  address  the  major  underlying 
problems, such as distressed banks or fiscal weaknesses.
As we look to the future, these basic principles will continue to govern our 
approach  to  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  in  the  euro  area,  through  both 
standard and non-standard means.
3  LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS FOR MACROECONOMICS AND 
FINANCE THEORY
Allow  me  now  to  turn  to  the  broader  issue  of  lessons  from  the  crisis  for 
macroeconomics and finance. 18 TRICHET
When the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and financial 
models immediately became apparent. Arbitrage broke down in many market 
segments,  as  markets  froze  and  market  participants  were  gripped  by  panic. 
Macro models failed to predict the crisis and seemed incapable of explaining 
what was happening to the economy in a convincing manner.10 As a policy-maker 
during the crisis, I found the available models of limited help. In fact, I would go 
further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools.
In the absence of clear guidance from existing analytical frameworks, policy-
makers  had  to  place  particular  reliance  on  our  experience.  Judgement  and 
experience inevitably played a key role. 
In exercising judgement, we were helped by one area of the economic literature: 
historical  analysis.  Historical  studies  of  specific  crisis  episodes  highlighted 
potential  problems  which  could  be  expected.11  And  they  pointed  to  possible 
solutions.12  Most  importantly,  the  historical  record  told  us  what  mistakes  to 
avoid.13  On  this  point,  I  look  forward  to  this  afternoon’s  discussion  in  our 
economic history panel.
But relying on judgement inevitably involves risks. We need macroeconomic 
and  financial  models  to  discipline  and  structure  our  judgemental  analysis. 
How should such models evolve? 
The key lesson I would draw from our experience is the danger of relying on a 
single tool, methodology or paradigm. Policy-makers need to have input from 
various  theoretical  perspectives  and  from  a  range  of  empirical  approaches. 
Open debate and a diversity of views must be cultivated – admittedly not always 
an easy task in an institution such as a central bank. We do not need to throw out 
our DSGE and asset-pricing models; rather, we need to develop complementary 
tools to improve the robustness of our overall framework. 
Which lines of extension are the most promising? Let me mention three avenues 
that I think may have been neglected by the existing literature. 
First, we have to think about how to characterise the homo economicus at the 
heart of any model. The atomistic, optimising agents underlying existing models 
do not capture behaviour during a crisis period. We need to deal better with 
heterogeneity  across  agents  and  the  interaction  among  those  heterogeneous 
agents.  We  need  to  entertain  alternative  motivations  for  economic  choices. 
Behavioural  economics  draws  on  psychology  to  explain  decisions  made  in 
crisis circumstances.14 Agent-based modelling dispenses with the optimisation 
assumption and allows for more complex interactions between agents.15 Such 
approaches are worthy of our attention.
10  See, for example, Caballero (2010).
11  See, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
12  See, for example, Jonung (2009).
13  For an example of the guidance offered by economic history, see Bernanke (2000).
14  See, for example, Diamond and Vartiainen (2007)
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Second,  we  may  need  to  consider  a  richer  characterisation  of  expectation 
formation. Rational expectations theory has brought macroeconomic analysis 
a long way over the past four decades. But there is a clear need to re-examine 
this assumption. Very encouraging work is under way on new concepts, such as 
learning 16 and rational inattention. 17 
Third, we need to better integrate the crucial role played by the financial system 
into our macroeconomic models. One approach appends a financial sector to 
the existing framework,18 but more far-reaching amendments may be required. 
In particular, dealing with the non-linear behaviour of the financial system will 
be  important,  so  as  to  account  for  the  pro-cyclical  build-up  of  leverage  and 
vulnerabilities. 19 
These are certainly areas of rich potential, as I think we will hear tomorrow in our 
panel session on alternative approaches to economic analysis.
In this context, I would very much welcome inspiration from other disciplines: 
physics, engineering, psychology, biology. Bringing experts from these fields 
together with economists and central bankers is potentially very creative and 
valuable. 20 Scientists have developed sophisticated tools for analysing complex 
dynamic  systems  in  a  rigorous  way. 21  These  models  have  proved  helpful  in 
understanding  many  important  but  complex  phenomena:  epidemics,  weather 
patterns, crowd psychology, magnetic fields. Such tools have been applied by 
market practitioners to portfolio management decisions, on occasion with some 
success. I am hopeful that central banks can also benefit from these insights in 
developing tools to analyse financial markets and monetary policy transmission.
An important perspective that researchers in other fields bring to economics 
is  a  focus  on  identifying  the  features  that  explain  economic  systems  as  we 
know them. Many aspects of the observed behaviour of financial markets are 
hard to reconcile with the “efficient markets” hypothesis, 22 at the heart of most 
conventional models. 23 Of course, establishing what the key features are remains 
an unresolved and difficult problem.24 But a determinedly empirical approach – 
16  See Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
17  See, for instance, Sims (2003); and Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009).
18  See Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003)
19  See Geanakoplos (2010). 
20  One example of such interaction was the conference “New directions for understanding 
systemic risk” organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the US National 
Academy of Sciences in May 2006 (see the proceedings reported at  http://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/epr/2007n1.html).
21  Such techniques rely on models: built on the law of large numbers, exemplified by the 
statistical  physics  underlying  modern  thermodynamics;  or  that  rely  on  advances  in 
mathematical analysis, as embodied in hydrodynamics and turbulence theory. The main 
unifying theme is that a complex “macro” phenomenon is explained by postulating some 
simple behaviour of a “micro” element (an atom, particle or molecule) at the basis of 
the process under study and evaluating these postulates empirically using statistical and 
simulation methods.
22  Fama (1970).
23  See Farmer and Geanakoplos (2008).
24  See Bouchaud (2010).20 TRICHET
which places a premium on inductive reasoning based on the data, rather than 
deductive reasoning grounded in abstract premises or assumptions – lies at the 
heart of these methods. In operationalising these insights, simulations will play 
a helpful role.25 Using such approaches can help to deepen our understanding of 
market dynamics and the behaviour of the economy. 
4  CONCLUSION 
The lessons of the crisis for macroeconomic and financial analysis are profound. 
And the current situation remains very demanding. 
Our  economies  and  citizens  rely  deeply  on  decisions  by  policy-makers.   
These, in turn, rely very much on two foundations in the economic field: the 
credibility of central banks and the credibility of governments. The credibility of 
central banks relies on their capacity to deliver price stability over the medium term 
in line with their definition of price stability, and thereby solidly anchor inflation 
expectations.  The  credibility  of  governments  means  that  they  must  preserve   
and consolidate their creditworthiness. In order to do so, they need, in particular, 
to  consolidate  public  finances  and  thereby  contribute  to  longer-run  and   
sustainable growth. 
In one sentence: in this still exceptionally demanding and uncertain environment 
for the financial sector and the real economy, it is essential to preserve and 
reinforce the authority of public authorities.
A final word on the European Union and euro area governance. As you know, 
the ECB’s Governing Council has, since its inception, constantly called upon 
executive  branches  to  apply  strictly,  preserve  and  reinforce  the  fiscal  and 
economic governance of the euro area. In 2004 we defended fiercely the Stability 
and Growth Pact, which was under attack by the major countries of Europe. 
In 2005 we expressed solemnly our “grave concerns” as regards the amendments 
brought about to the corrective arm of the Pact. Also in 2005 we called for 
the governance of the euro area to be enlarged to include the surveillance of 
competitive indicators and imbalances. In recent days, taking into account the 
lessons of the global crisis, in particular as regards its impact on the European 
single market and the single currency area, we have called, and are still calling, 
for a quantum leap of governance. Every day I am even more convinced that 
this is absolutely essential. And I am sending this message, as solemnly today, 
as in 2005 when I expressed, on behalf of the Governing Council, those “grave 
concerns” that I just quoted. 
25  See Bouchaud (2009).21 MONETARY POLICY NON-STANDARD MEASURES AND FINANCE THEORY
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We  evaluate  the  ECB’s  monetary  policy  strategy  against  the  underlying 
economic structure of the euro area economy, in normal times and in times of 
severe financial dislocations. We show that in the years preceding the financial 
crisis  that  started  in  2007  the  ECB’s  strategy  was  successful  at  ensuring 
macroeconomic stability and steady growth. Emphasis on monetary indicators in 
the policy process – the monetary pillar of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy – 
was  instrumental  in  avoiding  more  volatile  and  less  predictable  patterns  of 
inflation and output growth. After the collapse of financial intermediation in late 
2008, the strategy of the ECB was to preserve the integrity of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism by adopting a comprehensive package of non-standard 
policy measures. The liquidity interventions decided in October 2008 and in May 
2009 were critical to preserving price stability and forestalling a more disruptive 
collapse of the macroeconomy. 
1  INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of the financial turmoil in 2007, the subsequent financial crisis 
and the collapse in trade and economic activity in 2008 following the default of 
Lehman Brothers have led to a rethinking of monetary policy frameworks. Recent 
contributions to this debate include Bean et al. (2010) and Mishkin (2010). 
In this paper, we focus mainly on two aspects of this debate with reference to the 
euro area and US experience over the last 15 years. First, the financial boom and 
bust episode of the new millennium has brought into question the appropriateness 
of what is sometimes called the “Jackson Hole consensus”. According to this 
1  The views expressed in this paper are our own and not necessarily those of the European 
Central  Bank  or  its  Governing  Council.  We  thank  Gianni  Amisano,  Gergely  Kiss,   
Huw Pill, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Guido Tabellini, Jens Ulbrich, Jean-Pierre Vidal and Bill White 
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. We gratefully acknowledge Pavel Gertler’s 
and Kerstin Holzheu’s research assistance.27 LESSONS FOR MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES FROM THE RECENT PAST
consensus,  central  banks  should  only  respond  to  asset  prices  and  financial 
imbalances to the extent that they affect the inflation forecast.2 Other observers, 
including White (2006) and Rajan (2005), had warned that price stability may 
not be sufficient for financial stability and suggested that central banks should 
lean against the emergence of financial imbalances by tightening their monetary 
policy stances. 
The  ECB’s  monetary  policy  strategy  with  its  medium-term  orientation  and 
emphasis on monetary and credit analysis explicitly involves looking beyond 
short-term  price  developments  and  taking  into  account  the  medium-term 
implications  of  booming  asset  prices  and  credit  markets  for  price  stability.3   
As argued by Trichet (2009), excessive money and credit growth in 2004 and 
2005 was an important factor in the decision not to reduce the main refinancing 
rate below 2% in 2004 and underpinned the need to start a normalisation process 
from low interest rates in 2005. In Section 3 of this paper, we argue that, in line 
with  the  ECB’s  monetary  policy  strategy,  responding  to  money  and  credit 
developments helps to stabilise both inflation and output. We, therefore, argue 
that one of the important lessons from the crisis is that money and credit should 
play an enhanced role in monetary policy strategies.4 
Second, the great recession has led to an unprecedented use of non-standard 
monetary  policy  tools  for  two  reasons.  First,  central  banks  had  to  intervene 
in  financial  markets  to  prevent  liquidity  problems  turning  into  solvency 
problems with an eventual breakdown of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Malfunctioning interbank and other financial markets called upon central banks 
to take on a more active financial intermediation role. They also highlighted the 
fact that there was no longer a single market rate owing to the collapse of normal 
arbitrage activities. Second, because monetary policy had to be eased beyond 
what can be achieved by reducing short-term interest rates close to their lower 
bound, a number of central banks had to pursue alternative policies of quantitative 
and credit easing. The notion that the policy-controlled, short-term interest rate is 
the sole tool of monetary policy has thus been questioned. 
The ECB’s broad and flexible operational framework with a large number of 
counterparties and a broad set of collateral allowed for a quick and pervasive 
expansion  of  its  intermediation  role  in  the  interbank  market,  which  was 
first  demonstrated  when  tensions  arose  on  9  August  2007.5  In  Section  4,   
we discuss some of the non-standard policy measures the ECB took to address the 
malfunctioning in financial markets. We discuss these measures in the context of 
the academic literature and argue that the ECB intervention – which, notably, did 
not include entering into commitments regarding the future path of policy – was 
important to avoid disorderly deleveraging in the banking sector and instrumental 
in sustaining credit creation and averting downside risks to price stability. 
2  See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and the response by Cecchetti et al. (2000). 
3  See, for example, Trichet (2004) and Issing (2002).
4  Another important lesson of the crisis which we do not examine here is the need for a new 
macro-prudential policy framework.
5  See Cassola, Durré and Holthausen (2010) for a thorough review. 28 FAHR, MOTTO, ROSTAGNO, SMETS, TRISTANI
Before  addressing  those  two  issues  in  the  rest  of  this  paper,  we  first  review 
in Section 2 the euro area experience of the last 15 years in terms of nominal, 
real  and  financial  stability.  This  provides  the  background  and  illustrates  the 
developments  we  try  to  explain  in  the  paper.  For  comparison,  we  contrast 
euro area evidence with that from the United States. We show that during the 
decade prior to the financial crisis, low and stable inflation and low volatility 
in economic activity coexisted with highly pro-cyclical asset prices. In the late 
1990s this mostly took the form of rising stock prices, buoyant investment and 
rising credit, whereas in the middle of the last decade, rising house prices and 
mortgage  debt  with  falling  external  finance  premia  were  the  main  features.   
The secular rise in private debt associated with the low real and nominal volatility 
and  the  falling  external  finance  premia  contributed  to  the  sharpness  of  the 
correction in the most recent recession. An important feature of the euro area 
experience is that medium and long-term inflation expectations have been strongly 
anchored throughout the last 15 years, including during the period of the financial 
crisis. This has contributed to limiting the consequences of adverse shocks.
2  A TALE OF THE LAST 15 YEARS
In  this  section,  we  briefly  review  the  developments  in  inflation,  economic 
activity and financial markets over the past 15 years in the euro area and the 
United  States.  In  Section  2.1  we  first  document  how,  following  a  period  of 
great moderation, the financial crisis has affected the level and the volatility 
of inflation and economic activity. Section 2.2 then describes the underlying 
behaviour of financial markets.6 
2.1  THE GREAT MODERATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The Treaty creating the monetary union establishes price stability as the primary 
objective of monetary policy in the euro area. To provide a clear yardstick against 
which the public can hold the ECB accountable and with a view to anchoring 
medium to long-term inflation expectations, the Governing Council of the ECB 
adopted a quantitative definition of price stability in 1998. This definition reads: 
“Price stability shall be defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%. Price stability 
is to be maintained over the medium term.” Following a thorough evaluation of 
the monetary policy strategy in 2003, the Governing Council clarified that it aims 
to keep HICP inflation “below, but close to, 2%”.7 
Chart 1 plots HICP inflation over the past 15 years, as well as various survey 
and market-based measures of medium-term inflation expectations. The average 
annual inflation rate in the euro area between January 1999 and September 2010 
was 1.97%, about 0.65% lower than average inflation in the same 16 countries 
6  The review in Section 2 is very selective. One of the important developments over this 
period that we do not focus on is the process of real and financial globalisation. 
7  One of the reasons for keeping inflation close to 2% was to allow for a buffer in the presence 
of the lower bound on nominal interest rates. See Section 3 for a detailed analysis of the 
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of the current euro area in the decade prior to Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). More importantly, medium-term inflation expectations as measured by 
Consensus Economics or the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters have 
consistently been very close to 1.9%. Moreover, as shown in Smets (2010) and 
Orphanides (2010), differences across forecasters as, for example, captured by 
the standard deviation, systematically narrowed from the start of EMU up until 
the outbreak of the crisis. 
This  stability  of  inflation  expectations  can  also  be  observed  in  other  major 
economies.  For  example,  Chart  2  compares  the  five-year  ahead  spot  and 
Chart 1 Stable inflation and inflation expectations
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Chart 2 Inflation expectations in the euro area and the United States
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five-year  forward,  five-year  ahead  break-even  inflation  rates  (BEIRs), 
as measured by the difference between nominal and indexed bond yields for the 
euro area and the United States. The euro area in this respect compares well with 
the experience in the United States.8 
With the exception of the most recent period in which inflation briefly reached 
4%  in  2008  and  subsequent  negative  rates  in  2009  owing  to  highly  volatile 
energy and commodity prices, annual inflation has fluctuated around 2% in a 
relatively narrow band. Chart 3 shows that the volatility of headline inflation 
since  EMU  has  fallen  significantly  compared  with  the  pre-EMU  period. 
This has occurred because of a strong stabilisation of core inflation  9 and in 
spite of the surge in energy inflation volatility. An additional factor contributing 
to low inflation volatility is the negative correlation between core and energy 
inflation observed in the euro area. This negative correlation absorbed some 
of the increased volatility of energy inflation and is a special feature of the 
euro area data since EMU. The ECB’s clear focus on headline inflation may 
have contributed to the negative correlation as potential cost-push factors are 
8  The  stability  of  inflation  expectations  has  also  been  documented  using  more  rigorous 
econometric techniques in Beechey et al. (2010) and Ehrmann et al. (2010). Galati et al. 
(2010)  investigate  whether  the  financial  crisis  has  affected  the  stability  of  inflation 
expectations. 
9  Core inflation is defined here for comparability reasons as headline inflation excluding 
processed and unprocessed food and energy prices.
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offset through anchored inflation expectations. Chart 4 shows a decomposition 
of headline inflation volatility over time using a backward-looking 36-month 
moving window. It reveals that the negative correlation between food and energy 
as well as between core inflation and energy appeared relatively soon after the 
beginning of EMU and became strongest over the three years leading up to 2002, 
a period of declining energy prices and increasing core inflation. Chart 4 further 
shows the sharply increased volatility of inflation rates during the most recent 
crisis episode. This is, however, mainly due to the sharp rise in the volatility in 
energy and food price inflation, combined with stronger positive co-movement 
between all three considered sub-components of headline inflation. 
The stabilisation of headline inflation at low levels in the euro area has not 
been at the expense of reduced growth performance.10 As shown in Chart 5, 
average annual per capita growth since the start of EMU until the end of 2010 
10  The  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  indicates  price  stability  as  the 
primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), but in addition states 
that “[w]ithout prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the 
general economic policies in the Union” (Article 127(1), as updated by the Lisbon Treaty). 
The purpose of these general economic policies is to “establish an internal market. It shall 
work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and 
social progress […]” (Article 3(3) European Union Treaty). The ECB is able to contribute 
to these objectives through its pursuit of price stability. 
Chart 4 Variance decomposition of inflation over time Euro area
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Sources: BEA, ECB, Eurostat, Federal Reserve and ECB calculations.
Notes: The variance is computed as 36-month moving windows. Inflation refers to HICP inflation for the euro 
area and the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator for the United States. Core refers to headline 
inflation excluding food and energy. “var” is variance, “cov” is twice the covariance between the respective 
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was 1.1%, compared with 1.2% for the United States. Output per capita for the 
euro area and the United States is about 11% higher than in the first quarter of 
1999,  although  the  growth  dynamics  between  the  two  regions  have  differed 
over time. The United States took a stronger hit after the burst of the dot-com 
bubble, but performed especially well in 2004-05 when the euro area suffered 
from subdued growth performance. This strong growth performance compared 
with the euro area was mainly due to large differences in total factor productivity 
developments in the years 2002 to 2004, as documented in Chart 6. Section 3 
further elaborates on the consequences of these supply shocks for the economy 











































































Sources: BEA, Eurostat and ECB calculations.
Notes: Output per capita is real GDP divided by total population. Left panel: Q1 1999 =100; right panel: annual 
percentage changes. Last observation refers to Q2 2010.
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and particularly for inflation and monetary policy. Remarkably, both regions 
went through a similar contraction of about 5% on an annual basis during the 
acute period of the financial crisis, demonstrating in an impressive way the global 
implications of the crisis, which was evidenced in the trade collapse towards the 
end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009.
Chart  7,  adapted  from  Benati  and  Goodhart  (2010),  shows  how  the  financial 
crisis  has  put  a  (temporary)  end  to  the  long  period  of  low  nominal  and  real 
economic volatility in industrial countries. The period before the financial crisis, 
known as the “Great Moderation”, was the result of a number of factors that 
can  be  grouped  into:  a)  structural  change,  e.g.  better  inventory  management 
(McConnel  and  Perez-Quiros  (2000))  or  financial  innovation  and  better  risk 
sharing  (Blanchard  and  Simon  (2001));  b)  improved  macroeconomic  policies, 
such as the establishment of stability-oriented monetary policies; and c) good luck,   
i.e. the absence of large shocks such as the oil price crises of 1974 and 1979.11 The 
relative importance of these factors has been hotly debated, but all three factors 
are likely to have contributed to a reduction in volatility.12 The strong increase 
in volatility becomes apparent when extending the sample from the beginning 
of EMU to cover the recent crisis period. All four economies that we consider   
(the euro area, the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom) have experienced 
11  See Bernanke (2004) for an overview of the factors behind the great moderation from a 
policy perspective. The break in volatility in real GDP was first documented by McConnell 
and Perez-Quiros (2000). 
12  See, for example, Stock and Watson (2004).
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a  stronger  increase  in  real  output  volatility  than  in  price  inflation,  probably 
reflecting the strong anchoring of inflation expectations throughout the crisis.
A  number  of  additional  observations  are  worth  making.  First,  there  is  no 
apparent trade-off between output and inflation volatility in the cross-section 
of industrial countries shown in Chart 7. This may be partly due to the fact that 
the shocks have varied across countries. Nevertheless, both output and inflation 
volatility  have  been  relatively  small  in  the  euro  area  compared  with  other 
countries. However, to the extent that the stability-oriented monetary policy of 
the ECB has been successful in anchoring inflation expectations and avoiding 
inflation or deflation scares, it may also have supported an inward shift of the 
output/inflation volatility trade-off. Smets (2010) illustrates this mechanism by 
performing a counterfactual simulation of the recent recession using the ECB’s 
New  Area-Wide  Model.  This  simulation  shows  that  a  higher  sensitivity  of 
long-term inflation expectations to actual headline inflation would have deepened 
the most recent recession significantly and led to a longer period of deflation, 
in particular in the light of the lower bound on interest rates. Notwithstanding 
the differences in policy objectives and the role played by inflation expectations 
as well as differences in labour market institutions, the trade-off between inflation 
and the unemployment gap – referred to as the Phillips curve – appears to be 
very  similar  over  the  past  15  years  in  the  euro  area  and  the  United  States 
(see Chart 8). It appears that different features of labour market and price-setting 
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institutions compensate each other to deliver a similar sacrifice ratio. However, 
the range of inflation and unemployment gap outcomes is smaller in the euro 
area than in the United States. The chart also reflects the fact that the flattening 
of  the  Phillips  curve,  which  can  be  observed  if  considering  data only  up  to 
2007, may have been a temporary phenomenon of the last few years of the great 
moderation.
Second, there has been a uniform outward shift in the volatility of output and 
inflation following the financial crisis. A closer look at the dynamic evolution 
of inflation and output growth volatility is presented in Chart 9 by employing a   
five-year window for computing volatilities from 1995 until the present. The chart 
indicates that the turn of the century led to an increase in output growth volatility 
in the euro area and the United States associated with the burst of the dot-com 
bubble in 2001, but inflation volatility remained constant. If anything, inflation 
volatility slightly declined for the euro area, whereas it increased somewhat for 
the United States. The 1999-2003 window marks the first period entirely under 
the auspices of the ECB. Thereafter, and up until 2007, inflation volatility and 
output growth volatility declined. The traditional stabilisation trade-off became 
a “trade-in” for the euro area. In the United States, output volatility was reduced 
as well, but inflation volatility remained at its previous levels. Most recently, 
as energy prices began to rise significantly in 2007 and 2008, volatilities in both 
the euro area and the United States increased, first for inflation in the euro area,   
but later for output growth too, particularly following the financial crisis.
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In conclusion, while the volatility of headline inflation and economic activity has 
increased quite dramatically over the past three years, average headline inflation 
and medium-term inflation expectations have remained closely anchored to the 
ECB’s definition of price stability. This, in turn, has contributed to a stabilisation 
of both nominal and real volatility. The low macroeconomic volatility during 
most of the early part of the new millennium may have contributed to a reduction 
in the perception of risk and an increase in leverage and debt, which subsequently 
exacerbated the depth of the financial crisis. In the next section, we turn to some 
of the developments in financial markets. 
2.2  BOOMS AND BUSTS IN ASSET AND CREDIT MARKETS
The previous section described how the last 15 years have been characterised 
by price stability. Over the same period, signs of instability existed within the 
financial sector which eventually led to the most recent crisis. Chart 10 shows the 
development of aggregate asset prices over nominal GDP in the euro area and the 
United States since 1995. This measure of aggregate asset prices includes stock 
market prices as well as residential and commercial property prices weighted by 
their relative sectoral size.13 It captures nicely the two boom-bust episodes in this 
period, illustrating the equity-driven boom and the subsequent dot-com bust at 
the beginning of the millennium, as well as the cycle predominantly driven by 
property prices leading to the great recession. The developments of aggregate 
13  For the link between asset price booms and money and credit growth, see Borio and 
Lowe (2002) and Detken and Smets (2004).
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asset prices in the United States and the euro area are amazingly synchronised, 
with the euro area exhibiting a slightly lower amplitude owing to the relatively 
lower share of stock prices in the index.
The two boom and bust phases experienced by the United States and the euro 
area  over  the  past  15  years  were  clearly  different  in  nature  with  different 
implications  for  the  rest  of  the  economy.  Chart  11  directly  compares  the 
two phases through the lens of corporate bond spreads, separated into financial 
and non-financial corporations. These spreads indicate the special nature of the 
recent crisis in comparison with the dot-com bubble in 2001. Spreads between 
BBB-rated securities of non-financial corporations and AAA-rated government 
bonds in the euro area increased persistently to above 200 basis points during 
the bursting of the dot-com bubble, whereas financial securities remained well 
contained.14 During the financial crisis, however, BBB-rated financial spreads 
reached up to 2,700 basis points over AAA-rated government bond yields, while 
non-financial spreads have a pattern reflecting nothing more than a deeper but 
common recession.
There  are,  however,  many  similarities  between  the  two  boom  periods. 
As shown in Chart 12 for the euro area, in both boom periods the rise in stock 
14  Two short-lasting spikes can nevertheless be identified, which caused the spreads to rise 
by more than 200 basis points above the AAA-rated government bond yields.
Chart 11 Spreads of corporate securities
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prices was associated with increasing shares of credit and investment in GDP 
in the corporate sector and supported by a fall in the external finance premium. 
The reverse pattern is visible when stock prices fall, illustrating the pro-cyclicality 
of the financial system. The latter effect is in line with models where collateral 
valuations  are  relevant  for  credit  supply  such  as  in  the  financial  accelerator 
models  of  Bernanke,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1999)  or  Christiano,  Motto  and 
Rostagno (2010). Higher stock prices increase the net worth of borrowers and 
thereby relax the external finance constraint. 
Another complementary interpretation is that higher stock prices and a booming 
economy increase the risk-taking capacity of the financial sector and thereby 
lead to lower risk premia, in turn reinforcing the economic boom. This process 
then goes in reverse when the first signs of a slowing economy become apparent. 
Recent research has emphasised the importance of such a risk-taking channel as 
a driver of the business cycle. For example, Adrian and Shin (2010) argue that 
value-at-risk (VaR) constraints on the banking sector will lead to a pro-cyclical 
pricing of risk. Recent evidence on the impact of the monetary policy stance on 
the price of risk and credit standards in a number of financial markets provides 
support for such an interpretation.15 
15  See, for example, Jiménez et al. (2009), Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2010), Maddaloni 
et al. (2010), and Gambacorta and Marquez (2010). 
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Chart 13 plots M3 corrected for portfolio shifts and the external finance premium. 
The chart further confirms the negative correlation between the external finance 
premium and monetary indicators. As discussed in Section 3, the ECB’s monetary 
analysis can be used to identify signals of the monetary-financial side that affect 
the economy.16 At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that monetary policy 
is not the most efficient instrument to deal with such financial imbalances.
Another  feature  of  Chart  13  worth  mentioning  is  the  secular  decline  in  the 
external  finance  premium  from  1995  till  2007  and  the  sharp  rise  thereafter. 
The decline in the external finance premium up until 2007 also compares well 
with the widespread finding that the equity premium fell over the same period, 
as surveyed in the meta-analysis by van Ewijk, de Groot and Santing (2010). 
This coincides with a secular decline in long-term interest rates, which may 
partly be the result of the global savings glut observed since the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. A complementary explanation for the fall in risk premia is the 
greater macroeconomic stability during that period. To the degree that greater 
stability  has  been  achieved  through  better  institutional  set-ups  and  policies, 
it may provide sound reason for the fall in risk premia. But to the degree that 
smaller shocks are behind this stability, it may have led to mispricing and overly 
positive asset valuations.17 
The fall in risk premia, long-term interest rates and macroeconomic uncertainty 
may also have played a role in the rise in leverage across sectors in the euro 
16  See  Detken,  Gerdesmeier  and  Roffia  (2010)  for  an  overview  of  methodological 
improvements in assessing asset price bubbles through monetary analysis. 
17  See also Trichet (2008) in this respect.
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area and the United States, including over longer periods. Chart 14 shows the 
evolution of private and government debt in the euro area since 1999 and the 
United States since 1950. Three observations are worth making. First, according 
to the national financial accounts, overall private and government debt in both 
the euro area and the United States exceeded 300% of GDP ahead of the financial 
crisis. Second, the share of government and corporate debt is relatively larger in 
the euro area than in the United States, but the rapid growth of debt in the first 
half of the 2000s in the United States was mainly due to the increase in household 
debt. Over the short and long run, it was net financial debt (excluding equity) that 
grew fastest, with strong increases since the mid 1980s. Finally, the most recent 
rise in overall debt since 2008 was mainly due to an increase in government debt 
in response to the deep recession, while the private sector has been deleveraging, 
particularly  in  the  United  States.  As  noted  by  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2008), 
the increase in sovereign debt levels is typical following a financial crisis and is 
not primarily caused by the implicit or explicit bailout costs, including guarantees 
to the private sector, but instead is the consequence of a period of increased use 
of automatic stabilisers and government spending to offset the recession.
Overall, the period since 1995 has been characterised by booms and busts in 
asset prices and the build-up of financial imbalances against the background of 
stable prices and economic activity. The current financial crisis, which started 
in August 2007, was triggered by a European bank declaring it could not value 
the underlying assets in three of its funds that were invested in US sub-prime 
mortgages. Its ultimate source, however, derived from the excessive build-up of 
debt and leverage in the period of great moderation.
Chart 14 Debt by sector
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3  THE ECONOMY AND MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY
Macroeconomically  speaking,  and  despite  growing  financial  imbalances,  the 
period between 1999 and 2007 was a successful one for the euro area. Monetary 
union built a solid constituency for low inflation in Europe. The ECB acceded 
to  the  people’s  demand  for  economic  security  by  delivering  stable  prices 
in  a  context  of  steady  income  progression  and  moderate  real  fluctuations.   
The financial crisis that started in 2007 and deflagrated in 2008 sharply changed 
that economic landscape. This is where Section 2 leaves us.
In the jargon of Great Moderation analysts, the first nine years of monetary 
union  pose  an  identification  issue.  What  provided  the  underpinnings  for  the 
good macroeconomic performance? Did monetary policy have an active role in 
steering the economy along a steady path, which would not have been that steady 
otherwise? In other words, did the monetary policy strategy lead the economy? 
If it did, what was the role of monetary analysis in creating the conditions for 
success? 
3.1  STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
Answering  our  question  of  whether  the  strategy  lead  the  economy  requires 
structural inference and the use of counterfactual analysis, which simulates a 
change in the systematic pattern of monetary policy conduct. In the jargon of 
modern  quantitative  macroeconomics,  a  strategy  is  identified  by  the  “policy 
rule”. If the systematic behaviour – the coefficients and the reaction variables – 
of the central bank had been different, history would have looked different. 
But which policy rule is our baseline? And in which directions do we twist its 
specification in counterfactuals in order to test the performance of the strategy? 
In synthesis: how can we stress-test a multifaceted strategy on the basis of a 
policy rule? Arguably, our ambition to assess selective elements of the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy is limited by the tool at our disposal. This limitation is 
measurable by considering the list below, which enumerates the main elements 
of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. 
First, the Treaty that lays down the institutional foundations of EMU instructs  • 
the ECB – and the whole European System of Central Banks – to pursue price 
stability as its overriding objective, to which any other policy consideration is 
to be subordinated. The ranking of priorities is clearly hierarchical. 
Second, as mentioned in Section 2, the Governing Council of the ECB has  • 
quantified  its  overriding  objective  with  a  range  of  values  for  inflation  – 
positive inflation rates of below 2% – which, if realised over the horizon that 
is relevant for policy (see below), would be consistent with the attainment of 
price stability. Here, it is critical to note that a quantitative definition of price 
stability is not a point target for inflation.
Third, the Governing Council has enunciated that, in pursuing its objective,    • 
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medium term. The notion of the medium-term horizon is critical. It is not 
preset or quantified, but it is meant to depend on the nature and source of the 
shocks that hit the economy from time to time. And, even more importantly, it 
is associated with a steady-handed response to the evolution of the economic 
state – realised or expected – and a rejection of day-to-day fine-tuning.18
Fourth, in assessing the risks to price stability, the Governing Council gives  • 
great prominence to monetary factors, which – if left unattended – can pose 
threats to price stability over longer horizons. Analysis of monetary trends and 
imbalances – for example, money and credit growing consistently out of line 
with sustainable trajectories – is a cornerstone of the strategy. It provides a 
perspective from which the Governing Council cross-checks the robustness of 
the policy implications that emanate from standard conjunctural analysis and 
macroeconomic projections. It is an insurance against policy myopia. 
The distance between these strategic principles and the measurement tool at 
our disposal is evident. Price stability is a pre-ordered policy priority in the 
ECB’s statutes, but it is only a weighted objective among others in the policy 
rule that we estimate and simulate. Put differently, our rule is non-hierarchical.   
A quantification of price stability is not an inflation point target. Yet, specifying 
a  policy  rule  requires  postulating  a  reaction  to  inflation  in  deviation  from  a 
single numerical value. The medium-term horizon is not a fixed time window 
in the ECB’s strategy, but it necessarily has a mechanical element in the policy 
feedback in our simulations. Finally, a two-pillar strategy where the Governing 
Council  systematically  cross-checks  inferences  and  policy  implications 
across  different  ways  to  describe  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism  is,   
by construction, impossible to render if one – like us – is to use a single model. 
These are the terms of our heuristic compromise. 
Our analysis in this section will fall short of the task in a further dimension, 
namely that it will be selective. We will mainly concentrate on one element 
of the strategy: the role of monetary analysis. The prominent role of monetary 
analysis is critical to the entire structure of the strategy, but has been contentious 
to a varying degree of intensity over time. We will try to demonstrate that it has 
inspired a policy attitude which could have been instrumental in avoiding major 
policy mistakes over the recent past. Those mistakes, if incurred, would have 
worsened the starting conditions in which the ECB would have found itself when 
the crisis hit its climax in the autumn of 2008.
In order to generate the structural inference that we need as a precondition of 
our  counterfactual  simulations,  we  need  a  structural  model  of  the  euro  area 
economy. Because our counterfactual critically involves the central bank reacting 
to monetary phenomena – specifically, under the second pillar of the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy – we choose to conduct our exercise using the structural 
model  documented  in  Christiano,  Motto  and  Rostagno  (2010;  hereinafter 
“CMR”). This framework combines the standard features of a dynamic general 
18  For a different view on the role that fine-tuning should receive in the monetary policy strategy, 
see Blinder and Reis (2005) who suggested that the Federal Reserve System under Chairman 
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equilibrium model of the monetary business cycle, such as the one presented in 
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), with variables pertaining to the financial and 
monetary sector. 
Our exercise is two-staged. In a first stage, we estimate the CMR model over a 
long sample which starts prior to monetary union. This exercise yields a sequence 
of structural shocks that the model identifies to have occurred in the historical 
sample. In a second stage, holding fixed the history of the economic non-policy 
shocks that the structural model identifies over the estimation sample period,   
the model is re-simulated using a different policy rule. 
We estimate the CMR model over the sample period from the first quarter of 
1985 to the third quarter of 2008. For this estimation, we use the following 
specification of the money market feedback relationship:
(1)  Rt = ( ρRt
 
–1
 + (1 – ρ)[α(Et πt  + 1 – π*) + β∆yt
  + γ∆Mt ] +  εt )  +  θξt
In (1) the very short-term money market interest rate on the left side, which   
we identify with the euro overnight index average (EONIA), is determined by 
two components. The first component corresponds to the first term in round 
brackets on the right-hand side of (1) and reflects policy intentions: the “policy 
rule” proper. Conventionally, this includes the lagged interest rate, the expected 
gap between GDP inflation and a numerical value consistent with price stability, 
GDP  growth  in  deviation  from  its  trend,  and  a  white  noise  policy  error,  εt. 
Unconventionally,  and  in  order  to  capture  monetary  analysis  considerations, 
we add an extra regressor to this term: excess growth of a monetary indicator, 
∆Mt.19 The second component of (1) is the last term on the right-hand side, θξt. 
This includes a latent shock, ξt, which, in the model, calibrates banks’ demand 
for central bank credit.20 In estimation, this shock is identified with the total 
outstanding stock of Eurosystem refinancing operations, which is included in 
the set of observables. The coefficient, θ, attached to the shock thus measures 
the sensitivity of the overnight interbank rate on the left of (1) to money market 
liquidity conditions. Indeed, we find that this estimated elasticity is positive, 
large and highly significant in the pre-crisis period. 
Regarding  the  shocks  identified  through  estimation,  we  concentrate  on   
two classes which seem to be particularly relevant for explaining – according 
to the CMR model – the euro area business cycle: monetary-financial shocks 
and supply-side shocks. Monetary and financial factors lead or coincide with 
the peaks and troughs of output and tend to dissipate quickly as a determinant 
of growth, except in crisis times, but introduce long-lasting trends in inflation. 
Supply  shocks,  instead,  have  usually  been  timely  indicators  and  certainly 
extraordinarily  persistent  pro-cyclical  determinants  of  growth  and  inflation, 
at least since the start of monetary union. While a typical demand shock and 
a typical financial shock that move aggregate demand pose little puzzle to a 
19  Later on in this Section we shall discuss the reasons behind our choice of credit – rather than 
headline money – as a proxy for the monetary variable to be included in (1).
20  The Annex gives an intuition for this and other latent shocks.44 FAHR, MOTTO, ROSTAGNO, SMETS, TRISTANI
stability-orientated central bank – given that they move output and inflation in 
the same direction – a supply shock poses a signal extraction problem for the 
central banker. What is policy relevant is the effect that the shock is expected 
to  have  on  inflation  expectations  and  on  the  self-sustaining  momentum  that 
expectations – once unsettled – can add to the inflation process going forward. 
If  inflation  expectations  are  sufficiently  impervious  to  a  supply  shock,  then 
monetary policy can afford to lengthen its policy horizon and look through the 
disturbance. Otherwise, it needs to intervene to stem the transmission of the 
shock via expectations. In a way, central banks need to be vigilant to the fact 
that a supply shock might morph into a demand shock, if and when it is allowed 
to influence inflation expectations. It is this mutation that is most relevant for 
policy. But, of course, judging whether the mutation will happen or is likely to 
happen is fraught with hazards in real time.
By bearing these findings on the shock decomposition in mind we now stress-test 
the ECB’s monetary policy strategy along the dimension of monetary analysis.21
3.2  MONETARY ANALYSIS AND THE MEDIUM-TERM ORIENTATION
More  recently,  the  controversy  over  the  usefulness  of  monetary  analysis  has 
subsided somewhat. Many academic critics who had long advised the ECB to place 
less emphasis on the role of money in its strategy have qualified or recanted their 
earlier positions. At the same time, the related question of whether a central bank 
should concentrate on targeting inflation or should also “lean against the wind” 
blown by rising monetary and financial imbalances has been put back on the agenda 
for discussions relating to the theory and practice of central banking. Inflation 
targeting was the almost undisputed view of the majority of participants in that 
debate before the crisis. Since the crisis, the median view has arguably shifted. 
It is this latter aspect of monetary analysis that we want to address.22 As the 
ECB – like all other central banks – has presided over a period of heightened 
volatility in financial markets, it is interesting to ask whether macroeconomic 
history would have looked materially different in the euro area if the ECB had 
not  relied  on  its  monetary  pillar.  This  requires  a  counterfactual.  But,  as  we 
mentioned before, this counterfactual exercise is not an easy one, for essentially 
two reasons. First, using one single model, we obviously forfeit one critical side 
of the monetary pillar approach: that it can induce robust policy, namely a policy 
that has a better chance of delivering good results across different specifications 
of the inflation process. It is the cross-checking aspect of the two-pillar strategy 
that we are sure to miss. Quoting from ECB (2003):
21  As mentioned before, by focusing on a single aspect of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy 
we are disregarding different facets of the same that may be complementary in delivering 
price stability. In particular, the medium-term orientation, which is not covered here, goes 
hand in hand with the analysis of money aggregates.
22  The fact that trends in money are highly coherent with trends in consumer prices provides 
the main foundation for the role of money in the ECB’s strategy. This role is sufficiently   
well-established in theory and econometrics (for example, see Lucas (1995) and Benati (2009)). 
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“In  order  to  assess  the  indications  about  the  appropriate  stance  of  monetary 
policy, the two-pillar approach provides a cross-check of the information that 
stems  from  the  shorter-term  economic  analysis  with  that  from  the  monetary 
analysis, which mainly provides information about the medium to long-term 
determinants of inflation.” (p. 92) 
Second, the policy rule should include the underlying money trend as an indicator 
of the underlying trend in prices. Indeed, it is this connection that lies at the 
centre of the ECB’s mandate (see Stark (2010)).23 Avoiding excess volatility in 
asset markets is a by-product of the strategic role of money, and is justified only 
to the extent that it can contribute to price stability over a medium to long-term 
horizon. However, owing to the technical complications implicit in estimating 
and simulating a policy reaction function which feeds back on the underlying 
trend – as opposed to headline growth rates – of money, we employ a proxy 
in our quantitative exercises. Our proxy is the growth rate of bank credit to the 
non-financial sector in deviation from its long-run trend. This is the reaction 
variable  ∆Mt  which  we  include  in  the  money  market  interest  rate  feedback 
equation (1).24 Chart 15 gives some grounds to believe that such a proxy might 
indeed be acceptable. 1t shows that the correlation – at least since monetary 
union – between credit and underlying money growth based on the CMR model 
(the red bars) is large.25
23  Quoting from Stark (2010): “[Monetary analysis] compels policy-makers to consider trends 
in money and credit growth, which may exert an influence on price developments beyond 
that identified by a purely conjunctural or output-gap view of the world.”
24  Owing to the prevalence of shifts in the demand for money over the relevant sample period, 
estimating (1) with feedback on headline – as opposed to trend – money growth does not 
yield a significant reaction coefficient. 
25  In the CMR model, underlying M3 growth is derived by generating the M3 growth path 
in response to all shocks identified in sample by the model estimation, except those that 
pertain to the demand for money by households and firms. For a thorough discussion of the 
measures of underlying money computed by the ECB, see Papademos and Stark (2010).
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Subject to these limitations, we run the following counterfactual exercise. We set 
the reaction coefficient γ, which in (1) is attached to excess credit growth, equal 
to zero.26 We then re-simulate the model in response to the estimated sequence 
of all non-policy shocks. The difference between history and the artificial path 
is a rough representation of the contribution of the monetary pillar. Chart 16 
is consistent with the following two conclusions. First, inflation would have 
been distinctly higher at times of financial exuberance and would have fallen 
precipitously into negative territory in the wake of the financial market collapse, 
starting in the autumn of 2008. In other words, inflation would have been more 
reactive to the state of financial sentiment. Second, the economy as a whole 
would have been more volatile. Monetary policy would have added fuel to credit 
market euphoria – visibly in the early years of monetary union – which would 
have made the subsequent reversal even more spectacular and destabilising than 
it was in retrospect.
We generalise these results to test their robustness to all possible realisations 
of shocks. Chart 17 shows the inflation-output variability frontier – the Taylor 
frontier – that can be traced out in our model given the profile of the whole 
spectrum of shocks that hit the euro area economy on average. The black line 
with diamonds on the right-hand scale of the chart shows the frontier that is 
attainable if the feedback rule does not feature a reaction to excess credit growth 
(the γ coefficient in (1) is zero). Diamonds of a bigger size correspond to higher 
coefficients – with a step size of 0.2 – of reaction to inflation (the α coefficient). 
It is apparent that starting from very low values of α and shifting along the upper 
portion of the black line, which is positively bent, a central bank would be able 
to improve on both dimensions of policy by just making its response to inflation 
more aggressive. Note, however, that adding a response to excess credit growth 
would be even more effective: it would systematically curtail output volatility at 
no cost in terms of inflation volatility. This is shown by the blue lines that depart 
from the black Taylor frontier on the right-hand scale of the chart and point 
left. The blue diamonds along these lines indicate different degrees of response   
(step size of 0.05) to excess credit growth. Among them, the red diamonds mark 
the maximum response to credit – in association with the corresponding inflation 
coefficient on the black frontier – that would be possible without incurring a 
trade-off. Connecting the red diamonds with a line, one could trace out a curve. 
This curve would represent a shift of the black curve towards the origin. In other 
words, reaction to credit brings with it a Pareto improvement in policy design 
which would be unattainable otherwise.
Notice the difference between a monetary pillar and a genuine “leaning against 
the wind” approach. The ECB has long recognised that it is not asset prices 
per se that a central bank should incorporate in its policy framework. After all,   
the  equilibrium  value  of  assets  –  particularly  real  assets,  such  as  claims  on 
companies and houses – is difficult to compute and is certainly state contingent. 
So, there is little merit in an unconditional monetary policy response to asset 
price changes, as was advocated by the early proponents of a “leaning against 
26  The mode of the estimated posterior distribution for γ is 0.54.47 LESSONS FOR MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES FROM THE RECENT PAST
the wind” strategy.27 The policy response should be conditional. And the critical 
condition that a central bank should ascertain before judging if an asset price 
trend is policy-relevant is whether the market trend is causing – and/or is being 
fed by – a concomitant monetary imbalance. Quoting from ECB (2005):
27  An  early  manifesto  of  “leaning  against  the  wind”  is  Cecchetti,  Genberg,  Lipsky  and 
Wadhwani (2000). Bernanke and Gertler (2001) provide a critique of that approach.
Chart 16 Counterfactual: history without the monetary pillar
GDP inflation Real GDP growth
(year-on-year percentage change) (quarter-on-quarter percentage change)
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Notes: In each panel, the blue line indicates history. The red dotted line indicates the counterfactual associated 
with a money market feedback relationship (1) in which the monetary policy reaction coefficient, γ, is set equal 
to zero.48 FAHR, MOTTO, ROSTAGNO, SMETS, TRISTANI
“Monetary analysis can contribute to assessing the extent to which generously 
valued assets can be traced to – and at the same time become a source of – excess 
creation of liquidity and over-extension of credit. Detecting and understanding 
this link helps the ECB form an opinion on whether an observed movement 
in asset prices might already reflect the inflating of an unsustainable bubble.” 
(p. 59)
A market bubble that progresses in symbiosis with a credit bubble, and which then 
spills over into excess money creation, is certainly a policy-relevant event. Being 
vigilant to the monetary imbalance means for a central bank being better able to 
discriminate between benign and less-benign phenomena in financial markets.
In conclusion, the mechanism by which a monetary pillar can improve on policy 
outcomes achievable under different policy strategies is simple. The monetary 
pillar draws attention to rising imbalances in the monetary sector. Monetary 
imbalances  are  well-correlated  with  financial  imbalances.  In  turn,  financial 
imbalances are typically a distinct feature of the macroeconomy at those critical 
time junctures when the central bank is called upon to find a balance between 
short-term risks and its long-term stability objective. In attempting to strike this 
difficult  balance,  monetary  analysis  can  promote  a  longer-term  perspective. 
It can act as the commitment mechanism which a central bank needs to have in 
place to overcome policy myopia.
4  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The initial turmoil and the subsequent crisis that swept through financial markets 
over the past three years have posed unprecedented challenges for central banks. 
Chart 17 The Taylor frontier with and without the monetary pillar
(trade-off)


















Notes: Taylor frontiers with a reaction to credit (blue lines) and without a reaction to credit (black lines). Black 
(blue) diamonds of increasing size indicate reaction to inflation (credit) of increasing intensity. Reddish brown 
diamonds represent the maximum reaction to credit consistent with a trade-in.49 LESSONS FOR MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES FROM THE RECENT PAST
Their  policy  responses  have  been  equally  unprecedented  and  have  involved   
non-standard  measures,  i.e.  actions  that  go  beyond  the  usual  changes  in  a 
“policy” interest rate. 
Inevitably, the exceptional nature of the financial crisis which led to the deep 
recession of 2008-09 – often referred to as the “Great Recession” in the academic 
literature – implies that a full assessment of the effectiveness of non-standard 
policies deployed by monetary and fiscal authorities will have to wait until the 
world’s major economies have completely recovered. The exceptional nature of 
these policies also implies that their effectiveness cannot be entirely understood 
using traditional frameworks and models. From this perspective, new benchmarks 
for “appropriate policy” and new interpretative tools have to be developed before 
alternative policy responses can be studied – with the considerable benefit of 
hindsight.
In this section, we provide a summary description of economic and financial 
developments  in  the  euro  area  starting  from  August  2007,  until  mid-2010.   
The  main  objective  of  this  review  is  to  highlight  the  main  standard  and   
non-standard  measures  enacted  by  the  ECB,  clarify  their  stated  intent,  and 
provide  preliminary  evidence  on  their  economic  impact.28  In  so  doing,  we 
attempt to relate non-standard measures to the academic literature, including 
papers which were already available at the time of the crisis and thus provided 
a possible framework to help interpret unfolding events, and papers which were 
written after the crisis and are thus tools to understand the policy decisions that 
were taken ex post. 
4.1  FROM THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL TO THE GREAT RECESSION 
Before the inception of the financial turmoil, euro area developments in 2007 
were characterised by an environment of sound economic growth and vigorous 
money and credit expansion. Throughout the year, medium-term risks to price 
stability remained clearly on the upside. Average annual HICP inflation stood 
at 2.1% in 2007, rising sharply towards the end of the year, mainly owing to 
substantial  increases  in  international  oil  and  food  prices.  Economic  activity 
expanded at solid rates throughout the year, with contributions from all GDP 
components,  thanks  to  favourable  financing  conditions  (especially  in  the   
first half of the year), and positive developments in real disposable income as 
labour market conditions improved. Monetary analysis confirmed the existence 
of upside risks to price stability at medium to longer horizons, owing to the 
strength of the underlying rate of money and credit expansion, as underlined,   
in particular, by the sustained growth of loans to the private sector. To contain 
these risks, the Governing Council adjusted the monetary policy stance, raising 
the key ECB rates twice in the first half of the year. As a result, the minimum 
bid rate in the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem stood at 4.00% in 
June 2007 (see Chart 18).
28  See also Baumeister and Benati (2010) and Lenza et al. (2010) for a description and analysis 
of non-standard monetary policy measures in the euro area and other countries.50 FAHR, MOTTO, ROSTAGNO, SMETS, TRISTANI
At  the  same  time,  longer  term  risks  for  economic  growth  remained  on  the 
downside,  mainly  on  account  of  external  factors,  such  as  the  possibility  of 
further  increases  in  oil  and  other  commodity  prices.  Following  the  onset  of 
the turmoil and increased volatility in financial markets in early August 2007, 
the outlook for economic activity in the euro area was characterised by unusually 
high uncertainty. ECB interest rates remained unchanged in the second half of 
the year.
4.1.1 THE PERIOD BEFORE SEPTEMBER 2008
When the first signs of turmoil manifested themselves on 9 August 2007, the ECB 
was among the first central banks to react to the shock and to inject abundant 
liquidity  into  the  money  market.  Owing  to  the  adverse  developments  in  the 
US sub-prime mortgage market, euro area banks became increasingly concerned 
with the risk of having to provide funding to structure investment vehicles that 
had invested in mortgage-backed securities. At the same time, banks became 
increasingly unwilling to provide funds to counterparties in the interbank market 
owing to concerns about their creditworthiness. These two phenomena led to a 
hoarding of liquidity and weak activity in the interbank market. An indicator of 
these difficulties was the spread between the interbank rate, which is unsecured, 
and the overnight swap rate, which is only subject to a minimum amount of 
counterparty risk. After remaining very close to zero for years, these spreads rose 
to around 60 basis points for 12-month rates in the euro area, the United States 
and the United Kingdom (see Chart 19). 
The  first  consequence  of  the  turmoil  was  that  banks  that  had  lost  access  to 
liquidity  from  the  interbank  market  started  to  increasingly  rely  on  liquidity 
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from  the  Eurosystem  and  notably  to  frontload  the  fulfilment  of  the  reserve 
requirement  at  the  beginning  of  the  maintenance  period.  The  Eurosystem’s 
reaction over the rest of the year and until the collapse of Lehman Brothers was 
to satisfy the increase in demand for liquidity, while keeping the overall policy 
stance unchanged. Significant changes were therefore decided in the timing and 
maturity of open market operations, so as to continue steering aggregate liquidity 
conditions in a way which supported banks’ liquidity management process.
The distinction between monetary policy decisions and liquidity operations has 
been characterised by the ECB as a “separation principle” (see, for example, 
ECB (2008)). The separation principle can be understood in the context of the 
traditional analysis of Poole (1970), according to which stabilising the short-term 
interest rate in the face of purely financial shocks is the best way to insulate the 
real economy from the effects of those shocks. Poole’s analysis is obviously 
merely  illustrative,  since  it  is  based  on  a  backward-looking  model  and  also 
abstracts from the inflationary consequences of any shock. At the same time, 
the intuition for why the central bank should stabilise the short-term interest 
rate, rather than the supply of liquidity, in the face of high-frequency financial 
shocks appears relevant also in relation to the late 2007/early 2008 period of 
financial turmoil. If the ECB had not accommodated banks’ desire to frontload 
their reserve requirements, excess demand for central bank money would have 
driven the EONIA rate upwards at the beginning of the maintenance period, and 
downwards at the end. These fluctuations could have led to a de facto change in 
the policy stance – in spite of the Governing Council’s decision not to move the 
ECB interest rates – and thus induced undesired consequences on the economy.
The  separation  principle  could  also  be  understood  under  the  more  recent 
conceptual framework provided by Woodford (2003) and, with specific reference 
to the financial crisis, Cúrdia and Woodford (2010). These analyses suggest that 
the central bank should operate a corridor system and remunerate reserves at 
market interest rates – like the ECB does for required reserves – or at least at a 
constant spread below market rates – which is again consistent with the ECB’s 
approach for excess reserves. The remuneration of reserves has the advantage of 
eliminating (if the remuneration is at market rates), or making constant (if the 
remuneration is a constant spread below market rates) banks’ opportunity cost 
of holding reserves. Fluctuations owing to exogenous factors in banks’ needs 
for reserves can then be accommodated through corresponding changes in the 
demand for central bank liquidity without placing an additional burden on banks. 
Hence, liquidity policy can be implemented independently of monetary policy 
proper, i.e. without involving changes in the monetary policy stance.
From  the  perspective  of  both  Poole’s  and  Cúrdia  and  Woodford’s  analyses, 
the changes in the ECB’s liquidity policy in the second half of 2007 can be 
understood as shock absorbers, rather than as the desire to stimulate the economy 
in the face of an adverse shock. While clearly increasing the uncertainty of the 
economic outlook, the financial turmoil of the late 2007 and early 2008 period 
did not pose direct threats to the economy, provided that the risk of a “bank 
run”-type collapse of the banking sector resulting from a drying up of interbank 
liquidity could be avoided. 52 FAHR, MOTTO, ROSTAGNO, SMETS, TRISTANI
In  this  paper,  we  do  not  venture  into  a  detailed  discussion  of  money 
market  developments  (see  Cassola  et  al.  (2010)  for  an  in-depth  analysis 
of  the  latter).  Nevertheless,  recent  analyses  have  supported  the  view  that 
spreads  in  the  interbank  markets  were  initial  signals  of  a  type  of  bank  run   
(see Gorton (2009)). At the ECB, Heider et al. (2009) provide a model of how 
varying levels of counterparty risk, together with asymmetric information, can 
lead to the evaporation of liquidity in the unsecured interbank market. At high 
levels of risk, safer banks leave the unsecured market and trading occurs at a 
higher interest rate among higher risk-taking banks. When the dispersion of risk 
is particularly high, the interbank market may break down altogether, leading to 
multiple equilibria driven by self-fulfilling expectations. In these circumstances, 
the central bank can be thought of as acting as a “market maker of last resort”. It 
can offer to take on the excess liquidity and act as a counterparty for all liquidity 
transactions.  In  an  extreme  case,  the  central  bank  could  entirely  replace  the 
interbank market.
4.1.2 DEVELOPMENTS AFTER SEPTEMBER 2008
With the financial turmoil still ongoing, inflationary pressures in the euro area 
increased in the first half of 2008 leading to a climb in annual HICP inflation 
from 3.2% in January to 4% in June and July. While the US slowdown and the 
financial market turbulence kept the outlook particularly uncertain, there were 
clear risks that levels of inflation well above the ECB definition of price stability 
could begin affecting expectations of future wage and price levels. To ensure 
that long-term inflation expectations remained anchored, the Governing Council 
raised the ECB rates by 25 basis points in July.
As  of  15  September,  however,  the  financial  turbulence  intensified  following 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, leading to a renewed and unprecedented 
increase in interbank spreads (see Chart 19). The high levels, around 60 basis 
points, reached by the EURIBOR-OIS spreads at the end of 2007 were dwarfed 
by the new values of over 200 basis points, touched by the same spreads in 
September 2008. The overall level of macroeconomic uncertainty – as measured, 
for  example,  by  stochastic  volatility in  the  stock  market  –  also  increased  to 
unprecedented  levels.  In  a  few  weeks,  the  outlook  changed  dramatically.   
Euro area GDP contracted by 0.2% in the third quarter of 2008 (quarter on 
quarter) and by a further 1.5% in the fourth quarter. Annual HICP inflation fell to 
1.6% in December. By the turn of the year, a clear decline was also observed in 
the growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations. Overall, monetary trends 
supported the view that inflationary pressures were weakening further.
Against  the  background  of  this  worsening  outlook,  the  Governing  Council 
decided on a fast sequence of reductions in ECB interest rates, starting with a 
coordinated move with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Federal 
Reserve System, Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank on 8 October. 
In eight months, ECB rates fell by 325 basis points, so that the main refinancing 
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4.1.3 THE EXPANSION OF THE ECB BALANCE SHEET
At the same time, the worsening of the macroeconomic situation was accompanied 
by signals of increasing impairments in credit markets. Evidence from the ECB’s 
Bank  Lending  Survey  suggested  that  part  of  the  reduction  of  credit  to  the 
non-financial sector may have been due to supply constraints (see, for example, 
Ciccarelli et al. (2010)). While reducing interest rates, the Governing Council 
adopted non-standard measures to deal with the dysfunctional money market, 
relax  banks’  balance  sheet  constraints  and  facilitate  the  transmission  of  key 
ECB  interest  rates  to  bank  lending  rates.  First,  it  decided  on  a  temporary 
narrowing of the corridor formed by the rates on the standing facilities, thereby 
increasing the ECB’s role of market maker in the interbank market. Second, 
the  Governing  Council  introduced  additional  open-market  operations  at  one, 
three  and  six-month  horizons  to  cover  a  longer  maturity  spectrum  for  liquidity 
provision. Third, it announced full allotment at fixed rates in its tender operations. 
This led to a surge in demand from banks for central bank liquidity and, as a 
result, to a large increase in the ECB balance sheet (see Chart 20).
Additional  non-standard  measures  were  adopted  in  May  2009  –  when  the 
MRO rate reached the 1% level – to support the flow of credit to households 
and corporations. These included: the lengthening of the maximum maturity of 
refinancing operations to one year; the extension of the list of assets accepted as 
collateral; the provision of liquidity in foreign currency; and outright purchases 
in the covered bond market. These decisions, together with those adopted in 
October  2008,  configured  the  ECB’s  policy  of  “enhanced  credit  support”  in 
response to the financial crisis.
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The  measures  taken  under  the  enhanced  credit  support  umbrella  aimed  to 
overcome the financial market impairments which were constraining the process 
of credit creation in spite of the reduction in policy interest rates. As a result, 
the  ECB  succeeded  in  lowering  the  cost  of  financing  in  specific  financial 
market  segments.  Over  time,  conditions  in  the  money  market  stabilised  and 
funding uncertainty for banks abated. Chart 21 depicts the average remaining 
maturity  of  outstanding  liquidity  granted  through  the  main  and  longer-term 
refinancing  operations,  which  was  lengthened  from  around  30  days  before 
the first one-year long-term refinancing operation (LTRO) to 200 days during 
the  second  half  of  2009.  This  decision  was  instrumental  in  stabilising  the 
three-month EURIBOR-OIS spread at levels below those observed before the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. In addition, the announcement of the one-year 
LTRO at the Governing Council meeting of 7 May 2009 shifted the EONIA 
forward curve downwards and flattened it out up until the end of 2009 (see the 
EONIA curves of 5 May and 7 May 2009 in Chart 21). The implementation 
of  the  one-year  operation  at  the  end  of  June  2009  led  to  further  decreases 
in  EONIA  forward  rates  (see  the  EONIA  curve  of  9  July  2009).  While 
the  main  aim  of  the  one-year  LTROs  was  to  stabilise  the  banking  system 
by providing a stable funding environment, these operations also contributed 
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to  lower  expected  future  short-term  rates  up  to  one  and  a  half  years  ahead. 
Their effects therefore share similarities with policies of forward guidance and 
commitment recommended in the presence of the zero lower bound, even though 
the ECB did not explicitly commit to a path for its future policy rate. In contrast 
to forward guidance, though, the result of the longer-term liquidity operations 
affected only the short end of the yield curve.
In addition to the money market conditions, the covered bond programme led 
to a fall in yields in this market, which is important for banks’ financing needs. 
A more direct impact of the vast expansion of ECB liquidity which went along 
with the full allotment policy, especially after the lengthening of the maturity 
of LTROs to one year, was the persistent fall in the EONIA below the levels 
of the MRO rate. This fall was also facilitated by the decision in January 2009 
to widen the corridor formed by the rates on the standing facilities back to 2%: 
the corresponding 0.5% reduction in the rate on the deposit facility allowed for a 
further decrease in the EONIA rate.
Allowing for a persistent spread to open between the EONIA and the MRO rate – 
something unprecedented in the ECB’s history – was the approach followed by 
the ECB to deal with the segmentation which had, in the meantime, materialised 
in  the  banking  sector.  Only  some  of  the  banks  with  liquidity  needs  could 
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borrow funds from their counterparties at the EONIA rate; other banks were 
considered too risky and therefore forced to obtain refinancing directly from 
the ECB at the higher MRO rate. The spread between the EONIA and the MRO 
rate had two effects. On the one hand, the lower refinancing rate (the EONIA) 
available to banks with access to the overnight market could be expected to 
influence other money market segments and, ultimately, the rates on loans to the   
non-financial sector. On the other hand, the MRO refinancing rate available 
for banks with larger perceived exposures to illiquid assets – together with the 
extension of the list of assets accepted as collateral – could be interpreted as 
a standard application of the Bagehot principle. according to which, at times 
of crisis, the central bank should provide unlimited liquidity at a penalty rate. 
The unlimited provision of liquidity allowed solvent banks to overcome their 
liquidity problems, while the penalty at which they obtained central bank funds 
maintained their incentives to restructure their balance sheets. This policy also 
aimed to keep the risk of “zombie banks” (see Caballero et al. (2005)) operating 
in the euro area at a low level.
Overall, the ECB’s enhanced credit support policy has a distinct character from 
the “quantitative easing” policy introduced in Japan between 2001 and 2006. 
One key feature of the latter approach was the aim to increase the amount of 
excess reserves of commercial banks, primarily by buying government securities. 
By contrast, the ECB’s objective was to improve liquidity in market segments 
that were especially impaired. The increase in excess reserves was thus only 
a  by-product,  rather  than  the  primary  target,  of  the  ECB’s  enhanced  credit 
support. This also explains why government bonds purchases were not part of 
the programme.
A second key feature of quantitative easing was that it was only introduced after 
policy rates had reached levels very close to zero. Quantitative easing can thus 
be seen as a substitute for conventional policy easing, to be exploited only once 
there is no more room for manoeuvre in policy interest rates. By contrast, the 
ECB programme was rather a complement to standard policy easing. Standard 
and non-standard measures were in fact adopted in parallel, as of October 2008. 
Non-standard measures aimed to reinforce, rather than replace, the impact of 
the reductions of policy interest rates, whose effectiveness had been reduced by 
impairments in the financial market. 
The enhanced credit support programme was therefore independent of the level 
of the MRO rate: it could have been adopted, thus generating a large expansion 
of the ECB’s balance sheet, at any interest rate level. The possibility of creating 
large amounts of excess reserves at any level of the policy rates, and not only 
when they are zero, is a result of the ECB’s corridor system. This system makes 
the opportunity cost of excess reserves independent of the level of the MRO 
rate and only a function of the spread between the MRO rate and the rate on 
the deposit facility. As a result, lowering policy interest rates to zero is not a 
prerequisite for an expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet.
Some elements of the ECB’s enhanced credit support make it akin to the credit 
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objective of targeting specific segments of the financial market. At the same 
time,  there  are  differences  in  the  specific  implementation  of  this  objective. 
While the Federal Reserve intervened through direct lending to the non-financial 
sector, the ECB approach was, by and large, limited to improving liquidity in the 
banking sector. These differences simply reflect the differing financial structures 
of the euro area and the United States. The ECB focused on banks because, in 
the euro area, banks are the primary source of financing for the real economy.   
The bulk of external financing of non-financial corporations comes from the 
banking  sector,  which  is  especially  important  for  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises.
Another  distinguishing  feature  of  the  enhanced  credit  support  programme, 
compared  with  the  Federal  Reserve’s  credit  easing,  is  that  most  operations 
carried  out  in  the  context  of  the  ECB  programme  have  been  conducted  as 
repurchase  transactions.  These  operations  facilitate  the  “phasing  out”  of   
non-standard measures because they can easily be terminated if they are not 
renewed upon maturity.
Since  the  crisis,  new  frameworks  have  been  put  forward  to  understand 
developments during 2008 and 2009 and to help devise the best policy response 
(see Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Curdia and Woodford (2010)). By and 
large, these analyses conclude that non-standard monetary policy measures were 
warranted, since they addressed the inefficient intensification of credit market 
frictions.
For  example,  in  the  Gertler  and  Kiyotaki  (2010)  framework,  the  ECB’s 
expansion of liquidity can be understood as a means to support the provision   
of  credit  to  the  economy  through  the  relaxation  of  a  liquidity  constraint  for   
some  banks.  In  that  framework,  banks  willing  to  lend  may  be  unable  to  do 
so  owing  both  to  the  deterioration  of  their  own  balance  sheet  and  to  the 
segmentation  of  the  interbank  market.  Central  bank  intervention  through  the 
provision of liquidity is then warranted, provided that the central bank has an 
advantage, with respect to other commercial banks, in ensuring that the funds 
will be used for productive purposes. Then banks that have good investment 
opportunities, but are otherwise constrained, can benefit from the provision of 
central bank liquidity, even at a penalty rate. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) report 
that, in their simple model, this policy has equivalent effects as the central bank 
lending directly to the private sector.
4.1.4 THE SECURITIES MARKETS PROGRAMME
Over the course of 2009 spreads in the money market began to gradually decline 
and overall financial market conditions started showing signs of stabilisation. 
The ECB therefore announced in December 2009 that non-standard measures 
would begin to be gradually phased out, alongside the normalisation of financial 
markets. The phasing-out began with the discontinuation of one-year longer-term 
operations. In March 2010 the return to a variable rate tender procedure in the 
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In early 2010, however, new tensions emerged in euro area government bond 
markets. Market concerns about the sustainability of public finances in some 
euro area countries led to the increase in spreads between ten-year government 
bonds of those countries relative to German bonds. Once again, some secondary 
markets dried up. The tensions increased in April and early May 2010 and, on 
9 and 10 May, euro area governments announced a comprehensive package of 
measures, including the set-up of a European Financial Stability Facility, to react 
to the new financial market tensions.
On 10 May the ECB announced the launch of the Securities Markets Programme. 
Under  the  programme,  targeted  to  overcome  the  new  market  impairments,   
the Eurosystem can intervene in the euro area public and private debt securities 
markets to ensure depth and liquidity in dysfunctional market segments and to 
restore the proper functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
All purchases are fully sterilised by conducting liquidity-absorbing operations. 
In addition, in order to avoid spillovers from domestic sovereign bond markets 
to other financial markets, the ECB reintroduced the fixed rate tender procedure 
with  full  allotment  for  the  three-month  operations  and  conducted  a  new   
six-month  refinancing  operation  with  full  allotment.  The  temporary  liquidity 
swap lines with the Federal Reserve System were also resumed.
The Securities Markets Programme appears to have been temporarily effective in 
reducing the risks of contagion across euro area government bond markets. 
5  CONCLUSION
The  financial  crisis  has  led  to  a  rethinking  of  monetary  policy  frameworks.   
In this paper, we investigate some features of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy 
and  the  ECB’s  monetary  policy  response  to  the  financial  crisis  against  the 
background of economic and financial developments in the euro area over the 
last 15 years. While the volatility of headline inflation and economic activity has 
increased quite dramatically over the past three crisis years, underlying inflation 
and medium-term inflation expectations have remained closely anchored to the 
ECB’s definition of price stability, even during the financial crisis. During the 
decade prior to the financial crisis, low and stable inflation and low volatility in 
economic activity co-existed with highly pro-cyclical asset prices and money and 
credit developments. The low real and nominal volatility and the falling external 
finance premia led to a secular rise in private debt, which itself contributed to the 
sharpness of the correction in the most recent recession. The strong anchoring 
of medium-term inflation expectations, on the other hand, helped to limit the 
consequences of the adverse financial shocks.
The boom-bust nature of the financial system over the past 15 years and the 
high cost of the recent financial crisis have challenged the so-called Jackson 
Hole consensus that central banks should only react to asset prices and financial 
imbalances to the extent that they affect the short-term inflation forecast. Using 
the fully-specified structural model of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010), 
we investigate this proposition. As argued by Christiano et al. (2010b), supply 59 LESSONS FOR MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES FROM THE RECENT PAST
developments  complicate  the  appropriate  setting  of  monetary  policy  because 
they typically require a pro-cyclical rise in the equilibrium real interest rate at a 
time when price developments point in the opposite direction. A second lesson is 
that monetary policy strategies should allow for an enhanced role of the analysis 
of money and credit developments. One important remaining issue is how a 
monetary policy that leans against financial imbalances interacts with macro-
prudential policies.
The great recession led to an unprecedented use of non-standard monetary policy 
tools. In this paper, we discuss some of the non-standard policy measures the 
ECB  took  to  address  the  malfunctioning  in  financial  markets.  The  measures 
taken  under  the  “enhanced  credit  support”  umbrella  aimed  to  overcome  the 
financial  market  impairments  which  were  constraining  the  process  of  credit 
creation in spite of the reduction in policy interest rates. We put these measures 
in the context of the academic literature and conduct a preliminary assessment 
of their effectiveness. We argue that the ECB intervention – which, notably, did 
not include entering into commitments regarding the future path of the policy 
rate – was important to avoid disorderly deleveraging in the banking sector and 
instrumental in sustaining credit creation and averting downside risks to price 
stability. An important lesson from the financial crisis experience is therefore 
that, by taking on a financial intermediation role in markets that are impaired, 
central  banks  can  complement  their  more  traditional  interest  rate  policy  and 
ensure its proper transmission. These non-standard policies are quite different 
from policies of quantitative easing which typically aim to act as a substitute 
for  the  traditional  interest  rate  policy  in  an  environment  where  the  latter  is 
constrained by the lower bound. 
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ANNEX 
THE DSGE MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
The  DSGE  model  used  in  the  paper  to  interpret  the  data  and  carry  out 
counterfactual simulations is taken from CMR (2010). The CMR model builds 
on the DSGE model developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) 
and Smets and Wouters (2003) and is extended by including the credit market, 
bankruptcies, money holding decisions and a liquidity-creating banking sector. 
The presence of a profit-maximising banking sector extending credit, operating 
a fractional reserve system for the transformation of base money into deposits 
and issuing short-term securities to finance capital formation makes it possible to 
include a broad array of monetary aggregates and financial prices in the empirical 
analysis. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods on data spanning the 
1985-2008 period for the euro area. In the estimation, 16 variables are treated as 
observables, spanning from standard macroeconomic variables to monetary and 
financial variables such as the stock market, a measure of the external finance 
premium, credit, M1 and M3, the outstanding stock of refinancing operations 
with  the  Eurosystem,29  and  the  spread  between  the  ten-year  bond  rate  and 
the short-term interest rate. CMR (2010) shows that the model is capable of 
reproducing the dynamic correlations of macroeconomic, monetary and financial 
variables existing in the data, and to be competitive in terms of out-of-sample 
performance.
The size and composition of a bank’s balance sheet, which is in itself the result of 
business decisions by banks interacting with households’ and firms’ demand for 
banks’ assets and liabilities, can amplify or dampen macroeconomic fluctuations 
depending on the nature of shocks buffeting the economy. Another key finding 
is that shocks originating in the financial system and money-creating activities 
by banks can become an independent source of macroeconomic fluctuations. 
In particular, three shocks that alter conditions in credit and liquidity markets 
are found to be important. The first shock represents exogenous changes to the 
cross-sectional  dispersion  of  borrowers’  returns.  By  making  the  uncertainty 
about the borrowers’ worthiness vary over time, this shock plays an important 
role  in  generating  positive  correlation  between  economic  activity,  credit  and 
other  financial  variables.  The  second  shock  alters  directly  the  amount  of 
net  worth  at  the  disposal  of  borrowers.  Both  shocks  have  a  realised  and  an 
anticipated  “signal”  component.  In  each  period,  economic  agents  observe 
the present realisation and receive signals that update their perceptions of the 
future  evolution  of  these  shocks.  The  realised  and  anticipated  components 
have  different  macroeconomic  implications.  Anticipated  shocks  can  generate 
expected excess returns that rise (or decline) in a sustained manner over time. 
The process of updating expectations also means that new signals reinforce or 
counteract (depending on their sign) previously received signals. This sets in 
motion waves of accumulation and decumulation of capital, credit and money 
29  For the years 1985 to 1999, it uses an aggregation of bank reserves held with the central 
banks of Germany, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Finland, appropriately 
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that resemble typical economic fluctuations. The third type of shock originating 
within the financial and liquidity side of the economy is related to banks’ access 
to complementary forms of funding in the model: the issuance of checkable 
deposits included in M1, the issuance of other short-term deposits and marketable 
securities (M3-M1), and central bank refinancing. In particular, it is found that a 
shock changing banks’ desire for safe assets in the form of central bank liquidity 
exerted a significant downward impact on economic activity during the recent 
financial crisis. In the model, safe assets are held on banks’ balance sheets to 
withstand  unexpected  withdrawals  of  funds,  thereby  ensuring  continuity  in 
banking activity and productivity within the banking sector. Chart 22 provides 
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an illustration of the transmission mechanism of such a shock. A lower demand 
for liquidity buffers by banks generates increased balance sheet capacity and a 
greater scope for expanding loan supply. This exerts expansionary effects on real 
economic activity and upward pressure on inflation. This impulse is not triggered 
by central bank decisions to change the policy rate, but finds its source within 
banks’ funding activity itself.
COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS
Structural models can be used to construct policy scenarios and counterfactuals   
that  try  to  assess  the  impact  of  alternative  hypothetical  policy  actions. 
Counterfactuals centred around the financial crisis require models that can trace 
out the transmission mechanism of shocks originating in the financial sphere and 
that propagate to the rest of the economy. This is a further motivation for the use 
of the specific DSGE model described above. 
The counterfactuals are constructed by using a two-stage approach. In the first 
stage, the model is used as a filter (two-sided) to recover the underlying shocks in 
the sample. In case the sample period relevant for the analysis extends beyond the 
available historical data and includes a projection horizon, the historical data can 
be augmented by model-based conditional or unconditional forecasts, or simply 
by treating forecasts produced outside the model as if they were “data” in sample. 
Having obtained an estimate of the underlying shocks, in a second stage it is 
imposed that a given variable, e.g. the policy rate, follows a different path from 
the historical one. This amounts to carrying out a conditional forecast where the 
conditioning assumption is met by manipulating the relevant shock. The relevant 
shock is chosen according to the source of uncertainty that the counterfactual 
is  trying  to  understand.  Then,  the  time  series  of  all  shocks  that  have  been 
recovered in the first stage is kept unchanged, with the exception of the one for 
the relevant shock that is adjusted in order to meet the conditioning assumption.   
Finally, the model is used to trace out the implications of such an altered shock 
path for the other endogenous variables. Counterfactuals are generally carried 
out by assuming that the altered path of the shock materialises in an unexpected 
manner. This practice is followed in some of the counterfactuals presented in 
the  paper.  However,  the  paper  also  presents  some  simulations  based  on  the 
assumption that agents know in advance about the new path for the shock.67 MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY: LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines what we have learned about monetary policy strategy and 
considers how we should change our thinking in this regard in the aftermath of 
the 2007-09 financial crisis. It starts with a discussion of where the science of 
monetary policy stood before the crisis and how central banks viewed monetary 
policy strategy. It then examines how the crisis has changed the thinking of both 
macro/monetary economists and central bankers. Finally, it looks at the extent to 
which the science of monetary policy needs to be altered and draws implications 
for monetary policy strategy.
1  INTRODUCTION
Until August 2007, advances in monetary economics theory and in empirical 
work in the field had led both academic economists and policy-makers to argue 
that there was now a well-defined “science of monetary policy”. There was a 
general consensus among central banks about most elements of monetary policy 
strategy,  and  monetary  policy  was  perceived  as  being  highly  successful  in 
OECD countries, with not only low inflation but also low variability of inflation.   
In  addition,  output  volatility  had  declined  in  these  countries,  and  the  period 
from the early 1980s onwards was dubbed the “Great Moderation”. Monetary 
economists and central bankers were feeling pretty good about themselves. 
Then,  in  August  2007,  the  world  was  hit  by  what  Alan  Greenspan,  former 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, described in Congressional testimony 
as a “once-in-a-century credit tsunami”. The tsunami resulting from the 2007-09 
financial crisis not only flattened economic activity, producing the most severe 
worldwide economic contraction since the Great Depression, but also seemed to 
sweep away confidence in the ability of central bankers to successfully manage 
the economy. 
1  This paper was commissioned by the European Central Bank for its 6th ECB Central 
Banking Conference, Frankfurt, November 18-19, 2010. The views expressed here are my 
own and are not necessarily those of Columbia University, the National Bureau of Economic 
Research or the European Central Bank. I would like to thank Jean Boivin, Christopher 
Sims, Michael Woodford, Jean Pisani-Ferry and William White, as well as the participants 
of the brown bag lunch workshop held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the 
New York Area Workshop on Monetary Policy held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, and the 6th ECB Central Banking Conference for their helpful comments. Disclosure 
of my outside compensated activities can be found on my website at http://www0.gsb.
columbia.edu/faculty/fmishkin/. 68 MISHKIN
This paper examines what we have learned about monetary policy strategy and 
considers how we should change our thinking in this regard in the aftermath of 
the 2007-09 crisis. It starts with a discussion of where the science of monetary 
policy stood before the crisis and how central banks viewed monetary policy 
strategy. It then examines how the crisis has changed the thinking of both macro/
monetary economists and central bankers. Finally, it looks at what implications 
this change in thinking has had for monetary policy science and strategy. 
2  THE SCIENCE OF MONETARY POLICY BEFORE THE CRISIS
To  examine  the  state  of  monetary  policy  analysis  before  the  crisis  I  will 
draw heavily on a paper that I wrote just before the crisis began, which was 
presented  at  a  conference  at  the  Bundesbank  in  September  2007  (Mishkin 
(2009a)). In that paper I outlined nine basic scientific principles, derived from 
theory and empirical evidence, which guided thinking within almost all central 
banks. They are as follows: 1) inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon; 2) price stability has important benefits; 3) there is no long-run 
tradeoff between unemployment and inflation; 4) expectations play a crucial 
role in the determination of inflation and in the transmission of monetary policy 
to the macroeconomy; 5) real interest rates need to rise with higher inflation,   
i.e. the Taylor Principle; 6) monetary policy is subject to the time-inconsistency 
problem; 7) central bank independence helps improve the efficiency of monetary 
policy; 8) commitment to a strong nominal anchor is central to producing good 
monetary policy outcomes; and 9) financial frictions play an important role in 
business cycles. 
The first eight of these principles are elements of what has been dubbed the 
“new neoclassical synthesis” (Goodfriend and King (1997)), and before the crisis 
almost all academic economists and central bankers agreed with them. The last 
principle – that financial frictions play an important role in business cycles – was 
not explicitly a feature of models used for policy analysis in central banks, but it 
was well understood by many, although not all, central bankers. Because a key 
issue for this paper will be whether or not recent events overturn these principles, 
it is worth spending a fair amount of time understanding the theoretical and 
empirical basis for each of them.
NINE BASIC PRINCIPLES
1.    Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon
By the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of macroeconomists had reached a consensus 
with regard to macroeconomic fluctuations that downplayed the role of monetary 
factors. Much of this consensus reflected the aftermath of the Great Depression 
and Keynes’ seminal work The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Prices,  which  identified  shortfalls  in  aggregate  demand  as  the  source  of  the 
Great Depression and emphasised the role of fiscal policy as a possible remedy.   
In contrast, in their research Milton Friedman and others, in what became known 
as the “monetarist” tradition (Friedman and Meiselman (1963); Friedman and 
Schwartz  (1963a,  1963b)),  attributed  much  of  the  economic  malaise  of  the 69 MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY: LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS
Depression to poor monetary policy decisions, and more generally argued that 
the growth in the money supply was a key determinant of aggregate economic 
activity and, particularly, inflation. Over time, this research, together with 
Friedman’s predictions that expansionary monetary policy in the 1960s would 
lead to high inflation and high interest rates (Friedman (1968)), had a major impact 
on the economics profession, with almost all economists eventually coming to 
agree with Friedman’s famous adage that “inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon” (Friedman (1963)), provided that by inflation we mean 
a sustained increase in the price level (e.g. Mishkin (2010a)).2
This general agreement with Friedman’s adage did not mean that all economists 
subscribed to the view that money growth was the most informative piece of 
information about inflation, but rather that the ultimate source of inflation was 
overly expansionary monetary policy. In particular, an important manifestation 
of this line of thought was that central bankers came to recognise that keeping 
inflation under control was their responsibility. 
2.  Price stability has important benefits
With the rise of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, economists, and also 
the public and politicians, began to discuss the high costs of inflation (for 
example, see the surveys in Fischer (1993) and in Anderson and Gruen (1995)). 
High inflation undermines the role of money as a medium of exchange by acting 
as a tax on cash holdings. On top of this, a high-inflation environment leads to 
overinvestment in the financial sector, which expands to help individuals and 
businesses escape some of the costs of inflation (English (1996)). Inflation leads 
to uncertainty about relative prices and the future price level, making it harder 
for firms and individuals to make appropriate decisions, thereby decreasing 
economic efficiency (Lucas (1972); Briault (1995)). The interaction between the 
tax system and inflation also increases distortions that adversely affect economic 
activity (Feldstein (1997)). Unanticipated inflation causes redistributions of 
wealth, and, to the extent that high inflation tends to be associated with volatile 
inflation, these distortions can raise the costs of borrowing. Finally, some 
households undoubtedly do not fully understand the implications of a general 
trend in prices – that is, they may suffer from nominal illusion – making financial 
2  Although inflation can be characterised as a monetary phenomenon, it is crucial to recognise 
that fiscal policy can drive monetary policy if there is fiscal dominance, that is, if government 
budget deficits get so large that they force monetary authorities to expand the money supply 
to pay for government spending. Monetary authorities are only able to keep inflation under 
control if governments pursue responsible fiscal policy so that fiscal dominance does not 
occur. The usual view is that fiscal dominance is rarely a feature of advanced countries and 
instead is limited to developing countries. However, the recent massive government budget 
deficits in advanced countries and the reluctance of politicians in these countries to rein in 
future entitlements may indicate that fiscal dominance is now a danger even for advanced 
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planning more difficult.3 The total effect of these distortions came to be more 
fully appreciated over the course of the 1970s, and the recognition of the high 
costs of inflation led to the view that low and stable inflation can increase the 
level of resources productively employed in the economy.4, 5 
3.There is no long-run tradeoff between unemployment 
and inflation
A paper published in 1960 by Samuelson and Solow (1960) argued that research 
by Phillips (1958), which resulted in what became known as the Phillips curve, 
pointed towards a long-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation and 
that this tradeoff should be exploited. Acting in accordance with this view, the 
policymaker would have to choose between two competing goals – inflation and 
unemployment – and decide how high an inflation rate he or she would be willing 
to accept to attain a lower unemployment rate. Indeed, Samuelson and Solow 
even mentioned that a non-perfectionist’s goal of a 3% unemployment rate could 
be achieved alongside what they considered to be a not-too-high inflation rate 
of 4% to 5% per year. This thinking was influential, and probably contributed 
to  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  activism  aimed  at  bringing  the  economy  to 
levels of employment that, with hindsight, were not sustainable. In fact, the 
economic record for the late 1960s and the 1970s was not a happy one: inflation 
accelerated, with the inflation rate in the United States and other industrialised 
countries eventually climbing above 10% in the 1970s, leading to what has been 
dubbed “The Great Inflation.”
The tradeoff suggested by Samuelson and Solow was hotly contested by Friedman 
(1968) and Phelps (1968), who independently argued that there was no long-run 
tradeoff  between  unemployment  and  the  inflation  rate:  rather,  the  economy 
would gravitate to a natural rate of unemployment in the long run, no matter 
what the rate of inflation was. In other words, the long-run Phillips curve would 
be vertical, and attempts to lower unemployment below the natural rate would 
result only in higher inflation. The Friedman-Phelps natural rate hypothesis was 
immediately influential and fairly quickly began to be incorporated into formal 
econometric models.
3  Of  course,  economic  theory  implies  that  inflation  can  be  either  too  high  or  too  low.   
The discussion has emphasised costs associated with high inflation. But there are also 
potentially important costs associated with rates of inflation that are very low. For example, 
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) suggest that downward nominal wage rigidity could result 
in severe difficulties for economic performance at times when inflation is too low. Other 
research has shown that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can lower economic 
efficiency if inflation is too low (e.g. Reifschneider and Williams (2000)). Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) discuss strategies to address the zero lower bound problem.
4  A further possibility is that low inflation may even help increase the rate of economic 
growth. While time-series studies of individual countries and cross-national comparisons of 
growth rates were not in total agreement (Anderson and Gruen (1995)), the consensus grew 
that inflation is detrimental to economic growth, particularly when inflation rates are high.
5  The deleterious effects of inflation on economic efficiency imply that the level of sustainable 
employment is probably lower at higher rates of inflation. Thus, the goals of price stability 
and a high employment rate are likely to be complementary, rather than competing, and so 
there is no policy tradeoff between the goals of price stability and maximum sustainable 
employment,  the  so-called  dual  mandate  that  the  Federal  Reserve  has  been  given  by 
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Given the probable role that the attempt to exploit a long-run Phillips curve 
tradeoff had in the “Great Inflation”, central bankers now adopted the natural 
rate,  or  no-long-run-tradeoff,  view.  Of  course,  my  earlier  discussion  of  the 
benefits of price stability suggests a long-run tradeoff, but not of the Phillips 
curve type. Rather, low inflation is likely to contribute to improved efficiency 
and hence higher employment in the long run.
4.  Expectations play a crucial role in the macroeconomy
A key assertion of the Friedman-Phelps natural rate hypothesis was that while 
sustained inflation may initially confuse firms and households, in the long run 
it does not boost employment because expectations of inflation adjust to any 
sustained rate of increase in prices. From the early 1970s onwards, the rational 
expectations revolution, which began with a series of papers by Lucas (1972, 
1973, and 1976), took this reasoning a step further and demonstrated that the 
expectations of the public and the markets with regard to policy actions have 
important effects on almost every sector of the economy.6 The theory of rational 
expectations assumed that economic agents are driven by optimising behaviour, 
and therefore their expectations of future variables are optimal forecasts (the best 
guess of the future), using all available information. The optimising behaviour 
posited by the theory of rational expectations indicates that expectations should 
respond immediately to new information, and the theory therefore suggests that 
the long run might be quite short, so that attempting to lower unemployment 
below the natural rate could lead to higher inflation very quickly. 
A fundamental insight of the rational expectations revolution is that expectations 
about  future  monetary  policy  have  an  important  impact  on  the  evolution  of 
economic  activity.  As  a  result,  the  systematic  component  of  policy-makers’ 
actions – i.e., the component that can be anticipated – plays a crucial role in 
the conduct of monetary policy. Indeed, the management of expectations about 
future policy has become a central element of monetary theory, as emphasised 
in the recent synthesis by Woodford (2003).7 And this insight has far-reaching 
implications, for example with regard to which types of systematic behaviour on 
the part of policy-makers are likely to be conducive to macroeconomic stability 
and growth.8
6  The 1976 Lucas paper was already very influential in 1973, when it was first presented at 
the Carnegie-Rochester Conference. Note that although Muth (1961) introduced the idea 
of rational expectations more than ten years earlier, his work went largely unnoticed until 
resurrected by Lucas.
7  Indeed, one implication of rational expectations in a world of flexible wages and prices 
was the policy ineffectiveness proposition, which indicated that if monetary policy was 
anticipated, it would have no real effect on output; only unanticipated monetary policy could 
have a significant impact. Although evidence for the policy ineffectiveness proposition 
turned out to be weak (Barro (1977); Mishkin (1982a, 1982b, 1983)), the theory arising 
from the rational expectations revolution that monetary policy’s impact on the economy is 
substantially influenced by whether it is anticipated or not has become widely accepted.
8  Of course, the recognition that management of expectations is a central element in monetary 
policy-making brings to the forefront the credibility of monetary policy authorities as regards 
doing what they say they will do. It does not diminish, however, the importance of actions by 
the monetary authorities, because “actions speak louder than words”: monetary authorities 
will be believed only if they take actions consistent with how they want expectations to be 
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5. The Taylor Principle is necessary for price stability
The recognition that economic outcomes depend on expectations of monetary 
policy suggests that policy evaluation requires a comparison of how the economy 
performs  under  different  monetary  policy  rules.9  One  type  of  rule  that  has 
received enormous attention in economic literature is the Taylor rule (Taylor 
(1993)),  which  describes  monetary  policy  as  setting  an  overnight  bank  rate 
(federal funds rate in the United States) in response to the deviation of inflation 
from its desired level or target (the inflation gap) and the deviation of output from 
its natural rate level (the output gap).10 Taylor emphasised that a rule of this type 
had desirable properties and that it would stabilise inflation only if the coefficient 
on the inflation gap exceeded unity. This conclusion came to be known as the 
“Taylor principle” (Woodford (2001)) and can be described most simply by 
saying that a stabilising monetary policy must raise the nominal interest rate 
by more than the rise in inflation. In other words, inflation will remain under 
control only if real interest rates rise in response to a rise in inflation. Although 
the Taylor principle now seems pretty obvious, estimates of Taylor rules, such 
as those by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), indicate that during the late 1960s 
and 1970s many central banks, including the Federal Reserve, violated the Taylor 
principle, resulting in the “Great Inflation” that so many countries experienced 
during this period.11 Indeed, as inflation rose in the United States, real interest 
rates fell.12 
6.    The time-inconsistency problem is relevant to monetary policy 
Another important development in the science of monetary policy that emanated 
from the rational expectations revolution was the discovery of the importance of 
the time-inconsistency problem in papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo 
(1978), and Barro and Gordon (1983). The time-inconsistency problem can arise 
if monetary policy conducted on a discretionary, day-by-day basis leads to worse 
long-run outcomes than could be achieved by committing to a policy rule. In 
particular, policy-makers may find it tempting to exploit a short-run Phillips curve 
tradeoff between inflation and employment; but private agents, cognisant of this 
temptation, will adjust their expectations to anticipate the expansionary policy, so 
that it will result only in higher inflation with no short-run increase in employment. 
In other words, without a commitment mechanism, monetary policy-makers may 
find themselves unable to consistently follow an optimal plan over time; an optimal 
plan can be time-inconsistent and therefore could be soon abandoned. The notion 
of time-inconsistency has led to a number of important insights regarding central 
bank behaviour, such as the importance of reputation (formalised in the concept of 
reputational equilibria) and of institutional design.
9  Although Lucas’ paper (1976) was a critique of the then-current practice of using econometric 
models to evaluate specific policy actions, it leads to the conclusion that monetary policy 
analysis should involve a comparison of how the economy performs under different rules.
10  Variants of the Taylor rule also allow for interest rate smoothing, as in Taylor (1999).
11  In contrast, Orphanides (2003) argues that the Federal Reserve did abide by the Taylor 
principle, but pursued overly expansionary policies during this period as a result of large and 
persistent misperceptions of the potential output level and the natural unemployment rate.
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7.    Central bank independence improves macroeconomic 
performance
The potential problem of time-inconsistency has led to a great deal of research 
into the importance of institutional features that can give central bankers the 
commitment mechanisms they need to pursue low inflation. Perhaps the most 
significant findings are those showing that central bank independence, at least 
in some respects, is likely to be very important in maintaining low inflation. 
Allowing  central  banks  to  be  instrument-independent,  i.e.  allowing  them  to 
control the setting of monetary policy instruments, can help insulate them from 
short-run pressures to exploit the Phillips curve tradeoff between employment 
and inflation, and thus avoid the time-inconsistency problem.13
Evidence  supports  the  conjecture  that  macroeconomic  performance  improves 
when central banks are more independent. When central banks in industrialised 
countries are ranked from least legally independent to most legally independent, 
the inflation performance is found to be the best for countries with the most 
independent central banks (Alesina and Summers (1993); Cukierman (1993); 
Fischer (1994); and the surveys in Forder (2000) and Cukierman (2006)).14
Although there is a strong case for instrument independence, the same is not true 
for goal independence, i.e. the ability of the central bank to set its own goals for 
monetary policy.15 In a democracy, the public exercises control over government 
ctions, and policy-makers are accountable – a situation that requires the goals of 
monetary policy to be set by the elected government. Although basic democratic 
principles dictate that the government should set the goals of monetary policy, 
the question of whether it should set goals for the short-run or intermediate-run 
is more controversial. For example, an arrangement in which the government 
sets a short-run inflation or exchange rate target that is changed every month 
or every quarter could easily lead to a serious time-inconsistency problem in 
which short-run objectives would dominate. In practice, however, this problem 
does not appear to be severe, because, for example, in many countries in which 
the government sets the annual inflation target, the target is rarely changed once 
13  For an example of how the time-inconsistency problem can be modelled as arising resulting 
from political pressure, see Mishkin and Westelius (2008). Instrument independence also 
insulates the central bank from the myopia that can be a feature of the political process. 
Instrument independence thus makes it more likely for the central bank to be forward-
looking and to adequately allow for the long lags between monetary policy actions and 
inflation in setting their policy instruments.
14  A case study constituting a striking example of the benefits of instrument independence 
is provided by the granting of instrument independence to the Bank of England in May 
1997 (Mishkin and Posen (1997); Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999)); before 
that date, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the finance minister) set the monetary policy 
instrument, not the Bank of England. During 1995 and 1996 the UK retail inflation rate 
(RPIX) was fairly close to 3%, but the spread between nominal and indexed bond yields – 
referred to as 10-year breakeven inflation – was substantially higher, in the range of 4% 
to 5%, reflecting investors’ inflation expectations as well as compensation for perceived 
inflation risk at a 10-year horizon. Notably, breakeven inflation declined markedly on the 
day that the government announced the Bank of England’s independence and has remained 
substantially lower ever since. 
15  The distinction between goal and instrument independence was first made by Debelle and 
Fischer (1994) and Fischer (1994).74 MISHKIN
price stability is achieved. Even though, in theory, governments could manipulate 
monetary policy goals to pursue short-run objectives, they usually do not if the 
goal-setting process is highly transparent. 
However,  the  length  of  the  lags  between  monetary  policy  and  inflation  is  a 
technical  issue  that  the  central  bank  is  well-placed  to  determine.  Thus,  for 
example, deciding how long it should take for inflation to return to a long-run 
goal necessarily requires judgement and expertise regarding the nature of the 
inflation process and its interaction with real activity. That need for judgement 
and expertise constitutes support for having the central bank set medium-term 
goals, because the speed with which it can achieve them depends on the lags 
of  monetary  policy.  Whether  the  central  bank  or  the  government  should  set 
medium-term inflation targets is therefore an open question.
8.    Credible commitment to a nominal anchor promotes price  
and output stability
The  inability  of  monetary  policy  to  boost  employment  in  the  long  run,   
the  importance  of  expectations,  the  benefits  of  price  stability,  and  the  time-
inconsistency problem are the reasons why a credible commitment to a nominal 
anchor – i.e. the stabilisation of a nominal variable such as the inflation rate, the 
money supply, or an exchange rate – is crucial to successful monetary policy 
outcomes. 
An institutional commitment to price stability via the establishing of a nominal 
anchor  provides  a  counterbalance  to  the  time-inconsistency  problem  because  it 
makes it clear that the central bank must focus on the long-run and thus resist 
the  temptation  to  pursue  short-run  expansionary  policies  that  are  inconsistent 
with the nominal anchor. Commitment to a nominal anchor can also encourage 
governments to be more fiscally responsible, which also supports price stability. 
For example, persistent fiscal imbalances have, in the absence of a strong nominal 
anchor, led some governments, particularly in less-developed economies, to resort 
to the so-called inflation tax, i.e. the issuing/printing of money to pay for goods and 
services, which leads to more inflation and is thus inconsistent with price stability.
Commitment  to  a  nominal  anchor  also  leads  to  policy  actions  that  promote 
price  stability,  which  helps  promote  economic  efficiency  and  growth.   
A credible commitment to a nominal anchor helps stabilise inflation expectations, 
which reduces the likelihood of “inflation scares”, in which expected inflation 
and interest rates shoot up (Goodfriend (1993)). Inflation scares lead to bad 
economic outcomes because the rise in inflation expectations leads not only to 
higher actual inflation but also to monetary policy tightening to get inflation 
back under control, which often results in large declines in economic activity. 
A credible commitment to a nominal anchor is therefore a crucial element in 
the successful management of expectations; and it is a key feature of the new 
neoclassical synthesis (Goodfriend and King (1997); Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999); Woodford (2003)). A successful commitment to a nominal anchor has 
been found to produce not only more-stable inflation, but also lower volatility of 
output fluctuations (Fatás, Mihov and Rose (2007); Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 
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Commitment to a nominal anchor can also help stabilise output and employment. 
Specifically, to counter a contractionary demand shock, the monetary authorities’ 
response may be to reduce the short-run nominal interest rate; however, the 
effectiveness  of  such  a  policy  action  may  be  hindered  if  long-run  inflation 
expectations are not firmly anchored. For example, should the private sector 
become less certain about the longer-run inflation outlook, then an increase in 
the inflation risk premium could boost longer-term interest rates by more than 
the increase in expected inflation. A higher inflation risk premium would place 
upward pressure on the real costs of long-term financing for households and 
businesses (whose debt contracts are almost always expressed in nominal terms) 
and hence could partially offset the direct monetary stimulus. Thus, a central 
bank commitment that firmly anchors long-run inflation expectations can make 
an important contribution to the effectiveness of the central bank’s actions aimed 
at stabilising economic activity in the face of adverse demand shocks. 
9.    Financial frictions play an important role in the business cycle
Research  outlining  how  asymmetric  information  could  impede  the  efficient 
functioning of the financial system (Akerlof (1970); Myers and Majluf (1984); 
Greenwald,  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1984))  suggests  an  important  link  between 
business cycle fluctuations and financial frictions. When shocks to the financial 
system  increase  information  asymmetry  and  thereby  dramatically  increase 
financial frictions, it gives rise to financial instability, and to the financial system 
no  longer  being  able  to  channel  funds  to  those  with  productive  investment 
opportunities. This can result in the economy experiencing a severe economic 
downturn (Mishkin (1997)). The rediscovery years later of Fisher’s paper on the 
Great Depression (1933) led to the recognition that financial instability played 
a central role in the collapse of economic activity during that period (Mishkin 
(1978); Bernanke (1983); and the survey in Calomiris (1993)), and it spawned 
a large amount of literature on the role of financial frictions in business cycle 
fluctuations  (e.g.  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1999,  2001);  Bernanke,  Gertler  and 
Gilchrist (1999); Kashyap and Stein (1994)). Empirical evidence also strongly 
supported the proposition that the most severe business cycle downturns are 
always associated with financial instability, not only in advanced countries but 
also in emerging market countries (Mishkin (1991, 1996)). 
Even before the crisis, most central bankers understood that financial disruptions 
could be very damaging to the economy, and this explains the extraordinary 
actions that central banks took during the crisis to shore up financial markets 
(Mishkin (2011)). However, the macroeconomic models used for forecasting 
and policy analysis, whether they were dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models or more traditional macroeconometric models such as FRBUS, 
which is used at the Federal Reserve, did not allow for the impact of financial 
frictions and disruptions on economic activity.
2.1   THEORY OF OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 
The theory of optimal monetary policy starts by specifying an objective function 
that represents economic welfare, that is, the well-being of households in the 
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provided  by  a  model  of  the  economy.  Before  the  crisis,  both  the  objective 
function and the model of the economy were based on the principles of the new 
neoclassical synthesis. 
2.1.1  OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
Standard  descriptions  of  the  central  bank’s  objective  function  have  been 
expressed in terms of two components (e.g. Svensson (1997); Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (1999); Woodford (2003)). The benefits of price stability (principle 2) 
are reflected in the first component, which involves minimising the deviations 
of inflation from its optimal rate, which most central bankers take to be around 
the 2% level. The second component reflects the costs of underutilised resources 
in  the  economy  and  involves  minimising  the  deviations  of  real  economic 
activity from its natural rate level, which is the efficient level determined by the 
productive potential of the economy. Because expectations about the future play 
a central role in the determination of inflation and in the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy (principle 4), in order to achieve an optimal monetary policy 
the intertemporal nature of economic welfare must be taken into account, and the 
objectives both for the present state of the economy and for the expected path in 
future periods maximised. Given that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and 
is thus viewed as controllable by monetary policy (principle 1), the central bank 
sets its policy instruments (under normal circumstances, a short-term interest 
rate) to maximise the objective function, subject to the constraints.
2.1.2  CONSTRAINTS: THE MODEL
The constraints, as embodied in macroeconometric models in use at central banks 
before the crisis, also reflect the principles of the new neoclassical synthesis. 
These models display no long-run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation 
(principle 3). Expectations play a central role in household and business behaviour 
(principle  4)  and  lead  to  the  existence  of  the  time-inconsistency  problem 
(principle 5). The models also display the importance of a credible commitment 
to a strong nominal anchor in order to produce good monetary policy outcomes 
(principle  8),  and  this  requires  an  independent  central  bank  (principle  7).   
Because the transmission of monetary policy to the economy operates through 
the real interest rate, real interest rates have to rise in order to stabilise inflation 
(Taylor principle 5). 
2.1.3  LINEAR-QUADRATIC FRAMEWORK 
As  we  have  seen,  the  objective  function  and  the  model  (constraints)  used 
by  central  banks  before  the  crisis  reflected  all  eight  principles  of  the  new 
neoclassical synthesis. However, the approach to analysing optimal monetary 
policy used by central banks had an additional important feature: it made use of a 
linear-quadratic (LQ) framework, in which the equations describing the dynamic 
behaviour of the economy are linear – a basic feature of DSGE models – and the 
objective function specifying the goals of policy is quadratic. For example, the 
objective function was characterised as a loss function comprising the squared 
value of the inflation gap (that is, actual inflation minus desired inflation) and the 
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2.1.4  REPRESENTATIVE-AGENT FRAMEWORK 
The  models  also  contained  another  additional  feature:  a  representative-agent 
framework in which all agents are alike, thereby precluding the presence of 
financial frictions as the latter require agents to differ, particularly in the amount 
of information they have. With asymmetric information ruled out, the financial 
sector has no special role to play in economic fluctuations. Thus, although central 
bankers were aware of principle 9, i.e. that financial frictions could have an 
important effect on economic activity, financial frictions were not a key feature 
in the macroeconometric models used in central banks and were not an element 
of the pre-crisis theory of optimal monetary policy. 
3  MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY BEFORE THE CRISIS
The science of monetary policy described above had several implications for 
monetary policy strategy, some of which were generally agreed to by almost all 
central bankers and others of which were accepted by most, but not all, central 
bankers, but on which there was not a complete consensus. 
3.1  FLEXIBLE INFLATION TARGETING
The  monetary  policy  strategy  that  follows  from  the  eight  principles  of  the 
new neoclassical synthesis is referred to in the academic literature as “flexible 
inflation targeting” (Svensson (1997)). It involves a strong, credible commitment 
by the central bank to stabilising inflation in the long run, often at an explicit 
numerical level, but also allows for the central bank to pursue policies aimed at 
stabilising output around its natural rate level in the short run. 
The  phrase  “inflation  targeting”  to  describe  this  monetary  policy  strategy  is 
somewhat unfortunate. Although I would argue that almost all central banks in 
advanced economies that have an independent monetary policy follow the general 
principles of flexible inflation targeting, they do have very different approaches to 
the communication strategy surrounding it. Some of these central banks announce 
an explicit numerical inflation objective and treat it as a target – these are classified 
as fully fledged inflation targeters – while others are reluctant to be so explicit.
For example, the Federal Reserve has espoused a strong commitment to stabilising 
inflation, but has not been willing to announce an explicit inflation objective. Instead, 
the Federal Reserve reports on the individual Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) participants’ projections of inflation in the long run under “an appropriate 
monetary policy”. In effect, the Federal Reserve provides the long-run inflation 
objective for each FOMC participant, but has not required that the participants 
agree on a common objective for inflation. The Federal Reserve has therefore not 
yet adopted an agreed-upon inflation objective and so it is not classified as being in 
the inflation-targeting camp. On the other hand, the FOMC participants’ long-run 
inflation projections have all fallen within a pretty tight range – between 1 ½ and 
2% – and so they are not far from committing to a specific inflation objective: it 
would not require a vast degree of modification to their communication strategy to 
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In other cases, such as those of the European Central Bank and the Swiss National 
Bank, central banks have been willing to announce an explicit numerical inflation 
objective, but are reluctant to treat it as a target because they believe that this 
would not give them sufficient flexibility. They are unwilling to be classified as 
inflation targeters because they believe that the use of the word “target” might 
lead the public to expect them to hit the inflation targets too precisely or over too 
specific a horizon.
Despite these apparent differences in communication strategy, the basic approach 
of central banks with an independent monetary policy before the crisis was very 
similar. They adhered to the eight principles of the new neoclassical synthesis 
and were willing to conduct monetary policy under a strong commitment to 
stabilising inflation in the long run. Indeed, Svensson (2002) argues that any 
central bank that indicates that it will pursue the standard objective function, 
involving minimising both inflation and output gap in an intertemporal setting, is 
effectively a flexible inflation targeter. Before the crisis, almost all central banks 
with an independent monetary policy fell into this classification.
3.2  CERTAINTY EQUIVALENCE, GRADUALISM AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Under the assumptions of the linear-quadratic framework, the optimal policy is 
certainty equivalent: it can be characterised by a linear time-invariant response 
to each shock, and the magnitude of these responses does not depend on the 
variances or on any other aspect of the probability distribution of the shocks.   
In such an environment, optimal monetary policy does not focus on tail risk, 
which  might  require  risk  management.  Furthermore,  when  financial  market 
participants  and  wage  and  price  setters  are  relatively  forward-looking,  the 
optimal policy under commitment is characterised by considerable inertia, which 
is commonly referred to as gradualism.16 
Indeed, in the United States, as well as in many other industrial economies, the 
actual  course  of  monetary  policy  before  the  crisis  was  typically  very  smooth.   
For example, the Federal Reserve usually adjusted the federal funds rate in increments 
of 25 or 50 basis points (that is, ¼ or ½ percentage point) and sharp reversals in the 
funds rate path were rare. Numerous empirical studies have characterised monetary 
policy before the crisis using Taylor-style rules, in which the policy rate responds to 
the inflation gap and the output gap; these studies have generally found that the fit of 
the regression equation is improved by including a lagged interest rate that reflects 
the smoothness of the typical adjustment pattern.17 
Although in many ways central banks have conducted monetary policy under 
a  certainty  equivalence  strategy,  central  bankers  have  not  been  completely 
16  The now-classic reference on this approach is Woodford (2003). Also see Goodfriend and King 
(1997); Rotemberg and Woodford (1997); Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999); King and Wolman 
(1999); Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000); Benigno and Woodford (2003); Giannoni and 
Woodford (2005); Levin, Onatski and Williams (2005); and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005).
17  See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000); Sack (2000); English, Nelson and Sack (2003); 
Smets and Wouters (2003); Levin, Onatski and Williams (2005). Further discussion can be 
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comfortable  with  this  approach  to  monetary  policy.  While  a  linear-quadratic 
framework may provide a reasonable approximation of how optimal monetary 
policy operates under fairly normal circumstances, this approach is less likely to 
be adequate for the consideration of monetary policy when there is a risk, however 
small, of particularly poor economic performance. First, the dynamic behaviour of 
the economy may well exhibit nonlinearities, at least in response to some shocks 
(Hamilton  (1989);  Kim  and  Nelson  (1999);  Kim,  Morley  and  Piger  (2005)). 
Furthermore, the use of a quadratic objective function does not reflect the extent 
to which most individuals have a strong preference for minimising the incidence 
of  worst-case  scenarios.  Therefore,  given  the  central  bank’s  ultimate  goal  of 
maximising public welfare, there is a case to be made for monetary policy to reflect 
the public’s preference of avoiding particularly adverse economic outcomes. 
Their  discomfort  with  a  certainty  equivalence  approach  to  monetary  policy 
led central bankers to exposit a “risk management” approach to the conduct of 
monetary policy, even before the crisis. Alan Greenspan indeed described his 
thinking about monetary policy as exactly such an approach (Greenspan (2003)), 
although he was not very explicit about what this meant. However, it is clear that 
even before the crisis, central bankers were aware that they had to worry about 
risks of very bad economic outcomes. Specifically, they were aware that in some 
circumstances  the  shocks  hitting  the  economy  might  exhibit  excess  kurtosis, 
commonly referred to as “tail risk”, in which the probability of relatively large 
disturbances is higher than would be implied by a Gaussian distribution. 
3.3  DICHOTOMY BETWEEN MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY POLICY
Even before the crisis, central bankers were aware that financial disruptions could 
have a serious negative impact on the economy. This is why many central banks 
not only issued reports on monetary policy, but also published Financial Stability 
Reports to discuss potential threats to the financial system. Nonetheless, the 
general equilibrium modelling frameworks at central banks did not incorporate 
financial frictions as a major source of business cycle fluctuations. This naturally 
led to a dichotomy between monetary policy and financial stability policy in 
which these two types of policies were conducted separately. Monetary policy 
instruments would focus on minimising inflation and output gaps. It would then 
be up to prudential regulation and supervision to prevent excessive risk-taking 
that could promote financial instability. 
Although  I  would  say  that  most  central  bankers  supported  the  dichotomy 
between monetary policy and financial stability policy, there were views that 
monetary policy should address financial stability issues, particularly as regards 
responding to potential asset price bubbles, as discussed below.
3.4  RESPONSE OF MONETARY POLICY TO ASSET PRICE BUBBLES: 
THE “LEAN” VERSUS “CLEAN” DEBATE
One active debate in central banks before the crisis focused on how central banks 
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element in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, the theory of optimal 
monetary policy requires that monetary policy responds to asset prices in order to 
obtain good outcomes in terms of inflation and output. Hence, the issue of how 
monetary policy might respond to asset price movements is not whether it should 
respond at all, but whether it should respond at a level over and above that called 
for in terms of the objectives of stabilising inflation and employment. Another way 
of defining the issue is whether monetary policy should try to pop, or slow, the 
growth of possibly-developing asset price bubbles in order to minimise damage 
to the economy when these bubbles burst. Alternatively, rather than responding 
directly to possible asset price bubbles, should the monetary authorities respond to 
asset price declines only after a bubble bursts, to stabilise both output and inflation? 
These opposing positions have been characterised as leaning against asset price 
bubbles versus cleaning up after the bubble bursts, and so the debate over what to 
do about asset price bubbles has been labelled the “lean versus clean” debate.
Even  before  the  crisis,  there  was  no  question  that  asset  price  bubbles  have 
negative effects on the economy. As Dupor (2005) emphasised, the departure 
of asset prices from fundamentals can lead to inappropriate investments that 
decrease the efficiency of  the economy. Furthermore, throughout  history  the 
bursting of bubbles has been followed by sharp declines in economic activity, as 
Kindleberger’s (1978) famous book demonstrated. 
Before  the  crisis,  the  clear-cut  dangers  of  asset  price  bubbles  led  some   
economists, both inside and outside central banks, to argue that central banks 
should at times “lean against the wind” by raising interest rates to stop bubbles 
from getting out of hand.18 They argued that raising interest rates to slow a 
bubble’s growth would produce better outcomes because it would either prevent 
the bubble or would result in a less severe bursting of the bubble, with far less 
damage to the economy. 
The  opposing  view  to  the  “leaning  against  the  wind”  view  that  asset  prices 
should have a special role in the conduct of monetary policy, over and above that 
implied by their foreseeable effect on inflation and employment, is often referred 
to as the “Greenspan doctrine”, because, when Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board, he strenuously argued that monetary policy should not try to lean against 
asset price bubbles, but rather should just clean up after they burst (Greenspan 
(2002)).19 There were several elements to this argument.
First, bubbles are hard to detect. In order to justify leaning against a bubble, 
a  central  bank  must  assume  that  it  can  identify  a  bubble  in  progress.   
18  See  Cecchetti  and  others  (2000).  The  Bank  for  International  Settlements  (BIS)  view,   
as represented by Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio, English and Filardo (2004), and White 
(2004), has been viewed as advocating leaning against asset-price bubbles, but the BIS 
view is far more nuanced. Instead it advocates leaning against financial imbalances, only 
one element of which was an asset-price boom. As we will see the case for leaning against 
financial market imbalances is far stronger than the case for leaning against asset-price 
bubbles and so characterizing the BIS position as advocating leaning against potential   
asset-price bubbles is misleading.
19  I was also a proponent of this view (Mishkin (2001a, 2007b)). 81 MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY: LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS
That assumption was viewed as highly dubious because it is hard to believe 
that the central bank has such an informational advantage over private markets. 
If the central bank has no informational advantage, and if it knows that a bubble 
has developed, the market will almost surely know this too, and the bubble will 
burst. Thus, any bubble that can be identified by the central bank would be 
unlikely ever to develop much further.
A second objection to leaning against bubbles was that raising interest rates 
may be very ineffective in restraining the bubble, given that market participants 
expect such high rates of return from buying bubble-driven assets.20 
A third objection was that there are many asset prices, and at any one time a 
bubble may be present in only a fraction of assets. Monetary policy actions are 
a very blunt instrument in such a case, as such actions are likely to affect asset 
prices in general, rather than solely those in a bubble.
Fourth, although some theoretical models suggested that raising interest rates 
could  diminish  the  acceleration  of  asset  prices,  others  suggested  that  raising 
interest rates could cause a bubble to burst more severely, thus doing even more 
damage  to  the  economy  (Bernanke,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1999);  Greenspan 
(2002); Gruen, Plumb and Stone (2005); Kohn (2006)). This view was supported 
by historical examples, such as the monetary tightening that occurred in 1928 and 
1929 in the United States and in 1989 in Japan, where the subsequent bursting 
of the bubble was followed by severe economic contractions.21 Another way 
of saying this is that bubbles are departures from normal behaviour, and it is 
unrealistic to expect that the usual tools of monetary policy will be effective in 
abnormal conditions. Attempts to prick bubbles were thus viewed as possibly 
violating the Hippocratic oath of “do no harm”.
Finally, there was a view that the monetary authorities have the tools to keep 
the harmful effects of a bursting bubble at a manageable level, as long as they 
respond in a timely fashion. This was held to be true even in the event of interest 
rates falling and approaching the zero lower bound, and so the conventional tool 
of lowering the policy interest rate would no longer be an option. The economy 
could be stimulated by either: 1) managing expectations in order that the policy 
rate be viewed as staying low for an extended period, thereby lowering long-
term interest rates; 2) lowering risk and term premiums by purchasing securities, 
and thereby changing their relative supply; or 3) by exchange rate interventions 
aimed at lowering the value of the domestic currency, which would increase 
foreign demand for domestic production.22 
One counterargument to this view was the disastrous experience of Japan after 
the  bursting  of  the  stock  market  and  real  estate  bubbles.  However,  as  Posen 
(2003) pointed out, the problem in Japan was not so much the bursting of the 
bubble as the subsequent policies. The imbalances in Japan’s banking sector were 
20  For example, see the discussion in Greenspan (2002).
21  For example, see Gruen, Plumb and Stone (2005), Hamilton (1987), Cargill, Hutchison and 
Ito (1995), Jinushi, Kuroki and Miyao (2000) and Posen (2003). 
22  E.g. see Svensson (2001), and Bernanke (2004).82 MISHKIN
not resolved, so they continued to get worse well after the bubble had burst. In 
addition, as pointed out in Ahearne and others (2002), the Bank of Japan did not 
ease monetary policy sufficiently or rapidly enough in the aftermath of the crisis.
The bottom line of the analysis behind the Greenspan doctrine was that the 
cost of leaning against asset price bubbles was likely to be high, while the cost 
of bursting bubbles could be kept low. Rather than advocating leaning against 
bubbles,  the  view  supported  an  approach  in  which  central  banks  just  clean 
up after the bubble. This approach was fully consistent with monetary policy 
focusing on stabilising inflation and employment without a special focus on asset 
price bubbles. 
Another argument against focusing on asset prices is that it could lead to public 
confusion regarding the objectives of such a policy. As reported in Giavazzi and 
Mishkin  (2006),  interviews  with  participants  from  different  sectors  of  Swedish 
society suggested that statements on house prices by Sveriges Riksbank confused the 
public and led to a general weakening of confidence in the Swedish central bank.
I  would  argue  that  the  Greenspan  doctrine,  which  was  strongly  supported  by 
Federal Reserve officials, held great sway in the central banking world before 
the crisis. However, there were dissenting voices. For example, over the course 
of  several  meetings  in  2004,  a  minority  of  members  of  the  Monetary  Policy 
Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England argued in favour of raising interest rates 
more than could be justified in terms of the Bank’s objectives for inflation over its 
normal policy horizon.23 According to the minutes of those meetings, the advocates 
believed that such a move would reduce the risk of high house-price appreciation 
and the rapid accumulation of household debt leading to an abrupt adjustment 
process, with serious negative consequences for the economy.24 Mervyn King, the 
Governor of the Bank of England, did not advocate leaning against the wind, but 
did suggest that to prevent a build-up of financial imbalances a central bank might 
extend the horizon over which inflation is brought back to target (King (2004a, 
2004b)). Statements from officials at the European Central Bank and other central 
banks also suggested that in the event of an asset boom or bust, a longer period than 
the usual one to two years might be required to assess whether the price stability 
goal was being met (Issing (2003a, 2003b); Stevens (2004); Selody and Wilkins 
(2004); Bank of Canada (2006); Rosenberg (2006)).
4  HOW HAS THE CRISIS CHANGED OUR THINKING?
The global financial crisis of 2007-09 was not only a tsunami that flattened the 
economy: in the eyes of some commentators it flattened the science of monetary 
policy, necessitating a total rethink. Armed with an understanding of where the 
science of monetary policy stood before the crisis, we can now consider which 
aspects of the events that unfolded during the crisis require us to modify our earlier 
23  Bank  of  England  (2004),  MPC  Minutes:  January,  p.  8;  March,  p.  9;  April,  p.  9;  and 
August, p. 9.
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analysis. From my reading of the crisis, there are five lessons that should change 
how we think about the science of monetary policy and monetary policy strategy.
1.    Developments in the financial sector have a far greater 
impact on economic activity than we  
previously realised
Although  central  bankers  generally  recognised  that  financial  frictions  could 
play  an  important  role  in  business  cycle  fluctuations,  the  2007-09  financial 
crisis made it clear that the adverse effects of financial disruptions on economic 
activity could be far worse than originally anticipated for advanced economies. 
When the financial crisis started in August 2007, central bank actions to contain 
it seemed to be working. Many central bank officials, although still concerned 
about the disruption to the financial markets, hoped that the worst was over 
and  that  the  financial  system  would  begin  to  recover  (see  Mishkin  (2011)).   
The subprime mortgage sector was after all only a small part of the overall capital 
market, and the losses in the subprime mortgage market, although substantial, 
still  seemed  manageable.  By  the  summer  of  2008,  central  banks  were  even 
turning their attention to the very high inflation rates at the time: for example, 
there  were  discussions  within  the  Federal  Reserve  as  to  whether  the  easing 
phase of monetary policy might have to be reversed in order to contain inflation   
(e.g. see Wessel (2009)).
But then came a set of shocks that sent the financial system and the economy 
over the cliff: the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on 15 September 2008, the AIG 
collapse on 16 September, the run on the Reserve Primary Fund on the same 
day, and the US Treasury’s struggle to get the TARP plan approved by US 
Congress over the following couple of weeks (Mishkin (2011)). The financial 
crisis  now  morphed  into  a  global  crisis,  causing  a  sharp  drop  in  economic 
activity in the United States – real GDP declined at an annual rate of -1.3% in 
the fourth quarter of 2008, -5.4% in the first quarter of 2009 and -6.4% in the 
second quarter of 2009 – but also in the rest of the world, with real GDP falling 
by -6.4% in the fourth quarter of 2008 and by -7.3% in the first quarter of 2009. 
The unemployment rate shot up to over 10% in the United States and in many 
other advanced economies, and it remained stubbornly high even after the world 
economy  started  to  recover.  The  worldwide  recession  that  resulted  from  the 
financial crisis turned out to be the most severe economic contraction since the 
worldwide depression of the 1930s. 
The  global  financial  crisis  of  2007-09  therefore  demonstrated  that  financial 
frictions  should  be  front  and  centre  in  macroeconomic  analysis:  they  could 
no longer be ignored in the macroeconometric models that central banks used 
for forecasting and policy analysis, as we saw was the case before the crisis.   
As a result of this, there has been a resurgence of interest in the interaction 
of finance and macroeconomics. Economists, both in academia and in central 
banks, are now actively trying to build financial frictions into their general 
equilibrium  models,  and  there  is  a  new  body  of  literature,  currently  in  its 
infancy, based on the exploration of how financial frictions would modify the 
prescriptions provided by the science of monetary policy.25
25  For example, see Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Curdia and Woodford (2009).84 MISHKIN
2.  The macroeconomy is highly nonlinear
Because economic downturns typically result in even greater uncertainty about 
asset  values,  such  episodes  may  involve  an  adverse  feedback  loop  whereby 
financial disruptions cause investment and consumer spending to decline, which, 
in turn, causes economic activity to contract. Such contraction then increases 
uncertainty about the value of assets, and, as a result, the financial disruption 
worsens. In turn, this development causes economic activity to contract further, 
in a perverse cycle.
The deterioration of balance sheets during a recession can also intensify problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard because it removes an important channel 
through which information asymmetries can be mitigated: the use of collateral. 
If a borrower defaults on a loan backed by collateral, the effects of the adverse 
selection problem are less severe because the lender can take title to the collateral 
and  thus  make  up  for  the  loss.  In  addition,  the  threat  of  losing  the  collateral 
gives  the  borrower  more  of  an  incentive  not  to  take  unmanageable  risks  that 
might ultimately lead to a default, and it thus reduces the moral hazard problem.   
These mechanisms work only as long as the collateral is of sufficient quality: during 
macroeconomic downturns, the value of collateral may fall, problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard again become central, and lenders become much less 
willing to lend. Again, these events can result in an adverse feedback loop.
The events following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy showed how nonlinear 
both the financial system and the macroeconomy could be. In the aftermath, the 
financial system seized up and both credit spreads (such as the Baa-Treasury 
or junk bond Treasury spreads) and liquidity spreads (such as the TED or the 
LIBOR-OIS spreads) shot up dramatically. The subsequent economic downturn, 
which saw the collapse of real GDP and world trade during the fourth quarter 
of 2008 and the first half of 2009, as mentioned above, also indicated that the 
macroeconomy can at times be highly nonlinear. 
The role of nonlinearities in the macroeconomy when there is a financial disruption 
implies an important flaw in the theory of optimal monetary policy that was in 
general use prior to the crisis: the theory of optimal monetary policy was based 
on the assumption that the macroeconomy can be described by linear dynamic 
equations. The financial crisis of 2007-09 demonstrated that although the linear-
quadratic framework may provide a reasonable approximation of how optimal 
monetary policy operates under fairly normal circumstances, this approach is not 
adequate for the consideration of monetary policy when financial disruptions hit the 
economy.26 Furthermore, the use of a quadratic objective function does not reflect 
the extent to which most individuals have a strong preference for minimising 
the incidence of worst-case scenarios, such as the one we have just experienced. 
Therefore, given that the central bank’s ultimate goal is the maximisation of public 
26  Even  before  the  crisis  there  was  some  research  which  recognised  that  the  dynamic 
behaviour of the economy could exhibit nonlinearities, at least in response to some shocks   
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welfare, the design of monetary policy should reflect the public’s preferences, 
especially with respect to avoiding particularly adverse economic outcomes. 
Most of the quantitative studies of optimal monetary policy have also assumed 
that  shocks  hitting  the  economy  have  a  time-invariant  Gaussian  distribution, 
that is, a classical bell curve with symmetric and well-behaved tails. In reality, 
however,  the  distribution  of  shocks  hitting  the  economy  is  more  complex.   
In some instances, the uncertainty facing the economy is clearly skewed in one 
direction or another; again, this is likely when there are significant financial 
disruptions. In addition, as we have seen with the recent crisis, shocks hitting the 
economy may exhibit excess kurtosis, that is, tail risk, because the probability 
of relatively large negative disturbances is higher than would be implied by a 
Gaussian distribution. 
3.    The zero lower bound is more problematic than we realised
As discussed earlier, before the crisis, central bankers recognised that the zero 
lower bound for nominal interest rates would require the use of non-conventional 
monetary policy in the event of a contractionary shock causing interest rates to 
fall toward zero. One view is that the zero lower bound problem is more serious 
than originally contemplated because non-conventional monetary policy was not 
that effective during the crisis. I disagree strongly with this view. 
The  shock  to  the  financial  system  resulting  from  the  global  financial  crisis 
was in many ways more complicated than the shock that produced the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, and yet the economic contraction turned out to be far 
less severe. One key factor that appreciably lessened the severity of the recent 
economic downturn was that monetary policy was very aggressive, and that it 
was effective.27 
Non-conventional  monetary  policy  took  four  forms:  1)  liquidity  provision 
in  which  central  banks  expanded  lending  to  both  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions; 2) asset purchases of both government securities and private assets 
to lower borrowing costs for households; 3) quantitative easing, in which central 
banks greatly expanded their balance sheets; and 4) management of expectations, 
which involved central banks committing to keeping their policy rate at very low 
levels for a long period of time.
In  evaluating  liquidity  provision,  some  research  argues  that  these  types  of 
programmes had little effect. Taylor and Williams (2009), for example, do not 
find that the actual lending from the Term Auction Facility (TAF) had any impact 
on easing credit markets. Other research challenges this conclusion by arguing 
that financial markets would react to the announcements of programmes rather 
than the actual lending, and that the dependent variable in the analysis should 
use changes in spreads and not levels. McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008) find 
that announcements about TAF did significantly lower credit spreads, and other 
research supports the conclusion that the TAF and other credit facilities helped 
lower  interest  rates  (Wu  (2008),  Christensen,  Lopez  and  Rudebusch  (2009), 
27  Not all economists would agree with this view, notably John Taylor (2009). 86 MISHKIN
and Sarkar and Shrader (2010)). Baba and Packer (2009), McAndrews (2009) 
and Goldberg, Kennedy and Miu (2010) find that the US dollar swap facilities 
did help improve the performance of the dollar swap markets. Using a similar 
event-study methodology, Ait-Sahalia et al. (2010) find that liquidity provision, 
not only in the United States but also in the United Kingdom and Japan, did help 
lower interbank risk premiums. This research suggests that liquidity provision 
did help stabilise financial markets during this crisis.
Research on the impact of the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases 
during the global financial crisis by Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010) 
finds that these programmes lowered long-term bond rates relative to short rates 
by  around  50  basis  points,  and  lowered  mortgage-backed  securities  (MBS) 
interest rates even further by improving liquidity in this market, thereby having 
a substantial impact on residential mortgage rates. 
I am more sceptical of quantitative easing, by itself, making much difference to 
stimulating the economy. Why should an expansion of the monetary base lead 
to higher aggregate demand when it was unable to lower interest rates further 
or stimulate bank lending? (For example, see Curdia and Woodford (2009)).   
In addition, evidence from the Japanese episode does not provide much support 
for the theory that a pure expansion of a central bank’s balance sheet can be 
effective in stimulating aggregate demand (Kuttner (2004)). 
There is strong theoretical support for the idea that the management of expectations 
stimulates spending when the policy rate hits the zero lower bound, because a 
commitment to keep short-term interest rates low for a substantial period of time 
helps lower long-term interest rates and also raises inflation expectations, thereby 
reducing  the  real  interest  rate  (Eggertsson  and  Woodford  (2003,  2004)  and 
Woodford (2003)). However, empirical evidence on how effective management 
of expectations was during this episode is not yet available.
What I take from all this evidence is that non-conventional monetary policy was 
effective during the recent financial crisis. I would also argue that conventional 
monetary policy was effective as well – even more so during this financial crisis 
than is normally the case (Mishkin (2009b)). To see this, we can think about 
the counterfactual: what would have happened to the interest rates relevant to 
spending decisions by households and businesses if the Federal Reserve had not 
lowered the federal funds rate by over 500 basis points starting in September 
2007? Clearly interest rates on default-free Treasury securities would have been 
higher, but also credit spreads would have widened by even more than they did 
during the crisis, because the weaker economy would have made conditions 
in  financial  markets  even  more  stressed.  Another  way  of  saying  this  is  that 
macroeconomic risk would have been higher, and so credit spreads would have 
been higher, along with higher default-free interest rates. The outcome would 
then surely have been that households and firms would have faced much higher 
interest  rates,  with  the  result  that  household  and  firm  spending  would  have 
declined even more precipitously, leading to a far deeper recession and possibly 
even a depression. The problem with regard to conventional monetary policy 
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shock from the financial crisis was so severe that it overwhelmed the ability of 
conventional monetary policy to counteract it.
My view that monetary policy, both conventional and non-conventional, was 
effective during the crisis does not imply that the zero lower bound problem 
is less serious. Indeed, the lesson that I take from the crisis is that it is a more 
serious problem than central bankers anticipated. Research before the crisis took 
the view that as long as the inflation objective was around 2%, then the zero 
lower bound problem would not be very serious because it would be infrequent 
and short-lived (Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Coenen, Orphanides 
and Wieland (2004)). The fact that the Federal Reserve has had to resort to non-
conventional monetary policy twice during the first decade of the 21st century – 
once in 2003-04 when it made a commitment to keep interest rates low for a 
considerable period, and once during the 2009-10 period – suggests that the zero 
lower bound problem may be far more prevalent than earlier research suggested, 
and not short-lived at all. The flaw with this research is that it was conducted with 
models that were essentially linear, and, as pointed out above, we now recognise 
that the macroeconomy is likely to be very nonlinear.
The second reason why it is now clear that the zero lower bound problem is 
more serious than previously thought is that we now see that contractionary 
shocks  to  the  economy  can  be  far  greater  than  previously  anticipated.   
Again,  this  results  from  the  presence  of  nonlinearities  and  large  tail  risks. 
Sufficiently  large  contractionary  shocks  can  make  the  costs  of  the  zero 
lower bound constraint very significant. Large contractionary shocks can thus 
overwhelm  the  ability  of  conventional  policy  to  counteract  them,  and  may 
necessitate massive interventions in credit markets and the expansion of central 
bank balance sheets. As I will discuss below, these massive interventions may 
have a very high cost for central banks later on.
4.    The cost of cleaning up after financial crises is very high
Besides the obvious cost of a huge loss of aggregate output as a result of the 
worldwide recession, the global financial crisis suggests that there are likely 
to be three additional costs that will raise the total cost far higher: 1) financial 
crises are typically followed by very slow growth; 2) the budgetary position of 
governments may sharply deteriorate; and 3) the exit strategy for central banks 
from non-conventional monetary policy may both be complicated and hinder the 
ability of the central bank to successfully manage the economy in the future.
When  economies  experience  deep  recessions,  typically  they  subsequently 
experience  very  strong  recoveries,  often  referred  to  as  V-shaped  recoveries. 
However, as Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) document, this V-shaped pattern is not 
characteristic of recessions that follow financial crises because the deleveraging 
process  takes  a  long  time,  resulting  in  strong  headwinds  for  the  economy.   
When analysing 15 severe post-World War II financial crises, as well as the 
Great Depression, the 1973 oil shock period and the recent crisis, they find that 
real GDP growth rates were significantly lower during the decade following 
each of these episodes, with the median decline in GDP growth being about 
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crisis episodes, with the median unemployment rate 5 percentage points higher 
in advanced economies. Although we have many years to go until a decade has 
passed following the most recent crisis, it actually looks like it might have worse 
outcomes than the average crisis episode studied by Reinhart and Reinhart. They 
find that 82% of the observations of per capita GDP during the period 2008 to 
2010 remain below or equal to the 2007 level, while the comparable number for 
the fifteen earlier crisis episodes is 60%. We now recognise that the cumulative 
output losses from financial crises are massive, and the current crisis looks like 
it will be no exception.
As pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), in the aftermath of financial 
crises  there  is  almost  always  a  sharp  increase  in  government  indebtedness. 
We have seen this exact situation in the aftermath of the current crisis. The 
massive  bailouts  of  financial  institutions,  fiscal  stimulus  packages,  and  the 
sharp economic contractions leading to reductions in tax revenue that occurred 
throughout  the  world  have  adversely  affected  the  fiscal  situation  in  many 
countries. Budget deficits of over 10% of GDP in advanced countries like the 
United  States  have  become  common.  Furthermore,  this  rise  in  indebtedness 
has the potential to lead to sovereign debt defaults, which has become a serious 
concern in Europe following the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the problems 
that the Irish government is facing as a result of the spiralling cost of bailing out 
their banking system. The fiscal retrenchments required to put fiscal balances on 
a sustainable path are likely to not only be contractionary, but also to increase 
societal stress. Indeed, there is even a possibility that the fiscal problems brought 
on by the crisis could lead to countries exiting from the euro.
Actions by central banks aimed at containing the global financial crisis resulted 
in huge expansions of their balance sheets. The expansion of balance sheets 
arising from liquidity provision is typically easy to reverse because most liquidity 
facilities provide loans at interest rates that are higher than market rates during 
normal  times.  Hence  these  liquidity  facilities  are  self-liquidating  because  as 
financial markets return to normal, market participants are no longer willing to 
borrow at above-market rates, so the use of these facilities shrinks. Hence this 
source of balance sheet expansion naturally reverses itself as the financial system 
recovers, and this is exactly what has happened.
A far more serious concern is the expansion of the balance sheet that stems from 
asset market purchases. This expansion of the balance sheet is not self-liquidating 
and there are concerns that the resulting expansion of the monetary base will lead 
to high inflation in the future. This would be of greater concern if the expansion 
in the monetary base was closely linked to inflation, but this is unlikely to be 
the case in the current environment. The huge increase in the monetary base of 
144.6% in the United States from August 2007 to the end of 2009 has resulted 
in only a 16.0% increase in M2, because banks are perfectly happy to hold onto 
to huge amounts of excess reserves as long as they are paid interest on them, as 
is the case currently. Indeed, as argued earlier, because quantitative easing was 
unlikely to have had a large expansionary effect during the financial crisis, the 
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More  problematic  is  the  fact  that  asset  market  purchases  were  often  for   
long-term securities, and this exposes the central bank to interest risk (and credit 
risk if it buys private securities such as mortgage-backed securities) because 
these securities can have substantial price fluctuations. Possible losses on these 
securities  thus  mean  that  there  could  be  an  erosion  of  capital  in  the  central 
bank’s balance sheet, and this could subject it to Congressional or parliamentary 
criticism and actions that could weaken its ability to conduct an independent 
monetary policy. In addition, if a central bank has bought private securities, their 
presence on the balance sheet means that the central bank has encroached on the 
politicians’ turf, because the central bank has engaged in a form of fiscal policy, 
which makes its political position more precarious, again possibly leading to a 
loss of independence.  28
Even the purchase of long-term government securities poses a danger for central 
banks  because  it  may  create  the  perception  that  the  central  bank  is  willing 
to accommodate irresponsible fiscal policy by monetising the debt. This is a 
particular concern right now in the euro area, where the ECB has purchased 
securities issued not only by governments that have large fiscal imbalances, but 
also even by a government – in the case of Greece – that lied about its fiscal 
position. This problem is also a serious concern in the United States, where 
both political parties have been unwilling so far to address long-run trends in 
entitlements that could cause US government debt to explode. Not only can the 
purchase of long-term government assets encourage fiscal profligacy, but it can 
also lead to an unhinging of inflation expectations, which could make it difficult 
for the central bank to control inflation in the future.  29
5.    Price and output stability do not ensure financial stability
Before the recent financial crisis, the common view, both in academia and in 
central  banks,  was  that  achieving  price  and  output  stability  would  promote 
financial  stability.  This  was  supported  by  research  (Bernanke,  Gertler  and 
Gilchrist  (1999)  and  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (2001))  indicating  that  monetary 
policy which optimally stabilises inflation and output is likely to stabilise asset 
prices, making asset price bubbles less likely. Indeed, central banks’ success in 
stabilising inflation and the decreased volatility of business cycle fluctuations, 
which became known as the Great Moderation, made policy-makers complacent 
about the risks from financial disruptions. 
The benign economic environment leading up to 2007, however, surely did not 
protect the economy from financial instability. Indeed, it may have promoted 
it. The low volatility of both inflation and output fluctuations may have lulled 
market participants into thinking there was less risk in the economic system than 
was really the case. Credit risk premiums fell to very low levels and underwriting 
28  A particular problem for the Federal Reserve is that its holdings of MBSs on its balance 
sheet  directly  involve  it  in  the  most  politicised  financial  market  in  the  United  States.   
As discussed in Mishkin (2011), this could lead to politicians viewing the Federal Reserve 
as personally responsible for developments in the housing markets, which could expose it to 
increased political criticism and pressure on its policy decisions, thereby further weakening 
its independence.
29  See Cochrane (2010) for a discussion of how recent fiscal events could lead to a rise in 
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standards for loans dropped considerably. Some recent theoretical research even 
suggests that benign economic environments may promote excessive risk-taking 
and may actually make the financial system more fragile (Gambacorta (2009)). 
Although  price  and  output  stability  are  surely  beneficial,  the  recent  crisis 
indicates that a policy focused solely on these objectives may not be enough to 
produce good economic outcomes.
5  HOW MUCH OF THE SCIENCE OF MONETARY POLICY NEEDS   
TO BE ALTERED?
Pundits, such as Paul Krugman (2009) and the Economist Magazine (2009), 
have argued that the financial crisis has revealed deep flaws in the modern field 
of macro/monetary economics developed over the last forty or so years and that 
this field needs to be completely overhauled.  30 Indeed, Krugman titled his 2009 
New York Times Magazine article “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?”. 
Does this mean that the science of monetary policy as we knew it before the crisis 
should be abandoned, and that policy-makers and monetary economists should 
start all over, as Krugman seems to imply?
To answer this question, let’s examine which elements of the science of monetary 
policy are repudiated by the lessons from the financial crisis that we discussed 
in the previous section. First, let’s look at the basic principles of the science of 
monetary policy, and then the theory of optimal monetary policy.
5.1  BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF MONETARY POLICY
The lessons from the crisis are as follows: that the financial sector can have 
a very large impact on economic activity and can make the economy highly   
nonlinear; that the zero lower bound problem can be very serious, which is just 
one of the reasons why cleaning up after financial crises can have very high costs; 
and that price and output stability do not ensure financial stability. One reason 
why I devoted so much time earlier in the paper to the theory and empirical work 
that supports the nine principles of the science of monetary policy is that we 
can now ask whether any of the lessons from the crisis refute the justification 
for those principles. Upon examination of the reasoning behind each of the nine 
principles discussed earlier, the answer is very clear-cut: none of the lessons from 
the financial crisis in any way undermine or invalidate the nine basic principles   
of the science of monetary policy developed before the crisis.
Each of the five lessons from the crisis is completely orthogonal to the theory or 
empirical work that supports the eight principles of the new neoclassical synthesis. 
The lessons in no way weaken the case for any of these principles. The above 
conclusion is an extremely important one (and this is why I boldfaced and italicised 
it to make it stand out). It tells us that we should not throw out all that we have 
learned in the field of macro/monetary economics over the last forty years, as some 
30  See Lucas (2009) and Cochrane (2009) for spirited replies to both the Economist (2009) and 
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pundits seem to suggest. Rather, much of the edifice of the science of monetary 
policy is clearly still as valid today as it was before the crisis. As we shall see, this 
has important implications for how we view monetary policy strategy. 
The lesson that developments in the financial sector can have a large impact 
on economic activity indicates not only that the ninth principle about financial 
frictions is of course valid, but also that it is now even more important than 
central bankers previously realised. 
5.2  THEORY OF OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
On the other hand, the lessons from the crisis do undermine two key elements of the 
pre-crisis theory of optimal monetary policy. The lesson that the macroeconomy 
is inherently nonlinear undermines the linear-quadratic framework that is a key 
element of that policy. The lesson that the developments in the financial sector 
can have a major impact on economic activity undermines the representative-
agent  framework,  another  key  element  of  the  pre-crisis  theory  of  optimal 
monetary  policy.  Doubts  about  the  linear-quadratic  and  representative-agent 
frameworks that have arisen because of the financial crisis also have important 
implications for the strategy of monetary policy. 
6  IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY
Armed with an understanding of which areas of the science of monetary policy 
need rethinking, we can examine how monetary policy strategy might be modified 
in each of the four areas of monetary policy strategy we discussed earlier.
6.1  FLEXIBLE INFLATION TARGETING
I  have  referred  to  the  monetary  policy  strategy  that  follows  from  the  eight 
principles of the new neoclassical synthesis as flexible inflation targeting, for 
want of a better name. Since, as I have argued here, none of the principles are 
invalidated by the events of the recent financial crisis, this approach to monetary 
policy  strategy  is  still  equally  valid.  The  arguments  supporting  central  bank 
adherence to the principles of the new neoclassical synthesis are still every bit as 
strong as they were before the crisis. Therefore, there is still strong support for 
central banks having a strong, credible commitment to stabilising inflation in the 
long run by announcing an explicit, numerical inflation objective, but also having 
the flexibility to pursue policies aimed at stabilising output around its natural rate 
level in the short run. 
Although  the  support  for  the  flexible  inflation  targeting  framework  is  not 
weakened by the lessons from the financial crisis, the lessons do suggest that 
the  details  of  how  flexible  inflation  targeting  is  conducted,  and  of  what  is 
meant by flexibility, need to be rethought. Let us first look at two possible basic 
modifications to the flexible inflation targeting framework: the choice of the 
level of the inflation target, and whether some form of price level targeting would 
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6.1.1  LEVEL OF THE INFLATION TARGET
Because the financial crisis has shown that the zero lower bound problem could be 
more serious than previously thought, there is the question of whether the optimal 
inflation rate level for a central bank target should be higher than the typical value 
of around 2%. With a higher inflation target, the real interest rate can be driven 
down to lower levels in the face of adverse aggregate demand shocks. For example, 
Blanchard,  Dell’Ariccia  and  Mauro  (2010)  have  suggested  that  the  inflation 
target might be raised from the 2% to the 4% level. With expectations of inflation 
anchored to this target, by lowering the nominal interest rate to zero the real interest 
rate could be lowered to as low as -4%, rather than -2% with the 2% inflation target. 
Conventional monetary policy, which involves manipulating the nominal policy 
rate, would then be able to ease monetary policy to a greater extent than it could with 
the lower inflation target. Another way of stating this is to say that the zero lower 
bound on the policy rate would be less binding with a higher inflation target.
This argument suggests that inflation targets of less than 2% might be undesirable. 
While some FOMC participants have declared their desired long-run inflation 
rate level to be below 2% in the FOMC projections that come out four times a 
year, the lessons of the financial crisis provide support for the higher 2% long-
run inflation goal of many of the other FOMC participants. However, does this 
support the raising of the inflation target to 4%, as Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and 
Mauro (2010) seem to suggest?
The answer, to my mind, is no. The logic behind the view that a higher inflation 
target makes the zero lower bound on the policy rate less binding is of course 
correct. But we have to look not only at the benefits of a higher inflation target, 
but also at the costs. If it were no more difficult to stabilise the inflation rate at a 
4% level than at a 2% level, then I think the case for raising the inflation target 
to 4% would be much stronger. However, the history of the inflation process 
suggests that this is not the case. Inflation rates that accord with the Greenspan 
definition  of  price  stability,  i.e.  “the  state  in  which  expected  changes  in  the 
price level do not effectively alter business or household decisions”,31 seem to 
be below the 3% level. Once inflation starts to rise above this level, the public 
is likely to believe that price stability is no longer a credible goal of the central 
bank and then the question arises, “if a 4% level of inflation is OK, then why not 
6%, or 8%, and so on.” 
As was discussed earlier, economists such as Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow 
argued that policy-makers should be willing to tolerate higher inflation rates 
in the 4 to 5% range. But we have seen that when inflation rises above the 3% 
level, it tends to keep on rising. This was the experience in the United States in 
the 1960s that eventually led to the Great Inflation period from the 1970s to the 
early 1980s. Getting inflation back down again during the Volcker era was very 
costly. No central banker wants to go through that cycle again.
31  Greenspan apparently first expressed this definition in the July 1996 FOMC meeting (page 
51 of the transcript, which can be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/FOMC19960703meeting.pdf).  This  definition  was  later  made  public  in  numerous 
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A second consideration is that the benefits of a higher inflation target only accrue 
when the zero lower bound becomes a binding constraint. Although this has surely 
been  a  major  problem  during  the  recent  episode,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
episodes like this are not very frequent. Indeed, we have not experienced a negative 
shock to the economy of this magnitude for over seventy years. If shocks of this 
magnitude are rare, then the benefits of a higher inflation target are not very large 
because they are only available infrequently. On the other hand, the costs of higher 
inflation in terms of the distortions it produces in the economy are continuous. 
Thus, although they may not be that large in any given year, these costs add up, 
and in present value terms far outweigh the intermittent benefits obtained from the 
zero lower bound not being binding in periods like the current one.
6.1.2   PRICE LEVEL TARGETING
Although the commitment to a strong nominal anchor for countries that have 
an independent monetary policy has taken the form of a target for inflation, an 
alternative is to target a price level path instead. Theoretical research starting 
in the late 1990s (e.g. Svensson (1999), Woodford (2002), Ditmar, Gavin and 
Prescott (1999, 2000) and Vestin (2000, 2006)) demonstrated that a price-level 
target produces less output variance than an inflation target. Indeed, as expressed 
by Woodford (2003), a price-level target makes policy history-dependent and 
this produces improved economic outcomes. The reasoning is straightforward. 
A negative demand shock that results in a lower price level requires monetary 
policy to try to raise the price level back to its target path, and this means that 
inflation is expected to rise in the short run to a level above the long-run inflation 
target embedded in the price-level target path. The rise in expected inflation then 
lowers the real interest rate, thereby stimulating aggregate demand and economic 
activity.  Hence,  a  price-level  target  is  an  automatic  stabiliser:  a  negative 
demand shock leads to stabilising expectations, which stabilise the economy. 
This mechanism is even more effective when the negative demand shock is so 
large that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates becomes binding, as 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) point out.
There are, however, some potential costs to price-level targets. A traditional 
objection, forcefully articulated by Fischer (1994), is that a price-level target can 
produce more output variability than an inflation target because unanticipated 
shocks  to  the  price  level  are  not  treated  as  bygones  and  must  be  offset.32   
A price-level target requires that any overshooting or undershooting of the target 
must be reversed, and this can impart significantly more volatility to monetary 
policy, and, with sticky prices, to the real economy in the short run. An additional 
problem with a price-level target is that it is harder to communicate, particularly 
if it has an upward trend, which is required if the optimal long-run inflation rate is 
positive in order to make deflations a less frequent occurrence and the zero lower 
bound constraint less likely to bind. In this case, a price-level target would be a 
moving target and so harder to explain than an inflation target, which is always 
kept at a constant level.
32  This view is supported by simulations of econometric macro models with backward-looking 
expectations, which typically find that a price-level target leads to greater variability of 
output and inflation than an inflation target. E.g. see Haldane and Salmon (1995).94 MISHKIN
The lesson from the financial crisis that the zero lower bound problem is more 
serious than was previously contemplated suggests larger benefits of a price-level 
target, which may outweigh the costs. Although the communication challenges 
are serious,  33 the potential benefits of price-level targeting may prompt central 
banks to look into ways of effectively communicating a price-level target to 
the public. For example, a central bank could indicate that in the event that it 
undershoots its inflation target for a period of time, as is occurring currently in 
many countries, it would be willing to tolerate a higher inflation rate in the short 
run in order for the average inflation rate over a longer horizon to meet the target 
objective. For this strategy to work, however, it would be crucial for the central 
bank to make it clear, and convince the public, that in so doing it would not be 
raising its long-run inflation objective, and that its commitment to stabilising 
inflation would therefore remain as strong as ever.
6.2  RISK MANAGEMENT AND GRADUALISM
As discussed earlier, a key element of the analysis of optimal monetary policy 
is  the  linear-quadratic  framework  in  which  financial  frictions  do  not  play  a 
prominent role. Although the linear-quadratic framework might be reasonable 
under  normal  circumstances,  we  have  learned  that  financial  disruptions  can 
produce  large  deviations  from  these  assumptions,  indicating  that  the  linear-
quadratic  framework  may  provide  misleading  answers  for  monetary  policy 
strategy when financial crises occur. 
The  important  role  of  nonlinearities  in  the  economy  arising  from  financial 
disruption  suggests  that  policy-makers  should  not  only  focus  on  the  modal 
outcomes, as they would in a certainty equivalent world which is a feature of 
the linear-quadratic framework, but should also tailor their policies to cope with 
uncertainty and with the possible existence of tail risks in which there is a low 
probability of extremely adverse outcomes. I have argued elsewhere (Mishkin 
(2010b))  that  the  importance  of  financial  frictions  and  nonlinearities  in  the 
economy provides a rationale for a particular form of risk management approach 
to monetary policy.
What  would  this  risk  management  approach  look  like?  The  first  element  of 
this approach is that monetary policy would act pre-emptively when financial 
disruptions occur. Specifically, monetary policy would focus on what I have 
referred to as macroeconomic risk (Mishkin (2010b)) – that is, an increase in 
the probability that a financial disruption will cause significant deterioration in 
the real economy through the adverse feedback loop described earlier, in which 
the financial disruption causes a worsening of conditions in the credit markets, 
which causes the economy to deteriorate further, causing a further worsening 
of conditions in the credit markets, and so on. Monetary policy would aim at 
reducing  macroeconomic  risk  by  cutting  interest  rates  to  offset  the  negative 
effects of financial turmoil on aggregate economic activity. In so doing, monetary 
policy could reduce the likelihood of a financial disruption setting off an adverse 
33  This is why I argued in favour of inflation targeting over price-level targeting in the past 
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feedback loop. The resulting reduction in uncertainty could then make it easier 
for the markets to collect the information that facilitates price discovery, thus 
hastening the return of normal market functioning. 
To achieve normal market functioning most effectively, monetary policy would 
be  timely,  decisive,  and  flexible.  First,  timely  action,  which  is  pre-emptive, 
is  particularly  valuable  when  an  episode  of  financial  instability  becomes 
sufficiently severe to threaten the core macroeconomic objectives of the central 
bank. In such circumstances, waiting too long to ease policy could result in 
further deterioration of the macroeconomy and might well increase the overall 
amount of easing that would eventually be required to restore the economy to 
health. When financial markets are working well, monetary policy can respond 
primarily to the incoming flow of economic data about production, employment, 
and  inflation.  In  the  event  of  a  financial  disruption,  however,  pre-emptive 
policy would focus on indicators of market liquidity, credit spreads, and other 
financial market measures that can provide information about sharp  changes 
in the magnitude of tail risk to the macroeconomy. Indeed, even if economic 
indicators were strong, monetary policy would act to offset the negative impact 
of the financial disruption.
Second,  policy-makers  would  be  prepared  for  decisive  action  in  response 
to  financial  disruptions.  In  such  circumstances,  the  most  likely  outcome   
(the modal forecast) for the economy may be fairly benign, but there may also be 
a significant risk of more severe adverse outcomes. In this situation the central 
bank can take out insurance by easing the stance of policy further than if the 
distribution of probable outcomes were perceived as fairly symmetric around 
the  modal  forecast.  Moreover,  in  such  circumstances,  the  monetary  policy 
authorities can argue that these policy actions do not imply a deterioration of 
the central bank’s assessment of the most likely outcome for the economy, but 
rather constitute an appropriate form of risk management that reduces the risk of 
particularly adverse outcomes. 
Third,  policy  flexibility  is  especially  valuable  throughout  the  evolution  of  a 
financial  market  disruption.  During  the  onset  of  the  episode,  this  flexibility 
may be evident from the decisive easing of policy that is intended to forestall 
the contractionary effects of the disruption and provide insurance against the 
downside  risks  to  the  macroeconomy.  However,  it  is  important  to  recognise 
that in some instances financial markets can also turn around quickly, thereby 
reducing the drag on the economy as well as the degree of tail risk. Therefore, 
the central bank would monitor credit spreads and other incoming data for signs 
of financial market recovery and, if necessary, take back some of the insurance; 
thus, at each stage of the episode, the appropriate monetary policy may exhibit 
much less smoothing than would be typical in other circumstances. 
The  risk  management  approach  outlined  here  is  one  that  abandons  the 
prescription of the linear-quadratic framework that the optimal monetary policy 
would involve gradual changes. Instead, with this approach aggressive actions 
by central banks to minimise macroeconomic risk would result in pre-emptive, 
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of conventional monetary policy by the Federal Reserve during the crisis. In 
September 2007, just after the initial disruption to financial markets in August, 
the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target by 50 basis points   
(0.5  percentage  point)  even  though  the  economy  was  displaying  substantial 
positive momentum, with real GDP growth quite strong in the third quarter. 
The Federal Reserve was clearly not reacting to current economic conditions, 
but rather to the downside risks to the economy from the financial disruption. 
Subsequently, the Federal Reserve very rapidly brought the federal funds rate 
target from its level of 5¼% before the crisis, in September 2007, to 2% in April 
2008. Then, after the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, the Federal 
Reserve began another round of rapid interest rate cuts, with the federal funds 
rate target lowered by 75 basis points in December 2008, bringing it down to the 
zero lower bound. Clearly, the Federal Reserve had abandoned gradualism.34
One danger from aggressive, pre-emptive actions that are taken as part of the risk 
management approach is that they might create the perception that the monetary 
policy  authorities  are  too  focused  on  stabilising  economic  activity  and  not 
enough on price stability. If this perception occurs, the pre-emptive actions might 
lead to an increase in inflation expectations. The flexibility to act pre-emptively 
against a financial disruption presupposes that inflation expectations are well 
anchored and unlikely to rise during a period of temporary monetary easing.   
To work effectively, the risk management approach outlined here thus requires a 
commitment to a strong nominal anchor. A risk management approach therefore 
provides  an  additional  rationale  for  a  flexible  inflation  targeting  framework, 
and, as I have argued elsewhere (Mishkin (2008)), a strong nominal anchor can 
be especially valuable in periods of financial market stress, when prompt and 
decisive policy action may be required as part of a risk management approach in 
order to forestall an adverse feedback loop. 
6.3  THE LEAN VERSUS CLEAN DEBATE
The lean versus clean debate initially focused on whether monetary policy should 
react to potential asset price bubbles. In thinking about this debate, it is worth 
first distinguishing between two different types of asset price bubbles. We can 
then see how this bears on the lean versus clean debate and go on to examine the 
different policy options for responding to potential bubbles. 
6.3.1  TWO TYPES OF ASSET PRICE BUBBLES
34  One period before the crisis when the Federal Reserve abandoned gradualism was during 
the LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management) episode, when it lowered the federal funds 
rate target by 75 basis points within a period of a month and a half in the autumn of 1998. 
This action fits into the risk management approach described here. However, once the shock 
dissipated, the Federal Reserve did not take away the insurance provided by the funds rate 
cuts, as the risk management approach outlined here suggests would have been appropriate. 
I consider this to be one of the serious monetary policy mistakes made by the Federal 
Reserve  under  Greenspan.  Not  only  did  inflation  subsequently  rise  above  the  desired 
level, but the actions also indicated that the Federal Reserve would react asymmetrically 
to shocks, lowering interest rates in the event of a financial disruption, but not raising them 
upon reversal of the adverse shock. This helped contribute to the belief in the “Greenspan 
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As pointed out in Mishkin (2010b), not all asset price bubbles are alike. Financial 
history  and  the  financial  crisis  of  2007-09  indicate  that  one  type  of  bubble, 
which is best referred to as a credit-driven bubble, can be highly dangerous.   
With this type of bubble, there is the following typical chain of events: as a result 
of either exuberant expectations about economic prospects or structural changes 
in financial markets, a credit boom begins, increasing the demand for some assets 
and thereby raising their prices. The rise in asset values, in turn, encourages 
further lending against these assets, increasing demand, and hence their prices, 
even more. This feedback loop can generate a bubble, and the bubble can cause 
credit standards to ease as lenders become less concerned about the ability of the 
borrowers to repay loans and instead rely on further appreciation of the asset to 
shield themselves from losses.
At some point, however, the bubble bursts. The collapse in asset prices then leads 
to a reversal of the feedback loop in which loans go sour, lenders cut back on 
credit supply, the demand for the assets declines further, and prices drop even 
more. The resulting loan losses and declines in asset prices erode the balance 
sheets at financial institutions, further diminishing credit and investment across 
a broad range of assets. The decline in lending depresses business and household 
spending, which weakens economic activity and increases macroeconomic risk 
in credit markets. In extreme cases, the interaction between asset prices and the 
health of financial institutions following the collapse of an asset price bubble can 
endanger the operation of the financial system as a whole.
However, there is a second type of bubble that is far less dangerous, which can 
be referred to as an irrational exuberance bubble. This type of bubble is driven 
solely by overly optimistic expectations and poses much less risk to the financial 
system than credit-driven bubbles. For example, the bubble in technology stocks 
in the late 1990s was not fuelled by a feedback loop between bank lending and 
rising equity values, so the bursting of the bubble was not accompanied by a 
marked  deterioration  in  bank  balance  sheets.  The  bursting  of  the  tech-stock 
bubble thus did not have a very severe impact on the economy, and the recession 
that followed was quite mild. 
6.3.2   THE CASE FOR LEANING VERSUS CLEANING
We have learned from the recent crisis that not only can the bursting of credit-driven 
bubbles be extremely costly, but also very hard to clean up after. Furthermore, 
bubbles of this type can occur even if there is price and output stability in the 
period leading up to them. Indeed, a period of price and output stability might 
actually encourage credit-driven bubbles because it leads market participants to 
underestimate the amount of risk in the economy. The case for leaning against 
potential bubbles rather than cleaning up after them has therefore become much 
stronger. 
However,  the  distinction  between  the  two  types  of  bubbles,  one  of  which 
(credit-driven) is much more costly than the other, suggests that the lean versus 
clean debate may have been misguided, as White (2009) indicates. Rather than 
leaning against potential asset price bubbles – including both credit-driven and 
irrational exuberance bubbles – there is a much stronger case for only leaning 98 MISHKIN
against credit-driven bubbles, and not irrational exuberance bubbles. As White 
(2009) and Mishkin (2010b) have pointed out, it is much easier to identify credit 
bubbles than it is to identify whether asset prices are deviating from fundamental 
values. Financial regulators and central banks often have information indicating 
that lenders have weakened their underwriting standards, that risk premia appear 
to be inordinately low or that credit extension is rising at abnormally high rates. 
The argument that it is hard to identify asset price bubbles is therefore not a valid 
argument against leaning against credit bubbles.
6.3.3   MACRO-PRUDENTIAL POLICIES
There is a strong case for leaning against credit bubbles, but what policies will be 
most effective? First, it is important to recognise that the key principle to consider 
in designing effective policies to lean against credit bubbles is whether they fix 
market failures. Credit extension necessarily involves risk-taking. It is only when 
this risk-taking is excessive because of market failures that credit bubbles are 
likely to develop. Upon recognising that market failures are the problem, it is 
natural to look to prudential regulatory measures to constrain credit bubbles. 
Some of these regulatory measures are simply the usual elements of a well-
functioning  prudential  regulatory  and  supervisory  system.  These  elements 
include  adequate  disclosure  and  capital  requirements,  liquidity  requirements, 
prompt corrective action, careful monitoring of an institution’s risk-management 
procedures,  close  supervision  of  financial  institutions  to  enforce  compliance 
with  regulations,  and  sufficient  resources  and  accountability  for  supervisors.
The  standard  measures  mentioned  above  focus  on  promoting  the  safety  and 
soundness  of  individual  firms  and  fall  into  the  category  of  what  is  referred 
to  as  micro-prudential  supervision.  However,  even  if  individual  firms  are 
operating prudently, there is still a danger of excessive risk-taking because of the 
interactions between financial firms that promote externalities. An alternative 
regulatory  approach,  which  deals  with  these  interactions,  focuses  on  what 
is happening in credit markets in the aggregate, and is referred to as macro-
prudential regulation and supervision. 
Macro-prudential regulations can be used to dampen the interaction between 
asset price bubbles and credit provision. For example, research has shown that 
the rise in asset values that accompanies a boom results in higher capital buffers at 
financial institutions, supporting further lending in the context of an unchanging 
benchmark for capital adequacy; in the bust, the value of this capital can drop 
precipitously, possibly even necessitating a cut in lending.  35 It is important for 
research to continue to analyse the role of bank capital requirements in promoting 
financial stability, including whether capital requirements should be adjusted 
over  the  business  cycle.  Other  macro-prudential  policies  to  constrain  credit 
bubbles include dynamic provisioning by banks; lower ceilings on loan-to-value 
ratios or higher haircut requirements for repo lending during credit expansions; 
and Pigouvian-type taxes on certain liabilities of financial institutions.  36 
35   For example, see Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Adrian and Shin (2009). 
36  For example, see Bank of England (2009) and French et al. (2010).99 MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY: LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS
Some policies aimed at addressing the risks to financial stability from asset price 
bubbles could be made a standard part of the regulatory system, to be operational 
at all times – whether a bubble was in progress or not. However, because specific 
or new types of market failures might be driving a particular credit bubble, there 
is a case for discretionary prudential policies aimed at limiting the market failures 
in such a case. For example, during certain periods risks across institutions might 
become highly correlated, and discretionary policy aimed at responding to these 
higher-stress environments could help reduce systemic risk.
6.3.4   MONETARY POLICY
The fact that the low interest rate policies of the Federal Reserve from 2002 
to 2005 were followed by excessive risk-taking suggests to many that overly 
easy monetary policy might promote financial instability. Using aggregate data, 
Taylor (2007) has argued that excessively low policy rates led to the housing 
bubble, while Bernanke (2010), Bean, Paustian, Penalver and Taylor (2010), 
Turner (2010) and Posen (2009) have argued otherwise. Although it is far from 
clear that the Federal Reserve is to blame for the housing bubble, the explosion 
of microeconomic research, both theoretical and empirical, provides support for 
monetary policy playing a role in creating credit bubbles. Borio and Zhu (2008) 
have called this mechanism the “risk-taking channel of monetary policy”. 
The literature provides two basic reasons why low interest rates might promote 
excessive risk-taking. First, as Rajan (2005, 2006) points out, low interest rates 
can increase the incentives for asset managers in financial institutions to search 
for  yield  and  hence  increase  risk-taking.  These  incentives  could  come  from 
contractual arrangements that compensate asset managers for returns above a 
minimum level, often zero, and with low nominal interest rates only high-risk 
investments will lead to high compensation. They could also come from fixed-
rate commitments, such as those provided by insurance companies, forcing the 
firm to seek out higher-yielding, riskier investments. Or they could arise from 
behavioural tendencies such as money illusion, as a result of which the managers 
believe that low nominal rates indicate that real returns are low, encouraging 
them to purchase riskier assets to obtain a higher target return.
A second mechanism through which low interest rates could promote risk-taking is 
through income and valuation effects. Low interest rates increase net interest margins 
and increase the value of financial firms, expanding their capacity to increase their 
leverage and take on risk (Adrian and Shin (2009, 2010) and Adrian, Moench and 
Shin (2010)). In addition, low interest rates can boost collateral values, again enabling 
increased lending. This mechanism is closely related to the financial accelerator of 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), except in 
that it derives from financial frictions for lenders rather than borrowers. 
Monetary policy can also encourage risk-taking in two other ways. Although 
desirable from the viewpoint of establishing credibility and a strong nominal 
anchor, more predictable monetary policy can reduce uncertainty and encourage 
asset managers to underestimate risk (Gambacorta (2009)). Monetary policy that 
cleans up after financial disruptions by lowering interest rates, which has been 
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Federal Reserve when Alan Greenspan was at the helm, can lead to a form of 
moral hazard in which financial institutions expect monetary policy to help them 
recover from bad investments (e.g. see Tirole and Farhi (2009), Keister (2010), 
and  Wilson  and  Wu  (2010)).  The  Greenspan  put  can  also  increase  systemic 
risk  because  it  is  only  exercised  when  many  financial  firms  are  in  trouble 
simultaneously, and so they may be encouraged to pursue similar investment 
strategies, thereby increasing the correlation of returns.
Micro-empirical analysis provides a fair amount of support for the theory of the 
risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina 
(2009), using Spanish credit registry data, find that low nominal interest rates, 
despite decreasing the probability of defaults in the short term, lead to riskier 
lending and more defaults in the medium term. Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro 
(2009) examine a quasi-controlled experiment in Bolivia and find that lower US 
federal funds rates increase lending to low-quality borrowers, which leads to a 
higher rate of defaults and yet at lower interest rate spreads. Delis and Kouretas 
(2010), using data from euro area banks, finds a negative relationship between 
the level of interest rates and the riskiness of bank lending.
Adrian and Shin (2010) discuss and provide evidence relating to the risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy, using more aggregate data. They find that reductions 
in the federal funds rate increase term spreads and hence the net interest margin 
for  financial  intermediaries.  The  higher  net  interest  margin,  which  makes 
financial  intermediaries  more  profitable,  is  then  associated  with  higher  asset 
growth, and higher asset growth, which they interpret as a shift in credit supply, 
serves as a prediction for higher real GDP growth. 
Given the evidence relating to the risk-taking channel, should monetary policy 
be used to lean against credit bubbles? There are several objections to doing so. 
First, if monetary policy is used to lean against credit bubbles, it is a violation 
of the Tinbergen (1939) principle, because one instrument is being asked to 
do two jobs: 1) stabilise the financial sector; and 2) stabilise the economy.  37   
Given  that  there  is  another  instrument  with  which  to  stabilise  the  financial 
sector  –  macro-prudential  supervision  –  wouldn’t  it  be  better  to  use  macro-
prudential supervision to deal with financial stability, leaving monetary policy to 
focus on price and output stability?
This argument would be quite strong if macro-prudential policies were able 
to do the job. However, there are doubts on this score. Prudential supervision 
is subject to more political pressure than monetary policy because it affects 
the bottom line of financial institutions more directly. Thus they have greater 
incentives  to  lobby  politicians  to  discourage  macro-prudential  policies  that 
would  rein  in  credit  bubbles.  After  all,  during  a  credit  bubble  financial 
37  Stabilising the financial sector is not a completely separate objective from stabilising the 
economy because financial instability leads to instability in economic activity and inflation. 
However, because the dynamics of financial instability are so different than the dynamics 
of inflation and economic activity, for the purposes of the Tinbergen principle, promoting 
financial  instability  can  be  viewed  as  a  separate  policy  objective  from  stabilising  the 
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institutions make the most money, and they therefore have greater incentives 
and more resources to lobby politicians to prevent restrictive macro-prudential 
policies. A case in point is the recent Basel III accord. Press reports suggest 
that the capital standards in the accord were substantially weakened because 
of complaints by the German Landesbanken. Furthermore, implementation of 
the accord was put off for ten years, and it did not contain measures to deal 
with systemic risk considerations such as having higher capital requirements 
on systemically more important financial institutions. The Basel III episode 
suggests that political considerations may make it extremely difficult to have 
effective macro-prudential supervision. 
The possibility that macro-prudential policies may not be implemented sufficiently 
well to constrain credit bubbles suggests that monetary policy may have to be 
used instead.  38 But this raises another objection to using monetary policy to lean 
against credit bubbles: it may not work. I am sympathetic to the view discussed 
earlier  that  tightening  monetary  policy  may  be  ineffective  in  restraining  a 
particular asset bubble because market participants expect such high rates of 
return from purchasing bubble-driven assets. On the other hand, the evidence 
relating to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy suggests more strongly 
that  raising  interest  rates  would  help  restrain  lending  growth  and  excessive 
risk-taking. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis discussed immediately above 
suggests that if a central bank credibly commits to raising interest rates when 
a credit bubble seems to be forming, then expectations in credit markets will 
work to make this policy more effective. The expectation that rates will go up 
with increased risk-taking will make this kind of activity less profitable and thus 
make it less likely to occur. Furthermore, expectations that rates will rise with 
increased risk-taking means that interest rates will not have to be raised as much 
to have their intended effect.  39 
Nonetheless, using monetary policy to lean against credit bubbles is not a monetary 
policy strategy that can be taken lightly. Doing so could at times result in a weaker 
economy than the monetary authorities would desire, or inflation that is too low. 
This suggests that there is a monetary policy tradeoff between the pursuit of 
financial stability and the pursuit of price and output stability. Also as mentioned 
earlier, giving monetary policy another objective might lead to confusion about 
the central bank’s commitment to price stability, thereby weakening the nominal 
anchor, with potentially adverse effects on economic outcomes.
38  However, as pointed out in Boivin, Lane and Meh (2010), whether monetary policy will be 
effective in countering financial imbalances depends on the nature of shocks. Boivin, Lane 
and Meh conduct simulations that show that where financial imbalances reflect specific 
market failures and regulatory policies can be directed to such failures, monetary policy 
is less likely to be effective. Monetary policy is likely to be more effective when financial 
imbalances arise from economy-wide factors. 
39  Monetary policy leaning against credit bubbles can also be thought of as a form of risk 
management because it pre-emptively takes measures to restrain credit bubbles. As in the 
risk management approach discussed earlier, the justification for pre-emptively leaning 
against credit bubbles is the presence of nonlinearities in the economy, so that monetary 
policy is used to take out insurance against the high cost of the bubble when it bursts. 102 MISHKIN
Another danger from having monetary policy as a tool to promote financial stability 
is that it might lead to decisions to tighten monetary policy when it is not needed 
to constrain credit bubbles. A situation of low interest rates does not necessarily 
indicate that monetary policy is promoting excessive risk-taking. One lesson from 
the analysis here is that policy-makers, and especially monetary policy-makers, 
want tools to assess whether credit bubbles are developing. Research is underway 
(e.g. as described in Borio and Lowe (2002) and Adrian and Shin (2010)) to find 
measures that will signal whether credit bubbles are likely to be forming. High 
credit growth, increasing leverage, low risk spreads, and surveys to assess whether 
credit underwriting standards are being eased are factors that can help central 
banks decide if there is an imminent danger of credit bubbles. Monitoring of credit 
market conditions will become an essential activity of central banks in the future, 
and research on the best ways of doing so will have a high priority.
This danger of considering using monetary policy to promote financial stability 
is  highly  relevant  today.  Some  economists,  for  example  Hoenig  (2010)  and 
Rajan (2010), have called for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates because 
they  argue  that  the  current  low  rates  are  encouraging  excessive  risk-taking. 
However, the US economy is currently not in a situation of rapid credit growth, 
low risk premiums and increasing leverage. Indeed, it still seems to be mired in 
a deleveraging cycle that is producing serious headwinds for the economy. This 
doesn’t mean that the situation cannot change. However, at the current juncture, 
low interest rates do not appear to be creating the next credit bubble in the United 
States, and justification for raising them to curb risk-taking is lacking. 
On  the  other  hand,  many  emerging  market  economies  and  some  advanced 
economies like Israel are currently in a very different environment because they 
did not go through a deleveraging cycle such as occurred in the United States and 
Europe. They thus have the potential for a credit bubble to develop, and low US 
interest rates are a potential danger because they could promote excessive risk-
taking.40 In these countries, however, the option of tightening monetary policy 
to restrict risk-taking may not be available because raising interest rates would 
just encourage capital inflows that could also promote a credit boom. For these 
countries the only option may be to pursue macro-prudential policies to limit 
credit growth.  41 
6.4   DICHOTOMY BETWEEN MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY POLICY
Another lesson learned from the financial crisis and the discussion above is that 
monetary policy and financial stability policy are intrinsically linked to each other, 
and so the dichotomy between them is a false one. As we have seen, monetary 
policy can affect financial stability, while macro-prudential policies to promote 
financial stability can have an impact on monetary policy. If macro-prudential 
40  The empirical research in Ioannidou et al. (2009), which indicated that loans became riskier 
in Bolivia when US interest rates were low, is particularly relevant on this point.
41  These might take the form of policies to restrict capital inflows, but with a focus on 
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policies are implemented to restrain a credit bubble, they will slow credit growth 
and will slow the growth of aggregate demand. In this case, monetary policy may 
need to be easier in order to offset weaker aggregate demand. 
Alternatively, if policy rates are kept low to stimulate the economy, as is true 
currently, there is a greater risk that a credit bubble might occur. This may require 
tighter macro-prudential policies to ensure that a credit bubble does not develop. 
Coordination  of  monetary  and  macro-prudential  policies  becomes  of  greater 
value when all three objectives of price stability, output stability and financial 
stability are to be pursued.
I have argued elsewhere (Mishkin (2009c) and in French et al. (2010)) that the 
recent financial crisis provides strong support for a systemic regulator and that 
central banks are the natural choice for this role. The benefits of coordination 
between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy provide another reason 
for having central banks take on the systemic regulator role. Coordination of 
monetary policy and macro-prudential policy is more likely to be effective if one 
government agency is in charge of both. As anyone who has had the pleasure 
of experiencing the turf battles between different government agencies knows, 
coordination  of  policies  is  extremely  difficult  when  different  entities  control 
these policies. 
7  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The  bad  news  is  that  we  have  just  been  through  a  once-in-a-century  credit 
tsunami that has had a devastating impact on the economy, one that will last for 
years to come. The good news is that macro/monetary economists and central 
bankers do not have to go back to the drawing board and throw out all that they 
have learned over the last forty years. Much of the science of monetary policy 
remains intact. The case for the basic monetary policy strategy, which for want 
of a better name I have called flexible inflation targeting, is still as strong as ever, 
and in some ways more so. 
The  recent  financial  crisis,  however,  has  necessitated  some  major  rethinking 
regarding  the  details  of  this  basic  framework  for  monetary  policy  strategy. 
We now recognise that the financial sector plays a very prominent role in the 
macroeconomy, and makes it highly nonlinear at times. This requires that we 
abandon the linear-quadratic framework for considering how to conduct monetary 
policy when there is a financial disruption. There is now a stronger case for a risk 
management framework that factors in tail risks that can produce very adverse 
outcomes for the economy. Another lesson is that there is a stronger case in favour 
of monetary policy leaning against credit bubbles (but not asset price bubbles per 
se), rather than just cleaning up after the bubble has burst. Using monetary policy 
to pursue financial stability goals is not an easy task, however, and research on 
how to monitor credit conditions so that decisions to use monetary policy to 
restrict excessive risk are based on the correct information will be a high priority 
for researchers in the future. Finally, the financial crisis has made it clear that the 104 MISHKIN
interactions between the financial sector and the aggregate economy imply that 
monetary policy and financial stability policy are closely intertwined.
There  is  one  other  piece  of  good  news  that  has  emerged  from  this  crisis.   
The field of macro/monetary economics has become considerably more exciting. 
We are now faced with a whole new agenda for research that should keep people 
in the field very busy for a very long time. It has also made the work of central 
bankers more exciting as well. They now have to think about a much wider range 
of policy issues than they had to previously. This will surely be exhausting, but 
central banking will be a far more stimulating profession as a result.
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COMMENT
BY GUIDO TABELLINI, BOCCONI UNIVERSITY
Both papers are very interesting, and contain much more than you have heard.   
I will comment on both papers simultaneously, discussing the main questions that 
they address. I would like to organise my discussion around two points: crisis 
prevention, for the most part, and one final comment on crisis management. 
On crisis prevention, both papers agree – and so do I – that the most important 
lesson we have learned is that price and output stability does not imply financial 
stability. The reason is that in periods of price and output stability there could be 
an accumulation of financial imbalances that may suddenly unwind. The prices 
that rise in these periods are those of assets that are used as collateral or that may 
be related to the expansion of leverage. We now also have a better understanding 
of how the credit cycle can amplify business fluctuations. Moreover, the high cost 
of cleaning up is a result of the misallocation of real investment that accompanies 
these changes in asset prices. 
The main questions raised by these lessons are as follows. First of all, should 
we change the flexible inflation targeting framework in the pursuit of financial 
stability,  and,  if  so,  how?  And  second,  what  instrument  should  be  used  to 
achieve financial stability? Should it be the interest rate or regulatory tools?   
These are very difficult questions, because the science of monetary policy, as 
Mishkin called it, is still not equipped to address them. In particular, the ninth 
principle of monetary policy in the paper by Mishkin is not really on a par with 
the others. Although we have very promising work by Geanakoplos and by Shin 
and Adrian on the importance of the leverage cycle, the ninth principle has not   
yet fully developed to the same operational stage as the “neoclassical synthesis”. 
Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, I would give the following answers. 
On  inflation  targeting,  I  fully  agree  with  Mishkin.  The  first  eight  principles 
that he mentions are very much valid and they continue to imply that inflation 
expectations  play  a  central  role.  They  also  imply  the  need  to  anchor  those 
expectations  through  appropriate  central  bank  incentives  and  through  an 
institutional framework. A framework means a structured decision process with 
clear goals that enables central banks to implement state-contingent policy rules 
and not just isolated actions; a mechanism for communicating intentions about 
the long run; a mechanism to hold central banks accountable and to shape their 
incentives. The crisis has very much enhanced the need for this framework, 
because it is now clear that we have to use a wider set of policy tools with a lot 
of judgement. It’s also clear that incentives to create unexpected inflation are 
much stronger, because, if we could do that, it would reduce the debt burden. 
So  we  need  to  anchor  expectations  even  more  firmly  than  before.  Flexible 
inflation targeting is helpful in that regard, because it focuses on the final goal 
and it is consistent with a very wide range of indicators. Nevertheless there are 
some possible adjustments that may be usefully added to the inflation targeting 
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One possible adjustment is to include measures of housing prices to a relevant   
degree  in  the  inflation  target,  because  those  prices  react  more  quickly  than 
others  to  the  financial  imbalances.  This  is  an  important  issue  in  Europe, 
where house prices are not so fully reflected in the harmonised price index. 
One  might  also  want  to  incorporate  the  risk-taking  channel  of  monetary 
policy  by  adjusting  interest  rates  for  risk  so  as  to  assess  the  stance  of 
monetary  policy,  as  was  stressed  in  the  ECB  paper.  Finally,  one  may 
want  to  condition  policy  decisions  on  a  broad  set  of  financial  indicators,   
and perhaps be prepared to lean against the wind identified by such indicators.
I would also stress my reservations with regard to the emphasis that Mishkin put 
on the risk management approach. We understand the need for a pre-emptive 
policy because of the costs of cleaning up. But in the past the risk management 
approach  could  have  led  to  excessive  accumulation  of  financial  imbalances. 
Taylor offered the following assessment of US monetary policy in the period 
2002-05: maybe the Federal Reserve was too expansionary precisely because 
there was a need to buy insurance against the risk of deflation. 
But these marginal changes to the inflation targeting framework are not enough, 
because the problem of how to achieve financial stability remains. Here we need 
to develop a framework to manage the leverage cycle with policy tools other 
than the interest rate – regulatory tools in particular. Some of the arguments for 
relying on other policy tools, rather than interest rates, have been mentioned 
by Mishkin. In particular, we don’t want to destabilise the economy in order to 
reduce the accumulation of credit imbalances. 
But  to  be  sure  of  this  point,  we  would  need  more  empirical  research.   
A recent paper by Bean (Bean et al. (2010)) suggests that interest rate changes 
are not so powerful in influencing credit aggregates and removing the credit 
imbalances. But he obtained this result using a VAR framework, to which the 
Lucas critique applies: as you change the policy rule, the parameters also change. 
Nevertheless,  this  evidence  seems  to  suggest  that  interest  rates  do  not  have   
a powerful effect on the credit imbalances. 
If  you  believe  that  you  should  rely  on  other  policy  tools,  there  are  at 
least  two  issues  to  address.  First,  do  you  want  to  target  securities  through 
margin requirements, or do you want to target intermediaries through capital 
requirements? I think the question here is which approach is more likely to 
win  a  race  against  financial  innovation.  Perhaps  you  want  to  rely  on  both.   
The  second  issue  is  that  you  really  need  to  develop  a  framework,  as  with 
inflation  targeting,  with  which  to  manage  expectations  in  a  practical  way. 
We  don’t  just  want  a  predetermined  set  of  rules:  we  need  to  manage 
the  leverage  cycles  with  administrative  rules,  and  that  requires  creating   
a framework as defined above. 
I think there is a strong argument for putting the central bank in charge of both 
policy tools – interest rates and administrative tools. One rationale in support 
of this was emphasised in the paper by Mishkin, namely the need to coordinate 
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a second argument, and it concerns the skills that are needed. We are talking 
about macro issues, not micro issues, and those skills you find in central banks. 
It is true that there is the political economy concern, but I would regard that   
as  a  concern  which  is  particularly  powerful  only  because  we  don’t  have   
a framework at present. If we had a more transparent and complete framework, 
then  perhaps  those  political  influences  would  be  easier  to  resist.  To  put  it 
more  bluntly,  the  institutional  framework  that  we  have  now  reflects  the 
intellectual dichotomy between monetary policy and financial stability policy.   
If  this  dichotomy  is  false,  then  the  institutional  framework  and  architecture 
should be reconsidered much more deeply. This is also because of the incentive 
issues, not just because of the required skills.
I will now turn to the ECB paper and the ECB approach. The question that I would   
like to address is whether the monetary pillar is really an alternative framework 
for the pursuit of financial stability. By that I mean whether it did indeed prevent 
an accumulation of leverage, a fall in risk and a surge in asset prices, and, if so, 
how. My answer is no, it is not really an alternative framework. The ECB paper 
argues that the monetary pillar improves stability of prices and output in the long 
run, but that is different from financial stability. In fact, the monetary pillar was 
not conceived to promote financial stability. It was conceived to improve inflation 
forecasts in the long run. Indeed, if the goal was financial stability, it is not clear 
why one would want to condition on money; in fact, the ECB paper considers 
credit, not money. Besides credit, one may want to condition on measures of the 
price of risk, such as interest rate spreads and margin requirements, which of 
course is not what the monetary pillar did.
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Source: Fischer et al. 2008.
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Finally, there is also evidence that the monetary pillar on its own was not so 
influential in driving interest rate decisions. Here I would like to show a chart 
from another ECB paper by another group of ECB economists (Fischer, Lenza, 
Pill and Reichlin) that supports this conclusion. In their research they look at the 
narrative of the ECB statements to quantify the monetary and economic pillar. 
Perhaps this is a better way to assess the evidence, because it is so difficult to 
estimate money demand shocks. The solid line in the graph represents the risks 
to price stability suggested by the monetary analysis, as reflected in the language 
used by the ECB President after each Council meeting. The triangles are the same 
indicators obtained from the economic analysis, also from the ECB statement, 
and the histograms are the changes in interest rates. 
As you can see, typically monetary and economic indicators move in the same 
direction. When they don’t, the economic analysis seems to be more important. 
This is certainly true for the period 2001-03, when the monetary analysis suggested 
no risk to price stability. Based on this graph it seems that maybe only in late 2005 
was there an instance in which the monetary pillar induced an earlier increase in 
interest rates than would otherwise have occurred. But overall, I would say that 
the monetary pillar was not something that significantly altered the framework 
relative to what I would describe as a form of flexible inflation targeting.
And now one last point on the management of the crisis. Here I agree with 
both  papers,  which  provided  a  very  rich  discussion  that  I  will  not  repeat.   
There is, however, a very important lesson to be drawn from the crisis that is not 
mentioned in either paper. It is the need to manage expectations. In situations of 
extreme uncertainty, such uncertainty may precipitate contagion, and lead to what 
Ricardo Caballero has called a sudden financial arrest. This is not surprising, 
because a crisis can be thought of as a situation of multiple equilibria. The good 
equilibrium  is  typically  supported  by  the  implicit  expectation  that  there  is  a 
lender of last resort that can provide insurance against sudden financial arrest. 
Disappointing the expectation is very, very dangerous. I think that was a mistake 
that was probably made in the early phase of the crisis in the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Perhaps it is a mistake that is going to be made now in Europe. 
This mistake reflects a genuine dilemma among policy-makers regarding whether 
to bail out institutions to prevent contagion, or avoid creating incentives for moral 
hazard in the future. But I think this is to some extent a false dilemma, because 
moral hazard should be addressed by regulation, not by the threat of withholding 
insurance. If you withhold insurance you really risk precipitating the crisis. 
This is an important lesson for Europe, because there is a fundamental fragility   
in the euro area that comes from the separation of monetary and fiscal policy. 
This separation implies that central banks cannot easily act as lenders of last 
resort to stop a sudden financial arrest in the worst case scenario, and of course 
this raises the risk of a sovereign debt crisis. It is a relevant lesson to bear in 
mind, because the main threat will not come from the housing market now; it 
will come from sovereign debt. It may still be that we have other lessons to learn 
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To summarise, the main points I want to stress are first, that we should preserve 
the inflation targeting framework, although with some adaptations. Second, we 
should work hard on developing a framework in which financial stability can be 
managed with policy tools other than the interest rate. Third, I don’t think that the 
ECB monetary pillar was really an alternative framework. And finally, central 
banks should be able to provide insurance against a sudden financial arrest.
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COMMENT
BY WILLIAM R. WHITE, OECD
1  INTRODUCTION 
I wish to begin with a crucial introductory point. According to all of the models 
commonly in use at central banks and international financial institutions, this 
crisis was not supposed to happen. Indeed, it could not happen. Modern macro 
models such as the New Classical, New Keynesian, and DSGE models rule 
out extended economic disequilibria by assumption. More traditional structural 
models  rule  out  such  outcomes  inadvertently  by  paying  too  little  (if  any) 
attention to the factors now commonly believed to have both precipitated the 
crisis and to have contributed to its longevity. Here I am referring to the whole 
gamut of credit, leverage, stocks (especially of debt), and the gradual build-up   
(now unwinding) of “imbalances” in the real economy. 
By “imbalances” I mean asset prices that rose to levels that were increasingly 
hard to explain in terms of fundamentals, as well as financial institutions that 
became exposed to a variety of risks that threatened their solvency. The dangers 
posed by these financial imbalances are now being addressed in the context of 
the broader search for “financial stability”. However, other imbalances also built 
up, affecting the real side of the global economy. Household savings rates in 
English-speaking countries (and some others) fell to zero, and sometimes well 
below. Fixed investment ratios in China rose to over 50% of GDP, a level never 
seen before in market-based economies. And, as a by product of these domestic 
imbalances, global trade imbalances also rose to unprecedented levels. Finally, as 
supply responded to demand-side pressures, whole industries expanded beyond 
sustainable levels (construction, financial services, global distribution networks, 
etc.), implying a need for subsequent downsizing. These real-side imbalances are 
still not receiving the attention they deserve.
The crisis was triggered in the summer of 2007 by the recognition of problems 
in the financial sector, but could just as easily have started on the real side of 
the economy. Whatever the trigger, the fundamental point is that the imbalances 
on the real and financial sides interact in both the upswing (“boom”) and the 
downswing (“bust”) of the credit cycle. While some of the imbalances revealed 
by  the  crisis  have  subsequently  been  reduced,  most  of  them  still  remain.   
This is the fundamental reason for doubting the robustness and sustainability of 
the recovery seen recently in the global economy.
Of course, the fact that commonly used models failed to foresee the crisis was 
only part of the broader analytical failure. If crises cannot happen, there is no 
need for pre-emptive action to prevent them. Nor is there any need for ex ante 
measures to improve crisis management (appropriate insolvency laws for both 
banks and other entities, Memoranda of Understanding between official bodies, 
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without an understanding of the deep roots of the crisis, there was also a tendency 
for insolvency problems to be first misdiagnosed as liquidity problems, and for 
any positive economic indicators to be interpreted wrongly as the “green shoots” 
of a lasting recovery.
So we need a profound re-evaluation of how our modern economies work, and of 
the role of money and credit in such economies.1 In effect, we need to reopen the 
Keynes-Hayek debate of the 1930s, which effectively pitted a one-period model 
(Keynes), which focused on how to get out of a deep slump, against a multi-
period model (Hayek), which focused, quite differently, on the dynamics of how 
the economy got into such a terrible muddle in the first place. And I would add 
that attention to some of the insights of Minsky 2 (how stability breeds instability) 
and Koo 3 (on balance sheet recessions) would not go amiss either.
Evidently, such a re-evaluation could have profound implications for monetary 
strategy. However, just how profound, for any given central bank, would depend 
very much on what it believed before the crisis. I would contend that the beliefs 
of  central  banks  actually  differed  significantly  before  the  crisis  arrived,  and 
that these differences contributed at times (for example in the summer of 2008)   
to significant differences in policy stance.4 While there are many reasons for 
these differences between central banks, history has certainly had an important 
role to play. Let me expand.
The Federal Reserve seems to have a “one pillar” strategy, which relies on the 
output gap to drive inflation. The insurance policy they commonly refer to is 
insurance against deflation. This reflects the fact that the Great Depression was 
historically the defining economic moment for the United States. In contrast, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) has a “two pillar” strategy (the gap pillar and 
the monetary pillar), and has traditionally been on the lookout for inflationary 
pressures. I think this reflects the fact that the defining historical moment for 
Europeans  (the  legacy  of  the  Bundesbank)  was  the  hyperinflation  in  central 
Europe  in  the  1920s.  Finally,  the  Bank  of  Japan  has  a  strategy  based  on   
“two perspectives”. As with the other central banks, the first perspective relates 
prospective  inflationary  pressures  to  the  output  gap.  However,  the  second 
perspective  involves  looking  out  for  signs  of  “imbalances”  and  bubble-like 
behaviour leading eventually to a bust and deflation. It is in effect a pledge not 
to repeat the Japanese excesses of the 1980s, and is thus very different from a 
traditional interpretation of the second pillar of the ECB. Against the backdrop of 
these fundamental differences, it is very hard to see how the conduct of monetary 
policy can be described as a “science”, as many (largely American) economists 
seem inclined to do. 
My own belief is that excessive credit/monetary creation is at the heart of all the 
problems feared by these different central banks. Moreover, each of them is right, 
1  For a fuller discussion of such issues see White (2010).
2  Minsky (1992). 
3  Koo (2009). 
4  For a fuller discussion, see White (forthcoming).126 WHITE
though they fear different things, since historically some episodes of excessive 
credit expansion have led to inflation while other episodes (via imbalances and 
eventual busts) have led to deflation. It is like a horse race, with the winner being 
revealed only at the end. These views about the importance of credit seem to be well 
supported by the historical analysis carried out by those such as Bordo and Filardo 
(2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), and Eichengreen 
and Mitchener (2003), as well as research carried out by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) 5 and the International Monetary Fund (2008, 2009).
Let me now turn to the two papers I am going to discuss. One is by Rick Mishkin, 
who has had a long and close association with the Federal Reserve System, and the 
other is by staff members of the European Central Bank. Without questioning their 
objectivity, I must first note that both wind up strongly supporting the basic positions 
of their respective institutions. That said, both are excellent papers. The Mishkin 
paper  is  more  wide-ranging,  but  the  ECB  paper  is  particularly  insightful  and 
innovative in dealing with the more limited number of issues it chose to address.
2  COMMENTS ON THE PAPER BY RICK MISHKIN
In important respects, Mishkin seems rather unrepentant. He states that “the 
case for the basic monetary policy strategy (flexible inflation targeting)... is still 
as strong as ever”. In light of the magnitude and depth of the crisis, this seems,   
at first glance, astonishing. However, he then goes on almost immediately to say 
that we require “major rethinking regarding the details of the basic framework”. 
Since the devil is always in the details, let me turn to some of his suggestions 
about possible changes to monetary policy strategy. Here I distinguish between 
lessons for the “leaning” phase (the upswing of the credit cycle) and lessons for 
the “cleaning” phase (the downswing of the credit cycle).
2.1   LESSONS FOR THE “LEANING” PHASE
Mishkin makes a number of points with which I agree. His description of how 
monetary policy can contribute to credit excesses via the “risk-taking channel” 
is  something  that  my  former  colleague  at  the  BIS,  Claudio  Borio,  has  been 
writing about for years.6 I also agree that a clearly articulated and credible policy 
commitment to leaning against financial excesses could well steer behaviour in a 
stabilising direction.7 After all, is that not what we believe happened after central 
banks became serious about resisting inflation?
I  also  agree  that  identifying  credit  bubbles  is  a  lot  easier  than  identifying 
irrational exuberance bubbles. I must add, however, that at the BIS our analysis 
of emerging problems was always couched in terms of credit rather than asset 
prices. To put it differently, we always felt that it was important to deal with 
5  The BIS has published an immense amount of work on these general themes. For a careful 
look at one aspect of the historical record, see Borio and Filardo (2004).
6  See Borio and Zhu (2008).
7  As suggested in a previous paper. See White (2006).127 COMMENT SESSION 1
the  underlying  causes  of  imbalances  rather  than  focus  on  just  one  of  their 
many symptoms. Indeed, the vigour with which this narrow asset-price theme 
was pursued before the crisis may have reflected a more sinister motivation.   
By creating a straw man, it would evidently be easier to undermine the arguments 
for  the  more  fundamental  rethink  of  the  policy  framework  that  we  were 
suggesting.
I must, however, also disagree with Mishkin on a number of points. He refers 
(as did Chairman Greenspan) to what we have just gone through as “a once-in-
a-century credit tsunami”. And he adds that that, in light of this rare event, “The 
case for leaning... has therefore become much stronger”. This is simply not true. 
The historical analysis to which I referred earlier shows that credit-driven bubbles 
occur with very high frequency and cause enormous damage – whether the result 
is rising inflation or deflation or just general stagnation. The fundamental policy 
error in the United States derived, then, not only from a failure to learn from 
the history of economic thought, but also a failure to take the right lessons from 
economic history.
On one other matter concerning policy in the upswing, I am not sure whether I 
disagree with Mishkin or not, since he seems to say two contradictory things. 
On the one hand, he argues against monetary policy playing a role in resisting 
credit  excesses,  and  potentially  leading  to  financial  instability,  since  “one 
instrument is being asked to do two jobs”. On the other hand, he stresses, that the 
distinction between price stability and financial stability is not only overdrawn, 
but wrong. I agree with this latter point. The underlying problem is a macro 
problem: excessive credit, leading to excessive real growth, and potentially to 
both inflation and imbalances, each of which could lead to financial instability. 
Leaning against one is to lean against them all, even if this obviously implies 
more “fuzziness” in achieving all three objectives, given only one instrument. 
Mishkin is also right in suggesting that the responsibility for such macro policy 
decisions should be in the hands of the central bank, and that macro-prudential 
policies (more instruments) must be very important complements to the use of 
monetary policy.
Finally, with respect to “leaning”, I think Mishkin’s analysis misses a crucial 
point in that it justifies leaning against financial imbalances solely in terms of 
avoiding financial instability. As noted above, real-side imbalances are equally 
costly to the economy. Indeed, it is the interaction of real-side imbalances with 
financial imbalances that commonly cause such huge losses in the “bust” phase 
of credit cycles. As households and corporations cut back spending in the face 
of accumulated debt, we are confronted with what Keynes called the “paradox 
of saving”. Similarly, as exposed lenders cut back, we are confronted with what 
Fisher called the “paradox of deleverage”. Interacting with each other, these 
constitute powerful forces pushing the economy away from full employment 
equilibrium.
The influence of real-side imbalances are also attested to by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009). They note that over half of the crises they looked at began on the real side 
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recession affected the capacity of borrowers to repay. They also note numerous 
cases in history where the real economy suffered badly even though the financial 
sector seemed to be in a relatively good state of health. The experience of my 
home country, Canada, during the Great Depression is a good example of this 
phenomenon.
2.2   LESSONS FOR THE “CLEANING” PHASE
In spite of his more positive comments on “leaning”, Mishkin still seems to 
believe that “cleaning” is a better alternative – if done properly. To this end, 
he suggests a pre-emptive reduction in interest rates when the probability of a 
financial crisis rises above some threshold. I think this would not work for at 
least four reasons.
First, if the imbalances are building up on the real side of the economy then 
looking primarily at financial indicators would be looking in the wrong place. 
Second, during credit booms, the financial sector generally looks in fantastic 
shape right up until the “Minsky moment”, when everything changes. This means 
that identifying the appropriate time to ease would not be easy. Third, lowering 
interest rates at the height of a boom would only encourage more risk-seeking 
behaviour. And fourth, Mishkin’s “risk management” seems suspiciously like 
Chairman Greenspan’s “risk management paradigm”, which I believe contributed 
significantly to our current problems in the first place.
On a similar note, Mishkin also fails to mention an important fact. Whatever its 
possible merits in encouraging near-term increases in aggregate demand, there 
are also many downsides to aggressive monetary easing in the bust phase of a 
credit bubble. One possible consequence is that it will just encourage another 
unsustainable  bubble.  Indeed,  as  we  speak,  fears  are  increasing  over  asset 
price increases globally (with the exception of house prices in some important 
countries) and over massive capital flows to emerging markets. Another concern 
is that low interest rates encourage “zombie” companies and “zombie” banks that 
reduce aggregate productivity growth in turn. Low savings rates and misallocated 
capital can reduce potential growth even further. While I have no time here 
to go into the details, let me say for the record that I believe such forces have 
contributed  significantly  to  Japan’s  secular  stagnation.  Put  differently,  these 
issues are not so unimportant that they can be safely ignored by policy-makers.
Finally, Mishkin provides some comments on inflation targets and price-level 
targets going forward. On the former, I agree with him that Blanchard’s recent 
suggestion  (a  throwaway  comment,  to  be  fair)  –  that  we  should  raise  our 
inflation targets to provide more room for interest rates to fall in downturns – is 
not acceptable.8 Not only does higher inflation have significant costs, but also 
Blanchard’s suggestion again focuses on making it easier to clean up after a 
crisis rather than trying to avoid the problem in the first place. As for price-
level targets, Mishkin seems to like them because they also allow more stimulus 
in downturns. However, it is instructive to look at the period 2003-07, when 
8  Blanchard et al. (2010). 129 COMMENT SESSION 1
inflation was constantly registering below both target and forecast. For those 
(like me) who think monetary policy was too easy during that period, a price-
level target would have made things even worse.
3  THE PAPER BY FAHR, MOTTO, ROSTAGNO, SMETS AND 
TRISTANI
This brings me to the ECB paper. Unlike Mishkin’s analysis, which focuses 
almost  totally  on  aggregate  demand,  this  paper  gives  much  more  balanced 
attention  to  demand-side  and  supply-side  issues.  While  my  introductory 
comments indicate that I am not the greatest fan of DSGE modelling, I found the 
authors’ decomposition of shocks extremely useful. Moreover, their analysis of 
the implications for policy was both interesting and important. 
I particularly welcome the attention to supply-side issues and how important 
supply shocks can complicate the strategy of monetary policy. For example, 
positive supply shocks push down prices, even as they increase demand. With 
time, however, the latter phenomenon is likely to get out of hand (given monetary 
accommodation), and this could potentially push prices back up above desired 
levels. This is one rationale for the ECB looking past the immediate effect on 
prices to the potential longer-term effects.
The  observation  that  the  source  of  a  shock  matters  for  policy  is  not  only 
interesting, but also important. While the ECB paper is based on the use of a 
closed-economy model, it still throws light on a bigger problem. Globalisation 
led for a decade or more to significant downside pressure on world prices. The 
reaction in most central banks was to follow an easier than normal monetary 
policy. In a way this is curious. Given the rise in potential growth, and thus in 
the longer-term natural rate of interest, the very opposite reaction would seem 
to have been called for. Indeed, there is an extensive body of pre-war literature 9 
that argues for inflation targets to be reduced in response to such productivity 
increases. In a nutshell, if prices “want to go down” and monetary policy refuses 
to let them, then monetary expansion creates the imbalances that lead to recession 
or worse. This was Hayek’s particular insight when (almost alone) he predicted 
the Great Depression in the United States.10
Another interesting question raised in this paper has to do with communications 
policy. It comes up in the discussion of the medium-term orientation of the 
ECB. It is also raised in the discussion of the use of non-standard instruments, 
where the authors repeatedly note that the ECB (unlike the Federal Reserve) 
never offers “pre-commitments” concerning future changes in the policy rate. 
The authors apparently agree (not surprisingly in their assumed world of rational 
9  This body of literature was well summarised by Selgin (1997). For a more recent analysis, 
see Beckworth (2008).
10  This is well described in Haberler (1986). While many believed in the 1920s that the stability 
of US prices meant the business cycle had been abolished, “Hayek demurred; he argued that 
under the smooth surface of stable prices basic maladjustments were bound to develop that 
would eventually lead to a severe crisis”.130 WHITE
expectations) that pre-commitment can be a very powerful monetary instrument. 
However, once one allows for supply-side shocks, that same power can lead to 
very bad outcomes as well as good ones. I found their counterfactual simulations 
about the use of such policies by the ECB in the late 1990s very convincing.
The  paper  also  contains  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
communication strategy when it was raising policy rates in a “measured” way 
between  2003  and  2007.  Apparently,  it  was  worried  that  a  more  aggressive 
tightening might tip the economy into deflation, even though it was also aware 
that much of the downside risk to prices was arising from supply-side shocks. 
This  in  itself  might  lead  one  to  question  the  appropriateness  of  the  Federal 
Reserve’s policy, but it is possible there was another important downside. With 
the  yield  from  maturity  transformation  constantly  declining,  but  with  clear 
“communication” implying an even greater reduction in the risks associated with 
the carry, there was a strong incentive to increase leverage. This might well have 
contributed to the severity of the subsequent financial meltdown.
The  role  of  the  second  monetary  pillar  is  illustrated  in  the  paper  through 
simulations using a Taylor type rule, augmented with a “monetary” variable 
(deviations from trend of credit to the non-financial sector). It is demonstrated 
that such a rule leads to better economic performance than a rule without such 
a variable, and that it also dominates a standard Taylor rule premised on a more 
aggressive response to deviations of inflation from target.
However, the substitution in their work of “credit” for “money” raises a truly 
fundamental question. What is the second pillar for? Is it just another indicator of 
latent inflationary pressures (money growth predicts inflation at low frequencies), 
or is it rather an indicator of the dangers of a boom-bust cycle (credit growth 
leading to “imbalances”) and potential deflation? And does the answer to this 
question have implications for the conduct of monetary policy, or not?
I will touch only briefly on the issue of the ECB’s approach to the use of non-
standard instruments in responding to the crisis. The single most important point 
that emerges is that the ECB’s approach differs from that of the Federal Reserve 
in a number of ways. First, the authors contend that non-standard instruments 
were a complement to standard monetary policy for the ECB, but were used by 
the Federal Reserve as a substitute only after standard policy had reached its 
limits. Second, the ECB lent only to the banking sector while the Federal Reserve 
purchased  the  liabilities  of  non-financial  corporations.  Third,  to  facilitate  an 
“exit” from the non-standard measures, the ECB conducted only repos whereas 
the Federal Reserve made outright purchases. Fourth, as already noted, the ECB 
made no pre-commitments on policy rates, whereas the Federal Reserve did.
I do not feel qualified to comment on the merits of each institution’s position. 
I would only note that the evident differences between them indicate that they 
were  certainly  not  guided  by  the  “science”  of  monetary  policy.  Of  course, 
this cannot be considered a shortcoming, for the ECB at least, since they did 
not consider the use of these non-standard instruments to be an instrument of 
monetary policy in the first place.131 COMMENT SESSION 1
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Otmar Issing (Center for Financial Studies) stressed that the ECB was never 
part of the “Jackson Hole” consensus on monetary policy strategy. In his view 
the ECB is the only central bank to have fully embraced Mishkin’s principle 1   
(“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”). Tabellini was 
right in his assertion that the monetary pillar was not invented for financial 
stability purposes, but very early on these considerations were incorporated into 
the monetary analysis. In particular, the ECB also looks at credit and not just at 
M3. Issing expressed the concern that a policy that is asymmetric towards asset 
prices could result in a sequence of ever greater bubbles. Central banks should 
avoid  identifying  bubbles  in  individual  assets,  but  rather  look  at  aggregate 
money and credit. In his view there is no conflict between the monetary pillar 
and leaning against the wind. He concluded: “Welcome, Rick – you have arrived 
where we started years ago”. 
Thomas  Hoenig  (Kansas  City  Fed)  disagreed  with  Mishkin’s  view  that 
prudential policies are more subject to political pressure than monetary policy. 
In his view both policies become very political in the crunch. On the issue of 
quantitative easing he characterised himself as “multi-period oriented”. That is, 
he is concerned not only about its current effects, but also about the long run. 
It is hard to withdraw the stimulus at the right time, and withdrawing it too late 
creates conditions for a subsequent crisis.
Jacques  Cailloux  (Royal  Bank  of  Scotland)  referred  to  the  nonlinearities 
in financial markets identified by Mishkin and Tabellini, and asked them to 
elaborate on which responses on the part of central banks to the current crisis 
on  the  periphery  of  Europe  would  satisfy  the  conditions  of  being  “timely   
(pre-emptive), decisive and flexible”.
Smets agreed that the crisis gives rise to risks owing to an extended use of central 
bank instruments and their interaction with fiscal policy. For that reason a clear 
policy  framework  with  a  focus  on  medium-term  price  stability  is  important.   
He argued that separate institutions or frameworks are needed for price stability 
and financial stability (although with the central bank playing an important role 
in the latter). The fact that the frictions impinging on price stability and financial 
stability are different calls for the use of separate tools. In response to Pisani-
Ferry’s criticism that some of the counterfactuals without full allotment are too 
extreme, Smets explained that the whole point of the counterfactual exercise was 
to show outcomes which we do not see in the data, but which may have been 
possible without the forceful response of policy-makers. 
Mishkin agreed that cleaning up after crises creates moral hazard and recognised 
that low interest rates can (though not always) fuel leverage cycles. This may be 
an issue now in some emerging countries, e.g. China. Regarding the monetary 
pillar, he recalled that it was originally focused on inflation. His main reason for 
scepticism was that if money supply changes are the signal and money velocity 
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very low. Regarding a broader definition of the monetary pillar, he agreed with 
the concern about credit imbalances but disagreed with calling it a ‘monetary 
pillar’. He called for abandoning the label of ‘monetary pillar’, which may be 
distracting, and focusing on what is important, i.e. identifying risks to financial 
stability.  Standard  monetary  aggregates  may  only  be  imperfect  indicators  of 
such risks. For example, in the United States there is a large shadow banking 
sector,  and  monetary  aggregates  are  certainly  not  important  there.  Miskhin 
agreed with Hoenig’s concerns about the long run and expressed regret that the 
Federal Reserve has not adopted a long-run framework, such as explicit inflation 
targeting. Mishkin agreed with Tabellini’s comments on the pros and cons of 
having one institution in charge of both monetary policy and macro-prudential 
supervision, and referred him to the Squam Lake Report (French et al. (2010)). 
Mishkin said he was never sure what Greenspan meant by risk management.   
It was right to be expansionary in the wake of the 1998 LTCM bankruptcy, but it 
was a huge mistake not to reverse this policy later on. He stressed that the moral 
hazard problem is pervasive, since no country will fail to bail out systemically 
important institutions.
Mishkin agreed with Pisani-Ferry that the basic principles of monetary policy 
were established before the 1990s and that there was an element of a wrong turn 
in the post-1990 research. In particular, he was never a fan of the representative-
agent framework, which can be a trap. However, he warned that the current 
backlash against economic theory is making many economists switch to thinking 
that  expectations  do  not  matter  at  all,  which  is  going  too  far  in  his  view.   
For example, some economists think fiscal stimulus will always work in the 
same way, regardless of the fiscal position. Mishkin agreed that the international 
dimension is very important and that policies appropriate for one country do have 
effects on others. However, he protested against comparing current quantitative 
easing,  which  is  clearly  appropriate  in  the  US  situation,  with  beggar-thy-
neighbour policies. He also touched upon the international dimension of policies 
within Europe: he pointed out that countries such as Ireland and Greece are 
being forced to pursue very contractionary fiscal policies. In this situation the 
ECB should, in his view, adopt an easier monetary policy, to help them and to 
compensate for the fiscal contraction.
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Economic history, or rather, a certain reading of economic history is playing 
a  key  role  in  shaping  policy  responses  to  the  current  “sub-prime”  crisis.   
This is, in part, due to the feeling, expressed for instance in President Trichet’s 
remarks at this conference, that economic theory was taken by surprise at the 
beginning of the crisis and policy-makers were forced to act in a vacuum where 
the work of economic historians or economists inspired by history provided, 
if not a guidebook, at least relevant insight. This approach was pioneered by 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and expanded more recently into a multi-pronged 
body of literature, in which contributions such as Bernanke and James (1991) on 
financial and credit channels as well as that of Eichengreen (1992) on the role 
of exchange rate regimes and monetary rules represent important contributions.   
A pressing policy question put to economic historians these days is whether or 
not we have found the adequate policy instruments to contain episodes of panic 
such as the ones that have erupted repeatedly during the sub-prime crisis.
This question is a difficult one to ask as the crisis seems to be defying repeated 
attempts to address it once and for all. In fact, the development of the crisis raises 
further interesting questions and it is to be predicted that just as readings of the 
past have encouraged a certain perspective on the current crisis, the current crisis 
will lead to reinterpretation of the past. One issue is that of relevant historical 
parallels. Parallels in economic history are never perfect but they are intended to 
provide added insight. One such parallel is put forward by Gorton (2009), who 
suggests that the relevant parallel is not the inter-war crisis but rather the crises of 
the 19th century. According to Gorton: “The events starting in August 2007 are a 
banking panic. But unlike the historical banking panics of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, the current banking panic is a wholesale panic, not a retail panic. In the 
earlier episodes, depositors ran to their banks and demanded cash in exchange 
for their checking accounts. Unable to meet those demands, the banking system 
became  insolvent.  The  current  panic  involved  financial  firms  ‘running’  on 
other financial firms by not renewing sale and repurchase agreements (repo) 
or  increasing  the  repo  margin  (‘haircut’),  forcing  massive  deleveraging,  and 
resulting in the banking system being insolvent.” 
I argue that the parallel is in fact even closer than suggested by Gorton, who had 
the US banking system in mind, if (and perhaps more adequately when it comes 
to discussing ECB policy) we use the European experience instead and focus on 
panics in the London money market during the 19th century. I find it particularly 
valuable to draw a systematic parallel between the current crisis and the 1866 
“Overend Gurney Panic” that stormed the London money market and led the 
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“new wisdom” on central bank policy during crises, encapsulated in Bagehot’s 
teachings (1873). As I proceed to argue, the crisis of 1866 was very much a 
wholesale run. Plus, it was associated with the growth of a “shadow banking 
system” that presented the Bank of England with some thorny policy issues.   
The way it was dealt with has much relevance for today.
The  focal  point  of  the  crisis  was  a  forerunner  of  the  modern  collateralised 
debt  obligation  (CDO)  known  at  the  time  as  “acceptances”.  Acceptances 
could be drawn by a bank anywhere in the world on another bank in London.   
The bank in London, after reviewing guarantees, “accepted” the bill. The bill was 
secured by the drawer’s credit and also, in the case of trade acceptances, by the 
consignment, which usually travelled on British boats and was subject to British 
commercial law, making the seizure of the collateral easier. The acceptances 
could have many maturities, but those with short maturities came to dominate the 
market. This market was operated by “bill brokers”, which were really money 
market funds. They acted as brokers for “parcels” of acceptances (a collection of 
bills which they structured) and also offered to collect the funds of banks with 
liquid balances (as well as financial institutions, corporations and even foreign 
“sovereign funds”) at competitive interest rates, which they then used to invest 
in bills. As a result, those money market funds could be leveraged to quite some 
extent (although the numbers may appear small by modern standards): up to 10 or 
15 times the bill brokers’ own capital. Of course, there was an incentive to spice 
up returns by investing in riskier, longer-term or less liquid instruments, thus 
increasing the vulnerability of this “shadow banking system” to liquidity shocks. 
At the same time, the reputation of bill brokers was a major source of revenue   
(it determined their ability to attract funds) and this discouraged risk-taking. 
At the beginning of the 1847 crisis, for instance, it was said that the house of 
Overend Gurney, then the largest and most prestigious bill broker, managed to 
attract funds from institutional investors seeking safety.
The  Bank  of  England  was  the  cornerstone  of  this  system.  When  there  was 
anxiety in the money market (for instance, when commodity prices plummeted, 
raising fears regarding the credit of intermediaries and the value of collateral),   
a wholesale run occurred in a fashion that foreshadowed the run on banks that 
have taken place at various stages of the present crisis. At that stage, bill brokers 
at large were confronted by many withdrawals. To meet liquidity needs, they 
turned to the Bank of England to whom they sold (or “re-discounted”, which 
was the expression used at the time) acceptances. They also undertook repo 
operations with the Bank of England, pledging eligible securities such as British 
or certain colonial government bonds. This occurred during the crisis of 1847 and 
again during the crisis of 1857.
The Bank of England worried that, in so doing, it was really encouraging moral 
hazard  and  the  Bank  gradually  lost  control  of  the  shadow  banking  system. 
The availability of the Bank of England’s discount and repo window in crises 
encouraged higher levels of risk-taking. This evolved into an increasingly hostile 
relationship  between  the  Bank  of  England  and  the  bill  brokers,  intensifying 
during the 1860s. Overend Gurney sought to establish that the Bank of England 
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by brutally withdrawing its deposits with the Bank and forcing the Bank to 
abruptly tighten monetary policy. In retaliation, the Bank of England announced 
that it would begin discriminating against those bill brokers that would not have 
access to its credit facilities in normal times and began monitoring them with the 
help of specific files (Flandreau and Ugolini (2010)).
The international trade boom of the 1850s and 1860s was supported by the rise of 
money market funds that sought to avail of the facilities in London and increased 
the pressure on the Bank of England. Several bill brokers, prominently Overend 
Gurney, started expanding into new areas. For instance, as a result of debtors’ 
failures,  Overend  Gurney  found  itself  in  possession  of  several  loss-making 
commercial fleets operating in the Mediterranean, which it proved unable to 
reorganise. Tension escalated when, as the boom was losing steam and as prices 
of certain commodities such as cotton started to collapse (a result of the end of 
the US civil war), Overend Gurney raised doubts regarding the creditworthiness 
of  several  bill  brokers.  In  early  May,  Overend  Gurney  approached  the   
Bank of England. When it became known that the Bank had refused to support 
Overend  Gurney,  a  massive  panic  ensued  in  the  form  of  a  wholesale  run. 
Banks  removed  funds  from  bill  brokers  and  from  one  another.  They  sought 
refuge by depositing money at the Bank of England. At the same time, those 
financial institutions that were subject to withdrawals were forced to approach   
the Bank of England.
New data collected by Flandreau and Ugolini (2010) show how this occurred. 
The Bank of England suspended the rules of the gold standard and used the 
newly acquired freedom to provide massive support to customers in the form 
of  re-discounts  (outright  purchases  of  acceptances)  and  advances  (repos  of 
securities).  In  particular,  bill  brokers  received  substantial  amounts  of  money 
(about  one  third)  and  so  did  bankers  (another  third).  The  rest  was  for  the 
“regular” customers of the Bank of England (i.e. those who dealt with the Bank 
of England in normal times, meaning that the Bank had detailed information on 
them – at that time central banks also had commercial bank functions). Bank 
of England support operations were provided at very high interest rates: in two 
days, the nominal interest rate for Bank of England re-discounts was raised from 
6% to 10%. As a result of the massive interventions, the balance sheet of the   
Bank of England expanded substantially, increasing by close to 25% in only a 
few days. Investment in securities (bills and others) increased massively. This 
was largely financed through an increase in deposits at the Bank of England, but 
also, to a smaller extent, by note issues.
The  parallel  between  this  and  the  events  following  the  collapse  of  Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 is probably too obvious to require further discussion, 
given  space  constraints.  It  may  thus  be  more  interesting  to  focus  on  the 
differences. First, there were differences in outcome. While initially described 
in a language reminiscent of a more modern experience – King (1936) writes 
that it is “impossible to describe the terror and anxiety which took possession of 
men’s minds for the remainder of that and the whole of the succeeding day”   – the 
Overend Gurney crisis took a rather different turn. During the few weeks when 
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revealing information and facilitating orderly settlement. The panic subsided. 
By the end of the summer, the Bank of England’s balance sheet had returned to 
more normal levels.
This is in stark contrast with the current situation. Three important aspects may 
be identified to account for this difference. The first is the type of instruments that 
were taken on by the Bank of England. These comprised short-term instruments 
that were, as the expression went, “self-liquidating”, meaning that information on 
their true worth was not a distant test since maturity was never more than a few 
days or weeks ahead. In other words, the Bank of England provided forbearance, 
but it did not really stand in the way of information production. Today, by contrast, 
massive purchases by leading central banks of instruments with long maturities 
(such as mortgage-backed instruments) have contributed to the lack of information 
on the actual worth of structured products. Forbearance, combined with long-term 
maturities, may be seen to produce a kind of “lemons problem”, which (compared 
with the Bank of England’s experience with addressing crises in a few weeks) has 
stood in the way of a quick and sustained revival of interbank markets.
A second difference has to do with the extent to which central banks have access 
to  information.  Exploring  structural  differences  between  pre-crisis  and  crisis 
portfolios  of  investment  in  acceptances  by  the  Bank  of  England,  Flandreau 
and Ugolini (2010) find that crisis lending during 1866 was not a step into the 
unknown. Many more customers did receive many more funds, but the funds 
they received were the counterpart of a greater intake of the usual instruments. 
In other words, the Bank of England was not entering into a new market, but 
rather providing more support to a market it knew well and with which it was 
fully  conversant.  Related to  this  was  the  fact  that  the  Bank  of  England had 
de facto regulatory powers. It monitored the position of individual banks and 
acceptors, and was thus equipped with the relevant technology to identify any 
localised drift. Had some acceptor extended lending too aggressively, its bills 
would have inevitably ebbed at the Bank window, leading to inquiry by the Bank. 
This  “normal  time”  monitoring  provided  a  technology  for  identifying  “good 
collateral” and was the counterpart to generous crisis lending. In other words, an 
unwritten rule of the time of Bagehot (implicit in the recommendation to lend on 
good collateral only) is that the generous lender of last resort should also be the 
regulator. This differs from the situation today.
A final difference between then and now is that the immediate reaction of the 
Bank  of  England  was  to  raise  the  interest  rate,  while  modern  central  banks 
have  followed  the  recommendation  by  Friedman  and  Schwartz  to  lower  it. 
The  modern  policy  is  usually  rationalised  in  reference  to  the  need  to  avoid 
deflation. 19th century monetary policy was motivated by the concern to restore 
competitive  conditions  in  money  markets.  When  crises  occurred,  banks  and 
other intermediaries stopped lending to one another. The flight to safety led them 
to increase deposits with the Bank of England. By raising the interest rate and 
refusing to pay interest on deposits, the 19th century Bank of England increased 
the opportunity cost of not lending (Bagehot called this a “fine on unreasonable 
timidity”). In other words, while monetary authorities accepted the task of acting 
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cost for market participants and for a short time period (Bignon, Flandreau and 
Ugolini (2009)).
This brief overview provides a number of lessons for the current crisis. One is 
that the current crisis represents a step into the unknown, as illustrated by the 
bloated  balance  sheets  of  the  ECB  and  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  Unlike 
their historical predecessors, the European and US central banks have moved 
into providing durable support to failing markets rather than applying policies 
to jump start them again. This obviously has to do with the more extensive 
mandate of modern central banks which, on top of being tasked with maintaining 
price stability, are under considerable political pressure to limit the economic 
damage brought about by financial crises. A second lesson is that the reason why 
19th-century central banks such as the Bank of England could be so generous 
during financial crises was that they were so powerful. As seen, the Bank of 
England,  in  practice,  combined  monetary  policy,  regulatory  and  competition 
authority. As a result, one is led to conclude that modern central banks have to 
achieve more with less.
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I focus my remarks on the implications of the monetary policy response to the 
crisis for inflation and/or deflation and discuss the following questions:
Have we successfully avoided deflation and a great depression in its wake? • 
Will the expansion of central banks’ balance sheets eventually result in  • 
unacceptable inflation?
Have  unconventional  measures  impaired  central  bank  credibility  and/or  • 
compromised central bank independence?
What are the potential lessons from history for central bank policies in the  • 
future?
1  HAVE WE SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED DEFLATION AND A GREAT 
DEPRESSION IN ITS WAKE?
Yes, we have.
With regard to deflation, consumer prices in the United States and the euro area 
fell for three months in a row after the crash of Lehman Brothers, then stabilised 
at the start of 2009 and have since recovered to their pre-Lehman levels. It is true 
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that raw material prices displayed much stronger deflation. But they also quickly 
moved back up. Some have even surpassed pre-Lehman levels.
With regard to avoiding another great depression, the three charts shown here 
demonstrate  that  the  initial  declines  in  industrial  production,  in  the  volume 
of international trade and in stock prices in 2008-09 were as great as or even 
greater than those that occurred during the Great Depression that started in 1929. 
However, they also show that these declines reversed after less than a year this 
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time, whereas it took more than three years of continued decline before the 
trough was reached in the 1930s.
In my opinion there are several reasons for the relative success of monetary and 
economic policies in coping with the recent crisis, as opposed to the great crisis 
of the inter-war period.
  This time, the economic dynamism of emerging markets – especially the  (i) 
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which comprise more than 40% of 
the world’s population and produce, adjusted for purchasing power parity, 
almost one-quarter of world GDP – contrasted sharply with the role played 
by peripheral countries during the inter-war period. The latter had already 
been  in  crisis  since  1925  (Kindleberger  (1986),  Rothermund  (1996), 
Aldcroft (1977)). During the recent crisis, emerging markets’ dynamism 
played a prominent role in keeping the incipient depression in check and 
thus contributed strongly to supporting expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy measures in OECD countries.
  Decision-makers this time were aware of the much studied monetary and  (ii) 
fiscal  policy  mistakes  that  were  made  during  the  Great  Depression  of 
the 1930s.
  This time an unprecedented degree of international cooperation of central  (iii) 
banks  and  governments  was  the  immediate  response.  During  the  inter-
war period (also known as the Second Thirty Years War from 1914 to 
1945) political antagonism, trade protectionism and the scramble for gold 
prompted by the resurrected gold standard all worked to preclude such 
cooperation.
  Central bankers and politicians alike demonstrated courage by breaching  (iv) 
standard rules of monetary and fiscal policies and resorting to unorthodox 
measures. Judgement prevailed over the rigid adherence to rules.
  This resulted in a broadside of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy  (v) 
measures  to  check  the  collapse  of  prices  and  of  effective  demand. 
The effectiveness of fiscal policy this time was higher than during the 
post-1929 Great Depression due to the much greater share of government 
expenditure in GDP.1
  This time the measures taken by central banks and their communicated  (vi) 
targets primarily aimed to prevent the anchoring of deflation expectations 
and to anchor inflation expectations at the desired level instead.
The usual indicators for medium and long-term inflation expectations in the euro 
area and the United States show that their range is close to the inflation targets 
set  by  the  ECB  and  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  respectively.  In  my  view, 
1  When  US  President  Herbert  Hoover  took  office  in  March  1929,  US  federal  outlays 
amounted  to  slightly  more  than  3%  of  GNP  (U.S.  Census  Bureau  (1975)).  In  2007,   
US federal government expenditure came to more than 20% of GDP.146 HOLTFRERICH
the concentration of monetary policy measures on anchoring these expectations 
at the desired levels has been the key to successfully avoiding deflation and 
prolonged depression. The Federal Reserve’s recent announcement and decision 
in favour of more quantitative easing again primarily aims to avoid deflation by 
helping to raise the extremely low inflation expectations.
Debt-financed fiscal policy measures supported monetary policy by anchoring 
price expectations on the deflation-safe side. But in doing so, the mere existence of 
a fiscal programme seems to have been more important than the actual size of the 
fiscal stimulus package. This can be seen in a German/American comparison.2
2  WILL THE EXPANSION OF CENTRAL BANKS’ BALANCE SHEETS 
EVENTUALLY RESULT IN UNACCEPTABLE INFLATION?
During the three-year span running from July 2007, i.e. the month before the 
financial crisis broke out, to July 2010 the balance sheets of the world’s two 
leading central banks expanded as follows:
Federal Reserve: from USD 868 billion to USD 2,329 billion (168%); • 
ECB: from €1,213 billion to €2,000 billion (65%). • 
During the same period (i.e. from July 2007 to July 2010) broad money supply 
(M2) in the two currency areas increased by almost exactly the same proportion:
United States: from USD 7,249 billion to USD 8,546 billion (17.9%); • 
euro area: from €7,064 billion to €8,337 billion (18.0%). • 
We  know  from  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1971)  that  broad  money  supply, 
not  central bank money as such, is the driving force behind inflation. But central 
bank money is the control lever for money creation by the banking system. 
It works best as a decelerator and less reliably as an accelerator of money creation 
by the financial sector.
Here is a less well-known example of divergent developments in central bank and 
broad money supply taken from monetary history in Germany during the Great 
Depression. James (1985) dubbed the expansion of the Deutsche Reichsbank’s 
balance sheet after the banking crisis of July 1931 “Luther’s secret reflation” 
(Hans  Luther  was  president  of  the  Reichsbank  at  that  time).  The  decline  in 
consumer and asset prices, however, continued.
As a lender of last resort measure, the Reichsbank had pumped liquidity into 
the  shattered  and  partially  collapsing  banking  system.  The  debt/deflation 
shrinkage of broad money supply in the sense of Fisher (1933) was thereby 
2  For data showing that the US fiscal stimulus package was much larger than the German   
(and even the EU) package, see Prasad and Sorkin (2009) and IMF (2009). Especially the 
latter publication offers explanations for these differences.147 PANEL STATEMENT
not halted. “Luther’s secret reflation” in combination with Chancellor Heinrich 
Brüning’s fiscal austerity failed. These measures did not even aim to reverse 
price expectations from deflation to price stability. Two years into the Great 
Depression, fears of inflation, triggered by inflation expectations of a populace 
allegedly hypersensitised by the experience of Germany’s post-First World War 
hyperinflation, were still shaping monetary and fiscal policies. It was Reichsbank 
liquidity created from 1933 onward under Hjalmar Schacht, who was at the helm 
of Germany’s central bank during the Hitler government until he was dismissed 
in early 1939, that permitted broad money supply to expand. This caused inflation 
after full employment had been re-attained in 1936 and afterwards.
The answer to this section’s question would only be yes if the recent flood of 
central bank money was not retracted at the right time, at the kairos in ancient 
Greek parlance. Too early retraction – out of fear of inflation – poses the threat 
of a double dip, a blunder that the Federal Reserve System committed in 1936-37 
(Meltzer (2003), Friedman and Schwartz (1971)). The time for unwinding arrives 
as soon as the financial system returns to its normal functioning and the economy 
gathers steam and approaches potential output, and before inflation expectations 
become anchored at too high a level.
Central banks will have to sell those government bonds and government-guaranteed 
securities that they bought when executing their unconventional measures in order 
to keep financial institutions and the economy afloat. They will have to quit playing 
the role of investment banks that they had in practice assumed during the crisis. 
There is no indication as yet that the market for government bonds, especially 
those of the United States and Germany (rated AAA), will not be able to absorb 
what the central banks will need to sell. And the rescue umbrella for the fiscally   
weak members of the euro area should suffice to enable the ECB to privatise again 
with a profit the Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and other government bonds that 
it purchased in support of those countries’ borrowing capacities.
Danger looms only if the creditworthiness of not only the poorly rated but also 
of  the  thus  far  best-rated  governments  becomes  heavily  impaired.  This  could 
happen, for example, via a large extension of accumulated debt financing of budget 
expenditures. Then, not only the rating, but also the quotation for government 
bonds could fall so low that a government could no longer afford to pay the interest 
on its borrowings. The central bank could thus be forced to abstain from shortening 
its balance sheet again, otherwise playing havoc with the financial, economic and – 
last but not least – the political system.3 Such circumstances could trigger inflation 
in the future. But in my view, the inflation probability remains extremely low.
3  After the First World War the Deutsche Reichsbank saw the need to shorten its balance 
sheet in order to avoid further inflation. But the financial, economic and political system 
was not to be endangered. The Reichsbank informed the German government that the 
continued issuance of Treasury bills to be discounted by the Reichsbank would fuel inflation 
further. It demanded an end to the huge deficit financing of government expenditures,   
but also expressed its loyalty as long as the German government was exposed to excessive 
reparation demands and payments (see Holtfrerich (1986)). Haller (1976) argued explicitly 
that the parliamentary system of the Weimar Republic would not have survived its stormy 
first few years without these inflationary policies.148 HOLTFRERICH
3  HAVE UNCONVENTIONAL MEASURES IMPAIRED CENTRAL 
BANK CREDIBILITY AND/OR COMPROMISED CENTRAL BANK 
INDEPENDENCE?
Central  bank  credibility  is  an  indispensable  pre-requisite  for  a  successful 
communication policy aimed at anchoring inflation expectations at a low level.
The unconventional measures taken to counter the recent financial crisis implied risks 
to credibility. The expansion of central banks’ balance sheets did, indeed, provoke 
some journalists and financial experts to resurrect the spectre of rampant inflation. 
But so far current and expected price developments have not supported this fear.
In Europe the most controversial unconventional measure and the biggest threat 
to  the  ECB’s  credibility  was  the  decision  taken  in  May  2010  to  buy  Greek 
government bonds irrespective of just how low they were rated. This action 
was  intended  to  save  the  Greek  government  from  bankruptcy  and  the  euro 
from collapse. The purchase of government bonds issued by other weak euro 
area countries started a week later. This came as a total about-face by the ECB 
compared with its position earlier in the year and was the result of an emergency 
conference with euro area governments.
The media reported this step as the heaviest blow to the ECB’s reputation so far, 
saying it would raise inflation expectations and weaken the euro even further. 
The ECB’s credibility would allegedly suffer on three counts:
the threat posed to the ECB’s independence from governments; • 
an inflationary increase of liquidity; • 
a significant deterioration in the quality of the ECB’s assets. • 
Polls  conducted  by  Allensbach  in  April  2010,  i.e.  one  month  before  the 
unconventional  measures  were  taken,  had  already  shown  that  confidence  in 
the euro had dropped considerably among the German population. Polls that 
followed revealed an even further decline of confidence in the euro.
While confidence in the future stability of the euro had crumbled in Germany, 
six months later the facts of the case demonstrated quite the opposite.
External stability: the euro has become stronger, not weaker. • 
Internal stability: an inflation rate of 1.9% (HICP in October 2010) in the  • 
euro area almost exactly hits the ECB’s price stability goal.
The  Greek  government  did  not  go  bust.  On  the  whole,  its  credit  conditions 
improved.  But  the  spread  between  the  rate  of  return  of  German  and  Greek 
government bonds is still a rollercoaster ride. Recently the spreads of Irish and 
Portuguese over German government bonds have reached alarming proportions.149 PANEL STATEMENT
From this we see that the ECB’s rescue measures for Greece and other weak 
euro members have had some positive effects, but not as much as had been 
hoped for. In my view, only significant progress towards political union can 
solve the problem. What is still missing is the “new stage in the process of 
European integration” that the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 referred to in the first 
sentence of its preamble. It was as clear then as it is now that a possible euro 
crisis should not trigger a rollback, but another “new stage in the process of 
European integration”. This could take the form of an agreement on the transfer 
of national sovereignty in fiscal policy to an “economic government” at EU or 
at least euro area level.
Three questions appear to be of interest in this context.
  Is the ECB’s independence impaired? (i) 
    I am not an insider. But I doubt it. Even an independent central bank is   
a  team  player  and  has  to  interact  with  other  economic  policy-makers, 
especially with those responsible for fiscal policy.4 And this is all the more 
true when the survival of a currency is at stake. Attempts by politicians to 
pressure a central bank are not the same as command-and-control by politicians, 
just as the virtually incessant admonitions and pressures exerted by central 
bankers on policy-makers do not undermine independent decision-making 
by governments.
Is there an inflationary increase of liquidity? (ii) 
    I have already dealt with this question above. So far the additional liquidity 
the ECB and the Federal Reserve have injected into the financial system 
during the crisis has not had inflationary consequences. On the contrary, 
and in contrast to the Great Depression following 1929, this action proved 
to be necessary and sufficient to thwart the imminent danger of deflation.
  What about bad assets? (iii) 
  Like in a private bank or household portfolio, one never really knows ex 
ante whether one has picked a good, bad or neutral asset. What could be a 
good asset for the private sector is not necessarily a good asset for a central 
bank because the latter’s primary responsibility is to protect and support 
the functioning of the currency, the financial sector as well as the economy 
and the state as a whole.
An example of this problem is the role gold played during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. For private businesses and households gold turned out to be an asset 
increasing in value as a result of competitive currency devaluations. For central 
banks, however, gold holdings mandated by the gold cover requirement under 
the re-established gold standard turned out to be a shackle that prevented central 
banks from acting in accordance with their true mandates.
4  I learned this lesson from Sargent (1990). 150 HOLTFRERICH
This point is best illustrated by the case of Germany up to its banking crisis in 
mid-July 1931, after which foreign exchange controls severed the link to the gold 
standard,5 and the case of the United States during its banking crisis of 1932 and 
up until Franklin D. Roosevelt released the US dollar from its “golden fetters” 
in 1933 (Eichengreen (1992)).
In my view, the quality of central bank assets must be judged by the outcome 
of central bank policy. Asset quality is excellent if – by whatever means – the 
stability of the currency (internal and external), of the financial sector, of the 
economy in terms of growth and employment and, last but not least, of the state 
and its democratic institutions is firmly secured on a sustained basis.
4  WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL LESSONS FROM HISTORY   
FOR CENTRAL BANK POLICIES IN THE FUTURE?
Experience from the 19th century and from the Great Depression that started 
at the end of the 1920s has taught us that an unfettered market economy yields 
socially  and  politically  unsustainable  results.  Thus,  the  Great  Depression 
transformed  especially  the  United  States  from  a  law-and-order  state  into  a 
welfare-and-interventionist state. Strong financial and industrial regulation was 
put in place to prevent the repetition of such a calamity.
The  world  economy  fared  better  than  ever  with  strongly  regulated  market 
economies until, in the 1970s, the belief in the superiority of unfettered markets 
over  state  intervention  and  consequently  deregulation  became  the  preferred 
blueprint  for  economic  policy.  At  that  time,  the  “commanding  heights”  of 
economic policy were conquered by Friedrich A. Hayek (and his Mount Pelerin 
Society), displacing John M. Keynes (Yergin and Stanislaw (1998)). Since then 
the trend of economic growth has been lower and unemployment higher, on 
average, than before (Maddison (2001), Holtfrerich (1999)).
Central banks became advocates of deregulation, such as the removal of controls 
on international capital movements, i.e. of globalisation, and the dismantling 
5  In order to defend the gold cover requirement and the fixed exchange rate of the Reichsmark, 
the Reichsbank raised its discount rate from 4.0% to 7.0% over the period from June 1930 
to June 1931, while price indices of all sorts kept falling. In addition, Germany’s central 
bank sharpened its credit restrictions on 10 July 1931 although it was well aware that 
this move would bring about the downfall of Danatbank, one of Berlin’s eight big banks 
(Habedank (1981)). A run on all banks ensued and led the government to proclaim bank 
holidays for 14 and 15 July 1931. While the banking crisis was exacerbating deflation,   
the Reichsbank kept raising its discount rate: to 10.0% on 16 July 1931 and to a peak of 15.0% 
on 1 August 1931. The Lombard rate, which traditionally had been kept only 1 percentage 
point above the discount rate, was raised to 15% and 20%, respectively, i.e. 5 percentage 
points above the already high discount rate at that time. With real interest rates consequently 
even higher than this, the Reichsbank actively contributed to intensifying deflation, with 
prices and production shrinking further and unemployment increasing from 4.5 million 
persons on average in 1931 to 5.6 million in 1932 (see also Irmler (1976)). Irmler (1976) 
states convincingly that the Reichsbank should never have left the banks with their liquidity 
needs in the lurch and that it was one of those fateful hours in which the written law, which 
the Reichsbank and Reich government decision-makers obeyed, evidently clashed with the 
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of the regulatory apparatus that had been put in place in the 1930s to prevent 
excesses  on  financial  markets  and  within  financial  institutions.  They  even 
neglected their own regulatory powers that lawmakers had not removed, such as 
margin requirements for security purchases or the control of mortgage lending in 
the sub-prime market.
Summing up, in my view, central banks have responsibly conducted their monetary 
policies using good judgement. However, they misjudged the importance of their 
own and other agencies’ regulatory powers. In the future central banks should 
promote the expansion of financial regulation and make greater use of their 
regulatory powers.
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THE GrEAT DEPrESSioN ANALoGy:   
iS iT DiffErENT THiS TiME?
by HAroLD JAMES, PriNcEToN UNivErSiTy
The short and rather obvious answer is yes, today is different (and better). We are 
not in a Great Depression, although for six months such an outcome did seem to 
be a possibility. Monetary policy was much better than in the Great Depression: 
in  particular,  the  lessons  about  central  banks  acting  as  lenders  of  last  resort 
(associated with Walter Bagehot) and about central banks stopping a collapse of 
the money supply (associated with Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz) have 
been learnt, with beneficial consequences.1  
But there are very strong parallels between the very intense phase of the global 
financial crisis, the events that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 and a particular and decisive part of the story of the Great 
Depression. A series of bank panics emanated from central Europe in the summer 
of 1931 and spread financial contagion to Great Britain and then, in September 
1931, to the United States and on to France and the whole world. The Great 
Depression was not a single phenomenon with a single cause; rather, what turned 
a bad business downturn into the Great Depression was a series of bank collapses 
in Europe that raised a different problem to that identified by Friedman and 
Schwartz in their study of the United States. US banks were mostly small, but 
the very large European banks had the “too big to fail” characteristics of large 
financial institutions in 2008. The problems of these large institutions set off an 
international wave of contagion.
Another striking feature of the 1931 crisis was the linkage between banking 
crises and fiscal problems. Large bank failures required unanticipated increases 
in  government  spending;  and  governments  found  the  financing  of  their  debt 
increasingly  precarious,  in  part  also  because  of  the  difficulties  banks  were 
confronted with.
It is not difficult ex post to explain the causes of the 1931 panic, in the same way 
as the 2008 vulnerability of Lehman Brothers is (in retrospect) very clear. Central 
European bank collapses during the Great Depression were the result of bank 
weakness in countries that had been wrecked by the aftermath of bad policies 
that produced inflation, hyperinflation and a destruction of banks’ balance sheets. 
Intrinsic  vulnerability  made  for  heightened  exposure  to  political  shocks,  and 
disputes about the political implications of a central European customs union and 
about the post-war reparations issue were enough to topple banks like a house 
of cards.
1  See Bagehot (1873) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963).154 JAMES
But finding a remedy for the damage done by banking crises (“cleaning up” 
in contemporary parlance) was very tough – and it still is. There are actually 
no obvious macroeconomic answers to financial distress. Consequently, in the 
past some famous macroeconomists, including Larry Summers, have tried to 
play down the role of financial sector instability in causing depressions.2 Policy-
makers of the early 1930s wrestled with the difficulties caused by financial sector 
failure. Their remedies were surprisingly modern: government recapitalisation of 
failed banks, transferring non-performing assets to “bad banks”, establishing new 
institutions to commercialise and be able to trade frozen debts as well as splitting 
up mega-banks and separating investment from commercial banks.  
The answers to banking crises never produce stunning miracles of rebounding 
vigour: rather, the remedy lies in the slow and painful cleaning-up of balance 
sheets  as  well  as  in  microeconomic  restructuring,  which  cannot  be  simply 
imposed from above by an all-wise planner, but requires many businesses and 
individuals to change their outlook and behaviour. The improvement in regulation 
and supervision, while a good idea, is better suited to avoiding future crises than 
dealing with the consequences of a catastrophe that has already occurred.
Many economists had presented a quite different sort of lesson from the Great 
Depression: that the macroeconomic fallout can easily be tackled by counter-
cyclical fiscal and monetary policy. And both these lessons were applied after 
2007 – successfully in the case of monetary policy, more problematically in the 
case of fiscal policy.
Monetary policy has been better than it was in the Great Depression because 
it has not been subject to the gold standard constraint. But central bank policy 
is becoming more contentious because it is drifting away from an exclusive 
focus on monetary policy. Once central banks get involved in issues of financial 
stability, in discussions of which problematical securities they should buy and 
in the reordering of failed or vulnerable institutions, they are closer to doing 
redistribution  than  they  are  if  they  simply  follow  a  rule-based  approach  to 
monetary policy. As a consequence, they are increasingly becoming subject to 
intense political scrutiny. 
First, there is the consequence of financial sector problems. Bursting bubbles 
inevitably turn the conventional wisdom of the boom periods on its head. Central 
bankers  used  to  be  heroes  (of  the  Great  Moderation  story).  Now  they  have 
become villains (of the Financial Crisis story). In the Great Moderation, central 
banks were primarily concerned with price stability and with monetary policy. 
The financial crisis, however, has brought an involvement with financial sector 
stability issues and with issues of credit allocation and credit policy. Banks can 
refinance themselves easily and cheaply (indeed almost for free) from central 
banks, while small businesses that cannot tap capital markets directly and have 
their own bonds find borrowing expensive or even impossible. Credit policy 
raises quite different questions of political economy than monetary policy does.
2  See DeLong and Summers (1986).155 PANEL STATEMENT
The second source of political pressure is that a financial and economic crisis 
brings adjustment costs. People are really upset by big price changes that seem 
to raise general questions about the stance of monetary policy. Over the past 
two years, market sentiment has shifted abruptly from a fear of deflation to a 
fear of inflation. The crisis has produced a profound shock, with some prices 
(especially  housing)  moving  down  sharply,  while  others  (notably  foodstuffs 
and  some  raw  materials)  have  increased.  The  movement  of  price  relations 
is  actually  an  important  part  of  the  adjustment  process:  that  is,  Americans 
should devote less of their resources to building and filling mega-size houses.   
But the price changes involved here are deeply discomforting: the goods whose 
prices  are  falling  represent  a  major  store  of  wealth,  since  people  view  their 
houses as a sort of source of cash; and the prices that are rising are a major part 
of daily expenditure.
As a consequence of the shift in emphasis from monetary policy to credit policy, 
central banks are subject to strong, and sometimes quite conflicting, political 
pressures. But even when political demands conflict, the complaints and demands 
are  actually  similar:  the  complaint  that  central  banks  are  too  internationally 
oriented and the demand that the central bank should act as a national carapace.   
If redistribution takes place, taxpayers will demand that it occur in a national 
setting and not involve international transfers: but such a demand undermines the 
logic of globalisation in which money moves – and in a European setting, it also 
runs counter to the demands of European integration.
In the course of his presidential campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy called for a weaker 
euro  in  order  to  resist  US  and  Asian  “dumping”;  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
financial crisis, as President of the French Republic, he complained that the 
ECB did not lower interest rates: “They have facilitated things for speculators, 
while complicating them for entrepreneurs”.3 From a different angle, German 
Chancellor  Angela  Merkel  criticised  quite  directly  the  ECB’s  purchases  of 
covered bonds, which she described as “bowing to international pressure”.4
Probably the most elaborately articulated, viscerally hostile response to central 
banking activity has been in the United States, where it feeds on a populist 
tradition that goes back to US President Andrew Jackson’s campaign against the 
Second Bank of the United States. Jackson is now cited as a model for effective 
political  action  in  dealing  with  the  financial  sector,  even  by  distinguished 
economists.5  At  the  end  of  July  2009,  the  Chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
System, Ben Bernanke, was grilled on the financial crisis before the United 
States Congress, and the result was a series of viral YouTube videos that bounced 
around the world’s electronic highways. From one side of the political spectrum, 
Republican Ron Paul accused Bernanke of causing inflation by buying Treasury 
bills. From the other side, more spectacularly and more aggressively, Florida 
Democrat Alan Grayson focused an attack on the previously rather obscure topic 
of central bank swaps. Exchanges of reserves on a short-term basis between 
3   See Financial Times (2007) and The Times (2007).
4   See Financial Times (2009).
5   See Johnson and Kwak (2010).156 JAMES
central banks historically constituted one of the smoothing elements in forex 
markets. After the Lehman crisis their volume expanded as part of the global 
effort to provide liquidity with repurchase arrangements that avoided foreign 
exchange risk. On 21 July 2009, Grayson asked Bernanke why the swaps on the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet had increased from USD 24 billion at the end of 
2007 to USD 553 billion in 2008 and which foreign institutions were benefiting 
from such loans. Then he picked one foreign central bank that had done a swap –   
New Zealand, which is tiny and on the other side of the world. Why was the 
Federal Reserve giving USD 9 billion (or USD 3,000 to each inhabitant) to New 
Zealand when the money could have been better spent on Americans suffering 
from the credit crunch? In these circumstances, people do not think about central 
banks as facilitators of payment systems, but as the producers of wealth which is 
available for spending. 
The  answer  about  fiscal  policy  is  not  as  clear  as  depicted  in  many  popular 
analyses either. It is not really true that the Great Depression was caused by bad 
governments led by foolish men who needlessly and recklessly imposed fiscal 
deflation. US President Herbert Hoover’s administration did not initially respond 
to the depression by emphasising the need for fiscal austerity. On the contrary, 
Hoover and other public figures argued in a perfectly modern, Keynesian fashion 
that large-scale public works programmes were needed to pull the economy out 
of the trough.
Today, we are more generally worried about fiscal difficulties than we were 
two  years  ago.  The  UK’s  policy  of  fiscal  consolidation,  recently  announced 
by Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, sent shock waves around the 
world. Osborne argued that the UK was on the brink: that there was no alternative 
to  his  policy  if  the  country  were  to  avoid  a  massive  crisis  of  confidence.   
Other countries, such as Greece, needed to have a full-blown crisis in order to 
prompt such adjustment measures, whereas the UK was acting prudently and   
pre-emptively. If the UK, with a relatively low share of public debt to GDP 
(64.6%), is worried, the implication is that many other countries should be much 
more concerned.
The major question today should be whether the failure of capital markets (and 
the implication for government debt) since 2007 has been as severe as during the 
Great Depression. At the moment, there is no widespread revulsion against all 
government debt, and some countries today clearly have better access than others 
to capital markets, enabling them to finance their deficits externally.
The  debate  about  room  for  fiscal  manoeuvre  in  practice  soon  becomes  a 
debate about whether countries that have easily financed debt in the past can 
automatically continue to do so. We are still in the last stages of a bubble in 
government debt that arose in the first stage of the financial crisis from the 
“flight to safety” into US Treasuries. When that bubble collapses, it will hit not 
just the weaker countries – the equivalent of sub-prime mortgages – but also the   
stronger creditors.157 PANEL STATEMENT
In the Great Depression, one of the big surprises was the devastating abruptness 
with which markets turned on the United States. In the late summer of 1931, 
the  US  dollar,  alongside  the  French  franc,  appeared  to  be  the  strongest 
currency in the international financial system. That precedent should serve as a   
warning of how vulnerable governments and their finances can rapidly become 
and of how fiscal policy can stand in the way of a monetary approach oriented 
towards stability.
In the spring of 2010, Greece sent a wake-up call to the UK. The British response 
should prompt other industrial economies, above all the United States, to tackle 
their long-term fiscal weaknesses. In that sense, the longer answer to our question 
is no, but there should be a sustained debate about the problem: for even though 
we have largely escaped the collapse of the initial bubble, there are more bubbles 
down the road. We are not that different from our forefathers, and the lessons of 
the Great Depression should still give us nightmares.
Finally, it is often said that today we have much better cooperation, between 
governments and between central banks, than in the era of the Great Depression. 
In the six months following the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, during the 
most intense phase of the financial crisis, the world’s political leaders reassured 
themselves that international cooperation in the new millennium was working 
splendidly. They loved to contrast their apparently unique and novel harmony 
with  the  grim  precedent  of  the  nationalistic  and  autarkic  1930s.  Indeed  the   
self-praise of the global elite became a soothing mantra, constantly replayed. 
Heroic figures, led by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, were rescuing the 
world through far-sighted and beneficent public action.
In the course of the past months the self-confident belief about the capacity for 
international coordination has been decisively shattered. We are now in a more 
dangerous and more nationalistic world. Polite diplomacy has been shattered 
by the revelations of WikiLeaks. The United States Congress has produced its 
own version of WikiLeaks for the central banking world by unveiling the details 
of the enormous crisis support operations of the Federal Reserve. Both sets of 
revelations will make future cooperation much more difficult.
The European Union is polarised along national lines in its crisis response, with 
Germans blaming Greek extravagance, and Greeks bringing up history as an 
indictment of German brutality and irresponsibility. Stopgap crisis prevention 
measures are bitterly fought over.
Today’s  developments  uncannily  echo  the  earlier  collapse  of  international 
efforts at reaching common understanding. In 1933, representatives of the major 
countries of the world met in London for a World Economic Conference, but in 
fact all of them had fundamentally misaligned policy preferences.
In the crises of globalisation, much depends on the position of the very large 
powers.  In  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century,  the  United  States  remade 
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vision. That vision is now shattering, and to many critics, the United States looks 
as if it is returning to its 1930s (and earlier) isolationism.
Today’s  equivalent  to  US  President  Roosevelt’s  1933  “bombshell”  of  non-
cooperation is the Republican “shellacking” of US President Obama in the mid-
term elections. The outcome is perfect from the point of view of the American 
political  tradition.  It  is  a  restoration  of  the  logical  and  beautifully  designed 
system of checks and balances that the 18th century constitutional fathers drew 
up. The US political system will work, exactly as the founders intended, so as 
accurately to reflect the concerns of ordinary Americans. The political stalemate 
is likely to prevent further big bailouts, further economic stimulus measures, but 
it will also block efforts at government budget balancing. The election outcome 
means that the United States will turn in on itself and abandon attempts to steer a 
global economy. The Founding Fathers of the United States were not concerned 
with making a political system that would work in a highly integrated world 
economy.
The Federal Reserve’s announcement of the new USD 600 billion quantitative 
easing programme fits in the same agenda. It makes perfect sense as a domestic 
strategy, but its spillovers produce difficulties for the rest of the world. No one 
can really have been surprised by the howl of outrage that followed from the 
finance ministries of every emerging market economy. The American complaint 
that China was deliberately undervaluing its exchange rate looked bizarre as 
the United States fuelled the currency wars by weakening the US dollar and 
providing cheap funds that would surge in a wave of lending to fuel emerging 
market bond bubbles.
International cooperation, in short, is in bad shape. In the second half of the 20th 
century, the United States formulated a new internationalism that it can no longer 
afford. Is there any sign that there is a new power that might stabilise the world? 
Europe might have been a model, but it is too consumed by its own internal 
problems. European divisions between surplus and deficit countries appear only 
to reproduce broad global rifts on a regional level. China in the 2000s contributed 
to stabilising the world economy, but there is absolutely no sign that it is evolving 
a vision of a new global order that goes beyond xìng zāi lè huò or Schadenfreude 
that the conventional platitudes of liberal and democratic politics and economics 
are collapsing.
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COMMENT 
BY LORENZO BINI SMAGHI, MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 
OF THE ECB
Before opening the floor for general discussion, let me respond to some of the 
concerns raised by Flandreau, James and Holtfrerich about the ECB’s policies in 
the current crisis. 
Flandreau  is  concerned  that  central  banks  have  taken  on  too  much  risk. 
He emphasises that the expansion of the eligible collateral in the current crisis 
contrasts with historical experiences. One should, however, point out that the 
complexity and inter-connectedness of modern financial systems also contrast 
with  historical  experiences.  Effective  intervention  in  such  markets  requires 
extraordinary  measures,  involving  an  expansion  of  the  eligible  collateral. 
These extraordinary measures enabled decisive actions to avoid a major financial 
meltdown,  like  those  in  the  past.  Most  importantly,  the  ECB’s  non-standard 
measures have been effective in preventing a credit crunch in the euro area. 
This  is  illustrated  in  Chart  1a.  This  plot  shows  that  the  financing  of  both 
households  and  non-financial  corporations  has  been  positive  in  the  euro 
area throughout the crisis. By the way, this stands in contrast to the US data 
(shown in Chart 1b), where financing was negative during last year.
Chart 1a   Financing of households and non-financial corporations 
in the euro area
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Sources: ECB and Eurostat.
Note: The annual growth rate refers to the total value of transactions during the year in relation to the outstanding 
stock a year before. Latest observation: 2010 Q2.
1) Includes loans.
2) Includes loans, debt securities and liabilities for direct pension commitments of employers (i.e. not including 
other payables). 161 COMMENT SESSION 2
Moreover, contrary to Flandreau’s claims, the ECB’s non-standard measures are 
temporary in nature. Chart 2 shows that, recently, the ECB’s liquidity operations 
actually diminished. In fact, given that in the ECB’s monetary policy operations 
framework the non-standard measures rely on repos and not on outright asset 
purchases, this unwinding is endogenous.
Chart 1b   Financing of households and non-financial corporations 
in the United States
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Note: The annual growth rate refers to the total value of transactions during the year in relation to the outstanding 
stock a year before. Latest observations: 2010 Q2; for nominal GDP: 2010 Q3.
1) Includes credit market instruments (i.e. loans not including other payables) and debt securities issued by 
non-profit organisations.
2) Includes loans, debt securities and liabilities for direct pension commitments of employers (i.e. not including 
other payables). 




































Note: EUR billions.162 BINI SMAGHI
James and Holtfrerich worry that non-standard monetary policies put central bank 
independence and credibility at risk. The ECB’s independence is enshrined in the 
EU Treaties and has, together with the ECB’s track record of keeping inflation 
close to, but below 2% over the medium term, contributed to the ECB’s high 
degree of credibility for maintaining price stability. One indicator of the ECB’s 
credibility is a measure of euro area inflation expectations. As shown in Chart 3, 
five-years-ahead inflation expectations have been stable and centred around 2%, 
the ECB’s declared objective, all through the crisis. The only exception is the blip 
in the second quarter of 2008. 
The ECB’s credibility permitted it to take prompt action in the most dramatic 
moments, such as the Bear Stearns collapse in March 2008, the Lehman Brothers 
collapse in September 2008 and the Greek sovereign debt crisis in May 2010. 
The seriousness and the scope of the May 2010 episode are often underestimated. 
Charts 4 and 5 present evidence that this was one of the most dramatic episodes 
in the crisis. Chart 4 shows the time series of a systemic risk indicator derived 
from bank credit default swap spreads. We can see that euro area systemic risks 
in May 2010 were even higher than in September 2008. The global importance of 
the May 2010 episode is further illustrated by another measure of systemic risk 
in Chart 5. This Chart shows the average pair-wise realised correlations between 
S&P 500 stocks. In May 2010 these correlations were close to 1 and clearly 
higher than in September 2008.
Chart 3 Medium-term inflation expectations
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Overall, I would therefore conclude that the empirical evidence shows that the 
ECB’s policies have been effective and commensurate with the circumstances.
Chart 4 Indicator of systemic risk
(percentages; derived form bank CDS spreads)
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Referring to Flandreau’s presentation, Charles Goodhart (London School of 
Economics) pointed out a difference between today’s bank supervision and that 
of the 19th century. To a 19th-century central bank, being a competitor, the door 
to a commercial bank was always closed, and the central bank knew nothing 
about commercial banks’ internal operations. What they did know about was 
the quality of the securities they bought. Is the lesson today that central banks 
should investigate the business of commercial banks? Since mortgage credits 
are such big business today, should central banks monitor the loan-to-value and   
loan-to-income ratios for these credits? 
Goodhart disagreed with James’ account of the political attacks on the Bank of 
England. The measures that the Bank of England took to restructure the cotton 
and steel industries received virtually no political criticism. They were actually 
praised for providing support to the industrial heart of the UK. Reasons for 
which the Bank of England was criticised were its support for the re-adoption 
of the gold standard in 1925 at a rate against gold that was far too high, and the 
fact that it subsequently kept interest rates high. The accusation was that the 
high interest rates were crucifying industry for the benefit of the City. So, the 
Bank of England was praised for supporting industry and strongly criticised for   
perceived deflationary exchange rate and interest rate policies.
William White (OECD) called for a historical perspective on how monetary   
policy  affects  inflation  expectations,  as  well  as  other  types  of  expectations. 
He  recalled  the  debate  on  bimetallism  in  the  United  States,  which  failed  to 
trigger higher inflation expectations, but which did trigger a collapse of business 
confidence. 
James  agreed  that  Lancashire  cotton  reconstruction  was  not  particularly 
controversial. The most important cause for controversy was not the discussion 
of the choice of exchange rate in 1925, however. The Bank of England came 
under  attack  because  it  was  supposedly  part  of  a  “bankers’  ramp”  that  was 
pushing  through  a  specific  political  programme,  namely  the  cutting  of  the   
“dole” (unemployment benefit).
Most importantly, central bank interventions in particular sectors of the economy 
are a problem precisely because they are widely approved and trigger demand 
for  further  actions  of  the  same  kind.  For  example,  the  Lancashire  cotton 
reconstruction  triggered  demand  for  Bank  of  England  interventions  in  steel   
and  other  industries  as  well.  We  hear  similar  voices  today:  “if  the  Federal 
Reserve can bail out financial services, why would it not bail out other sectors 
of the economy?”
Regarding inflation expectations, there is enormous confusion in related political 
and  media  discussions.  A  good  example  is  the  Bild  Zeitung  headline  from 
2009  “Jetzt  kommt  die  Inflation”  (“Now  inflation  is  coming”).  At  the  time 
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prominent areas of the German media. But fears of inflation also exist in the 
United States, although this seems to be irrational, since what actually happened 
recently was a major temporary relative price shock. House prices fell while 
food prices increased. But people were using their houses as savings banks in 
order to finance their consumption. So when they saw house prices, i.e. their 
assets, falling, and food prices rising, they perceived inflation. The lesson is that 
inflation perceptions can be very different from the actual inflation risks in the 
longer term. For central banks this is a tricky communication issue, as income 
and wealth effects interfere with inflation perceptions.
Holtfrerich  returned  to  the  question  on  historical  inflation  expectations.   
The US Coinage Act of 1873 (“the crime of 1873”) that stopped the coinage 
of silver was followed by two decades of deflation, which was, in his view, 
anticipated. During the 1890s, the abundant supply of gold from South Africa 
and Canada – in tandem with the introduction of the cyanide process of refining 
gold – triggered inflation expectations. Broad money creation by the developing 
financial system in the United States reduced the need for banknotes and coin, 
and also created inflation expectations.
Flandreau referred back to the comment by Bini Smaghi that ECB policies helped 
avoid a meltdown. He voiced a concern that the ECB, by providing liquidity and 
buying time for the troubled banks and governments, is helping to delay a resolution 
of structural problems and weakening the incentives for resolving them.
Flandreau  agreed  with  Goodhart  that,  as  competitors  of  commercial  banks, 
19th-century  central  banks  had  no  access  to  certain  information.  But  on  the 
other hand they were gathering a significant amount of information by being 
involved in the market on a day-to-day basis. For example, Bank of England 
correspondence with Barings in 1890 shows that they were aware in advance of 
Barings’ problems. Barings had to be rescued in the end, which also shows that 
the too-big-to-fail problem is not a privilege of present times.
Regarding  White’s  question  on  inflation  expectations,  Flandreau  referred  to 
Garber  (1986)  and  Calomiris  (1993),  who  construct  19th-century  inflation 
expectations reflecting the probability of monetary regime changes. For instance, 
during  Bryan’s  election  campaigns  (1896  and  1990),  the  market  considered 
the switch to the silver standard to be a significant probability. The associated 
inflation expectations were reflected in higher interest rates. 
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On 30 June 1997, at the farewell ceremony on the occasion of the change of 
presidency of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), I made a speech in which 
I said, not literally but in substance: “Don’t overburden monetary policy with 
tasks it cannot accomplish”, by which I meant, “keep it targeting and achieving 
price stability and let other policies, and policy-makers, bear the responsibility 
for failing to achieve, or being proud of having achieved, other respectable policy 
objectives”.
In the first part of my remarks this evening, I propose to look back and set 
this recommendation in its historical context. This is the relatively easy part 
of  my  remarks.  In  the  second  part,  I  shall  stick  my  neck  out  and  meditate   
(I apologise to Jean-Claude for borrowing his patented expression) on whether 
today I would still make such a recommendation.
When I made this recommendation, only 18 months before 1 January 1999, 
which was the last possible date for the single monetary policy to start operating.   
There were still doubts, especially across the Channel and the Atlantic, whether 
this was going to happen, but the view of the markets and of all those familiar 
with the progress of the preparatory work was shifting towards cautious optimism. 
The most important events to shape this view were the crucial informal autumn 
meeting of the Ecofin Council in Valencia and the formal European Council 
meeting in Madrid in December 1995, which agreed on the main ingredients of 
the changeover to the single currency.
While a lot still remained to be done in those 18 months, in terms of institution-
building the groundwork was almost completed. I have often been asked: why did 
the forebodings prove unfounded? I must confess that until the Madrid meeting I 
had my own share of forebodings. In fact, while the road leading to the beginning 
of Stage Three was on occasion somewhat bumpy, there were no major conflicts 
of the kind that could have fatally jeopardised the implementation of the single 
currency: neither between the EMI Council and the national governments, nor 
among the governments themselves, nor inside the EMI, nor between any of 
these bodies and the European Commission – despite the fact that there were 
many vested interests against the introduction of the single currency. A lot of 
things could have gone wrong in the process of institution-building. How come 
they did not go wrong?
  My  favourite  explanation  is  that  we  were  well  served  by  the  exceptional 
convergence of several facts and influences. Let me list some of them – without 
going into longish explanations:
(i)    The initiators of the project were the governments themselves – and at the 
highest level: the Heads of State or Government – who had a vested interest 
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(ii)    These political leaders were shrewd enough to entrust the central bankers 
with  a  major  role  in  the  preparation  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  (Jacques 
Delors deserves a special mention in this respect). 
(iii)    The  Maastricht  Treaty  set  out  a  roadmap  in  great  detail,  described 
reasonably clearly the division of labour between the European Council, 
the European Commission and the central bankers of the EMI and of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and, most importantly, set 1 January 1999 
as the final date for the beginning of Stage Three. This time constraint, 
as Wim Duisenberg and I had the privilege to learn, turned out to be a 
barbarian, but most effective instrument for finding, in time, constructive 
compromises in matters which were not regulated by the Maastricht Treaty 
(such as the changeover scenario).
(iv)    In terms of the internal management of the EMI, an institution which had 
to be speedily built up from the small secretariat of the Committee of 
Governors into a fully operational enterprise, the EMI Council granted 
me  almost  complete  authority  (which  was  particularly  helpful  for  staff 
recruitment and allowed the number of staff to jump from 15 to close to 
three hundred by the time I was leaving).
External circumstances also played a helpful role. Perhaps the most important 
external circumstance was the fact that after the stagflation experience of the 
1970s, Keynesian demand management went out of fashion and anti-inflationary 
monetary  policy  began  acquiring,  or  regaining,  professional  (and  political) 
respectability.  This  led  to  a  sharp  decline  in  inflation  rates  well  before  the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) initiative. Average EU inflation declined 
successively from a horrifying peak of 14% in 1974 to 10% during the period 
1980-84 and then to 4% during the years 1985-89. Even more significantly, there 
was a marked downward convergence of inflation rates. The standard deviation 
of CPI inflation, which was a very high 6% during the late 1970s, fell to 2% by 
1995. This goes a long way towards explaining the relatively serene atmosphere 
prevailing in the Ecofin meetings I attended. 
To all this, we have to add the fact that the regained respect for both inflation-
fighting  and  the  inflation-fighting  capability  of  monetary  policy  has  been 
accompanied by a gradual, but general move towards granting policy-making 
independence to central banks – and this, too, began well before Maastricht.   
It is of course true that the Federal Republic of Germany played a major role in 
shaping the definition of the ECB’s independence – which in fact was defined in 
stricter terms than that of the Deutsche Bundesbank, although no more strictly 
than what had become the German practice over time – but these requests fell on 
receptive ears in the case of most Member States. The time was ripe for moving 
collectively in this direction.
With these favourable developments in mind, what prompted me to make my 
recommendation?  Well,  quite  simply,  my  deep  concern  about  the  inherent 
weakness of the “E” leg of EMU – and by weakness I mean the prospective 
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to  deliver  the  “right”  kind  of  fiscal  (as  well  as  other,  non-fiscal)  policies. 
Admittedly, I had to acknowledge that the uncontrolled growth of debt levels 
(general government gross debt, which in 1991 stood at 56% of GDP, reached 
73.5% by 1996) would have prompted governments to take action in any case – 
but this action received additional, and welcome, help from the constraint of the 
convergence criteria, which emerged at the right time. I nevertheless sensed a 
sharp contrast between the likely capability of the future ECB to deliver price 
stability and the built-in risk that an intergovernmental process would not be able 
to deliver the right kind of policies.
But beyond this broad problem, we were beginning to perceive EMI-specific 
reasons for concern. Both in the 1996 Convergence Report published by the 
EMI and in the EMI’s 1996 Annual Report you may find numerous examples 
of  concern  being  expressed  about  a  number  of  developments:  the  slowness 
of the pace of reduction of fiscal deficits; the recourse to one-off measures; 
the  temptation  to  raise  taxes  rather  than  reducing  expenditure;  and,  most 
importantly,  the  little  attention  paid  to  the  sustainability  of  deficit-reduction 
measures. Moreover, the Convergence Report contained a detailed analysis of 
a development which received, at that time, far less attention than today: the 
growing fiscal burden of state pensions.
Now let me turn to the second part of my remarks – would I make the same 
recommendation today? Well, yes and no, or no and yes. Let me spell out the 
reason for this cryptic answer.
Our current experience has confirmed something that was (or should have been) 
expected: that whether they like it or not, central banks are in the front line when 
it comes to keeping crises under control. They have the resources, and their 
traditional banking operations plus their oversight responsibilities in payment 
and settlement systems give them a proximity to the money and financial markets 
which finance ministers or supervisors not connected with central banks do not 
possess.
What is new in the current experience is that central banks have had to carry out 
their liquidity-boosting operations in an environment where liquidity shortages 
turned  rather  quickly  into  solvency  problems  of  frightening  dimensions  – 
problems for which there has been no precedent since the 1930s. Nor has there 
been any precedent for the speed of contagion at the global level. The result 
has been an increasing variety of “non-standard” central banking interventions, 
ranging from the lengthening maturity of liquidity support to quantitative easing 
of all shapes and sizes. In a number of instances, this has led not only to the 
spectacular expansion of the balance sheets of central banks, but also to a change 
in the composition of their assets, which implied the acquisition of risky assets. 
As a result, central banks have started navigating in uncharted waters, in terms of 
both operational techniques and their relations with governments.
Looking ahead, it is difficult not to ask whether these problems are going to fade 
away once we have the current crisis behind us. I regret to say that I doubt it.   
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First, because our globalised, competitive and highly innovative financial markets 
have an unlimited capacity to cause financial disturbances of a size and nature 
that could lead to systemic meltdown. I note with preoccupation the speed with 
which new, complex and bizarre innovations appear whenever the financial stress 
starts to ease. Hopefully, the severity of the current crisis will not be promptly 
forgotten by all market participants. But how long will the moderation last?
Second, while acknowledging that the numerous reform processes, if properly 
implemented,  will  enhance  our  prevention  capability,  I  have  to  note  that 
precious little is being done in the crucial field of structural reforms. Mergers 
and acquisitions are leading to concentration, and increasing the size of banks 
that qualify as systemically important. The widespread belief that such banks 
will  always  be  bailed  out  has  two  devastating  consequences:  it  encourages 
reckless risk-taking by such institutions, and it provides them with an unfair 
competitive edge over the rest of the financial industry by ensuring cheaper 
financial resources for them. To avoid this unappealing moral hazard trap, it has 
to be made clear that no financial firms, and especially banks, should count on 
being protected from failure. But no such statement will appear credible unless 
ways and means are found to ensure that the absence of a bail-out option has no 
systemically disruptive consequences. Trying to find, and agree “globally” on, 
such crisis resolution processes should rank very high on the political agenda. 
This does not seem to be the case.
Finally, despite the encouraging statements made by the G20, it is questionable 
whether we have the ability to deal with those macroeconomic imbalances which 
played an instrumental role in the crisis and therefore are likely to continue 
to  nurture  a  “crisis-friendly”  environment.  I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  savings/
investment imbalances and their capacity to contribute powerfully to the creation 
of excess liquidity.
It is for these reasons (and for some others as well) that I would expect systemic 
fragility to remain a source of concern for years to come. If so, central banks 
should not regard their macro-prudential duty as being less important than their 
mandate to preserve price stability. But nor do I believe that their duty to prevent 
a systemic meltdown should lead them to forget their mandate to preserve price 
stability. Price stability is just as much a public good as the stability of the 
financial system, and vice versa. Does this amount to squaring the circle? I do 
not think so, but I do not deny that situations may arise where decisions have to 
be taken which pose a risk to one of these objectives – a risk which is difficult 
to measure and therefore can lead to conflicting assessments. To minimise such 
risks, techniques have to be found to preserve the capability of central banks 
to  reabsorb  the  excess  liquidity  created  by  “non-standard”  liquidity-boosting 
interventions: this is feasible, but may on occasion be quite a challenge. 
Does  this  put  central  banking  independence  at  risk?  Yes,  it  does.  The  risk 
arises from the obvious fact that having to comply with two distinct mandates 
pushes central banks into a much more complex world. The modalities of their 
independence  in  their  monetary  policy  function  may  be  debatable,  but  once 
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of macro-prudential independence, this is much more difficult. Once the initial 
liquidity problem appears to be turning into a solvency problem, and especially 
when the latter implies the risk of a systemic meltdown, central banks have to 
operate hand in hand with their governments. But “hand in hand” can mean 
very different things – hence my plea for a reasonably well-defined operational 
framework. For a central bank, the macro-prudential mandate requires a type of 
relationship with, and therefore a type of independence from, the government 
that is different in substance from the one governing monetary policy. The rules 
of the game on both sides have to be spelled out.
The complexity of the current situation, and the likelihood that it will remain 
complex, mean that you have to navigate in uncharted waters. There is no way 
of “opting out” of this complex world. Wishing that we could go back to the 
professional and intellectual comfort of the pre-crisis years is a pipe dream.
A short remark by way of conclusion. A potential conflict between the two 
mandates is most likely to arise in the various stages of managing an open, or 
almost open, crisis. If you want to avoid this happening, you should put the 
emphasis on crisis prevention and, in particular, on working out crisis resolution 
processes that would make it possible to let financial institutions fail without 
triggering a systemic crisis. I realise that such reforms are difficult to design 
and even more difficult to implement, but this is the price you have to pay for 
financial stability and for a somewhat quieter life for central banks.
Well, this is where the text I drafted ahead of this dinner comes to an end. Having 
re-read it after today’s fascinating discussions, I feel that my remarks should be 
completed by trying to answer the following question: will the ECB be able to 
respond with efficiency to the challenges of this complex new world? Looking 
over the ECB’s past performance, five facts stand out which to my mind warrant 
quite some confidence that it will: 
  It has fulfilled its core mandate by ensuring price stability over the past    i) 
11 years – and this has happened despite the fact that a number of member 
countries were relative newcomers to the club of those countries which had 
a long period of price stability behind them. 
  It has displayed a capacity to adjust to new circumstances. I refer here to the  ii) 
gradual changes in its “two pillar” monetary policy strategy.
  It  has  displayed  an  unquestionable  capacity  to  take  swift  decisions,  of  iii) 
which the prime example was the Eurosystem’s massive intervention on   
9 August 2007. I still vividly remember that a certain newspaper described 
the ECB as a sleepy organisation, whose oversized Governing Council, 
operating  on  the  basis  of  consensus,  would  be  unable  to  reach  prompt 
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  It has displayed imagination and inventiveness: anybody who doubts this  iv) 
should take the trouble to note the steady changes in the Bank’s monetary 
policy tool-box.
Finally, it has managed to preserve its independence. v) 
Let me now conclude by expressing the hope that the ECB will play an active 
role  in  the  work  of  the  newly  created  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  –  an 
institution  which  must  become  the  key  macro-prudential  player  in  the  new 
European financial regulatory and supervisory architecture.174
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IN SEARCH OF A ROBUST MONETARY POLICY 
FRAMEWORK
BY JüRGEN STARK, MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE ECB
I  am  very  pleased 1  to  open  the  second  day  of  the  ECB  Central  Banking 
Conference.  We  witnessed  very  interesting  presentations  and  discussions 
yesterday, and today’s programme promises to be no less stimulating.
In my remarks I would like to offer some reflections on what I consider to be the 
desirable features of a robust monetary policy framework. Only three years ago, 
it was widely believed that this issue had been settled once and for all. At that 
time, several studies outlined the then prevailing consensus view on monetary 
policy.2 
This view emphasised, among other things: 
central bank independence;  • 
price stability as the primary objective of central banks; and • 
the importance of transparent communication for the solid anchoring of  • 
long-term inflation expectations. 
But the consensus also emphasised four elements to which the ECB has never 
subscribed, namely: 
the targeting of inflation at a relatively short and fixed horizon;  • 
the assignment of a primary role to monetary policy in the management of  • 
aggregate demand in the short term;
the systematic disregard of money and credit indicators in the conduct of  • 
monetary policy; and 
the asymmetric reaction to asset price bubbles as opposed to busts; the latter  • 
often referred to as the “cleaning-up strategy” in the context of the “Jackson 
Hole consensus”.
This framework has been severely tested during the financial crisis and perhaps, 
to some extent, damaged. Moreover, the crisis has exposed the fact that, on some 
1  I am grateful for support and comments by Claus Brand, Francesco Drudi, Philippine 
Cour-Thimann,  Dieter  Gerdesmeier,  Christophe  Kamps,  Wolfgang  Schill,  Wolfgang 
Modery, Philippe Moutot, Huw Pill and Massimo Rostagno.
2  See e.g. Goodfriend (2007), Mishkin (2007) and Woodford (2008).177 KEYNOTE SPEECH
crucial questions, the consensus view, as expressed in these studies, is in need 
of revision. 
Certainly, some aspects of the framework will, in my view, have to survive 
the crisis. The first aspect is central bank independence and, at least in the EU 
context, the prohibition of government debt monetisation. The second aspect is 
the centrality of price stability for monetary policy. And the third aspect is the 
importance of transparent communication. The crisis has not at all discredited 
these three principles. Together they have formed, and I believe will continue to 
form, the basis for central banks’ credibility and efficiency in contributing to the 
economic welfare of nations.
International convergence on these principles has, however, been a slow process. 
After  the  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system  there  was  a  long  period  of 
confusion created by the loss of a nominal anchor, which, during the system’s 
good times, had been provided by the US commitment to peg its currency to 
the price of gold. In the 1970s even some central bankers were sceptical that 
monetary policy alone could control inflation.3 Failed attempts to fine-tune the 
economy and the associated stop-and-go policies resulted in stagflation in a vast 
portion of the industrialised world. Drawing lessons from this experience, and 
inspired by monetarist views that had successfully influenced monetary policy in 
Germany and Switzerland, central banks in the 1980s gained confidence in their 
ability to bring inflation down to levels consistent with price stability at a modest 
cost to the economy at large.
The 1990s were characterised by the development of monetary policy frameworks 
capable of perpetuating the achieved degree of price stability. In my view, two 
major initiatives stand out: first, the development of inflation targeting. Inflation 
targeting  developed  in  many  countries  when  other  strategies  failed  to  bring 
about the desired level of price and macroeconomic stability. Some countries 
turned to inflation targeting because the instability of money demand in the face 
of ongoing financial innovation appeared to render the application of textbook-
type versions of monetary targeting unappealing. Even so, inflation targeting 
was heavily influenced by the monetarist view that monetary policy can control 
inflation.
The second development was the establishment of the ECB, with its two-pillar 
monetary  policy  strategy.  Inflation  targeting  and  the  ECB’s  strategy  share 
important  features:  the  insistence  on  central  bank  independence,  the  priority 
assigned  to  the  price  stability  objective,  and  the  importance  of  transparent 
communication.  These  three  principles  are  fundamental  to  sound  monetary 
policy. 
3  See Burns (1979). As Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Burns had long lamented the 
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Nevertheless, for various reasons, the ECB does not view itself as an inflation-
targeting central bank, at least not in the way inflation targeting is commonly 
described.  One  reason  relates  to  our  definition  of  price  stability  and  our 
specification of the policy horizon. Another reason relates to the special role 
our monetary policy strategy assigns to money and credit. Both aspects differ 
markedly from textbook inflation targeting. But I should also add that the ECB’s 
monetary pillar builds on the tradition developed by the most successful central 
banks prior to the introduction of the euro – a tradition which precedes the advent 
of inflation targeting, in some cases by decades. 
Let me adopt a stylised incarnation of a flexible inflation-targeting regime, a 
description which, nonetheless, follows closely early expositions in the literature. 
Inflation targeting has evolved, as we all know, both in theoretical work and in 
the practice of the inflation-targeting central banks. However, it might still be 
useful to identify elements in the regime – as it was originally conceived – which 
have influenced the conduct of monetary policy in the years immediately prior to 
the crisis more profoundly than was perhaps ideal. 
I will concentrate on two specific features, the implied short-termism in terms 
of excessive focus on aggregate demand management, on the one hand, and the 
systematic disregard of monetary phenomena, on the other, which in my view are 
essential ingredients for understanding the genesis of the crisis.
A key lesson from the current crisis is that, going forward, any monetary policy 
framework that lays claim to being “robust” will have to satisfy the following 
two requirements – beyond the uncontroversial principles I mentioned earlier: 
first, the monetary policy strategy needs to be geared towards the medium term 
to resist the fine-tuning temptation; and second, the strategy needs to assign 
a prominent role to developments in money and credit which – as the crisis 
has shown convincingly – provide reliable signals of risks to long-term price 
stability, financial stability and overall macroeconomic stability. 
In  my  view,  these  two  requirements  are  natural  complements.  The  key  role 
of money, both before and during the crisis, has been to maintain a focus on 
developments in nominal trends at lower frequencies.
THE CASE FOR MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES ORIENTED TOWARDS 
THE MEDIUM TERM
In this context let me elaborate the case for monetary policy strategies oriented 
towards the medium term. You may ask “but isn’t this exactly what central banks 
around the world have been pursuing for the past two decades?” Well, perhaps 
or perhaps not. Five years ago, at the Jackson Hole conference, for example, 
former Fed Vice Chairman Alan Blinder described US monetary policy since 
the late 1980s in terms of the “resurrection of fine-tuning”.4 Moreover, flexible 
inflation targeting, with its added focus on output stabilisation beyond inflation 
stabilisation is at risk of succumbing to the temptation of fine-tuning.
4   See Blinder and Reis (2005).179 KEYNOTE SPEECH
An element of the so-called “Jackson Hole consensus” was that monetary policy 
should play a key role in the management of aggregate demand in the short 
term, whereas fiscal policy was viewed as an inappropriate instrument, mainly 
because of decision and implementation lags embedded in the policy process. 
I would argue that we should not overestimate the potency of either policy. 
Before the crisis there was a common misperception that monetary policy could 
focus more on demand management because inflation was durably under control. 
Proponents of this view found apparent vindication in the phenomenon of the 
“great moderation” observed in the 20 years before the crisis. However, there 
were clear warnings that the short-term orientation could have negative side 
effects in the medium to long term.5 As we now know, the side effects manifested 
themselves  in  a  spectacular  build-up  of  monetary  and  financial  imbalances. 
The sudden unwinding of these imbalances marked the beginning of the current 
crisis. Although monetary policy frameworks oriented more towards the medium 
term  could  probably  not  have  completely  prevented  the  current  crisis,  I  am 
convinced that they would have helped to make it less disruptive.
The  then  dominant  theoretical  framework  suggested  otherwise.  The  New 
Keynesian model generated policy prescriptions which assigned the central bank 
the task of stabilising inflation and output developments at short horizons and in 
quite precise terms. 
These prescriptions have shaped the inflation-targeting policy advice to a non-
negligible  extent.  Let  me  emphasise,  though,  that  many  inflation-targeting 
central banks retain a considerable degree of flexibility when putting this advice 
into practice – although in a very different way from the meaning the term 
“flexibility” has received in theoretical work. I will return to this point shortly.
Simplifying, the inflation-targeting policy advice can be articulated in three main 
precepts: 
First,  look  at  inflation  forecasts  and  output  gap  forecasts  as  summary  • 
statistics of the state of the economy. 
Second, rely on your best model of the economy, even if it does not integrate  • 
or just assigns a trivial role to a host of variables, particularly money and 
credit, which are assumed to adjust to the state of the economy. 
Third,  follow  the  best  policy  implied  by  the  model  and  set  the  policy  • 
instrument so that inflation forecasts – whatever the nature of the shocks that 
might have caused them – are stabilised, and output volatility is minimised, 
at a pre-set horizon.
Now, it is easy to imagine economic conditions in which these prescriptions 
induce destabilising behaviour on the side of monetary policy, which is the exact 
opposite of what monetary policy should do. 
5   See e.g. Rajan (2005).180 STARK
Limiting the information set to inflation forecasts and output gap forecasts can 
be highly misleading. One of the reasons for this has been known for a long 
time: output gaps cannot be observed in real time. An imperfectly understood 
concept  –  which,  in  addition,  is  statistically  very  imprecisely  measured  and 
subject to frequent revisions – is not a safe indicator to choose as a guide for 
policy. Indeed, the great policy failures of the 1970s have been traced to policy-
makers’ exaggerated real-time measures of economic slack.6 
Another reason which argues against limiting the policy-makers’ information set 
is that the same inflation forecast can result from very different combinations of 
economic shocks. In other words, inflation forecasts are not summary statistics 
of the state of the economy: you have to look at the underlying shocks in order 
to interpret inflation. This is far less appreciated, but it is one of the economic 
foundations of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. A fundamental principle of 
our strategy is that different underlying shocks – although potentially leading to 
the same inflation forecast – can have vastly different implications for policy. 
Failing to recognise that a prudent policy stance is always conditional on the 
shocks that hit the economy, and that accordingly the policy-relevant horizon 
varies with those shocks, would not comply with the requirements of a medium-
term orientation and, in addition, would be extremely hazardous.
Let me give you an example. Think of a benign disinflation caused by positive 
supply-side shocks. Positive supply-side shocks tend to produce lower inflation 
and high output growth at the same time. The attempt to stabilise inflation at 
a certain horizon – and thus resist disinflation – can, in those circumstances, 
introduce pro-cyclicality in monetary policy. A central bank that is instructed 
to stabilise inflation at a pre-set horizon in those circumstances can well end 
up providing too much accommodation, precisely at a time when output and 
incomes are growing robustly and asset markets are most prone to exuberance. 
Think of the protracted period of productivity growth and negative price surprises 
associated with technological innovation and globalisation that we saw over the 
second half of the 1990s. If you combine that scenario with systematic resistance 
to disinflation, and systematic neglect of monetary phenomena, you can lay the 
ground for financial instability down the road. 
As I said, central banks describing themselves as inflation targeters have realised 
that, in practice, one needs to go beyond the standard inflation-targeting policy 
advice emanating from the New-Keynesian framework.
Referring back to my example, my feeling is that the central bank community is 
increasingly sharing the view that – in the face of positive supply-side shocks – 
one should accept in the short run inflation somewhat lower than the inflation 
objective so as to avoid the risks involved in potentially large deviations from 
target at longer horizons.7 
6   See Orphanides (2002).
7   See e.g. King (2004), p. 15.181 KEYNOTE SPEECH
This view is perfectly consistent with the ECB’s view of the medium term, 
also in the sense of not trying to manage aggregate demand. It points to the 
advantages of limiting the central bank’s mandate to the maintenance of price 
stability  over  the  medium  term  without  any  reference  to  aggregate  demand 
management. However, it immediately raises the question of how to enshrine 
this view into a monetary policy strategy. For inflation-targeting central banks, 
embedding this view appears to be achieved by extending the forecast horizon 
and by applying judgement. In contrast, the ECB’s monetary analysis can be seen 
as a formalisation of the view that the policy horizon should be commensurate 
with the nature and size of shocks, rather than being determined by a particular 
set of inflation forecasts.
This leads me to my second topic, the case for correcting the systematic disregard 
of monetary phenomena in the consensus framework.
THE CASE FOR CORRECTING THE SYSTEMATIC DISREGARD OF 
MONETARY PHENOMENA 
As I have stressed before, in my view, monetary policy should avoid any kind of 
short-termism. The necessary medium-term orientation of monetary policy calls 
for the use of tools and indicators that have a comparative advantage over such a 
horizon. At the same time, it is an undisputed fact in academic and central banking 
circles that prolonged periods of high inflation are associated with high money 
growth.  On  both  theoretical  and  empirical  grounds,  the  ultimately  monetary 
nature of inflation cannot be challenged. While other factors can influence price 
developments at shorter horizons, this does not call into question the underlying 
long-term relationship between money and prices.8 Furthermore, the empirical 
evidence  clearly  points  to  monetary  trends  leading  inflationary  trends,  thus 
giving support for a monetary analysis in a forward-looking monetary policy. 
The analysis of monetary aggregates allows the ECB to identify the longer-term 
and more persistent trends in inflation. This is the main reason for the monetary 
pillar in our monetary policy framework.
The monetary pillar should not be confused with a “financial stability pillar”. 
Monetary analysis is not conducted with the principal goal of detecting financial 
imbalances. It ultimately rests on the quantity-theoretic notion of there being 
a  reliable  link  between  money  and  price  developments.  Exploring  the  link 
between money and asset prices should be seen as a complementary way of better 
understanding the role of money. 
A  number  of  recent  studies  have  demonstrated,  in  a  quite  impressive  way, 
that  monetary  developments  –  especially  when  seen  in  conjunction  with 
credit  developments  –  can  also  alert  policy-makers  to  unwarranted  financial 
developments  and  imbalances.  Needless  to  say,  the  financial  crisis  we  have 
experienced has, in my view, clearly demonstrated the need for policy-makers to 
have such reliable early warning signals at their disposal.
8   See Lucas (1972, 1996) or McCandless and Weber (1995).182 STARK
While  some  parts  of  the  academic  literature  have  long  held  the  view  that 
identifying a bubble in real time is an impossible task, the academic literature on 
early warning indicator models has made significant progress over the past ten 
years. Research carried out within the BIS and the ECB have illustrated that – 
among other variables, such as price-earnings ratios or price-dividend ratios – 
simple deviations of money and credit aggregates from a trend that exceed a 
given threshold are among the few early indicators for (potentially costly) boom 
and bust periods.9 And one key property that strikes me as being of particular 
interest for policy-makers is the fact that these warning signals emerge well 
before the alarm bells of standard conjunctural analysis start ringing.
The  financial  crisis  and  its  subsequent  shockwaves  have  also  led  to 
recommendations  for  greater  importance  to  be  placed  on  an  approach  of 
“leaning against the wind”. According to this approach, monetary policy should 
be conducted in a “symmetric” manner over the financial cycle. More precisely, 
monetary policy should be more accommodative in times of falling asset prices, 
but less accommodative during a financial market boom. For instance, the central 
bank should conduct a slightly tighter monetary policy than warranted by its 
price stability objective, when the build-up of a potentially detrimental asset 
price boom has been identified. In so doing, the central bank would better ensure 
price stability over extended horizons and – at the same time – contain the future 
growth of the bubble. Such an approach can be compared to “buying insurance” 
against the risk of a harmful asset boom/bust cycle, with its potential costs in 
terms of macroeconomic and financial stability. 
Traditionally, however, there has been a great deal of scepticism about “leaning 
against the wind” for at least four reasons.10 First, it has been argued that it is 
not evident that asset price boom/bust cycles are necessarily a bad thing for real 
long-term growth in all countries. The benefits from the realisation of additional 
investment projects could, on average, outweigh the costs incurred during the 
bust phases. 
Second, as I have already mentioned, it is considered very difficult to identify an 
asset price bubble in real time. In particular, a tight policy response to asset price 
increases may end up destabilising the economy unnecessarily if the asset price 
valuation is driven by fundamentals. 
Third, it has been claimed that the policy interest rate is “too blunt a tool” to 
contain potential bubbles. Raising policy rates will depress the prices of many 
assets – including those not booming – as well as the real economy and consumer 
prices. 
Furthermore, in times of market euphoria, the policy rate might have to be raised 
quite significantly in order to have a measurable effect on booming asset prices. 
When taken seriously, these considerations lead to doubts about the effectiveness 
and efficiency of an active “leaning against the wind” approach. 
9   For a number of illustrative examples see, for instance, ECB (2010a).
10   For a more detailed discussion, see Papademos and Stark (2010), especially Chapter 6.183 KEYNOTE SPEECH
A fourth argument basically refers to cost-benefit considerations. In essence, 
the  argument  postulates  that  the  costs  of  “cleaning  up  afterwards”  (namely 
by loosening the monetary policy stance after the bust) are smaller than the 
“collateral  damage”  of  a  leaning  against  the  wind  approach  pursued  during 
the boom. These considerations describe the so-called “cleaning-up strategy” 
I mentioned earlier. 
In  essence,  these  arguments  all  reflect  valid  concerns  and  cannot  be  easily 
dismissed. More recently, however, a number of arguments have given reason 
for a tempering of the concerns I have just expressed and have lent support to a 
“leaning against the wind” approach to asset price bubbles. 
First  of  all,  with  regard  to  the  welfare  implications  of  “leaning  against  the 
wind”, the analysis of the costs of boom/bust cycles in asset prices in developed 
economies  has  been  deepened  and  refined.  Existing  theoretical  models  use 
fairly  specific  assumptions  to  allow  for  bubbles  in  general  equilibrium,  and 
tend to neglect important aspects which make bubbles costly in the real world. 
Admittedly, not all boom/bust cycles are detrimental and have significant real 
effects. This is also one of the reasons why the mechanical targeting of asset 
prices is not a sensible option for monetary policy. However, the experience of the 
recent financial crisis – which has been accompanied by sharp declines in global 
economic activity and increasing unemployment in advanced economies – is a 
vivid reminder that there are boom/bust cycles which have the potential to trigger 
systemic crises and thus constitute a serious threat to world economic growth.
Furthermore, as regards the scepticism on the effectiveness of monetary policy 
in containing asset price bubbles, recent research has detected some additional 
monetary policy transmission channels that, in essence, relate to the risk-taking 
behaviour of banks, the signalling effects of monetary policy and the breaking 
of herding behaviour. Taken together, the results then point towards the fact 
that each of these channels can reasonably be expected to amplify the impact of 
monetary policy during boom periods. For instance, the “risk-taking” channel 
suggests  that  banks’  attitudes  towards  risk  are  strongly  correlated  with  the 
monetary  policy  stance.  In  the  presence  of  very  considerable  intra-financial 
sector  leverage,  even  relatively  modest  increases  in  policy  rates  can  lead  to 
significant  changes  in  credit  conditions  and  market  dynamics,  to  the  extent 
that they alter financial institutions’ risk tolerance. Similarly, mechanisms that 
operate through the signalling effects of monetary policy or the role potentially 
played by central banks in discouraging herding behaviour by investors can result 
in policy rate changes exerting more pronounced effects on asset prices than was 
typically thought to be the case in the past. 
Regarding the appropriate policy reaction to the build-up of financial imbalances, 
there seems to be broad agreement that monetary policy would hardly be the 
first best line of defence against, for example, systemic risk associated with asset 
markets, let alone asset price bubbles detected in specific market segments. This 
task would rather fall to regulatory and supervisory policies. But if bubble-like 
behaviour becomes more widespread and reflected in imbalances in money and 
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If the past is of any guidance for the future, monetary policy needs to support 
regulatory and supervisory policies on two accounts. First, by making sure that 
the very short-term, risk-free price of credit – which the central bank controls – 
does not become a pro-cyclical source of volatility. And second, by intervening 
in a timely manner, both before asset price booms develop and when the bust 
of a bubble impacts the economy. Indeed, regulatory and supervisory policies 
lag  behind  innovation-driven  financial  market  developments,  and  sometimes 
they tend to be implemented too cautiously or too slowly. In this context, it is 
worth keeping in mind that asset prices by no means constitute the end point of 
the monetary policy transmission process. There are a variety of mechanisms – 
among them wealth and confidence effects – through which higher asset prices 
have an impact on business cycle developments and may eventually result in 
higher consumer prices.
As the financial crisis illustrates, the macroeconomic costs of financial instability 
and the challenges that it poses for the maintenance of price stability provide 
support to the case for a flexible and cautious strategy encompassing the need, 
in some well chosen circumstances, to influence financial markets. But how can 
such a policy be made operational? And if it can, can it really be implemented 
in practice? The answer to these questions very much depends on the monetary 
policy framework specifically adopted by a central bank. In this respect, the 
ECB’s monetary policy strategy embodies elements that – in my view – provide a 
suitable and robust framework for an occasional, but appropriate “leaning against 
the wind” approach.
The ECB’s Governing Council has defined its aim of keeping inflation rates 
below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The medium-term anchoring 
of inflation expectations allows the conduct of a less accommodative monetary 
policy during a period of buoyant financial markets, even in an environment of 
relatively subdued inflationary pressures. While this will result in lower inflation 
over shorter horizons, one could expect it to be more effective in maintaining 
price  stability  over  longer  horizons  by  helping  to  prevent  the  emergence  of 
possible deflationary risks after the bursting of the bubble. 
Taken together, I tend to regard the ECB’s monetary policy strategy as being 
particularly well equipped to deal with risks to price stability across different 
time horizons, insofar as they arise from imbalances in money and credit. 
It is fair to say that there have been times when the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy has not been well understood in some academic circles. In my view, 
there is only one way of addressing these concerns in a constructive way: the 
ECB needs to foster the public’s understanding of its monetary policy strategy 
and, thereby, especially the robustness of monetary analysis. 
In spring 2007 the Governing Council endorsed the pursuit of an agenda to 
enhance the ECB’s monetary analysis. Having faced excessive money growth, 
we then perceived serious challenges. We have made significant progress on 
our agenda. The results look promising and they will hopefully stimulate the 
debate further. To this end we have published a book on “Enhancing Monetary 185 KEYNOTE SPEECH
Analysis”. Of course, the book should not be seen as the final word. While it 
has interesting answers to offer regarding some questions, other questions and 
challenges have arisen during the process of compiling the material. But I am 
confident that the new generation of tools presented in the book and the results 
of the subsequent debate will help us to prevent a crisis of the magnitude seen in 
the recent past in future decades.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by summarising what are – in my view – the main features of a 
robust monetary policy framework. 
First, there is broad agreement that central bank independence, price stability  • 
and transparent communication will remain key features of effective and 
credible monetary policy-making. 
Second, in the case of the ECB, a quantitative definition of price stability,  • 
a medium-term orientation and a broad analytical framework, with money 
and credit playing an important role, have been key elements in the conduct 
of monetary policy. The crisis seems to be paving the way for solidifying 
support for the medium-term orientation and for the role of money and credit 
in a central bank’s analysis. 
Third, in relation to this, the crisis seems to point towards a need for a  • 
symmetric approach in central banks’ reaction to asset price bubbles and 
busts. Traditionally, the proposal of “leaning against the wind” has faced a 
considerable degree of scepticism. Recent results, however, call for a fair 
reassessment that does more justice to the advantages of such an approach.
I am confident that these features of a robust monetary policy framework will 
guide us in the future. At the same time, I am convinced that central bankers have 
a responsibility to ensure that their monetary policy frameworks create the proper 
incentives for the banking community to assume its responsibilities and take the 
appropriate decisions in a timely manner to shape a healthy banking sector at the 
service of the real economy.
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1  INTRODUCTION
Why  do  asset  prices  move  so  frequently  and  why  is  the  volatility  so  high?   
Why do prices move at all? This is obviously a fundamental question in theoretical 
economics  and  quantitative  finance  that  encompasses  other,  related  issues: 
what is the information reflected by prices, and to what extent do market prices 
reflect the underlying economic reality? Do we understand the origin of crises 
and crashes? In this paper, we review the evidence that the erratic dynamics of 
markets are to a large extent of endogenous origin, i.e. determined by the trading 
activity itself and not due to the rational processing of exogenous news. In order 
to understand why and how prices move, the joint fluctuations of order flow and 
liquidity – and the way these impact prices – become the key ingredients. Impact 
is necessary for private information to be reflected in prices, but, by the same 
token, random fluctuations in order flow necessarily contribute to the volatility of 
markets. Our thesis is that the latter contribution is in fact dominant, resulting in 
a decoupling between prices and fundamental values, at least on short-to-medium 
time scales. We argue that markets operate in a regime of vanishing revealed 
liquidity, but large latent liquidity, which would explain their hyper-sensitivity to 
fluctuations. We discuss several unstable feedback loops that should be relevant 
to account for excess volatility and market crises.
1.1  EFFICIENT MARKETS
The  neo-classical  paradigm  answers  that  question  as  follows:  prices  change 
because  new  information  about  the  fundamental  value  of  the  asset  becomes 
available.  If  the  information  is  instantly  and  perfectly  digested  by  markets, 
then prices should reflect faithfully these fundamental values and only move 
because of exogenous unpredictable news. This is the Efficient Market story, 
which assumes that informed rational agents would arbitrage away any error or 
small mispricing, and nudge the price back to its “true” value. This is very much 
a Platonian view of the world, where markets merely reveal fundamental values 
without influencing them – the volatility is an unbiased measure of the flow of 
news, and is not related to the trading activity per se. Crashes, in particular, 
can only be exogenous, but cannot be induced by market dynamics itself. 
Is this picture fundamentally correct to explain why prices move and to account 
for the observed value of the volatility? Judging from the literature, it looks as 
if a majority of academics still believe that this story is at least a reasonable 191 PANEL STATEMENT
starting point. The idea of rational agents and efficient markets has shaped the 
mind-set of decision-makers and regulators for decades and has permeated a 
variety  of  spheres,  from  international  monetary  policy  to  derivative  markets 
or sociology. Scores of financial mathematics papers are deeply rooted in the 
idea that options markets are efficient. In the aftermath of the crisis, a number 
of scholars and pundits have expressed concern about this whole intellectual 
construct, in particular about the intrinsic stability of markets (see, among the 
most provocative ones, Soros (2008), Akerlof and Shiller (2009), Farmer and 
Geanakoplos (2008), Marsili (2008), and in the context of financial markets, 
Taleb (2007) and Derman and Wilmott (2008)) – bearing in mind that Keynes 
(1936) had anticipated a lot of these “new” ideas). 
There are many reasons to believe that markets are very far from efficient in the 
above traditional sense. To start with, the very concept of a “fundamental value” 
that can be computed, at least as a matter of principle, with arbitrary accuracy 
with all information known at time t, appears to be deeply flawed. The number 
of factors affecting the fundamental value of a company (or of a currency, etc.) 
is so large, and the influence of unknown-unknowns so predominant, that there 
should be, at the very least, an irreducible error margin. All valuation models 
or predictive tools used by traders and market participants (e.g. using economic 
ratios, earning forecasts) or based on statistical analyses that detect trends or 
mean-reversion,  are  extremely  noisy  (statistical  methods  can  only  rely  on  a 
rather short history) and often even biased. For example, financial experts are 
known to be on the whole over-optimistic, and rather imprecise at forecasting 
the next earning of a company (see, for example, Guedj and Bouchaud (2005) 
and  references  therein).  News  is  often  ambiguous  and  not  easy  to  interpret, 
and  real  information  can  be  buried  underneath  terabytes  of  irrelevant  data. 
This is why there is no way to check directly that market prices indeed reveal 
fundamental values (if this could be achieved, we would not need markets in the 
first place!). 
If we accept the idea of an intrinsically noisy fundamental value with some band 
within which the price can almost freely wander (because nobody can know 
better),  the  immediate  question  is:  how  large  is  this  irreducible  uncertainty? 
Is it very small, say 10–4 in relative terms, or quite a bit larger, say 50% – as 
suggested by Black (1986), who defined an efficient market as a market giving 
the correct price to within a factor 2? If Black is right (which we tend to believe) 
and  the  uncertainty  in  the  fundamental  value  is  large,  then  Keynes’  famous 
beauty contest is a better narrative of what is going on in financial markets, at 
least in the short term. It is less the exogenous dynamics (news-driven) of the 
fundamental value than the endogenous dynamics of supply and demand that 
should be the main focus of research. 
Another  reason  why  markets  cannot  be  efficient  is  the  limited  intelligence 
of  us  humans  (even  if,  quite  strangely,  many  academics  have  a  hard  time 
coming to terms with this 1). We do make mistakes and have regrets, and we 
1  A lot could be said – and, to some extent, has been – about the religious roots and the political 
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do make suboptimal decisions. In fact, even perfectly rational agents that have 
to process information in a finite amount of time, are likely to make errors or 
go for suboptimal solutions. A good illustration of this is provided by chess: 
pressed by time, even chess masters do make errors and lose against Deep Blue. 
Many optimisation problems are indeed very complex, in the sense that the best 
algorithm to solve them requires a time that grows exponentially as a function 
of the size of the problem (for example, the size of a portfolio that one wishes 
to optimise, see Galluccio et al. (1998)). Humans just cannot be expected to be 
any good at such tasks without developing intuitive or heuristic rules – the most 
common one being: just do what your neighbour is doing, he might know better. 
Another one is: look for patterns, they might repeat (on this one, see Arthur 
(1995) and Wyart and Bouchaud (2007)).
1.2  MARKET IMPACT
This in fact leads us to a crucial issue, that of market impact, which is the main 
theme of this paper. It is both rather intuitive and empirically demonstrated that 
“buy trades” are followed by a rise of the price, and “sell trades” by a price 
decline. A simple way to try to guess what others are doing is to observe price 
variations,  which  may  reflect  the  impact  of  their  trades,  and  therefore  their 
intentions  (Kyle  (1985)).  The  interpretation  of  the  price-impact  phenomenon 
is, however, potentially controversial. In the Efficient Market picture, impact is 
nearly tautological, since informed agents successfully forecast short-term price 
movements and trade to remove arbitrage opportunities. This trivially results in 
correlations between trades and price changes, but these correlations cannot be 
exploited by copycats. In this story, however, uninformed trades should have no 
price impact (except maybe on short time scales); otherwise silly trades would, 
in the long run, drive prices arbitrarily far from fundamental values.
A more plausible story is the following: if Black’s idea is correct and the uncertainty 
in the fundamental value is large, then the amount of information contained in 
any given trade is necessarily small.2 Furthermore, modern electronic markets 
are anonymous, which makes it impossible to distinguish potentially informed 
trades from non-informed trades. Hence, all trades are equivalent and they must 
(statistically) equally impact prices. 
The mechanism by which the market reacts to trade by shifting the price is 
precisely  the  above  copycat  heuristic  rule,  applied  at  a  tick-by-tick  level. 
Since all agents are pretty much in the dark, but believe (or fear) that some trades 
might contain useful information, prices must statistically move in the direction 
of the trades. As reviewed below, high-frequency data allow one to make much 
more precise statements about the amplitude and time-dependence of this impact. 
But the consequence of such a scenario is that even silly trades do impact prices 
and contribute to volatility – a mechanism for instabilities, bubbles and crashes, 
even without any “news” or other fundamental cause for such events. 
2  Empirically, the standard deviation of market impact is found to be very large compared 
to its mean, confirming that the quantity of information per trade must indeed be small.193 PANEL STATEMENT
We therefore have to decide between two opposite pictures for the dynamics 
of  price:  exogenous,  news-driven,  or  endogenous,  impact-driven.  Of  course, 
reality should lie somewhere in the middle. In the next sections, we will review 
several empirical findings that suggest that endogenous dynamics are in fact 
dominant in financial markets.
2  EXOGENOUS OR ENDOGENOUS DYNAMICS? 
Is news the main determinant of volatility? Were this true, and in the absence 
of “noise traders”, the price should essentially be constant between news, and 
move suddenly around the release time of the news. Noise traders should merely 
add high-frequency, mean-reverting price changes between news, that do not 
contribute to the long-term volatility of the price. 
There are, however, various pieces of evidence suggesting that this picture is 
fundamentally  incorrect.  First,  high-frequency  time  series  do  not  look  at  all 
like long plateaus dressed by high-frequency noise. On liquid assets, there is 
very  little  sign  of  high-frequency  mean-reversion  that  one  could  attribute  to 
noise traders – in other words, the high-frequency volatility is very close to its   
long-term asymptotic value (see, for example, Bouchaud et al. (2004)).3 Volatility 
is furthermore well-known to be much too high to be explained by changes in 
fundamentals (Shiller (2000)), and most large price swings seem to be unrelated 
to relevant news releases. This was the conclusion reached by Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1989) in a seminal study of large daily price changes (see also Fair 
(2002) for a more recent discussion with identical conclusions). 
2.1  NEWS AND NO-NEWS JUMPS
We have recently confirmed in detail this conclusion, now on high-frequency 
data, using different news feeds synchronised with price time series. We have 
looked  for  simultaneous  occurrences  of  price  “jumps”  and  intra-day  news 
releases on a given company (Joulin et al. (2008)).4 This requires one to define 
jumps in a consistent, albeit slightly arbitrary fashion. We chose to compare the 
absolute size |r(t)| of a one-minute bin return to a short-term (120 minutes) flat 
moving average of the same quantity, σ(t), in order to factor in local modulations 
of  the  average  volatility.  An  s-jump  is  then  defined  such  that  |r(t)|  >  sσ(t). 
The number of s-jumps as a function of s is found to decay as  ≈ s–4, consistent 
with previous work on the distribution of high-frequency returns (Plerou et al. 
(1999), Gopikrishnan et al. (1999) and Gabaix et al. (2006)). We note once again 
that this distribution is very broad, meaning that the number of extreme events 
is in fact quite large. For example, for the already rather high value s  =  4 we 
find seven to eight jumps per stock per day! A threshold of s  =  8 decreases this 
3  Here we talk about the volatility of the mid-point, not of the traded price, that shows a large, 
trivial bid-ask bounce.
4  Overnight news and overnight jumps are not included in the study. “Big” company 
news are usually issued overnight. But this makes the existence of intraday jumps all the 
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number by a factor  ≈ 10, amounting to one jump every day and a half per 
stock. In the same period, we find on average one news item every three days 
for each stock. These numbers already suggest that a very large proportion of 
shocks cannot be attributed to idiosyncratic news (i.e. a news item containing the 
ticker of a given stock). This conclusion still holds when one includes (possibly 
also endogenous) collective market or sector jumps in the definition of news. 
The number of jumps explained by these “macro” events only increases by 20%, 
but leaves most jumps unexplained (see Joulin et al. (2008) for more details). 
One may also argue that these jumps are due to the arrival of private information. 
But this cannot be, since an investor really possessing superior information will 
avoid disturbing the market by trading too quickly, in order not to give away his 
advantage. As illustrated by Kyle’s model (1985), an insider should better trade 
incrementally and discretely. We will discuss below strong empirical evidence 
that trading indeed occurs incrementally.
More  quantitatively,  there  are  striking  statistical  differences  between  jumps 
induced by news, and jumps with no news, that clearly demonstrate that the 
two types of event result from genuinely distinct mechanisms. One difference 
resides in the distribution of jump sizes: the cumulative distribution of jumps 
with news has again a power law tail s–μ, but with an exponent μ ≈ 2.7, different 
from the value μ  =  4 mentioned above for jumps without news. Interestingly, if 
we extrapolate these distributions deep in the tail (and far beyond the observable 
regime), the news-induced jumps eventually become more probable than the 
no-news jumps, but only for s ≈ 60! 
A second difference is the way in which the volatility relaxes after a jump. In both 
cases, we find (see Chart 1) that the relaxation of the excess-volatility follows 
a power-law in time  σ (t) − σ (∞) ∝ t ˉζ  (as also reported in Lillo and Mantegna 
(2003) and Zawadowski et al. (2006)). This behaviour is the counterpart of the 
“Omori law” for earthquake aftershocks. The exponent of the decay is, however, 
markedly different in the two cases: for news jumps, we find ζ ≈ 1, whereas for 
no-news jumps one has ζ ≈ 1/2, with, in both cases, little dependence on the value 
of the threshold s. The difference between endogenous and exogenous volatility 
relaxation has also been noted in Sornette et al. (2003), but on a very restricted set 
of news events. Although counter-intuitive at first, the volatility after a no-news 
jump relaxes more slowly than after a news. This could be due to the fact that a 
jump without any clear explanation makes traders anxious for a longer time than 
if a well-identified event caused the jump. The slow, non-exponential relaxation 
after a no-news jump is very interesting per se, and already suggests that the 
market is, in some sense, critical. 
So,  yes,  some  news  do  make  prices  jump,  sometimes  a  lot,  but  the  jump 
frequency is much larger than the news frequency, meaning that most intraday 
jumps appear to be endogenous, induced by the speculative dynamics itself that 
may spontaneously cause liquidity micro-crises. In fact, a decomposition of the 
volatility (made more precise in Section 4.1 below) into an impact component 
and a news component confirms this conclusion: most of the volatility seems to 
arise from trading itself, through the very impact of trades on prices. 195 PANEL STATEMENT
Chart 1   Relaxation of the volatility
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2.2  UNIVERSALLY INTERMITTENT DYNAMICS
Another  striking  observation  that  could  be  naturally  accounted  for  if  price 
movements do result from the endogenous dynamics of a complex system is 
the universality of many empirical stylised facts, such as the Pareto tail of the 
distribution of returns, or the intermittent, long-memory nature of the volatility. 
These features are observed across the board, on all traded liquid assets, and are 
quantitatively very similar. We show for example in Chart 2 the distribution of 
the relative daily changes of the 60-day implied volatility corresponding to the 
S&P100 stocks from 1 January 2001 to 1 January 2006 (Biely (2006)). There is 
no reason whatsoever to expect that the statistics of implied volatility returns 
should resemble that of price returns. The implied volatility represents the market 
consensus on the expected volatility of the stocks for the 60 days to come. But as 
Chart  2  illustrates,  the  distribution  of  implied  volatility  returns  has  the  very 
same shape as that of any other traded asset, whatever its nature. In particular, 
the positive and negative tails of the distribution decay here as |r|–4 – very much 
as the tails of the daily price returns of stocks. The Pareto exponent is always 
found to be in the same ballpark for any liquid asset (e.g. stocks, currencies, 
commodities, volatilities). This suggests again that these tails are not generated 
by strong exogenous shocks, but rather by the trading activity itself, more or less 
independently of the nature of the traded asset.
The  activity  and  volatility  of  markets  have  a  power-law  correlation  in  time, 
reflecting their intermittent nature (see Chart 3): quiescent periods are intertwined 
with  bursts  of  activity,  on  all  time  scales.  Interestingly,  many  “complex” 
physical systems display very similar intermittent dynamics (Bouchaud (2009)): 
Chart 2   Semi-log plot of the probability distribution of the daily returns r 
of the 60-day implied volatility corresponding to the S&P100 stocks












Note: The positive and negative tails of the distribution decay as |r|–4, much as the distribution 
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earthquakes,  solar  eruptions,  velocity  fluctuations  in  turbulent  flows  (Frisch 
(1997)), avalanche dynamics in random magnets under a slowly varying external 
field (Sethna et al. (2001)), teetering progression of cracks in a slowly strained 
disordered material, etc. (Le Doussal et al. (2010), see also Krawiecki et al. (2002) 
and Cabrera and Milton (2002) for related papers). The crucial point about all 
these examples is that, while the exogenous driving force is regular and steady, 
the resulting endogenous dynamics are complex and jittery. These systems find 
a temporary equilibrium where activity is low, before reaching a tipping point 
where avalanches develop, until a new quasi-equilibrium is found – sometimes 
close to the previous one, sometimes very far. In financial markets, the flow 
of “real” news is of course needed to stir activity, but the scenario we favour 
is  similar:  it  is  the  response  of  the  market  that  creates  turbulence,  and  not 
necessarily the cause, barring of course exceptional events that do sometimes 
severely  disrupt  markets  (for  example,  Lehman’s  bankruptcy).  As  explained 
above, these events are, however, much too rare to explain why prices jump 
so frequently. 
In all of the above physical examples, the non-trivial nature of the dynamics 
comes from collective effects: individual components have a relatively simple 
behaviour,  but  interactions  lead  to  new,  emergent  phenomena.  Since  this 
intermittent  behaviour  appears  to  be  generic  for  physical  systems  with  both 
heterogeneities  and  interaction,  it  is  tempting  to  think  that  the  dynamics  of 
financial markets, and more generally of economic systems, do reflect the same 
underlying mechanisms. We will come back to these ideas in the conclusion.
Chart 3   Absolute value of the daily price returns for the Dow Jones index over a 

























Notes: The volatility can remain high for a few years (like in the early 1930’s) or for a few 
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3  ARE MARKETS IN “EQUILIBRIUM”?
Recent access to UHF, tick-by-tick data allows one to investigate the microscopics 
of order flow and price formation. As we will explain below, the analysis of these 
data sets calls for a substantial revision of the traditional view of the Walrasian 
tâtonnement process, that in theory should allow prices to quickly settle to their 
equilibrium values.
3.1  TRADES ARE LONG-RANGED CORRELATED! 
Each transaction can be given a sign ε  =  ±1 according to whether the trade 
took place at the ask, and was triggered by a buy market order, or at the bid, 
corresponding to a sell market order. Market orders cross the half-spread and are 
usually interpreted as resulting from agents possessing superior information that 
urge them to trade rapidly, at the expense of less-informed traders who place limit 
orders. Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it is an empirical fact that 
such market orders impact prices, in the sense that there is some clear correlation 
between the sign of a trade and the following price change. The impact function 
is a quantitative measure of this, and is defined as: 




where pn is the mid-point price immediately preceding the nth trade, and the 
average is taken over all trades, independently of their volume.
The efficient market story posits that each trade is motivated by a new piece 
of information, which quickly moves the price towards its new value. Since, 
by definition, the direction of the news is unpredictable, the resulting string 
of signs εn should have very short-range correlations in time. The surprising 
empirical result discovered by Bouchaud (2004) and Lillo and Farmer (2004) 
(see Bouchaud et al. (2009) for a review) is that the autocorrelation of the sign 
of trades is in fact very long-range correlated, over several days or maybe even 
months. The sign correlation function decays extremely slowly, as a power law: 






where the exponent γ is found to be around 0.5 for stocks and around 0.8 for 
futures. The fact that these binary strings have long memory (in the sense that 
γ < 1) turns out to have important technical consequences, discussed below. 
The long-memory nature of the sign process means that the order flow is highly 
predictable. Conditional on observing a buy trade now, one can predict with a 
rate of success a few percent above ½ that the sign of the 10,000th trade from 
now (corresponding to a few days of trading) will be again positive! 
3.2  SCANT LIQUIDITY AND TRADE FRAGMENTATION
Where does such a persistent correlation come from? A crucial point is that 
even “highly liquid” markets are in fact not that liquid. Take for example a   
US large cap stock. Trading is extremely frequent: tens of thousands of trades per 199 PANEL STATEMENT
day, adding up to a daily volume of roughly 0.1% of total market capitalisation. 
However, the volume of buy or sell limit orders typically available in the order 
book at a given instant of time is quite small: only of the order of 1% of the traded 
daily volume, i.e. 10–5 of the market cap for stocks. Of course, this number has 
an intra-day pattern and fluctuates in time, and it can reach much smaller values 
during liquidity crises. 
The fact that the outstanding liquidity is so small has an immediate consequence: 
trades must be fragmented. It is not uncommon for investment funds to want 
to buy large fractions of a company, often several percent. If trading occurs 
through the continuous double auction market, the numbers above suggest that 
to buy 1% of a company requires at least the order of 1,000 individual trades. 
It is clear that these trades have to be diluted over several days, since otherwise 
the market would be completely destabilised, leading to unacceptable costs for 
an aggressive buyer. Thus, if an investment fund has some information about 
the future price of a stock, it cannot use it immediately, and has to trade into 
the market incrementally in order to avoid paying its own impact (Kyle (1985)). 
This fragmentation of orders clearly leads to long-range correlations in the sign 
of trades (see Bouchaud et al. (2009) and Wyart et al. (2008) for a more thorough 
discussion of the empirical evidence for this fragmentation interpretation, rather 
than a copy-cat mechanism, at least on long time scales). Trade fragmentation 
is a direct evidence that most investors are, to some degree, insensitive to price 
changes. Once the decision to buy has been made, the trade is completed even if 
the price moves up and down, at least within some bounds on the order of a few 
days or a few weeks of volatility. This is in line with the idea that the inherent 
uncertainty on the price is rather large. 
3.3  MARKETS SLOWLY DIGEST NEW INFORMATION
From a conceptual point of view, the most important conclusion of this qualitative 
discussion  is  that  prices  are  typically  not  in  equilibrium,  in  the  traditional 
Marshall sense. That is, the true price is very different than it would be if supply 
and demand were equal – as measured by the honest intent of the participants, 
as  opposed  to  what  they  actually  expose.  As  emphasised  above,  because  of 
“stealth trading”, the volume of individual trades is much smaller than the total 
demand or supply at the origin of the trades. This means that most of the putative 
information is necessarily latent, withheld by participants because of the small 
liquidity of the market. Information can only slowly be incorporated into prices 
(see Lyons (2001) for similar ideas). Markets are hide-and-seek games between 
“icebergs” of unobservable buyers and sellers that have to funnel through a very 
small liquidity drain. Prices cannot be instantaneously in equilibrium. At best, 
the notion of equilibrium prices can only make sense when coarse-grained over a 
long time scale, but then the flow of news, and the change of prices themselves, 
may alter the intention of buyers and sellers. 
But why is liquidity, as measured by the number of standing limit orders, so 
meagre? Because “informed” traders that would use limit orders are reluctant to 
place large orders that would reveal their information. Liquidity providers who 
eke out a profit from the spread are also reluctant to place large limit orders that 200 BOUCHAUD
put them at risk of being “picked-off” by an informed trader. Buyers and sellers 
face a paradoxical situation: both want to have their trading done as quickly as 
possible, but both try not to show their hands and reveal their intentions. As a 
result, markets operate in a regime of vanishing revealed liquidity, but large 
latent liquidity. 
The  long-range  nature  of  the  sign  correlation  however  leads  to  a  beautiful 
paradox. As we emphasised above, the sign of the order flow is highly predictable. 
Furthermore, each trade impacts the price in the direction of the trade. Why is it, 
then, that prices can remain statistically efficient in the sense that there is hardly 
any predictability in the sign of price changes? The resolution of this paradox 
requires a more detailed description of the impact of each trade and, in particular, 
the time dependence of this impact. This is what we address in the next section.
4  IMPACT AND RESILIENCE
We qualitatively discussed the origin of price impact in the introduction. Even at 
this microlevel, one is faced with the exogenous vs. endogenous debate about 
the origin of price changes. In the efficient market picture, as emphasised by 
Hasbrouck (2007), “orders do not impact prices. It is more accurate to say that 
orders forecast prices.” However, if the market collectively believes that even 
a small fraction of trades contain true information, the price will, on average, 
be revised upwards after a buy and downwards after a sell. But while impact is a 
necessary mechanism for information to be reflected by prices, its very existence 
means that “information revelation” could merely be a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
which would occur even if the fraction of informed trades is in fact zero. 
4.1  SOME EMPIRICAL FACTS ABOUT IMPACT
In  any  case,  using  high-frequency  data,  one  can  measure  impact  accurately. 
The  average  change  of  the  mid-point  between  two  successive  transactions, 
conditioned to a buy trade or after a sell trade are found to be equal to within 
error bars: 
(3)  E[pn+1 p
n n = +1] E[ pn+1 pn n = 1]= R(l=1),  
where we have used equation (1) for the definition of the instantaneous impact. 
Note that, in the definition above, we average over all trades, independently of 
their volume. It is well known that the dependence of impact on volume is very 
weak: it is more the trade itself, rather than its volume, that affects the price 
(Jones et al. (1996), Bouchaud et al. (2009)). This is often interpreted in terms 
of discretionary trading: large market orders are only submitted when there is   
a large prevailing volume at the best quote, a conditioning that mitigates the 
impact of these large orders. 
One important empirical result is that the impact R(ℓ  =  1) is proportional to 
the bid-ask spread S: R(ℓ = 1) ≈ 0.3S. This proportionality holds both for a 201 PANEL STATEMENT
given stock over time, as the spread fluctuates, and across an ensemble of stocks 
with different average spreads. This law means that the market instantaneously 
updates the valuation of the asset almost to the last traded price (in which case 
one would find R(ℓ = 1) ≈ S/2). 
What happens on longer time scales? A plot of R(ℓ) vs. ℓ reveals that the impact 
first grows with time by a factor two or so in the first 100 to 1,000 trades, before 
saturating or maybe even reverting back (Bouchaud et al. (2004)). However, the 
interpretation of this increase is not immediate since we know that the signs of 
trades are correlated: many trades in the same direction as the first trade will 
occur. From this point of view, it is even surprising that R(ℓ) does not grow more 
than a factor of two. This is related to the paradox mentioned above. 
Another remarkable empirical finding is that the volatility per trade σ1 is found to 
be proportional to the instantaneous impact, and therefore to the spread. In fact, 




2, σ  
where R1 = R(ℓ = 1) and J  2is the contribution of news-induced jumps, that should 
happen with very little trading. One then finds that the second contribution is 
very small compared with the first (see Wyart et al. (2008)). The relation between 
σ1 and S is again true both for a single stock over time and across different stocks. 
A very simplified picture accounting for this finding is that the spread defines 
a “grid” over which the price moves with a random direction at every trade.   
Of course, the problem with this interpretation is that the long-ranged nature of 
the sign correlations should lead to super-diffusion, i.e. persistent trends in the 
price – we are back to the same paradox. 
4.2  A SUBTLE DYNAMICAL EQUILIBRIUM
Let us assume that the price at trade time t can be decomposed as a sum over past 
impacts, in the following way: 
(5)  pt = p + G
t'=
t 1
(t t') t'St'Vt'  
where St is the spread at time t and Vt the volume of the trade at that instant. The 
exponent ψ is found to be quite small (see Bouchaud et al. (2009) for a detailed 
discussion): as noted above, it is well documented that the response to the volume 
of a single trade is strongly concave. The most important quantity in the above 
equation is the function G(ℓ), that “propagates” the impact of the trade executed 
at time t ' up to time t. In other words, G can be interpreted as the impact of a 
single trade, in contrast to R, which sums up the impact of correlated trades. 
Within the above model, the relation between the two quantities reads: 
(6)  R(ℓ) = G [ (ℓ)+
0<n<ℓ
G(ℓ n)C(n)+ [G(ℓ+ n) G(n)]
n>0
C(n)], K
where K is a certain constant, and C is the correlation of the signs of the trades 
(see  Bouchaud  et  al.  (2004)).  If  impact  was  permanent,  i.e.  G(ℓ)  =  G0,  the   202 BOUCHAUD
long-range nature of the correlation of trades would lead to an ever growing 
R(ℓ), as ℓ1-γ for γ < 1, i.e. for a long memory process. Whenever γ > 1, R(ℓ >> 1) 
saturates to a constant. This underlies the significance of the fact that empirically 
γ is found to be less than unity.
If, on the other hand, G(ℓ) decays as ℓ–β with β exactly tuned to (1 − γ)/2, then 
the transient nature of the impact of single trades precisely offsets the long-range 
correlation of the sign of trades. This choice of β leads to both a saturating R(ℓ) 
and a diffusive price, for which returns are uncorrelated (Bouchaud et al. (2004)). 
The solution of our paradox is therefore that the market is resilient: after the 
immediate reaction to a trade, the impact slowly mean-reverts back to zero (but in 
the meantime, of course, new trades occur). Equation (6) above in fact allows one 
to determine the unknown function G(ℓ) from the empirical determination of 
R(ℓ) and C(ℓ), through matrix inversion (see Bouchaud et al. (2004) and Eisler et 
al. (2009)). One indeed sees that G(ℓ) decays as ℓ–β for large ℓ.
The above model can be reformulated in terms of a surprise in the order flow. 
Since the order flow is highly correlated, the past history of trades allows one to 
make a prediction of the sign of the next trade, that we call  t t. Within a linear 








where B(ℓ) are coefficients. If we forget the fluctuations of the product SV 
ψ, it 
is easy to show that the above transient impact model can be exactly rewritten 
in terms of a permanent response to the surprise in the order flow, defined as 
t t : 










provided that the following identification is made: G(1)B(ℓ) = G(ℓ+1) − G(ℓ) 
(see Gerig (2007) and Bouchaud et al. (2009)). If B(ℓ) corresponds to the best 
linear filter adapted to the long-ranged correlation in the εs, one easily recovers 
that G(ℓ) indeed decays as ℓ–β with β = (1−γ)/2.
The above interpretation in terms of surprise is interesting because it provides a 
microscopic  mechanism  for  the  decay  of  the  impact  of  single  trades.  Let  us 
rephrase the above result in more intuitive terms. Call 
t t the probability that a buy 
follows a buy. The unconditional impact of a buy is G(1) (see equation (8)). 
From the same equation, a second buy immediately following the first has a 
reduced impact, G+(1) < G(1), since now ε = 2p+–1 > 0. A sell immediately 
following a buy, on the other hand, has an enhanced impact equal to G–(1) > G(1).   
If we want the next trade to lead to an unpredictable price change, its conditional 
average impact must be zero: p+G+(1) – (1–p+)G–(1)≡0, which indeed leads to 
G–(1) = 
OP108_EN_FORMULAE_xx
p   +
1−p   +
G+(1) > G+(1) when p+ > ½ (Gerig (2007)). This is the “asymmetric 
liquidity” effect explained in Lillo and Farmer (2004), Farmer et al. (2006) and 
Gerig (2007). This mechanism is expected to be present in general: because of the 203 PANEL STATEMENT
positive correlation in order flow, the impact of a buy following a buy should be 
less than the impact of a sell following a sell – otherwise trends would build up. 
Now, what are the mechanisms responsible for this asymmetric liquidity, and how 
can they fail (in which case markets cease to be efficient, and jumps appear)? 
One scenario is “stimulated refill”: buy market orders trigger an opposing flow 
of sell limit orders, and vice versa (Bouchaud (2004)). This rising wall of limit 
orders decreases the probability of further upward moves of the price, which is 
equivalent to saying that G+(1) < G–(1). This dynamical feedback between market 
orders and limit orders is therefore fundamental for the stability of markets and 
for enforcing efficiency. It can be tested directly on empirical data; for example 
Weber and Rosenow (2005) have found strong evidence for an increased limit 
order flow compensating market orders (see also Eisler et al. (2009) for similar 
results). 
This stabilisation mechanism can be thought of as a dynamical version of the 
supply-demand equilibrium, in the following sense: incipient up-trends quickly 
dwindle because, as the ask moves up, market order buy pressure goes down 
while  the  limit  order  sell  pressure  increases  (see  also  Handa  et  al.  (1998)). 
Conversely,  liquidity-induced  mean-reversion  –  that  keeps  the  price  low  – 
attracts more buyers, which, in turn, is an incentive for liquidity-providers to 
raise their price. Such a balance between liquidity-taking and liquidity-providing 
is  at  the  origin  of  the  subtle  compensation  between  correlation  and  impact 
explained above. In fact, the relation between volatility and spread noted above 
is a direct manifestation of the very same competition between market orders and 
limit orders (Wyart et al. (2008)). Limit orders are only profitable if the spread 
is larger than the volatility, whereas market orders are profitable in the opposite 
case.  A  small  spread  attracts  market  orders,  whereas  a  large  spread  attracts 
limit orders. In orderly market conditions, an equilibrium is reached, enforcing   
σ1  =  cS, where c is a numerical constant (Wyart et al. (2008)). But this tight 
relation can also lead to an instability: a local increase of volatility leads to an 
opening of the spread, itself feeding back on volatility. This mechanism might 
be at the heart of the frequent liquidity micro-crises observed in markets, and 
the associated no-news jumps reported above. The relation between volatility 
and spread means that there is a kind of “soft-mode”: the market can operate 
at any value of the volatility, provided the spread is adapted (and vice versa). 
The absence of a restoring force pinning the volatility to a well-defined value 
is probably responsible for the observed long-memory property, and the slow 
relaxation of the volatility after a jump (see Chart 2).
4.3  THE PROBLEM WITH IMPACT
In conclusion, although “price impact” seems to convey the idea of a forceful 
and intuitive mechanism, the story behind it might not be that simple. Empirical 
studies show that the correlation between signed order flow and price changes is 
indeed strong, but the impact of trades is neither linear in volume nor permanent, 
as assumed in several models. Impact is rather found to be strongly concave in 
volume and transient (or history-dependent), the latter property being a necessary 
consequence of the long-memory nature of the order flow. 204 BOUCHAUD
Coming  back  to  Hasbrouck’s  comment,  do  trades  impact  prices  or  do  they 
forecast  future  price  changes?  Since  trading  on  modern  electronic  markets  is 
anonymous, there cannot be any obvious difference between “informed” trades and 
“uninformed” trades. Hence, the impact of any trade must statistically be the same, 
whether informed or not informed. Impact is necessary for private information to 
be reflected in prices, but, by the same token, random fluctuations in order flow 
must necessarily contribute to the volatility of markets. As argued all along this 
paper, our belief is that the latter contribution is significant, if not dominant. 
5  SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVES
Let us reiterate the main points of this paper, which aimed at describing why and 
how asset prices move and identifying the building blocks of any quantitative 
model that claims to reproduce the dynamics of markets.
5.1  MARKETS ARE CLOSE TO A CRITICAL POINT
We  have  first  made  a  strong  case  that  the  dynamics  of  markets  is  mostly 
endogenous, and determined by the trading activity itself. The arguments for 
this are: 
News  play  a  minor  role  in  market  volatility;  most  jumps  appear  to  be  • 
unrelated to news, but seem to appear spontaneously as a result of the market 
activity itself; 
The stylised facts of price statistics (fat-tails in the distribution of returns,  • 
long-memory  of  the  volatility)  are,  to  a  large  extent,  universal  and 
independent of the particular nature of the traded asset, and very reminiscent 
of endogenous noise in other complex systems (e.g. turbulence, Barkhausen 
noise,  earthquakes,  fractures).  In  all  these  examples,  the  intermittent, 
avalanche nature of the dynamics is an emergent property, unrelated to the 
exogenous drive, which is slow and regular. 
In search of a purely endogenous interpretation of these effects, it is natural to 
investigate  to  high-frequency,  micro-structure  ingredients  that  generate  price 
changes. We have discussed the remarkable long-range correlations in order flow 
that has far-reaching consequences and forces us to revise many preconceived 
ideas about equilibrium. First of all, these correlations reflect the fact that even 
“liquid” markets are in fact very illiquid, in the sense that the total volume in the 
order book available for an immediate transaction is extremely small (10–5 of the 
market capitalisation for stocks). The immediate consequence is that the trades 
of medium-to-large institutions can only be executed incrementally, explaining 
the observed correlation in the order flow. By the same token, the information 
motivating these trades (if any) cannot be instantaneously reflected by prices. 
Prices cannot be in equilibrium, but randomly evolve as the icebergs of latent 
supply and demand progressively reveal themselves (and possibly evolve with 
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buyers  must  hide  their  intentions,  while  liquidity-providers  only  post  small 
volumes in fear of adverse selection.
The observation that markets operate in a regime of vanishing revealed liquidity, 
but  large  latent  liquidity  is  crucial  to  understand  their  hyper-sensitivity  to 
fluctuations,  potentially  leading  to  instabilities.  Liquidity  is  necessarily  a 
dynamical phenomenon that reacts to order flow in such a way as to dampen 
the  trending  effects  and  keep  price  returns  unpredictable,  through  the  subtle 
“tug-of-war” equilibrium mentioned above. Such a dynamical equilibrium can, 
however, easily break down. For example, an upward fluctuation in buy order 
flow might trigger a momentary panic, with the opposing side failing to respond 
immediately. Similarly, the strong structural link between spread and volatility 
can ignite a positive feedback loop, whereby increased spreads generate increased 
volatility, which itself causes liquidity-providers to cancel their orders and widen 
the spread. Natural fluctuations in the order flow therefore lead, in some cases, 
to a momentary lapse of liquidity, explaining the frequent occurrence of price 
jumps without news. An extreme incarnation of this feedback loop probably took 
place during the “flash crash” of 6 May 2010. We believe that the formal limit 
of zero liquidity is a critical point (Bak (1996)), which would naturally explain 
the analogy between the dynamics of markets and that of other complex systems, 
in particular the universal tails and the intermittent bursts of activity. We are, 
however, lacking a precise model that would allow one to formalise these ideas 
(see Challet et al. (2005) and Mike (2008) for work in that direction).
In summary, the picture of markets we advocate is such that the lion’s share 
of  high-frequency  dynamics  is  due  to  fluctuations  in  order  flow.  News  and 
information about fundamental values only play the role of “stirring” the system, 
i.e. slowly changing the large latent supply and demand, except on relatively 
rare occasions where these events do indeed lead to violent shocks. Most of the 
market activity comes from the slow execution of these large latent orders, which 
cascades into high-frequency fluctuations under the action of the use of liquidity-
providers and liquidity-takers, who compete to exploit all statistical regularities. 
The end-product of this activity is a white noise signal. Prices are, in a first 
approximation, statistically efficient in the sense that there is little predictability 
left in the time series. But this does not necessarily mean that these prices reflect 
in any way some true underlying information about assets. We believe, as Keynes 
and Black did, that the uncertainty in fundamental values is so large that there 
is no force to anchor the price against random high-frequency perturbations. 
It  is  quite  remarkable  indeed  that  the  high-frequency  value  of  the  volatility 
approximately coincides with the volatility on the scale of weeks, showing that 
there is very little mean-reverting effects to rein the high-frequency tremor of 
markets. Only when prices reach values that are – say – a factor 2 away from 
their “fundamental value” will mean-reverting effects progressively come into 
play. In the context of stocks, this only happens on the scale of months to years   
(see de Bondt and Thaler (1985) and the discussion in Wyart & Bouchaud (2007)).   
From  this  point  of  view,  as  emphasised  by  Lyons  (2001),  “micro-structure 
implications may be long-lived” and “are relevant to macroeconomics”.206 BOUCHAUD
5.2  LOOKING FORWARD
Having said all this, the theoretical situation is still rather disappointing. There is, 
at this stage, no convincing framework to account for these effects, in the sense 
of converting the above qualitative ideas into a quantitative model that would, for 
example, predict the shape of the tails of the return distribution, or the long-range 
memory of volatility after a suitable coarse-graining in time. Most available 
models to date (e.g. agent-based models (Lux and Marchesi (2000), Giardina and 
Bouchaud (2003), Goldstone and Janssen (2005)), Minority Games (Challet et al. 
(2005)),  herding  models  (Cont  and  Bouchaud  (2000)),  Langevin  approaches 
(Bouchaud  and  Cont  (1998)))  postulate  a  linear  (in  volume)  and  permanent 
impact as in the Kyle model (Kyle (1985)), whereas, as we have shown, impact 
is both non-linear and transient. It may well be that the assumption of a linear, 
permanent impact is justified after some coarse-graining in time, say on a daily 
scale, but this is actually part of the programme that needs to be achieved. 
In the meantime, several strong messages emerge from the above remarks, 
that are particularly topical after the 2008 crisis:5 
Even liquid markets are not really liquid, and therefore have no reason to  • 
be efficient. One should stop taking market prices at face value, especially 
in many OTC markets where “liquidity” is deceptive. Quants should quit 
the obsession of exact calibration on market prices, in particular when the 
models are absurdly remote from reality. One of the worst examples, in the 
author’s  opinion,  is  the  use  of  local  volatility  models  (Dupire  (1994)), 
that are by construction able to fit any volatility surface – so calibration 
will always work, and this is unfortunately why the approach is so popular. 
But  sing this framework to price more exotic derivatives using plain vanilla 
instruments can lead to disaster, even if plain vanilla markets were efficient –   
because  the  underlying  reality  has  nothing  to  do  with  a  local  volatility 
process. The situation is obviously even worse if markets are not efficient. 
Errors are propagated and amplified in a non-linear way, and the price and 
hedge of illiquid instruments can be totally nonsensical. There are many 
examples in the quantitative finance literature of erroneous models that can 
be easily calibrated, and that are therefore used and abused by financial 
engineers. The use of such models contributes to propagate systemic risk, 
specially as they become standard practice.
Collective  effects  mediated  by  imitation  or  contagion  pervade  markets  • 
and  lead  to  instabilities.  Prosperity  relies  heavily  on  trust,  which  is  an 
immaterial common good that has no inertia and can dissipate overnight 
(Anand  et  al.  (2009)).  The  mechanisms  that  foster  or  destroy  trust 
are  intrinsically  (or  even  tautologically)  collective.  The  most  efficient 
mechanism for contagion is through the dynamics of the price and of the 
order flow, which is public, common information. Since it is impossible to 
be immediately sure that a silly trade is indeed silly, its impact on the price 
5  There are obviously many other aspects that we leave aside. The destabilising use of 
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can trigger an instability, as was likely the case during the flash crash of   
6 May 2010. Being influenced by the behaviour of others seems to be one 
of the most common human traits that persists across history. We are always 
worried that others may be smarter, or may have more information than 
we do. This imitation propensity is well known to lead to dramatic effects 
(see, for example, Keynes (1936), Granovetter (1978), Brock and Durlauf 
(2001), Galam (2008), Curty and Marsili (2006), Michard and Bouchaud 
(2005), Borghesi and Bouchaud (2007), Gordon et al. (2009) and references 
therein), and must be one of the ingredients leading to crises and crashes 
(Akerlof and Shiller (2009)). The importance of hysteresis, in that respect, 
cannot be overemphasised – see Michard and Bouchaud (2005), Gordon   
et al. (2009), Bouchaud (2009) and Cross et al. (2009).
There are many other contagion mechanisms – we just mentioned the use 
of similar pricing and risk models. More generally, common strategies lead 
to common positions (see, for example, the quant crunch of August 2007 
(Khandani and Lo (2009)), and so does the widespread diffusion of similar 
“toxic” products (e.g. CDOs). Benchmarking performance to the average 
of a peer group promotes copy-cat behaviour. The cross-liability network 
between financial institutions or between companies can also be instrumental 
in wreaking havoc (see, for example, Battiston et al. (2009), Neu and Kühn 
(2004) and Choi and Douady (2009)).
Another  important  idea  is  that  agents  in  financial  markets  are  strongly  • 
heterogeneous.  Physical  systems  where  individual  elements  are  both 
heterogeneous  and  strongly  interacting  are  well  known  to  be  inherently 
fragile  to  small  perturbations.  These  systems  generically  evolve  in  an 
intermittent  way,  with  a  succession  of  rather  stable  epochs  punctuated 
by rapid, unpredictable changes – again, even when the exogenous drive 
is smooth and steady. Within this metaphor of markets, competition and 
complexity could be the essential cause of their endogenous instability.
The main problem with the current theories is that they are based on the 
idea  that  we  can  replace  an  ensemble  of  heterogeneous  and  interacting 
agents by a unique representative one, in other words that the micro- and 
macro-behaviour should coincide (Kirman (1992)). Within this framework, 
crises are expected to require a major external shock, whereas in reality 
small local disturbances can trigger large systemic effects (the US sub-prime 
market represented in itself only a minor fraction of the global credit market, 
but still stoked a global crisis).
Finally, there are a number of explicit destabilising feedback loops that  • 
regulators  should  investigate  and  abate.  Some  are  a  direct  consequence 
of  the  faith  in  the  efficiency  of  markets,  such  as  the  “mark-to-market” 
accounting rule, which relies on the idea that market prices are fair and 
unbiased.  Such  a  pro-cyclical  practice  applied  on  credit  derivatives  has 
contributed to impair the balance sheet of many financial institutions in 
2008, and amplified the mayhem. In our opinion, again, the “fair price” idea 
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and a liquidity discount based on a pessimistic estimate of the impact cost 
during a fire-sale. Other feedback loops are created by the use of financial 
derivatives (see Marsili (2008) and Brock et al. (2009)) and/or, as alluded 
to  above,  by  quantitative  models  themselves  –  a  vivid  example  is  the 
crash of 1987 that was a direct consequence of the unwarranted trust in   
Black-Scholes’ perfect replication theory. 
There  are  also  nasty  feedback  loops  lurking  in  the  high  frequency, 
micro-structure side. We have mentioned several times in this paper the 
spread → volatility → spread loop that is probably at the origin of most 
“spontaneous” liquidity crises (such as the one of 6 May 2010, but also all 
the daily jumps that we discussed but that rarely make the news). It would be 
interesting to investigate mechanisms that help averting those. For example, 
dynamic  make/take  fees  that  depend  on  market  conditions  and  on  the 
distance between the placed order and the last traded price could endogenise 
stabilising feedback loops. This is clearly an issue around which academic 
research  and  regulation  merge,  which  makes  modelling  high-frequency 
so exciting. 
Whether or not the above ingredients can be mixed with agent-based models to 
provide a truly quantitative theory of economic and financial crises remains of 
course, at this stage, a fascinating open problem. 
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WHAT SHORTCOMINGS IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY AND 
MODELLING HAVE BEEN REVEALED BY THE FINANCIAL CRISIS   
AND HOW SHOULD THEY BE ADDRESSED IN THE FUTURE? 
BY MARTIN EICHENBAUM, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY AND NBER
This panel session is a wonderful opportunity to think about the lessons for 
researchers that have emerged from the recent economic crisis. I will organise 
my comments around three points. First, the key modelling and policy issues 
associated with the recent crisis were crystallised thirty years ago in two papers: 
Kareken and Wallace (1978) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). So whatever 
else may be true about the shortcomings of modern macroeconomic theory, the 
notion that it has little to say about the crisis is just wrong. Second, there are 
both good and bad reasons why mainstream pre-2008 dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models did not place much emphasis on financial market 
frictions.  Third,  significant  further  progress  in  understanding  key  financial 
market  puzzles  will  involve  making  progress  in  modelling  heterogeneity  in 
beliefs and persistent disagreement between agents.
Macroeconomists have long thought about financial crises. As Sargent (2010) 
argues,  it  is  useful  to  centre  these  thoughts  around  the  models  in  Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) and Kareken and Wallace (1978). The key policy question 
addressed  in  those  papers  is:  “what  do  government  lender-of-last-resort  and 
deposit insurance programmes do to stop or promote financial market crises?”
Sargent  (2010)  calls  these  models  polar,  because  in  Diamond  and  Dybvig’s 
model (the DD model) deposit insurance programmes have purely beneficial 
effects, whereas in Kareken and Wallace’s model (the KW model) the same 
programmes have purely negative effects. These differences reflect the different 
causes  of  financial  market  instability  in  the  two  models.  In  the  DD  model, 
instability  of  financial  markets  arises  from  a  temporal  mismatch  between 
financial  intermediaries’  assets  and  liabilities.  In  the  KW  model,  instability 
arises from mispriced government deposit insurance and the implied distortions 
in banks’ portfolios. 
Consider first the DD analysis. In this model banks perform the function of 
maturity and liquidity transformation, which improves social efficiency. Banks’ 
activities enable depositors to make long-term investments even though they hold 
liabilities that are short-term in duration. Through these activities banks facilitate 
risk-sharing among people with uncertain future liquidity needs.
A  potential  problem  with  the  arrangement  is  that  for  long-term  investments 
to  come  to  fruition  and  for  the  premature  liquidation  of  banks’  long-term 
investments to be avoided, enough patient depositors must leave their funds in 
banks. Without deposit insurance, even patient depositors may want to withdraw 
their funds early, causing banks to prematurely liquidate long-term investments. 214 EICHENBAUM
In particular, bank runs can be triggered by patient depositors’ private incentives 
to  withdraw  early  if  they  think  that  other  patient  investors  are  choosing  to 
withdraw their deposits early. Formally, there exist multiple Nash equilibria, 
some good and some bad in terms of welfare. The equilibria in which bank runs 
do not occur correspond to good social outcomes, while the equilibria in which 
runs do occur correspond to bad social outcomes.
The good news is that in the DD model there is a “simple” solution to bank 
runs: government-supplied deposit insurance. Even better news is that publicly 
provided  insurance  is  virtually  without  cost  to  the  government  because  in 
equilibrium there aren’t any bank runs.
There is nothing special about commercial banks, either in the DD analysis or 
in reality. The DD analysis applies to any institution that is in the business of 
liquidity  and  maturity  transformation.  Just  substitute  the  phrase  rollover  risk 
for bank-run risk and go from there. In 2008, there were all sorts of institutions 
that were really banks in the DD sense but which did not have access to explicit 
deposit  insurance.  These  entities,  otherwise  known  as  the  shadow  banking 
system, were the key players in the recent crisis.
Sargent  (2010)  points  out  that  we  can  use  the  DD  framework  to  provide  a 
sympathetic  interpretation  of  policy-makers’  response  to  the  financial  crisis. 
Policy-makers looked out their windows in the early autumn of 2008 and saw DD 
bank runs all over the place. From this perspective, the correct response was to 
stop the runs at the earliest stage possible by convincing creditors that their short-
term loans and deposits were effectively insured. Accordingly, policy-makers 
in the United States and Europe provided new short-term loans that markets 
weren’t  willing  to  supply  and  effectively  guaranteed  the  assets  of  shadow 
banks’ creditors. In this way, policy saved fundamentally good institutions and 
minimised the damage to the economy from the outbreak of bank runs. As in the 
DD model, the icing on the cake was that the “rescue” could be accomplished at 
little or no eventual cost to the taxpayers.
The KW framework provides a competing and darker vision of recent events. 
Instability of banks in the KW model arises from mispriced government deposit 
insurance and the implied distortions in banks’ portfolios. To make this point 
in as stark a manner as possible, KW suppose there are complete markets and 
that some people want to hold risk-free deposits. Without deposit insurance, 
depositors who want risk-free deposits must hold them in banks that hold risk-
free portfolios. Naturally such banks emerge in equilibrium. But suppose that 
there is deposit insurance that is either free or is priced too cheaply. Then it is 
privately optimal for banks to become as risky and as large as possible. With 
positive probability, banks will fail and taxpayers will have to compensate banks’ 
depositors.
The critical policy lesson is that if the government sets up deposit insurance and 
doesn’t regulate bank portfolios, then it is setting the stage for a financial crisis. 
Similarly, if the government deregulates financial institutions, it must first reform 
deposit insurance to prevent sewing the seeds of a crisis. The US policy-makers 215 PANEL STATEMENT
of the 1970s chose to not heed KW’s advice. The resulting harvest yielded the 
Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s.
The lesson for our time is clear. Any institution that knows it is too big or 
too complex to fail has an incentive to take on high degrees of risk. Claiming 
that these institutions won’t be bailed out isn’t credible because it is not time-
consistent. After the fact it is just too costly to let the shadow banking system 
collapse and induce a huge recession. Straightforward KW logic shows that such 
institutions have to be regulated.
So here we have a darker view of the recent crisis. The United States deregulated 
financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s. Policy-makers failed to effectively 
regulate financial firms and did not credibly commit to letting shadow bank 
creditors suffer heavy losses. These firms took highly leveraged, risky positions, 
helping  to  ignite  a  huge  run-up  in  housing  prices.  Once  real  estate  markets 
peaked, many important players in the shadow banking system became insolvent. 
Policy-makers caved in to the time-consistency problem and effectively bailed 
out their creditors. So the class of 2008 policy-makers had to pay for the sins of 
their predecessors, who failed in their regulatory duties. 
In sum we have two competing visions of the origin of the recent crisis and the 
appropriate  policy  response.  The  KW  analysis  instructs  policy-makers  to  be 
very cautious about lender-of-last-resort facilities and very sensitive to the risk-
taking activities of banks. The DD analysis prescribes that policy-makers should 
be sensitive to the possibility of runs on the financial system and the need for 
mechanisms to stop runs. 
No doubt there is some truth to both visions. In real time policy-makers had 
to place their bets on which of the visions was more important. It’s clear that 
during the crisis they put their chips on the DD analysis. At the same time they 
promised to pursue financial regulation in the future. Many of us are waiting for 
a meaningful delivery on that promise.
Looking forward, macroeconomists face two key tasks. First, we need to assess 
the quantitative importance of the risks stressed in the DD and KW visions. 
Second, we need to help design institutional reforms for minimising both sets 
of risks while allowing the financial system to perform its socially beneficial 
functions.
Now that the word quantitative has been mentioned, it seems fair to ask: “where 
were the DSGE models during the 2008 crisis and its immediate aftermath?”
Few  DSGE  models  placed  financial  market  frictions  at  the  centre  of  their 
analyses prior to the crisis. Important exceptions to this pattern can be found 
in models by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto and 
Rostagno (2009). But, while useful, these models have risk residing directly in 
real returns at the level of goods-producing firms. Our recent problems originated 
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Since the crisis, there has been a burst of good work incorporating financial 
market frictions into DSGE models. But there are still very few DSGE models 
in  which  shocks  originate  from  within  the  financial  system,  rather  than  the 
production sector. Moreover, all of the DSGE models that I’m familiar with rely 
on exogenous shocks to an entity’s net worth. Such models can certainly be used 
to assess how policy should respond to shocks. But we need richer models that 
let us assess the efficacy of alternative regulations that make “shocks” less likely 
and less intense.
We’ve  certainly  known  for  a  long  time  that  financial  frictions  could  act  as 
important propagation mechanisms to shocks. So why didn’t DSGE modellers 
place  more  emphasis  on  those  frictions?  In  practice  we  have  to  work  with 
simplified  models.  So  we  have  to  make  choices  about  which  frictions  to 
emphasise.  One  good  reason  not  to  have  emphasised  financial  frictions  in 
DSGE models is that until the recent episode, post-war recessions in the United 
States and western Europe did not seem closely tied to disturbances in financial 
markets. True, there was the Savings and Loan crisis. But it was a localised 
affair that did not develop into anything like the “Great Recession”. Similarly, 
the stock market meltdown in the late 1980s only had minor effects on aggregate 
economic activity. So, guided by the post-war data from the United States and 
western  Europe,  modellers  emphasised  other  non-financial-market  frictions 
when considering economic fluctuations. 
There was also a bad reason why DSGE modellers did not emphasise financial 
market frictions: we focused too narrowly on post-war US and western European 
data. Even if we leave pre-war history aside, the post-war era has been marked 
by numerous currency crises. Many of these crises, especially in the post-1980 
period, amounted to twin banking/currency crises. Moreover, many of the policy 
debates, especially those surrounding the collapse of fixed exchange rate regimes 
in South-East Asia, closely paralleled the DD and KW debate. 
The  crisis  countries  in  South-East  Asia  were  not  running  large  deficits  or 
suffering  from  any  standard  problems  that  would  lead  to  an  exchange  rate 
crisis.  So-called  “second-generation”  models  explain  these  currency  crisis 
episodes as self-fulfilling expectation crises that were essentially DD bank runs   
(see  Burnside,  Eichenbaum  and  Rebelo  (2008)  for  a  review  of  alternative 
currency crisis models). In contrast, “third-generation” models emphasise the 
importance  of  implicit  or  explicit  government  guarantees  to  banks’  foreign 
creditors under fixed exchange rate regimes. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo 
(2001a,  2004)  argue  that,  in  the  presence  of  such  guarantees,  it  is  optimal 
for banks to expose themselves to exchange rate risk and declare bankruptcy 
if  a  devaluation  occurs.  But  a  devaluation  transforms  potential  government 
liabilities into actual liabilities. So government guarantees create the possibility 
of self-fulfilling currency crises. 
As  in  the  KW  model,  fundamentals,  in  the  form  of  government  guarantees, 
determine whether a twin banking/currency crisis will occur. But, as in the DD 
model, the precise timing of the crisis is a multiple equilibrium phenomenon. 217 PANEL STATEMENT
So third-generation currency crisis models build on key features of the two polar 
models of financial instability.
Now, all models have to take some institutional frameworks as given. While flaws 
in  our  institutions  can  have  intense  effects,  these  effects  occur  at  irregular, 
infrequent  intervals.  We  can  be  blindsided  if  we  focus  on  relatively  short 
time series from broadly similar countries. The time series are not sufficiently 
informative  to  easily  detect  low-frequency  fault  lines  in  our  institutions. 
Economic history and data from countries less similar to our own can be highly 
informative in helping to detect those fault lines. 
I leave it to the economic historians to chastise macroeconomists for ignoring 
their work. I will chastise mainstream macroeconomists for not paying more 
attention to the post-war experiences of emerging markets. The currency crises 
of the late 1990s should have been the canary in the coal mine of financial 
deregulation. They weren’t, and we paid a heavy price.
Does this failure imply that there is an alternative to DSGE models? Of course 
not. Central banks work on a decision cycle of a few months. Quantitative models 
are crucial for organising discussions of the state of the economy and quantifying 
the  likely  effects  of  alternative  policy  actions.  For  these  purposes,  there  are 
simply no coherent alternatives to estimated DSGE models.
Exactly which features should we embed in future DSGE models? Future clever 
theorists will come up with clever theories highlighting all sorts of possibilities. 
Some of these possibilities may even contain a grain of truth. But we need some 
way of assessing their quantitative importance for aggregate economic activity. 
The only way to do this is to incorporate the proposed frictions into DSGE 
models.
The trick will be to estimate and evaluate evolving DSGE models using cross-
country evidence, and not rely solely on time series methods using data over 
short periods for similar countries. How to do this in a systematic way poses 
an interesting challenge. I suspect that Bayesian approaches will be particularly 
useful in this regard. 
From a broader perspective, macroeconomists face an even larger challenge. 
Researchers  and  policy-makers  obviously  have  long-lasting,  persistent 
disagreements about fundamental issues. Thirty years on and we’re still debating 
the relative merits of the KW and DD models. This disagreement is not just a 
matter of academic interest. When the policy-makers of the ECB convene to 
discuss the ongoing sovereign debt crises, differences of opinion will revolve 
around different answers to the following types of questions:
Are Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain’s debt problems primarily contagion 
phenomena or are we just seeing fundamentals work their way out?
How important is the moral hazard problem of “bailing out” a fellow Member 
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What is an analogue of “regulation” in a monetary union of sovereign states?
Clearly  differences  of  opinion  matter  and  are  persistent.  While  it  is  easy  to 
generate disagreement on fundamental matters in a conference of economists or 
policy-makers, it is remarkably hard to generate persistent disagreements between 
the agents in our models. I don’t think we’ll have convincing theories of asset 
prices and financial markets until we have convincing models of disagreement.
Nobody disagrees about the odds of drawing four aces from a deck of cards. But 
there is substantial scope for belief heterogeneity when historical evidence is at 
best a weak guide. For many questions this situation is the one we face. The data 
just aren’t there to provide compelling evidence about the effects of low-frequency 
changes in fundamentals such as regulations, the incentive effects of a monetary 
union  on  member  country  deficits,  or  the  effects  of  changes  in  productivity 
growth rates on asset prices. Under these circumstances, heterogeneity in beliefs 
can  evolve  over  prolonged  periods  of  time  with  important  consequences  for 
market outcomes. See for example Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) 
who analyse booms and busts in housing prices in models where agents have 
persistent disagreements about housing fundamentals.
Confronting the existence of persistent disagreements can push us outside the 
formal rational expectations framework, but in such a way that the richness or 
weakness of historical data remains informative. This research strategy is in its 
infancy but is highly promising. See Hansen (2007) and Sargent (2008) for a 
review of the literature.
Let me conclude with the following observation for policy-makers. Many of 
you were truly shocked to discover that staff models didn’t account for some 
key features of the crisis. And you were certainly frustrated that the science of 
macroeconomics hasn’t quite caught up with the art of macroeconomics. Before 
venting your frustration on the staff, remember the sage advice of the noted 
American decision theorist Don Rumsfeld: the art of policy-making involves 
constantly being on the alert for the unknown unknowns that we don’t know we 
don’t know. 
In a crisis, the staff can help. State-of-the-art models can help. Even 75-year-old 
books providing general theories of employment, interest and money can help. 
But a wise policymaker in the throes of a crisis will never focus on only one 
feather in his quill. And he will never be surprised to be surprised. 
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PANEL STATEMENT
BY JOHN GEANAKOPLOS, YALE UNIVERSITY, ELLINGTON CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT AND SANTA FE INSTITUTE
ENDOGENOUS LEVERAGE AND DEFAULT 
1  INTRODUCTION
In my view the fundamental missing ingredients in quantifiable macro models 
used  by  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  ECB  are  endogenous  default  and 
endogenous lending terms distinct from the interest rate. The models do not 
recognise that changes in the perception of potential defaults can radically alter 
lending conditions and therefore economic activity. This failure has prevented   
policy-makers from recognising asset bubbles, from understanding the source 
of debt crashes and from accurately gauging the severity and duration of their 
aftermath. It led to policy errors in ignoring the dangerous build-up of debt 
before this last crisis and to further policy errors after the crisis in not acting to 
restructure unpayable debts. In short, it has led to a faulty understanding of the 
nature of the debtor-creditor relationship and its impact on the macroeconomy.
For a long time now, maybe since Irving Fisher, we have come to believe that 
managing interest rates is the way to regulate lending and borrowing in the 
macroeconomy. Whenever anything goes wrong, people say “change the interest 
rate”. Similarly, we have developed a phobia about forgiving debt. My view is 
that neither of these prejudices can be unambiguously derived from a proper 
general  equilibrium  model  with  endogenous  default  and  lending.  Collateral 
rates or leverage can be more important to economic activity and prices than 
interest rates, and more important to manage. And the only expeditious way 
out of a severe leverage cycle crash is to move quickly in writing down debts.   
The fact that we do not presently know how to compute the optimal leverage 
ratios, or the optimal amount of debt forgiveness, is not an argument against 
taking such actions, but rather further proof that we have been developing the 
wrong models.
The nature of promises and debt has been a preoccupation of philosophers for 
thousands  of  years.  Keeping  promises  was  Plato’s  first  proposed  definition 
of justice in the Republic (it was shown not to be always just). Nietzsche, in 
the “Genealogy of Morals”, says the emergence of Conscience came from the 
repeated punishing of people who failed to honour their debts and the subsequent 
internalisation of that punishment. (Thus “schuld” is the root of the German word 
for debt and also for one version of Conscience.) The subtlest literary analysis of 
keeping promises can be found in Shakespeare’s “Merchant of Venice”.
The plot of the “Merchant of Venice” centres around the contract negotiated by 
Antonio to borrow money from Shylock to finance his friend Bassanio’s courtship 
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Shylock argue over the rate of interest on the loan. But Shakespeare understood 
the primary importance of collateral. How many of you can remember the interest 
rate  Shylock  charged  Antonio  and  Bassanio?  Yet,  all  of  you  remember  the 
collateral agreed on in the contract – the pound of flesh. Obviously, Shakespeare 
thought the collateral was more important. When all the boats apparently sink 
and Antonio is unable to repay the loan, the Court alters the collateral, saying it 
should be a pound of flesh, but not a drop of blood.
The theme of borrowing and default is repeated several times in the play with the 
story of the rings. Portia and her assistant lend Bassanio and his assistant their 
rings in exchange for the promise that they will never be taken off their fingers. 
Shylock has earlier made it clear that he would never break his promise about 
the ring his wife Leah gave him. Yet when faced with an urgent need, Bassanio 
and his assistant do give up their rings, and they expect forgiveness. “To do a 
great right, do a little wrong” is Bassanio’s philosophy. Or as Portia describes 
forgiveness of debts, “The quality of mercy is not strain’d, ...It blesseth him that 
gives and him that takes.”
Following Shakespeare’s lead, I discuss models of collateral and debt forgiveness 
(or  punishment  for  default).  In  the  next  section  I  argue  for  the  necessity  of 
collateral and leverage in macro models. I point out that, at present, leverage is 
absent from those models, even if lip service is paid to it now. I illustrate my view 
by describing the kinds of effects I have obtained in my models of leverage that 
cannot be reproduced by the more carefully calibrated macro models that guide 
central bank action. Next, I show that only by taking collateral seriously can one 
properly assess the effect on asset prices of new derivatives like credit default 
swaps. Finally, I talk about the optimal punishment for default and the current 
deplorable conditions of debt overhang that much of the world finds itself in.
2  LEVERAGE AND ASSET PRICING
Just as with Shakespeare’s Court, I believe today that the regulatory authority 
ought  to  be  managing  collateral  rates  in  addition  to  interest  rates.  I  have 
worked on the leverage cycle, as I call it, for over ten years – not quite as long 
as Shakespeare and with somewhat less attention than Shakespeare received.   
My oldest published papers on the subject are “Promises, Promises” in 1997, 
about collateral general equilibrium, “Liquidity Default and Crashes” in 2003, 
about the leverage cycle, and “Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy” 
in 2008 with Ana Fostel, about the spread of leverage cycles across markets.   
In those papers I showed that when leverage is high, asset prices tend to rise, and 
when leverage declines, asset prices fall, sometimes in a violent crash.
There have been other early papers on collateral. In fact, Ben Bernanke was 
one of the pioneers in emphasising collateral. However, he did not really write 
very much about leverage or changes in leverage. Instead he emphasised that 
when collateral goes down in value, the amount that can be borrowed goes down   
(as  would  be  the  case  with  a  constant  loan-to-value  lending  rule).  What  I 
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change in loan-to-value that is a crucial source of crashes. And as I shall argue, 
loan-to-value is a variable that can be regulated. 
The modern calibrated macro models that pay any attention to collateral, such 
as those presented by Christiano at the American Federal Reserve meetings in 
Jackson Hole last August (Christiano et al. (2010)) and by Smets at this ECB 
conference in Frankfurt (Fahr et al. (2010)), derive from the foundational work 
of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, and Kiyotaki and Moore. In that foundational 
work, leverage is barely mentioned and changes in leverage play no significant 
role. In Kiyotaki and Moore, for example, leverage actually rises after a bad 
shock, dampening any crisis. In the papers of Christiano and Smets, leverage 
is  duly  noted,  though  it  is  not  clearly  distinguished  from  credit,  but  again 
it does not play a central role. Both those models suggest the possibility of 
calibrating what happened in the current crisis. In the Smets paper, mysterious 
shocks started the crisis. No effort is made to identify what the shocks are or 
what they correspond to in reality; their existence is inferred from the fact that 
we had a crisis. Not even their properties are identified. In the leverage story   
I told in 2003 (and which is also told in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)), it is 
crucial that the shocks are not only negative, but that they increase in volatility, as 
they did in reality. Moreover, I identify the first shocks as increases in mortgage 
delinquencies. In the Smets paper, there is no reason why his shocks should cause 
leverage to decrease rather than increase. In Christiano, the shocks are explicitly 
identified as changes in future productivity. But again there is no reason why 
such shocks should lower leverage. It is quite clear that in these models, leverage 
is not needed and changes in leverage do not play a vital role.
The foundational work of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, Kiyotaki and Moore, 
and Holmstrom and Tirole is about credit cycles, not leverage cycles. In those 
papers, a drop in asset values or the wealth of entrepreneurs makes it more 
difficult to borrow, which in turn hampers productivity, which then lowers asset 
values, making it harder to borrow and so on. Their story is about levels of credit, 
not ratios. It could be told as if the ratio of loans to asset values were constant. 
The leverage cycle differs from the credit cycle insofar as it is about ratios of 
credit to asset values. In my view it is these ratios which played the crucial 
dynamic role.
What I mean by leverage is loan-to-value on new loans. If the loan-to-value is 
80%, USD 20 down gets you a USD 100 house. The leverage is five because 
your cash downpayment of USD 20 has been multiplied by five in the USD 100 
value of the asset. Loan-to-value and leverage describe the same thing. But let me 
emphasise it is on new loans. Debt-to-equity is essentially loan-to-value on old 
loans. Debt-to-equity is also an important ratio, but different from what I mean 
by leverage. And the two ratios often go in different directions. Historically, 
debt-to-equity typically increases for two or three years after a crisis and then 
starts a long slow decline stretching over years. But leverage on new loans drops 
abruptly before a crash. It is a cause, not a lagging result. How well things are 
going in the economy usually depends more on the leverage on new loans, not 
on what is happening to old loans, which often goes in the opposite direction. 
Of course, as we shall see, the duration of a crisis depends critically on the debt 
overhang, that is on the loan-to-value on old loans.223 PANEL STATEMENT
The  point  of  my  equilibrium  theory  of  leverage  is  that  supply  and  demand 
determine  not  just  the  interest  rate,  but  leverage  as  well.  Supply  equals 
demand for a loan is apparently just one equation, which gives rise to a puzzle.   
How can one equation determine two variables: interest and leverage? That is 
part of the reason why leverage has received so little attention in economics. It is 
just awkward for economic theory. That is why, as an economic theorist, I began 
to think about the subject. I wanted an equilibrium theory of what influences 
leverage and what role leverage plays in the economy. 
In my theory, supply and demand do determine both the interest rate and leverage. 
(The trick is that there is more than one supply equals demand equation, but I do 
not have time to discuss that here). What ends up influencing the interest rate in 
equilibrium is impatience; what influences leverage in equilibrium is volatility 
in the short run and, in the long run, innovation (because the economy is always 
looking for innovative ways to stretch scarce collateral).
Why are people now saying leverage is important? Every trader knows, if you 
are leveraged five to one and the asset goes up or down 1%, your wealth goes up 
or down 5%. You are more sensitive to changes. And the second thing they say 
is that since collateralised loans often turn out to be no recourse loans, people 
can walk away from their debts. “If we had only had limited leverage, these 
banks would not have lost so much money when prices started to go down. And 
homeowners would not be walking away from their homes.”
Of course, I believe those two things are very important and they play a crucial 
role in my theory. But there was a third aspect of leverage in my theory which   
I think is far more important. The real significance of leverage is that it allows 
fewer people to buy more assets and therefore raises the price of assets. Leverage 
causes bubbles.
In  the  leverage  cycle,  periods  of  high  leverage  produce  higher  asset  prices, 
while periods of low leverage produce lower asset prices, provided there is no 
short selling. In Chart 1 below, you can see why that is. Imagine a continuum of 
people from top to bottom, who have different views about the value of assets. 
The people at the top think the assets are worth a lot. The people at the bottom do 
Chart 1 Marginal buyer theory of price
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not think they are worth very much. This heterogeneity is of crucial importance. 
Whatever the price is, there are going to be people at the top who think the price 
is cheap and they will be the buyers. The people lower down are going to think 
the price is too much and they will be sellers. The guy who thinks the price is 
just right, his valuation is equal to the price. You might say his valuation is 
determining the price.
When leverage goes up, the people at the top can borrow more. Fewer of them 
are required to hold all the assets, so the marginal buyer goes up and the price 
rises, not because there is any fundamental change in the economy, but because 
the marginal buyer is someone who has a higher opinion of the value of the asset. 
More leverage causes higher asset prices because it changes the marginal buyer. 
Most of modern finance basically assumes this heterogeneity away. I am not 
aware of a single finance or macro textbook that mentions endogenous leverage 
and its effect on asset pricing.
There are many reasons why, in reality, agents have heterogeneous valuations 
of assets. For example, there are real differences in risk tolerance – risk-averse 
people value the assets less, even with the same information. There are also 
real differences in how people can use assets for production. There are also 
differences in utility from owning assets, like living in a house, for example.   
And some people maybe are just more optimistic about the assets than others.
3  THE LEVERAGE CYCLE IN THEORY
Over the leverage cycle, leverage gradually rises, as I said earlier, because of 
technological innovation stretching the available collateral and because volatility 
is  low.  After  a  big,  bad  shock  that  increases  volatility,  leverage  abruptly 
plummets. The fall in asset prices can be much bigger than anybody thinks is 
justified by the news alone because it is coupled with a crash in leverage and the 
bankruptcy of the most optimistic buyers. There is too much leverage in normal 
times and therefore too-high asset prices, and too little leverage in bad times and 
therefore too-low asset prices.
Leverage cycle crashes always happen in exactly the same way. First, there is a 
period in which leverage becomes very high and the assets are concentrated in the 
hands of the natural buyers (optimists for short) who have borrowed large sums 
of money to get them, setting the stage for the crisis. Then there is bad news that 
causes asset prices to fall because every investor values the assets less. This price 
fall forces the leveraged natural buyers or optimists to sell assets to meet their 
margin calls, thus realising their losses. In Chart 2 below, I assume they all go 
bankrupt. Their departure causes asset prices to fall more because the assets fall 
into less optimistic hands. If the bad news is “scary”, then lenders demand more 
collateral. This means that the remaining less ebullient optimists each buy less, 
requiring more of them to hold all the assets. The new marginal buyer must be 
much further down the continuum and so much more pessimistic, and prices drop 
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Now what is “scary bad news”? It is not just bad news, but it is the kind that 
creates more uncertainty, more volatility. You are at an airport and they say 
the plane is going to be ten minutes late. That is bad, but ten minutes is really 
nothing. However, once you hear it is ten minutes late, you think, “My gosh, 
maybe it is going to be an hour late.” That could be really bad. 
It is the uncertainty the news creates that is critical, not how bad it is. Another 
example is subprime delinquencies going from 2% to 5% in January 2007. 5% 
is not catastrophic. However, once it has reached 5% and broken the old pattern, 
investors think maybe it will go to 30% or 40%. That is what causes people to 
get nervous. When the lenders get nervous, they ask for more collateral and   
they force deleveraging. That is the beginning of the crisis.
The leverage cycle would occur even with completely rational agents; it gets 
much worse with irrationality. For example, if, in the boom, irrational lenders 
thought prices could only go up, leverage would get absurdly high, or if, as bad 
times approached, panicked investors sold everything, prices would fall much 
faster.
4  LEVERAGE CYCLES IN HISTORY
I believe our financial history is full of recurring leverage cycles, during which 
leverage gradually builds up, creating a huge asset bubble, and then leverage and 
asset prices suddenly come crashing down. That is what happened in the Tulip 
mania of 1637 in Holland, in the great Florida land boom and bust just before the 
Great Depression, in the 1980s land bubble in Japan, in the Asian crisis of 1998 
and in the subprime crisis of 2007-09. Of course, the data on historical collateral 
rates is spotty and needs assembling. There is a lot more work that could be done 
about this. We need to develop macro models that could calibrate the waste in the 
overbuilding that inevitably takes place in the ebullient stage when asset prices 
are too high and, even more importantly, that could calibrate the loss from the 
crisis stage and its aftermath.
The current crisis, I believe, is a clear example of a leverage cycle crash after 
a long leverage boom. And for this we do have some data. In Chart 3 below, 
Chart 2   Leverage cycle theory of crashes
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the dotted line is Shiller’s famous housing index. In 2000, it was at 100 on the 
right-hand scale. By the second quarter of 2006, it hits 190, a 90% increase in 
six years. Then it goes down by 30% or so from there. Shiller famously said that 
it was irrational exuberance driving prices up. And, when the narrative changed 
because people decided things could not go up forever, they started telling bad 
stories, so everyone got depressed and the prices went down.
I believe the housing boom and bust was more a matter of leverage than of 
irrational exuberance. The solid line above gives the average loan-to-value for 
securitised subprime and Alt-A loans among the top 50% leveraged homeowners. 
The left vertical axis measures loan-to-value from 0% at the bottom to 100% 
at the top, or equivalently, the downpayment measured from 0% at the top to 
100% at the bottom. You can see that the average downpayment goes from 14%   
(that  is  86%  loan-to-value)  in  2000  to  2.7%  in  the  second  quarter  of  2006.   
In exactly the same quarter that leverage hits its maximum – the second quarter 
of 2006 – so do home prices. It is not irrational exuberance, I say, but leverage 
that caused housing prices to go up and then go down.
In Chart 4, you see the analogous leverage-price diagram for prime mortgage-
backed security bond prices. Measured along the right vertical axis, the prices in 
the dashed curve stay close to 100 until the beginning of 2008 when they start to 
Chart 3   Housing leverage cycle: margins offered (downpayments 
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fall, eventually declining all the way to 70. Leverage is measured as in Chart 3 on 
the left vertical axis, and is given by the solid blue curve. These repo downpayments 
(margins)  are  data  the  Federal  Reserve  should  be  keeping,  but  apparently 
the  Federal  Reserve  did  not  closely  monitor  repo  margins  before  the  crisis. 
The hedge fund Ellington Capital Management that I work with gave me the 
history of margins they were offered, averaged over a large portfolio of prime 
mortgages. You see that downpayments were at 10% in 1998, then in the 1998 
leverage cycle crisis they jumped to 40%, then went back to 10% very quickly 
when  the  crisis  subsided.  Margins  eventually  went  down  to  5%  in  2006  – 
so 20-to-1 leverage. Then in 2007 leverage began to collapse, and afterwards 
you see prices and leverage collapsing together. Leverage on these AAA bonds, 
measured properly as loan-to-value on new loans, starts to collapse before prices 
and is part of the reason for the collapse of prices. The deleveraging comes before 
the fact, not two years after the fact. Of course, much of the deleveraging in the 
diagram (and in other time series of security prices) comes simultaneously with the 
fall in prices. Falling prices make rational lenders demand more collateral, which in 
turn lowers prices, making lenders ask for still more collateral and so on. 
What caused prices and leverage to go down? What was the scary bad news? 
To  listen  to  the  conventional  accounts,  the  crisis  began  with  housing  prices 
Chart 4   Securities leverage cycle: margins offered and AAA securities 
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suddenly plummeting, completely unexpectedly, out of the blue. In Chart 3, 
you see housing went down slowly. It is a nice slow curve. It goes up, it stops 
going up, and then it comes down slowly. That housing prices stopped going up 
is not really a surprise from the leverage cycle vantage point. Downpayments 
cannot go below 0%, so as housing downpayments approach their minimum, 
one would expect housing prices to stop increasing. What is surprising is how 
fast leverage comes down just after the second quarter of 2006. What happened? 
What was the scary bad news?
The scary bad news was that delinquencies on subprime loans started going 
up in 2006 and by the beginning of 2007 it was clear a dangerous trend was 
materialising. In Chart 5 we see that historical delinquencies as a percentage of 
original balances for Countrywide deals asymptote at 2%. But in January 2007 
the delinquencies on 2005 and 2006 loans were already approaching 5%.
The result was that the subprime BBB ABX index collapsed in January and 
Feburary of 2007, as we see in Chart 6.
Chart 5 Delinquencies as a percentage of original balances
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Note: The result was that the subprime BBB ABX index collapsed in January and Feburary of 2007, as we see 
in Chart 6.229 PANEL STATEMENT
It may seem surprising that an increase in delinquencies from 2% to 5% could 
cause such a drop in the subprime security index. I argued earlier this should 
not be surprising because of a sharp decline in leverage on subprime securities 
as nervous lenders ask for more collateral. I do not have the data on subprime 
security collateral, but I have the next best thing. As buyers of subprime securities 
get more nervous, one would expect them to prefer pools with subprime loans that 
have bigger downpayments. And that is just what we see in Chart 3. Leverage on 
subprime loans collapses just after January 2007. And I believe that is what led 
to the housing price collapse.
5  THE LEVERAGE CYCLE AND DERIVATIVES
The  role  of  derivatives  in  the  financial  crisis  has  not  been  well  understood. 
In my opinion the introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) played a vital role 
in the subprime crash. Before their introduction, a pessimist could not leverage 
his views. CDSs did not become standardised for mortgages until the end of 
2005. Only then could you easily leverage your position as a pessimist. All those 
guys at the bottom of the continuum in Chart 1, who earlier just had to stand by 
and shake their heads at the high subprime prices, could thereafter weigh in with 
money behind their opinion. This was bound to push the marginal buyer lower 
and to have a big effect on asset prices. Chart 7 shows the dramatic increase in 
CDSs in general (data is not available for mortgage CDSs in particular).
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But this raises an interesting puzzle. The growth of derivatives, for example, as 
tranches in the collateralised mortgage obligation market or as separate bonds 
in  subprime  securitisations,  long  predated  the  spectacular  expansion  of  the 
CDS market. In this prior stage, the growth in derivatives seemed to raise asset 
prices. Indeed, one of the major reasons the government sponsored securitisation 
and encouraged tranching was because it was believed to raise the underlying 
mortgage price, thereby making it cheaper for homeowners to borrow money 
to buy homes. But why should the creation of a derivative inside a mortgage 
securitisation increase the value of the mortgage, whereas the creation of a similar 
derivative like a CDS outside the tranche reduces the value of the mortgage?
The answer that Ana Fostel and I gave in a recent paper is that the collateralised 
mortgage  obligation  tranches  obviously  make  the  underlying  mortgage  more 
valuable relative to cash because the mortgage pay-offs can be divided in ways 
that  appeal  to  heterogeneous  investors.  The  mortgage  acts  as  collateral  for 
the tranches (and in fact is literally called collateral in the deal). On the other 
hand, when trading a CDS one has to put up cash as collateral to guarantee the 
payment. In effect, the CDS tranches the cash, making the cash more valuable 
relative to the mortgage.
6  MANAGING THE LEVERAGE CYCLE
Let me conclude my discussion of the 2000-10 leverage cycle by briefly mentioning 
four reasons why this last leverage cycle was worse than its predecessor cycles. 
First, leverage reached levels never seen before in previous cycles. There are a 
variety of reasons for this, including the great and long moderation in volatility. 
Another  is  the  aforementioned  securitisation  and  tranching.  Yet  another  is 
that  the  government  effectively  guaranteed  the  debt  of  Fannie  and  Freddie,   
and  perhaps  even  implicitly  for  the  big  banks,  letting  them  all  leverage  with 
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no market discipline. Still another reason is that the banks hid their leverage 
from regulators who might have turned a blind eye to them anyway. Lastly, low 
rates might have encouraged more leverage from investors searching for yield.   
The second reason this last leverage cycle was so bad is that it was really a   
double leverage cycle – in securities on the repo market and on homes in the 
mortgage market. These cycles fed off each other and, as we saw, as security 
prices fell and leverage collapsed there, leverage then went down in the housing 
mortgage market. Third, CDSs played a huge role and had been absent from 
previous cycles. CDSs helped optimists leverage at the end of the boom, making 
them  more  vulnerable,  but  most  importantly,  it  provided  an  opportunity  for 
pessimists to leverage and so made the crash much faster than it would have been 
without them. Lastly, because leverage got so high and then prices fell so far, a 
huge number of people and businesses ended up underwater, including 14 million 
homeowners. This debt overhang is playing a big role in our current malaise.
What should be done about the leverage cycle? Something to prevent it from 
getting too high, and then something to get out of the acute crisis once there is a 
crash, and, lastly, something to shorten the costly aftermath.
To prevent leverage from building up, we have to monitor it by collecting not 
only debt-to-equity ratios on a large variety of institutions, but also loan-to-value 
leverage data on all kinds of securities and assets. We have to put derivatives like 
CDSs on an exchange or something similar. I do not have time now to explain it, 
but CDSs are just another way of leveraging. So you have to monitor the leverage 
of  derivatives  just  like  you  would  monitor  the  leverage  of  asset  purchases.   
During normal times, loan-to-value leverage should be regulated. The Federal 
Reserve  or  another  body  that  is  given  the  authority  should  simply  say,   
“You cannot loan at 2% down on houses. You cannot make repo loans with 0.5% 
down. You cannot write CDS insurance unless your initial margin is comparable 
to the margin on buying the security. And if you want to buy CDS insurance, you 
also have to put comparable margins down.” 
Allow  me  to  mention  four  of  the  six  reasons  I  have  given  elsewhere  why 
monitoring  and  regulating  leverage  should  be  based  at  least  partly  on  loan-
to-value  ratios  on  new  loans  (asset-based  leverage)  for  all  borrowers  and 
lenders, rather than solely according to debt-equity ratios of entire institutions 
(investor leverage). First, leverage in the system can move away from regulated 
institutions. Second, limiting the overall leverage of an institution can sometimes 
incentivise it to choose riskier investments that are leveraged less. Third, as we 
have seen, investor leverage and asset leverage often move in opposite directions.   
Fourth, it is harder to lie about asset-based leverage because separate reports will 
be obtained from both the borrower and the lender.
If, despite efforts to curtail leverage, the crisis begins anyway, the only way to 
get out is to reverse the three standard causes of leverage cycle crises: reduce the 
uncertainty, re-leverage the system (to moderate levels), and inject optimistic 
capital to make up for the lost demand from the suddenly bankrupt or insolvent 
optimists. In the acute stage of the crisis we always see the same thing. There are 
a huge number of people who have gone bankrupt, but a much bigger group that 232 GEANAKOPLOS
are teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. Partly because of counterparty worries, 
a number of markets freeze up and liquidity disappears. Regulatory controls may 
suddenly be triggered. So there is a new kind of uncertainty, quite distinct from 
the volatile shock that triggered the crisis. The government must step in to quell 
this uncertainty and to keep markets transparent. 
During the crisis and its aftermath, what looks like a demand problem – no one is 
borrowing at the going low interest rate – is really a collateral problem. Lenders 
are asking for so much collateral that investors cannot borrow because they do 
not have the collateral. What the Federal Reserve has to do is to go around the 
banks and lend directly on less collateral, not at lower interest rates. In fact, that 
is one of the things the Federal Reserve and the Treasury did (in the TALF and 
PPIP programmes) that helped get the United States out of the depths of the 
crisis. It could have been done on a much broader scale. But the bravery to do 
something that had never been done before played a critical role in helping avoid 
a worse catastrophe.
Let me close this section by challenging the false separation between interest and 
collateral that has been maintained by some monetary authorities. It has been 
suggested that the Federal Reserve or the ECB should deal exclusively with interest 
in normal times, perhaps managing collateral in crises as “non-standard” policies. 
Of course, it has now been recognised that leverage must be systemically curtailed. 
But the idea is that in normal times the central bank worries about interest, while 
collateral management is left to the macro-prudential regulator. This reminds me 
of the old Soviet separation: one bureau was put in charge of prices, another in 
charge of quantities. A crisis is a window into the soul of the economy, like Plato’s 
republic was the soul writ large. If non-standard policies saved the economy during 
the crisis, they surely should play a role in normal times.
7  THE AFTERMATH: GETTING OUT FROM UNDERWATER
After a major crisis has stabilised, the most important uncertainty becomes who 
else will go bankrupt and how will they behave while they are underwater?   
The  depth  and  length  of  the  crisis  and  its  aftermath  depends  on  how  much 
leverage there was to begin with and on how effective government policy is in 
reducing value-destroying bankruptcies and debt overhang.
Debt  overhang  causes  terrible  deadweight  losses.  Once  a  homeowner  is  far 
enough underwater, he is not going to spend money to fix his house in order 
to raise its value when he knows he will probably lose it eventually anyway.   
Even if he wanted to fix his house, nobody would lend him the money to finance 
the repairs anyway. The underwater homeowner might continue to make his 
mortgage payments if he feels it would be more expensive to move and rent 
another house and live with a diminished credit rating, or if he thinks there is 
a chance his house might eventually recover enough value to be worth more 
than the debt. However, once he becomes far enough underwater it becomes too 
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A  major  reason  many  homeowners  have  stopped  paying  in  this  crisis  is 
that  they  are  underwater.  Chart  8  indicates  that  homeowners  with  current 
loan-to-values  well  below  100%  rarely  default,  whereas  subprime  borrowers 
with loan-to-value at 160% were defaulting at the rate of 8% per month in 2009. 
Default rates are steeply monotonic in how far underwater the homeowner is.
Throwing a homeowner out of the house for defaulting also incurs huge costs. 
On  average,  subprime  lenders  recover  less  than  25%  of  their  loan  from 
foreclosing. It takes 18 months to 3 years nowadays to throw somebody out of his 
house, during which time the mortgage is not paid, taxes are not paid, the house 
is not fixed, the house is often vandalised and realtor expenses are incurred.
By writing down principal on subprime loans so that the homeowners are above 
water, lenders and borrowers can both gain. For example, the lender can expect 
less than USD 40 back on a USD 160 loan if the house has a market value of 
USD 100 at the time of the default. If the lender cut the principal to USD 80, 
the homeowner would probably pay. If not, he would fix up the house and sell 
it. Either way the lender would get USD 80 instead of USD 40. The biggest 
policy mistake of the Obama administration in the current crisis was entrusting 
Chart 8   Loan-to-value ratios and default frequency
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mortgage modifications to the servicers and the banks. The servicers do not own 
the mortgages and thus do not have the same incentives as the bondholders or 
the homeowners to write down principal. On the contrary, their incentives lie 
in not writing down principal. And the big bank lenders are afraid of taking an 
immediate loss on their books, even though they will incur a bigger loss down 
the road by foreclosing. I wrote about this over two years ago in two op-eds 
with Susan Koniak in the New York Times, predicting a foreclosure fiasco if the 
government did not act.
The same logic can be applied to the many underwater businesses in America 
today. What appears to be a lack of demand for investment may instead be   
an inability to borrow either because of debt hangover (as Myers pointed out   
in 1977) or because lenders now require too much collateral. Macro models that 
do not capture such effects cannot possibly predict the effect of a stimulus or the 
period of time until normal employment levels are restored. Reducing interest, 
which  –  in  the  conventional  historical  times  used  to  calibrate  the  standard 
macro models – can be relied on to generate more activity, may be completely 
ineffective in the aftermath of a leverage cycle crash.
What applies to homeowners and businesses applies even more so to sovereign 
debt. After every leverage cycle crash, the government assumes some private 
debt and borrows to stimulate the economy. If the government debt was large 
before the crisis, it can become almost unmanageable after the crisis. In the 
United States, cities and states are beginning to cut back on vital services like 
policemen, firemen and teachers because they feel they can no longer increase 
their debt. When we add on top all the pension and medical obligations many 
western governments took on before the crisis, it is difficult to honestly maintain 
that any of them are solvent. This brief discussion is surely not the place to 
document  my  claim,  but  in  my  opinion  many  western  governments  will  be 
obliged to scale down their promises, that is, they will have to find ways to write 
down their debts or default on them.
One of the standard methods for governments to write down their nominal debt is 
to inflate it away. A 20% inflation over four years would reduce US government 
debt by 20% and bring millions of homeowners out from underwater. As the 
need for debt reduction becomes more acute and as the money supply created 
by  the  government  to  stimulate  demand  via  low  interest  becomes  larger,   
the private sector will begin to expect inflation. Central bankers will declare 
that they will not allow inflation to start, presumably for fear that once started it 
may spiral out of control. However, such protestations will not stop the private 
sector from hedging by moving money into commodities, which will be where 
inflation begins. With unemployment high and activity low, central bankers will 
be reluctant to put on the brakes and the inflation will start to spread. The surest 
way for inflation to spiral out of control is if the central bankers vow it will never 
start and it does. Then people will really believe it is out of control.235 PANEL STATEMENT
8  DEFAULT, PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS
It is generally believed that forgiving debt might start a chain reaction of defaults 
because the lender might then be unable to keep his promises, or that a default 
in one sector will lead lenders to expect a default in another sector and so kill 
lending there, or that debt forgiveness will create a moral hazard, encouraging 
future  borrowers  to  take  on  too  much  debt  and  to  strategically  default.   
Most importantly, it is believed that default is immoral, that the defaulter deserves 
blame and that if one man’s debt is forgiven, everyone’s should be. 
I  believe  that  much  of  this  viewpoint  derives  from  the  primitive  creation  of 
Conscience described by Nietzsche following centuries of punishment. Collateral 
is a much more sophisticated guarantor of delivery than punishment. It should 
spread the stigma of default to the lender. If the collateral falls so far in value that 
it no longer covers the loan, who is more to blame – the borrower or the lender?   
If a grocer goes bankrupt because he sells below cost (like the lender who asked for 
too little collateral), is the buyer to blame for purchasing on such absurd terms?
The Law recognises the difference between deception before the fact and default. 
A tort case and a contract case are treated differently. It may, in fact, be more 
blameworthy of governments to claim that all debts will be paid, say by entities 
they are bailing out or by programmes started many years before during boom 
times, even after they realise they will not than it was to make those promises 
in the first place when it was thought they could be paid. As Plato said, it is not 
always just to keep promises when unexpected or unusual circumstances arise.
My point, of course, is not that ancient philosophers understood default better 
than modern economists, but that we must change our models to incorporate 
default and lending terms in order to understand the macroeconomy in ways the 
ancient philosophers could not dream of doing.
Consider for a moment an example presented in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik 
(2005). Each investor would like to borrow money because he is almost always 
much richer in the future, but each has a state in the future in which he will be 
quite poor. Suppose the government can set ex ante a penalty per dollar of default 
(say how long one goes to jail, or how long one’s credit rating is destroyed).   
One might also think of the penalty as a pang of Conscience. How high should 
the penalty be set?
If the penalty is infinite, nobody will default and lenders can be sure to get their 
money back and so will lend at low interest. If the penalty is set lower, even for 
some people, then people will start to default, especially in the state they are 
poor. Lenders will then want a higher interest rate and even the borrowers who 
do not plan to default (but who cannot be distinguished from the low conscience 
borrowers by the lender) will face high interest rates. Moreover, the people who 
default will pay the penalty which is a pure deadweight loss for society. There seem 
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Yet it is Pareto superior to set an intermediate level of penalty, allowing for 
some defaults, the resulting higher interest rates and the deadweight losses of 
paying the penalties. An infinite default would force people to repay even in 
their bad state, which, with diminishing marginal utility, would be extremely 
painful. Foreseeing this, they would not borrow much, even at low interest rates, 
and everyone would be worse off. Notice that the optimal default penalty allows 
agents in bad circumstances to default (in exchange for paying the penalty) not 
because they cannot repay, for in fact they could, but because it would be so 
painful to repay.
This story includes almost all the elements of default that are so scary to central 
bankers: lenders demand higher interest rates, even completely reliable borrowers 
must pay the higher rates, defaults occur, and the defaults are messy and incur 
deadweight losses. Yet it is socially optimal to have them!
Moreover, if the government could intervene and declare a situation a crisis ex 
post and mandate debt forgiveness, then there would be yet another Pareto gain 
because the messy losses from default would be reduced. Ex ante, the lenders 
would of course anticipate that they would be forced to forgive debt in some 
circumstances. But the point is that they would not have been paid in those 
circumstances with the ex ante optimal default penalty either.
One  could  ask  a  further  question.  Can  the  market  set  the  default  penalties?   
The answer, as shown in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik, is yes, just like the 
market sets leverage ratios. In some circumstances, the market will set the correct 
levels of penalties, in some not. But these penalties will have a profound effect on 
the levels of aggregate borrowing and lending and therefore on macroeconomic 
activity.
To the best of my knowledge, these kinds of considerations are completely absent 
from the calibrated models that guide macroeconomic policy. The ECB needs a 
macroeconomic model in which the anticipation of some sovereign default raises 
interest rates and which then works out all the likely direct and indirect effects of 
an actual default. My guess is that the spectre of such an event makes modellers 
shrink from doing the labour to create the models.
9  PENSION PLAN DEFAULT
One of the principal sources of default is pension obligations. Firms, cities and 
states alike seem to promise more for future retirees than they can actually deliver. 
One important reason for this is the lack of regulatory guidelines. There does not 
appear to be a consensus on how much money should be required in the trust fund 
to back those promises, or how it should be invested, or even on how to compute 
the present value of the pension obligations. Discounting expected benefits at 
the risk-free rate gives astronomical numbers that would put most pension funds 
deeply underwater. Discounting at an equity return makes the liabilities seem 
manageable. I believe the reason for the lack of models and clear guidelines 
for pension plans is that regulators do not want to think seriously about default.   237 PANEL STATEMENT
If they got rigorous about default and wanted to ensure that it never happened, they 
would need to force pension managers to cut all the risk out of their portfolios. 
But regulators and managers alike seem to agree that it is sensible to hold a large 
stake in equities because their expected returns are so much higher. Inevitably, 
that leads to scenarios where the pension fund defaults. This probability must be 
quantified and the consequences of default systematically investigated. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Sukudhew Singh (Central Bank of Malaysia) asked whether the models used at 
central banks did not lead to policy myopia, in the sense that what was not in the 
models became invisible to policy-makers. Second, he expressed concern that it 
is difficult for economists and policy-makers to change the paradigm they are 
used to in the face of new facts and circumstances.
Eichenbaum answered that an image of a policy-maker looking only at a single 
New  Keynesian  DSGE  model  is  a  caricature.  Policy  institutions  use  many 
different models simultaneously. A model is merely a way to quantify a point of 
view. As for responding to new facts, he agreed with Keynes’ recipe: “When the 
facts change, I change my mind – what do you do, sir?”
Klaus  Adam  (Mannheim  University)  referred  to  the  research  program  of 
integrating asset pricing and macro models. Many of these models, including 
the Bernanke-Gertler approach, are incapable of reproducing even the very basic 
asset pricing facts and have to resort to added exogenous bubble components. 
What  mechanisms  can  provide  endogenous  propagation  to  integrate  macro 
dynamics with asset price dynamics? 
Bouchaud replied that in his view a lot of the excess volatility of financial assets 
comes from endogenous propagation within financial markets.
Geanakoplos pointed out two weaknesses of the Bernanke-Gertler and Kiyotaki-
Moore frameworks: they have no feedback between leverage and asset prices and 
they generate counter-cyclical leverage. Leverage is pro-cyclical in data and it is 
crucial that models replicate this fact. Economists have not yet tried introducing 
collateral and leverage in a serious way. The best proof of this fact is that they 
have not bothered to keep data on leverage.
Eichenbaum  pointed  out  that  a  heterogeneity  of  beliefs  about  uncertain 
fundamentals  generates  interesting  dynamics.  Extreme  views  may  affect 
aggregates in an interesting way, as in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), 
who present a model in which long calm periods are followed by sudden crises. 
To generate these effects frictions like those in search models are needed.
Geanakoplos added that Credit Default Swap (CDS) markets are crucial to the 
economy because they allow pessimists to leverage their bets. Without CDS 
markets only optimists could leverage.
Angel  Ubide  (Tudor  Investment  Corporation)  raised  the  point  that  focusing 
on aggregate credit bubbles can lead to the oversight of important disequilibria 
in  individual  market  segments  and  securities.  This  is  so  because  implicit 
leverage can be very large in individual securities under an adverse scenario,   
even when aggregate credit growth is not strong, as the super senior tranches of 
collateralised-debt obligations (CDOs) showed.240 GENERAL DISCUSSION SESSION 3 
Geanakoplos  agreed  that  even  though  banks  now  tend  to  ask  for  a  large 
amount of collateral, certain parts of the economy are leveraging very quickly.   
Current  government  interventions  are  encouraging  leverage  in  the  housing 
markets. The danger is that while policy-makers are trying to revive the economy 
after the bust they may fuel a new leverage cycle. He called for writing down 
the  principal  on  subprime  mortgages  in  order  to  deleverage  the  economy.   
This would benefit both lenders and borrowers, as foreclosures are very costly 
and inefficient. This policy would be more beneficial than the current policy of 
subsidising interest rates. In response to a query by Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, 
Geanakoplos  replied  that  lenders  should  bear  the  cost  of  the  write-down,   
but effectively they would also win, as otherwise subprime borrowers would 
default anyway and foreclosures are very costly, with very low recovery rates on 
defaulted mortgages (below 25%). The problem is, however, that only the loan 
servicers deal directly with homeowners, and these servicers have no incentives 
to cut the principal as it would reduce their fees.
John  Muellbauer  (Oxford  University)  pointed  out  that  the  New  Keynesian 
DSGE model is a US invention that spread around the world. He said it was 
therefore puzzling but welcome that the Federal Reserve has stuck to its old 
FRBUS model, in which data are allowed to speak more flexibly and asset prices 
and credit play a role. In this model it would be straightforward to introduce the 
innovations Geanakoplos mentioned – which are supported by Muellbauer’s own 
research – because the equations are easy to modify. 
In reply Eichenbaum said he was under the impression that the Federal Reserve 
invested a large amount in DSGE models, but that it has “many feathers in its 
quill”. It moved away from FRBUS for good reasons, one of them being that it 
forecasts poorly out-of-sample. That does not mean it is not useful. But going 
back to using FRBUS alone would be a step backwards.
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REBALANCING THE GLOBAL RECOVERY
BY BEN S. BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
US FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
1  INTRODUCTION
The global economy is now well into its second year of recovery from the deep 
recession  triggered  by  the  most  devastating  financial  crisis  since  the  Great 
Depression. In the most intense phase of the crisis, as a financial conflagration 
threatened to engulf the global economy, policy-makers in both advanced and 
emerging market economies found themselves confronting common challenges. 
Amid  this  shared  sense  of  urgency,  national  policy  responses  were  forceful, 
timely  and  mutually  reinforcing.  This  policy  collaboration  was  essential  in 
averting a much deeper global economic contraction and providing a foundation 
for renewed stability and growth.
In recent months, however, that sense of common purpose has waned. Tensions 
among nations over economic policies have emerged and intensified, potentially 
threatening our ability to find global solutions to global problems. One source of 
these tensions has been the bifurcated nature of the global economic recovery: 
some  economies  have  fully  recouped  their  losses  while  others  have  lagged 
behind. But at a deeper level, the tensions arise from the lack of an agreed-
upon  framework  to  ensure  that  national  policies  take  appropriate  account  of 
interdependencies across countries and the interests of the international system 
as a whole. Accordingly, the essential challenge for policy-makers around the 
world is to work together to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome – namely, 
a robust global economic expansion that is balanced, sustainable and less prone 
to crises.
2   THE TWO-SPEED GLOBAL RECOVERY
International policy cooperation is especially difficult now because of the two-
speed nature of the global recovery. Specifically, as shown in Chart 1, since the 
recovery began, economic growth in the emerging market economies (the dashed 
blue line) has far outstripped growth in the advanced economies (the solid red 
line). These differences are partially attributable to longer-term differences in 
growth potential between the two groups of countries, but to a significant extent 
they also reflect the relatively weak pace of recovery thus far in the advanced 
economies. This point is illustrated by Chart 2, which shows the levels, as opposed 
to the growth rates, of real gross domestic product (GDP) for the two groups of 
countries. Generally speaking, output in the advanced economies has not returned 
to the levels prevailing before the crisis and real GDP in these economies remains 
far below the levels implied by pre-crisis trends. In contrast, economic activity in 
the emerging market economies has not only fully made up the losses induced by 
the global recession, but is also rapidly approaching its pre-crisis trend. To cite 
some illustrative numbers, if we were to extend forward from the end of 2007 the 245 KEYNOTE SPEECH
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ten-year trends in output for the two groups of countries, we would find that the 
level of output in the advanced economies is currently about 8% below its longer-
term trend, whereas economic activity in the emerging markets is only about 1.5% 
below the corresponding (but much steeper) trend line for that group of countries. 
Indeed, for some emerging market economies, the crisis appears to have left little 
lasting imprint on growth. Notably, since the beginning of 2005, real output has 
risen more than 70% in China and about 55% in India.
In the United States, the recession officially ended in mid-2009, and – as shown 
in Chart 3 – real GDP growth was reasonably strong in the fourth quarter of 
2009 and the first quarter of this year. However, much of that growth appears 
to have stemmed from transitory factors, including inventory adjustments and 
fiscal stimulus. Since the second quarter of this year, GDP growth has moderated 
to around 2% at an annual rate, less than the Federal Reserve’s estimates of 
US  potential  growth  and  insufficient  to  meaningfully  reduce  unemployment.   
And indeed, as Chart 4 shows, the US unemployment rate (the solid black line) has 
stagnated for about eighteen months near 10% of the labour force, up from about 
5% before the crisis; the increase of 5 percentage points in the US unemployment 
rate is roughly double that seen in the euro area, the United Kingdom, Japan or 
Canada. Of some 8.4 million US jobs lost between the peak of the expansion 
and the end of 2009, only about 900,000 have been restored thus far. Of course,   
the jobs gap is presumably even larger if one takes into account the natural 
increase in the size of the working age population over the past three years.
Of particular concern is the substantial increase in the share of unemployed 
workers who have been without work for six months or more (the dashed red 
line in Chart 4). Long-term unemployment not only imposes extreme hardship 
on jobless people and their families, but, by eroding these workers’ skills and 
weakening their attachment to the labour force, it may also convert what might 
otherwise be temporary cyclical unemployment into much more intractable long-
term  structural  unemployment.  In  addition,  persistently  high  unemployment, 
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through its adverse effects on household income and confidence, could threaten 
the strength and sustainability of the recovery.
Low rates of resource utilisation in the United States are creating disinflationary 
pressures. As shown in Chart 5, various measures of underlying inflation have 
been  trending  downwards  and  are  currently  around  1%,  which  is  below  the 
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rate of 2% or a bit less that most Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
participants judge as being most consistent with the Federal Reserve’s policy 
objectives in the long run.1 With inflation expectations stable, and with levels of 
resource slack expected to remain high, inflation trends are expected to be quite 
subdued for some time.
3  MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
Because the genesis of the financial crisis was in the United States and other 
advanced economies, the much weaker recovery in those economies compared 
with that in the emerging markets may not be entirely unexpected (although, 
given  their  traditional  vulnerability  to  crises,  the  resilience  of  the  emerging 
market economies over the past few years is both notable and encouraging). 
What is clear is that the different cyclical positions of the advanced and emerging 
market  economies  call  for  different  policy  settings.  Although  the  details  of 
the  outlook  vary  among  jurisdictions,  most  advanced  economies  still  need 
accommodative policies to continue to lay the groundwork for a strong, durable 
recovery. Insufficiently supportive policies in the advanced economies could 
undermine the recovery not only in those economies, but for the world as a 
whole. In contrast, emerging market economies increasingly face the challenge 
of maintaining robust growth while avoiding overheating, which may in some 
cases involve the measured withdrawal of policy stimulus.
Let me address the case of the United States specifically. As I described, the 
US unemployment rate is high and, given the slow pace of economic growth, 
likely to remain so for some time. Indeed, although I expect that growth will 
pick up and unemployment will decline somewhat next year, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that unemployment might rise further in the near term, creating 
added risks for the recovery. Inflation has declined noticeably since the business 
cycle  peak,  and  further  disinflation  could  hinder  the  recovery.  In  particular, 
with shorter-term nominal interest rates close to zero, declines in actual and 
expected inflation imply both higher realised and expected real interest rates, 
creating further drags on growth.2 In light of the significant risks to the economic 
recovery, to the health of the labour market and to price stability, the FOMC 
decided that additional policy support was warranted.
The Federal Reserve’s policy target for the federal funds rate has been near zero 
since December 2008, so another means of providing monetary accommodation 
has  been  necessary  since  that  time.  Accordingly,  the  FOMC  purchased 
Treasury and agency-backed securities on a large scale from December 2008 to   
1  Chart 5 shows core and trimmed-mean measures to better display the decline in underlying, 
or trend, inflation. Total inflation measures have been volatile in recent years, but are 
currently a bit above 1% on a 12-month basis. Projections by FOMC participants have 
indicated that, under appropriate monetary policies, inflation as measured by the price index 
for personal consumption expenditures should converge to 2% or a bit less in the long run.
2  Unexpectedly high realisations of real interest rates increase the real burden of household 
and business debts, relative to what was anticipated when the debt contracts were signed. 
Higher expected real interest rates deter capital investment and other forms of spending.249 KEYNOTE SPEECH
March 2010, a policy that appears to have been quite successful in helping to 
stabilise the economy and support the recovery during that period. Following 
up on this earlier success, the Committee announced this month that it would 
purchase additional Treasury securities. In taking that action, the Committee 
seeks to support the economic recovery, promote a faster pace of job creation 
and reduce the risk of a further decline in inflation that would prove damaging 
to the recovery.
Although securities purchases are a different tool for conducting monetary policy 
from the more familiar approach of managing the overnight interest rate, the goals 
and transmission mechanisms are very similar. In particular, securities purchases 
by the central bank affect the economy primarily by lowering interest rates on 
securities of longer maturities, just as conventional monetary policy, by affecting 
the expected path of short-term rates, also influences longer-term rates. Lower 
longer-term rates in turn lead to more accommodative financial conditions, which 
support household and business spending. As I noted, the evidence suggests 
that asset purchases can be an effective tool; indeed, financial conditions eased 
notably in anticipation of the Federal Reserve’s policy announcement.
Incidentally, in my view, the use of the term “quantitative easing” to refer to the 
Federal Reserve’s policies is inappropriate. Quantitative easing typically refers 
to policies that seek to have effects by changing the quantity of bank reserves, 
a channel which seems relatively weak, at least in the US context. In contrast, 
securities purchases work by affecting the yields on the acquired securities and, 
via substitution effects in investors’ portfolios, on a wider range of assets.
This policy tool will be used in a manner that is measured and responsive to 
economic conditions. In particular, the Committee stated that it would review 
its asset-purchase programme regularly in light of incoming information and 
would  adjust  the  programme  as  needed  to  meet  its  objectives.  Importantly,   
the Committee remains unwaveringly committed to price stability and does not 
seek inflation above the level of 2% or a bit less that most FOMC participants 
see as consistent with the Federal Reserve’s mandate. In that regard, it bears 
emphasising that the Federal Reserve has worked hard to ensure that it will 
not have any problems exiting from this programme at the appropriate time. 
The Fed’s power to pay interest on banks’ reserves held at the Federal Reserve 
will allow it to manage short-term interest rates effectively and thus to tighten 
policy when needed, even if bank reserves remain high. Moreover, the Fed has 
invested considerable effort in developing tools that will allow it to drain or 
immobilise bank reserves as needed to facilitate the smooth withdrawal of policy 
accommodation when conditions warrant. If necessary, the Committee could also 
tighten policy by redeeming or selling securities.
The foreign exchange value of the dollar has fluctuated considerably during 
the course of the crisis, driven by a range of factors. A significant portion of 
these fluctuations has reflected changes in investor risk aversion, with the dollar 
tending  to  appreciate  when  risk  aversion  is  high.  In  particular,  much  of  the 
decline over the summer in the foreign exchange value of the dollar reflected an 
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European sovereign debt crisis. The dollar’s role as a safe haven during periods 
of market stress stems in no small part from the underlying strength and stability 
that the US economy has exhibited over the years. Fully aware of the important 
role that the dollar plays in the international monetary and financial system,   
the  Committee  believes  that  the  best  way  to  continue  to  deliver  the  strong 
economic fundamentals that underpin the value of the dollar, as well as to support 
the global recovery, is through policies that lead to a resumption of robust growth 
in a context of price stability in the United States.
In sum, on its current economic trajectory the United States runs the risk of 
seeing millions of workers unemployed or underemployed for many years. As a 
society, we should find that outcome unacceptable. Monetary policy is working 
in support of both economic recovery and price stability, but there are limits to 
what can be achieved by the central bank alone. The Federal Reserve is non-
partisan and does not make recommendations regarding specific tax and spending 
programmes. However, in general terms, a fiscal programme that combines near-
term  measures  to  enhance  growth  with  strong,  confidence-inducing  steps  to 
reduce longer-term structural deficits would be an important complement to the 
policies of the Federal Reserve.
4  GLOBAL POLICY CHALLENGES AND TENSIONS
The two-speed nature of the global recovery implies that different policy stances 
are appropriate for different groups of countries. As I have noted, advanced 
economies generally need accommodative policies to sustain economic growth. 
In the emerging market economies, by contrast, strong growth and incipient 
concerns about inflation have led to somewhat tighter policies.
Unfortunately, the differences in the cyclical positions and policy stances of the 
advanced and emerging market economies have intensified the challenges for policy-
makers around the globe. Notably, in recent months, some officials in emerging 
market economies and elsewhere have argued that accommodative monetary policies 
in the advanced economies, especially the United States, have been producing negative 
spillover effects on their economies. In particular, they are concerned that advanced 
economy policies are inducing excessive capital inflows to the emerging market 
economies, inflows that in turn put unwelcome upward pressure on emerging market 
currencies and threaten to create asset price bubbles. As is evident in Chart 6, net 
private capital flows to a selection of emerging market economies (based on national 
balance of payments data) have rebounded from the large outflows experienced 
during the worst of the crisis. Overall, by this broad measure, such inflows through 
the second quarter of this year were not any larger than in the year before the crisis, 
but they were nonetheless substantial. A narrower but timelier measure of demand for 
emerging market assets – net inflows to equity and bond funds investing in emerging 
markets, shown in Chart 7 – suggests that inflows of capital to emerging market 
economies have indeed picked up in recent months.
To a large degree, these capital flows have been driven by perceived return 
differentials  that  favour  emerging  markets,  resulting  from  factors  such  as 251 KEYNOTE SPEECH
stronger expected growth – both in the short term and in the longer run – and 
higher interest rates, which reflect differences in policy settings as well as other 
forces. As Charts 6 and 7 show, even before the crisis, fast-growing emerging 
market  economies  were  attractive  destinations  for  cross-border  investment. 
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However, beyond these fundamental factors, an important driver of the rapid 
capital inflows to some emerging markets is incomplete adjustment of exchange 
rates in those economies, which leads investors to anticipate additional returns 
arising from expected exchange rate appreciation.
The exchange rate adjustment is incomplete, in part, because the authorities in 
some emerging market economies have intervened in foreign exchange markets 
to prevent or slow the appreciation of their currencies. The degree of intervention 
is illustrated for selected emerging market economies in Chart 8. The vertical 
axis of this graph shows the percentage change in the real effective exchange 
rate in the 12 months up to and including September 2010. The horizontal axis 
shows the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves as a share of GDP over the 
same period. The relationship evident in the graph suggests that the economies 
that have most heavily intervened in foreign exchange markets have succeeded 
in limiting the appreciation of their currencies. The graph also illustrates that 
some emerging market economies have intervened at very high levels and others 
relatively little. Judging from the changes in the real effective exchange rate, 
the emerging market economies that have largely let market forces determine 
their exchange rates have seen their competitiveness reduced relative to those 
emerging market economies that have intervened more aggressively.
It is striking that, amid all the concerns about renewed private capital inflows 
to the emerging market economies, total capital, on net, is still flowing from 
relatively  labour-abundant  emerging  market  economies  to  capital-abundant 
advanced  economies.  In  particular,  the  current  account  deficit  of  the  United 
States implies that it experienced net capital inflows exceeding 3% of GDP in 
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the first half of this year. A key driver of this “uphill” flow of capital is official 
reserve accumulation in the emerging market economies that exceeds private 
capital  inflows  to  these  economies.  The  total  holdings  of  foreign  exchange 
reserves by selected major emerging market economies, shown in Chart 9, have 
risen sharply since the crisis and now surpass USD 5 trillion – about six times 
their level a decade ago. China holds about half of the total reserves of these 
selected economies, slightly more than USD 2.6 trillion.
It is instructive to contrast this situation with what would happen in an international 
system in which exchange rates were allowed to fully reflect market fundamentals. 
In  the  current  context,  advanced  economies  would  pursue  accommodative 
monetary policies as needed to foster recovery and to guard against unwanted 
disinflation. At the same time, emerging market economies would tighten their 
own monetary policies to the degree needed to prevent overheating and inflation. 
The resulting increase in emerging market interest rates relative to those in the 
advanced economies would naturally lead to increased capital flows from advanced 
to emerging economies and, consequently, to currency appreciation in emerging 
market economies. This currency appreciation would in turn tend to reduce net 
exports  and  current  account  surpluses  in  the  emerging  markets,  thus  helping 
cool these rapidly growing economies while adding to demand in the advanced 
economies. Moreover, currency appreciation would help shift a greater proportion 
of domestic output toward satisfying domestic needs in emerging markets. The net 
result would be more balanced and sustainable global economic growth.
Given  these  advantages  of  a  system  of  market-determined  exchange  rates, 
why have officials in many emerging markets leaned against appreciation of 
their  currencies  toward  levels  more  consistent  with  market  fundamentals?   
















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Sources: Bloomberg, country sources via Haver.
Note: Emerging market economies (EMEs) consist of Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Singapore and Russia.254 BERNANKE
The principal answer is that currency undervaluation on the part of some countries 
has been part of a long-term export-led strategy for growth and development. 
This strategy, which allows a country’s producers to operate at a greater scale 
and to produce a more diverse set of products than domestic demand alone might 
sustain, has been viewed as promoting economic growth and, more broadly, as 
making an important contribution to the development of a number of countries. 
However, increasingly over time, the strategy of currency undervaluation has 
demonstrated  important  drawbacks,  both  for  the  world  system  and  for  the 
countries using that strategy.
First,  as  I  have  described,  currency  undervaluation  inhibits  necessary 
macroeconomic adjustments and creates challenges for policy-makers in both 
advanced  and  emerging  market  economies.  Globally,  both  growth  and  trade 
are unbalanced, as reflected in the two-speed recovery and in persistent current 
account  surpluses  and  deficits.  Neither  situation  is  sustainable.  Because  a 
strong expansion in the emerging market economies will ultimately depend on 
a recovery in the more advanced economies, this pattern of two-speed growth 
might very well be resolved in favour of slow growth for everyone if the recovery 
in the advanced economies falls short. Likewise, large and persistent imbalances 
in current accounts represent a growing financial and economic risk.
Second,  the  current  system  leads  to  uneven  burdens  of  adjustment  among 
countries, with those countries that allow substantial flexibility in their exchange 
rates bearing the greatest burden (for example, in having to make potentially 
large and rapid adjustments in the scale of export-oriented industries) and those 
that resist appreciation bearing the least.
Third,  countries  that  maintain  undervalued  currencies  may  themselves  face 
important  costs  at  the  national  level,  including  a  reduced  ability  to  use 
independent  monetary  policies  to  stabilise  their  economies  and  the  risks 
associated with excessive or volatile capital inflows. The latter can be managed 
to some extent with a variety of tools, including various forms of capital controls, 
but such approaches can be difficult to implement or lead to microeconomic 
distortions. The high levels of reserves associated with currency undervaluation 
may also imply significant fiscal costs if the liabilities issued to sterilise reserves 
bear interest rates that exceed those on the reserve assets themselves. Perhaps 
most important, the ultimate purpose of economic growth is to deliver higher 
living standards at home; thus, eventually, the benefits of shifting productive 
resources to satisfying domestic needs must outweigh the development benefits 
of continued reliance on export-led growth.
5  IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The current international monetary system is not working as well as it should. 
Currency undervaluation by surplus countries is inhibiting needed international 
adjustment and creating spillover effects that would not exist if exchange rates 
better reflected market fundamentals. In addition, differences in the degree of 255 KEYNOTE SPEECH
currency flexibility impose unequal burdens of adjustment, penalising countries 
with relatively flexible exchange rates. What should be done?
The answers differ depending on whether one is talking about the long term or the 
short term. In the longer term, significantly greater flexibility in exchange rates to 
reflect market forces would be desirable and achievable. That flexibility would 
help facilitate global rebalancing and reduce the problems of policy spillovers 
that emerging market economies are confronting today. The further liberalisation 
of exchange rate and capital account regimes would be most effective if it were 
accompanied by complementary financial and structural policies to help achieve 
better global balance in trade and capital flows. For example, surplus countries 
could  speed  adjustment  with  policies  that  boost  domestic  spending,  such  as 
strengthening the social safety net, improving retail credit markets to encourage 
domestic consumption, or other structural reforms. For their part, deficit countries 
need to do more over time to narrow the gap between investment and national 
saving. In the United States, putting fiscal policy on a sustainable path is a critical 
step toward increasing national saving in the longer term. Higher private saving 
would also help. In addition, resources will need to shift into the production 
of export and import-competing goods. Some of these shifts in spending and 
production are already occurring; for example, China is taking steps to boost 
domestic demand and the US personal saving rate has risen sharply since 2007.
In  the  near  term,  a  shift  of  the  international  regime  toward  one  in  which 
exchange rates respond flexibly to market forces is, unfortunately, probably not 
practical for all economies. Some emerging market economies do not have the 
infrastructure to support a fully convertible, internationally traded currency and 
to allow unrestricted capital flows. Moreover, the internal rebalancing associated 
with exchange rate appreciation – that is, the shifting of resources and productive 
capacity from production for external markets to production for the domestic 
market – takes time.
That said, in the short term, rebalancing economic growth between the advanced 
and emerging market economies should remain a common objective, as a two-
speed global recovery may not be sustainable. Appropriately accommodative 
policies  in  the  advanced  economies  help  rather  than  hinder  this  process.   
But the rebalancing of growth would also be facilitated if fast-growing countries, 
especially those with large current account surpluses, would take action to reduce 
their surpluses, while slow-growing countries, especially those with large current 
account deficits, take parallel actions to reduce those deficits. Some shift of 
demand from surplus to deficit countries, which could be compensated for, if 
necessary, by actions to strengthen domestic demand in the surplus countries, 
would accomplish two objectives. First, it would be a down payment toward 
global rebalancing of trade and current accounts, an essential outcome for long-
run economic and financial stability. Second, improving the trade balances of 
slow-growing countries would help them grow more quickly, perhaps reducing 
the need for accommodative policies in those countries while enhancing the 
sustainability of the global recovery. Unfortunately, so long as exchange rate 
adjustment is incomplete and global growth prospects are markedly uneven, the 
problem of excessively strong capital inflows to emerging markets may persist.256 BERNANKE
6  CONCLUSION
As currently constituted, the international monetary system has a structural flaw: 
it lacks a mechanism, market-based or otherwise, to induce needed adjustments 
by surplus countries, which can result in persistent imbalances. This problem is 
not new. For example, in the somewhat different context of the gold standard in 
the period prior to the Great Depression, the United States and France ran large 
current  account  surpluses,  accompanied  by  large  inflows  of  gold.  However,   
in defiance of the so-called rules of the game of the international gold standard, 
neither  country  allowed  the  higher  gold  reserves  to  feed  through  to  their 
domestic money supplies and price levels, with the result that the real exchange 
rate in each country remained persistently undervalued. These policies created 
deflationary pressures in deficit countries that were losing gold, which helped 
bring on the Great Depression.3 The gold standard was meant to ensure economic 
and  financial  stability,  but  failures  of  international  coordination  undermined 
these very goals. Although the parallels are certainly far from perfect, and I am 
certainly not predicting a new Depression, some of the lessons from that grim 
period  are  applicable  today.4  In  particular,  for  large,  systemically  important 
countries  with  persistent  current  account  surpluses,  the  pursuit  of  export-led 
growth cannot ultimately succeed if the implications of that strategy for global 
growth and stability are not taken into account.
Thus,  it  would  be  desirable  for  the  global  community,  over  time,  to  devise 
an  international  monetary  system  that  more  consistently  aligns  the  interests 
of individual countries with the interests of the global economy as a whole.   
In particular, such a system would provide more effective checks on the tendency 
for countries to run large and persistent external imbalances, whether surpluses 
or  deficits.  Changes  to  accomplish  these  goals  will  take  considerable  time, 
effort and coordination to implement. In the meantime, without such a system 
in place, the countries of the world must recognise their collective responsibility 
for bringing about the rebalancing required to preserve global economic stability 
and prosperity. I hope that policy-makers in all countries can work together 
cooperatively to achieve a stronger, more sustainable and more balanced global 
economy.
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Let me thank Ben again for his marvellous exposition. I will start by presenting 
the other two panellists.
We  are  privileged  to  have  here  with  us  Henrique  Meirelles.  He  needs 
no  introduction,  of  course,  but  let  me  only  remind  you  that  he  was  a 
private  banker.  He  joined  BankBoston  in  1974,  was  appointed  President  of 
BankBoston Corporation in 1996, and President of FleetBoston’s Corporate and   
Global Bank in October 1999, following the merger of BankBoston and Fleet 
Financial Group. Finally, he has been Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil 
since January 2003, making it almost an eight-year term – I know these eight-
year terms very well.
Henrique, you have been instrumental in the fantastic success of the Brazilian 
economy. I expect that you can help us see things from the perspective of the 
emerging market economies, taking into account the fact that not all emerging 
countries are in the same position, which was crystal clear in what we just heard 
from Ben. 
We  are  also  privileged  to  have  here  with  us  Dominique  Strauss-Kahn.   
He has a PhD from the University of Paris. He was a professor of economics 
at  the  University  of  Paris.  He  was  a  Member  of  Parliament  in  the  French 
National  Assembly,  of  which  he  also  chaired  the  Finance  Commission.   
He was France’s Minister of Industry and International Trade from 1991 to 1993 
and  their  Minister  of  Economy,  Finance  and  Industry  from  1997  to  1999.   
He left the latter Ministry immediately prior to the introduction of the euro,   
but he had coordinated all the related preparations. Since November 2007 he has 
been the tenth Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Dominique, you have the global perspective, not only because of the global 
reach of the institution you are heading – the IMF – but also because you are so 
instrumental in the G20. 
Ladies and gentlemen, as you see, with this panel we have a unique capacity to 
look at the current situation from a global perspective. This is crucial, because 
since 2007 we have been experiencing the first serious stress test of the new 
entity, i.e. of the fully integrated global financial system and the global economy. 
This global economy has been created over decades. Two processes accelerated 
its creation: first, the fall of the Soviet Union, and second, the conversion of 
the developing countries, as they were called at that time, into the impressive, 
emerging market economies, as they are called now. 
I perceive a great unity of purpose between central banks. We are all striving for 
credible medium to long-term price stability. I note a striking convergence in 
the definitions of price stability: in a recent speech Ben Bernanke defined price 261 PANEL STATEMENT
stability as “inflation of about 2%, or a bit below” (Bernanke (2010)), which is 
very close to the ECB’s definition: “below, but close to, 2%”.
Central  bankers  still  hold  differing  views  on  a  number  of  very  important 
issues, many of which are under discussion at this conference. One example 
is whether standard and non-standard measures are viewed as substitutes for,   
or complements to, each other. In his speech Ben Bernanke presented the view 
that these tools are substitutes. In contrast, we at the ECB think of them as 
complements: standard measures are the tools we use to define the monetary 
policy stance appropriate to delivering price stability. Non-standard measures are 
the tools that permit this monetary policy stance to be transmitted as correctly as 
possible to the economy. Thus, non-standard measures are commensurate with 
financial market anomalies, and they address the shortcomings of the monetary 
policy transmission channels. In this context I find it interesting that in the speech 
we just heard, Ben suggested that thanks to the Federal Reserve’s new power to 
pay interest on banks’ reserves, its policy stance might be tightened even while 
bank reserves are still high.
Views on macro-prudential regulation and the monitoring of systemic risks also 
differ in some aspects between the two sides of the Atlantic, although here too 
we have a unity of purpose: we are all building institutions that will be able to 
address the weaknesses exposed by the global stress test that we are experiencing 
now. 
I followed Ben’s comments on the dollar exchange rate. To me, his assertions at 
the Economic Club of New York several months ago constituted a historically 
very important statement on the part of the Federal Reserve. At the time he 
said  how  attentive  he  was  to  the  fluctuations  of  the  dollar  exchange  rate,   
and that the Federal Reserve’s “commitment to (its) dual objectives, together 
with the underlying strengths of the U.S. economy, will help ensure that the 
dollar is strong and a source of global financial stability.” (Bernanke (2009)).   
We all strongly share the view that a strong dollar that is credible vis-à-vis the 
other major floating currencies is very important. I also support his message 
on the current account surplus in economies with exchange rates that are not 
sufficiently flexible. 
Let  me  conclude  with  global  imbalances.  We  absolutely  need  to  correct  the 
current global imbalances, and we need to develop an appropriate strategy with 
which to tackle them in the future. If we fail to fulfil these two goals, we will 
pave the way for future major crises. 
Thank you for your attention, and let me hand over the floor to Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn.262 TRICHET
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Thank you, Jean-Claude, for the introduction and for inviting me to appear on 
this panel of central bankers. I’ll try to answer briefly today’s question: “Where 
do we stand in the aftermath of the crisis?”
Two years ago in Washington, the President of the United States decided to 
convene for the first time a G20 meeting at the Head of State level. That meeting 
set a precedent for cooperation between countries. Thanks to this cooperation 
the global economy was prevented from undergoing something that could have 
been as bad as the Great Depression. This cooperation was relatively easy to 
achieve, because everybody was scared, and so the will to work together and to 
find a consensus was very strong.
Now we are entering a second phase. The crisis is not over, but many may 
be thinking that the worst is behind us, and so this willingness to try to work 
together is not as strong as it has been. Against this background, I will comment 
on  three  main  topics:  the  macroeconomic  situation,  financial  sector  reform,   
and the governance of the global economy.
1  THE MACROECONOMIC SITUATION
The  macroeconomic  recovery  has  proved  to  be  very  uneven.  This  fact  was 
discussed extensively in Ben Bernanke’s speech. Growth is very low in Europe 
and very high in many emerging countries, with the United States in-between. 
Because  the  recovery  is  uneven,  it  is  very  fragile.  This  makes  it  absolutely 
necessary to support growth, even if supporting growth creates other problems. 
The  macroeconomic  stimulus  that  helped  to  avoid  a  large-scale  depression 
also had some undesirable side effects. But one always needs to prioritise, and 
the hierarchy of problems at this time was clear: supporting growth was more 
important than the possible bad side-effects of this policy. 
Thus, wherever it is possible – and it is not possible everywhere – support for 
growth is still absolutely necessary. We are still far from the end of the crisis. 
Therefore, developments such as whether US economic growth picks up to 4%, 
or goes down to 2% or even less, have huge consequences for the rest of the 
world. 
But, at the same time, here lies the big contradiction, because we also need to 
restore confidence. Restoring confidence relies on addressing the public debt 
situation of many countries, especially, but not only, in Europe. It is not only   
a question of the countries “at the edge of the cliff” (for those, there’s no choice): 
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They absolutely have to provide medium-term consolidation plans, even if they 
don’t  apply  them  immediately.  Markets  have  to  be  convinced  that  all  these 
governments are determined to reduce debt ratios to sustainable levels. Debt 
ratios are moving in the right direction, but I’m not sure that they are moving 
fast enough. 
The problems are particularly difficult in countries where the debt ratios are   
not obviously sustainable in the long term, even if there are no immediate crises. 
These problems have to be faced with strong commitment in the medium term.
Those countries that are “at the edge of the cliff” need strong programmes, like 
the programme supported by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF 
in Greece. I must say that I am very happy with the cooperation we have with 
the different institutions – the European Commission and the ECB. The Greek 
programme has been very important. Greece represents only 2.5% of the euro 
area’s whole GDP, so it might seem that its influence is not very big. In reality, 
the linkages that we have now in the global economy, and even more so in the 
euro area, are such that even the collapse of a country representing such a small 
percentage of euro area GDP could have a lot of consequences. I am glad to see 
that the Greek programme is on track. This programme is difficult, but I think the 
Greek government is really bold and is doing what it has to do.
Other countries, especially the emerging market economies, are facing a different 
set of problems: their macroeconomic imbalances trigger large and unexpected 
capital inflows and currency pressures. These countries revalue their currencies 
until they believe they hit a limit of revaluation; they sterilise and put in place 
prudential  control  measures.  The  problems  these  countries  are  facing  trigger 
backlashes against free capital mobility.
In the medium term there is no way to rebalance the global economy without 
an increase in the value of many emerging countries’ currencies. We have to 
recognise this. Revaluation can be done progressively – it probably has to be 
done progressively – but the idea that we can solve the so-called imbalance 
problem without some important changes in the relative value of currencies is 
something I just cannot understand, even on paper. I am not that pessimistic 
with regard to the prospect of gradual exchange rate realignment. I know that 
there is a perception that the G20 summit in Seoul was rather a failure, but I am 
not exactly of this point of view and I will say a few words on this later, when   
I discuss the governance question. 
2  FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM
Let me shift to the second topic: the financial sector. A lot has been achieved 
on this front. You all remember the promise made by the Heads of State of the 
G20 in London in April 2009. The promise was to fix the financial sector so 
that this kind of crisis would never happen again. Probably that promise was 
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identified in the financial sector will be fixed. So I welcome the release by the 
Basel Committee of what are commonly known as the Basel III rules. There are 
still open issues concerning implementation, which I will not enter into now,   
but the progress is clear. 
Regulation is necessary, but not sufficient, since there are at least three pillars 
within a stable financial system: regulation, supervision and crisis resolution. 
We need more work on supervision, as even the best regulation will not work 
without supervision. We also need more work on crisis resolution, especially 
cross-border resolution. The issues of “too important to fail” institutions and 
moral  hazard  make  this  area  very  difficult,  and  this  is  probably  one  of  the 
reasons why we haven’t made more progress. The areas of supervision and crisis 
resolution are crucial for the IMF, and I hope that the EU can help show the way 
forward and that the progress is quick. Will we have a new financial crisis in 
two years? Hopefully not. In five years, in ten years, in 15 years? Who knows?   
So it is important that we are ready in case a new crisis comes. This is fundamental 
to the public’s trust in the economic institutions. This trust would be seriously 
undermined if another crisis emerged looking like the previous one. 
We  also  have  to  better address  the  risks  posed  by  the  non-bank  sector,  and 
advance  the  agenda  of  creating  a  macro-prudential  framework.  The  IMF  is 
contributing to this work too. This agenda may change part of the work of the 
central banks. 
3  GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The last topic I would like to cover is governance. The way this crisis was 
addressed  at  the  global  level  was  in  my  view  absolutely  unprecedented  in 
mankind’s  history:  a  lot  of  countries  facing  the  same  problem  at  the  same 
moment in time put in place the same policy in a concerted way. This was a new 
beginning for global governance. During this crisis the general public has come 
to understand clearly that globalisation is not any longer only a topic for lectures 
and conferences: it is a reality. And it has become obvious that it is impossible to 
find a domestic solution to a global problem. This means that global governance 
in economic and financial matters has to be strengthened. 
The progress of global governance will be difficult. We are in the second phase 
of the G20. The first phase – the crisis phase – was easy. But in the second phase 
the threat appears less dramatic than before and it seems that most of the crisis 
is behind us. Domestic concerns start to predominate, which is politically and 
ethically absolutely legitimate – politicians are elected to address the problems 
of their own people. But contradictions may arise between domestic concerns 
and the consideration of global consequences, and these contradictions have to 
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European countries have moved a long way from the contradictions they faced   
40 years ago. They came to understand that cooperation was the only way forward 
and that the benefits of cooperation were huge. It took 20-25 years to largely 
overcome the worries associated with national public opinions on sovereignty. 
Governance issues at the global level are similar, but I guess it will not take   
25 years to solve them, partly because we just do not have 25 years for this.   
It was very obvious in Seoul that on the intellectual side everyone understands 
that big players have big responsibilities, and that the bigger you become the 
more responsibility you get. Free-riding, trying to take advantage of the situation 
without looking at the consequences for the rest of the world, carries clear risks 
as it may backfire on your own economy. 
That intellectual perception notwithstanding, the reality of politics is sometimes 
very  different.  The  future  of  the  global  economy  depends  on  our  capacity   
to solve this contradiction. I am optimistic: I think we will have ups and downs, 
good G20 summits and less good G20 summits, but over time – in 12 months, 
in 18 months, in two years – a really strong consensus can emerge. This is more 
than a wish: this is a possibility. The opposite outcome would be a disaster for 
the global economy. 
4  CONCLUSIONS: WHERE WE STAND
So let me conclude on where we stand in the aftermath of the crisis. Clearly the 
global economy after the crisis cannot be the same as before. The lessons we 
have to draw are of two kinds. 
The first lesson is that we need to fix the outstanding problems that formed part 
of the roots of the crisis, even if we know that the next crisis will have different 
roots.
The second lesson is that we need to be creative and imagine what the next global 
system will be like. For me, a cooperative system is the only possibility, because 
in the end such a system is a win-win solution for the global economy. Everybody 
is better off in a cooperative system than in a situation where everybody follows 
their own policy without taking into account what is going to happen to others. 
With this cooperative system in mind, at the IMF we are developing a new kind 
of process: the spillover report. These reports will introduce a different type 
of analysis of countries’ policies than was used previously. I think this will be 
helpful for the international community. We all need to progress in understanding 
that we, especially the big countries, are players in a global game. The idea that 
countries can find their own solutions for their domestic purposes is an idea from 
yesterday that cannot bring any good to the global economy. Cooperation has 
been successful and cooperation is the direction in which we need to continue.267 PANEL STATEMENT
PANEL STATEMENT 
BY HENRIQUE MEIRELLES, GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK  
OF BRAZIL
Thank you, Jean-Claude, for the introduction. With reference to the question 
of where we stand now, I will address two main issues. First, I will discuss the 
macroeconomic policies adopted in response to the crisis. Second, I will spend 
some time on the global imbalances. I will discuss these issues from an emerging 
markets’ point of view and, in particular, from the Brazilian point of view. 
1  MACROECONOMIC POLICIES DURING THE CRISIS
The first phase of the crisis did not affect Brazil. We were growing, as were 
most emerging markets, at a very fast pace until the Lehman Brothers’ collapse 
in the third quarter of 2008. The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy was the turning 
point:  it  triggered  an  almost  complete  collapse  of  cross-border  credit  lines. 
Since about 20% of the credit in Brazil was cross-border funded, this led to a 
series of consequences. 
First, we experienced a very sharp drop in liquidity. The domestic credit market 
was  impaired.  As  a  result,  industrial  output  dropped  sharply  (with  around  a 
20%  decrease  in  only  two  months  in  late  2008)  and  GDP  contracted  at  the 
annualised rate of 13% in the last quarter of 2008.
At  the  same  time,  we  had  a  run  against  the  currency,  with  an  almost  50% 
depreciation in a short period of time. Inflation expectations rose. The situation 
started  to  dangerously  resemble  the  pattern  of  past  emerging  market  crises. 
In  these  past  episodes,  higher  prices  decreased  the  purchasing  power  of  the 
average worker, which decreased demand. In response, corporations increased 
margins, rather than decreasing prices, in order to offset the declining sales. 
The  result  was  a  stagflation  that  has  characterised  some  emerging  market 
economies, particularly during the 1980s and a good portion of the 1990s.
We  addressed  these  threats  with  policies  which  roughly  followed  those 
described by Ben Bernanke in his speech earlier today, but with distinct aspects 
appropriate for our case. We immediately adopted non-standard measures to 
address impairments to the transmission channel in Brazilian financial markets.   
The  main  problems  were  in  the  dollar  credit  market.  Therefore,  we  started 
lending our foreign exchange reserves, first to the banking system and then to 
corporations. We also intervened in the dollar forward market because there was 
a liquidity problem there as a result of all the derivatives issued by exporters 
trying to hedge. Other measures followed, such as sales of dollars in the spot 
market and a reduction of the required reserves. 268 MEIRELLES
However, while undertaking all these measures we kept the policy rate steady and 
we reiterated our commitment to the inflation target. We stated that we would 
only decrease rates in the event that we saw inflation expectations falling. 
These policies had important effects. First, the commitment to price stability 
and the fact that the interest rate was kept at the same level discouraged further 
runs against the currency. If we had lowered the rate, it would have made it even 
cheaper to bet against the currency. Second, thanks to the non-standard measures, 
the normal functioning of the credit markets was restored quickly. Credit flows, 
which had fallen dramatically in late September/October, were almost back to 
normal in December. At the same time, the run on the currency abated.
Subsequently, a fiscal stimulus was adopted and applied in December 2008. 
In January 2009 we started lowering the policy rate. That led to a quick recovery. 
Brazil lost about 800,000 jobs during the crisis. But 1.2 million new jobs were 
created in 2009 and, in 2010 so far, about 2.5 million new jobs have been created. 
Unemployment is at the lowest level ever, currently standing at 6.5%. Industrial 
output grew fast to begin with, then stabilised somewhat, and is now slowly 
picking up again. 
Thus, growth is currently strong, as in many other emerging markets. We expect 
GDP growth of 7.3% for the year 2010, with market expectations a little higher 
than  that,  and  next  year  we  expect  some  moderation,  back  to  the  potential 
growth rate. 
2  GLOBAL IMBALANCES
We  now  come  to  the  question  of  global  imbalances.  In  Brazil,  as  well  as 
in  Mexico,  South  Africa  and  many  other  countries,  growth  is  basically  led 
by  domestic  demand.  In  Brazil,  we  have  a  strong  labour  market,  fast  credit 
expansion, a high level of consumer and business confidence, and very large 
public investment in order to cope with the higher rate of GDP growth.
This is leading to a strong growth in imports. Imports have expanded by 38% 
in Brazil, and by more than 30% in India, while high growth rates are also 
being observed in South Africa and other countries. As a result, in the case of 
Brazil, the current account deficit is widening from around USD 49 billion to an 
expected USD 67 billion next year. We are expecting to see a similar situation in 
South Africa, India and other countries.
Thus, emerging market economies are not all in the same position in terms of 
global imbalances. True, in general, the emerging market economies are growing 
faster than the developed economies. But among the emerging market economies 
we  observe  two  different  situations  in  terms  of  imbalances.  Some  of  these 
economies have external surpluses. Others like Brazil, for instance, have external 
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Brazil’s external deficit is a cause for concern for us. In the past, the correction 
of current account deficits has not always happened in an orderly way and has 
often been accompanied by the “run for the exit” phenomenon. We also worry 
that the capital inflows accompanying the current account deficit may contribute 
to excess liquidity and asset price bubbles.
We are taking a number of measures to address these concerns. We have raised 
the policy rate by 200 basis points and we had withdrawn all the non-standard 
measures by May 2010. Most of the fiscal stimulus was withdrawn by March 
of  the  same  year.  In  parallel,  we  are  strengthening  prudential  rules  in  the 
credit market. Fiscal authorities have applied a small tax on capital inflows. 
Our international reserves, which proved to be so instrumental during the crisis 
in 2008, also have a clear macro-prudential role.
We are dealing with the disproportionate effects that the global imbalances are 
having on our economy. The measures we have applied are working well and our 
economy is now better protected than it was in the past. Having said that, we are 
of course interested in global rebalancing, and thus strongly favour concerted 
international efforts to tackle the global imbalances.270 BERNANKE
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BY BEN S. BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
US FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
The last time I was here at the ECB, almost exactly two years ago, I sat on a 
distinguished panel much like this one to help mark the 10th anniversary of the 
euro. Even as we celebrated the remarkable achievements of the founders of 
the common currency, however, the global economy stood near the precipice. 
Financial markets were volatile and illiquid, and the viability of some of the 
world’s leading financial institutions had been called into question. With asset 
prices  falling  and  the  flow  of  credit  to  the  non-financial  sector  constricted, 
most of the world’s economies had entered what would prove to be a sharp and 
protracted economic downturn.
By  the  time  of  that  meeting,  the  world’s  central  banks  had  already  taken 
significant steps to stabilise financial markets and to mitigate the worst effects 
of  the  recession,  and  they  would  go  on  to  do  much  more.  Very  broadly,   
the responses of central banks to the crisis fell into two classes. First, central 
banks undertook a range of initiatives to restore normal functioning to financial 
markets and to strengthen the banking system. They expanded existing lending 
facilities and created new facilities to provide liquidity to the financial sector. 
Key  examples  include  the  ECB’s  one-year  long-term  refinancing  operations, 
the Federal Reserve’s auctions of discount window credit (via the Term Auction 
Facility) and the Bank of Japan’s more recent extension of its liquidity supply 
operations. To help satisfy banks’ funding needs in multiple currencies, central 
banks established liquidity swap lines that allowed them to draw each other’s 
currencies and lend those funds to financial institutions in their jurisdictions;   
the  Federal  Reserve  ultimately  established  swap  lines  with  14  other  central 
banks.  Central  banks  also  worked  to  stabilise  financial  markets  that  were 
important conduits of credit to the non-financial sector. For example, the Federal 
Reserve launched facilities to help stabilise the commercial paper market and 
the market for asset-backed securities, through which flow much of the funding 
for student, auto, credit card and small business loans, as well as for commercial 
mortgages. In addition, the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of England, the 
Swiss National Bank and other central banks played important roles in stabilising 
and strengthening their respective banking systems. In particular, central banks 
helped develop and oversee stress tests that assessed banks’ vulnerabilities and 
capital needs. These tests proved instrumental in reducing investors’ uncertainty 
about banks’ assets and prospective losses, bolstering confidence in the banking 
system and facilitating banks’ raising of private capital. Central banks are also 
playing  an  important  ongoing  role  in  the  development  of  new  international 
capital  and  liquidity  standards  for  the  banking  system  that  will  help  protect 
against future crises.
Second, beyond necessary measures to stabilise financial markets and banking 
systems, central banks moved proactively to ease monetary policy to help support 
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means of cuts in short-term policy rates, including a coordinated rate cut in 
October 2008 by the Federal Reserve, the ECB and other leading central banks. 
However, as policy rates approached the zero lower bound, central banks eased 
policy  by  additional  means.  For  example,  some  central  banks,  including  the 
Federal Reserve, sought to reduce longer-term interest rates by communicating 
that policy rates were likely to remain low for some time. A prominent example 
of the use of central bank communication to further ease policy was the Bank 
of Canada’s conditional commitment to keep rates near zero until the end of 
the second quarter of 2010.1 To provide additional monetary accommodation, 
several central banks – among them the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, 
the ECB and the Bank of Japan – purchased significant quantities of financial 
assets, including government debt, mortgage-backed securities or covered bonds, 
depending on the central bank. Asset purchases seem to have been effective 
in  easing  financial  conditions;  for  example,  the  evidence  suggests  that  such 
purchases  significantly  lowered  longer-term  interest  rates  in  both  the  United 
States and the United Kingdom.2
Although  the  efforts  of  central  banks  to  stabilise  the  financial  system  and 
provide monetary accommodation helped set the stage for recovery, economic 
growth rates in the advanced economies have been relatively weak. Of course, 
the economic outlook varies importantly by country and region, and the policy 
responses to these developments among central banks have differed accordingly. 
In the United States, we have seen a slowing of the pace of expansion since 
earlier  this  year.  The  unemployment  rate  has  remained  close  to  10%  since   
mid-2009,  with  a  substantial  fraction  of  the  unemployed  out  of  work  for   
six months or longer. Moreover, inflation has been declining and is currently 
quite low, with measures of underlying inflation running close to 1%. Although 
we  project  that  economic  growth  will  pick  up  and  unemployment  decline 
somewhat in the coming year, progress thus far has been disappointingly slow.
In  this  environment,  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC)  judged 
that  additional  monetary  policy  accommodation  was  needed  to  support  the 
economic recovery and help ensure that inflation, over time, is at desired levels. 
Accordingly, the FOMC announced earlier this month its intention to purchase 
an additional USD 600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end 
of  the  second  quarter  of  2011,  a  pace  of  about  USD  75  billion  per  month.   
The  Committee  will  also  maintain  its  current  policy  of  reinvesting  principal 
payments from its securities holdings in longer-term Treasury securities. Financial 
conditions  eased  notably  in  anticipation  of  the  Committee’s  announcement, 
suggesting that this policy will be effective in promoting recovery. As has been 
the case with more conventional monetary policy in the past, this policy action 
will be regularly reviewed in light of the evolving economic outlook and the 
Committee’s assessment of the effects of its policies on the economy.
1  Recent work at the Bank of Canada (see He (2010)) suggests that the bank’s forward 
guidance may have pushed back expectations of when policy accommodation would be 
withdrawn. For a differing view, see Chehal and Trehan (2009).
2  For the United States, see Gagnon et al. (2010), D’Amico and King (2010) and Hamilton 
and Wu (2010); for the United Kingdom, see Joyce et al. (2010).272 BERNANKE
I draw several lessons from our collective experience in dealing with the crisis. 
(My list is by no means exhaustive.) The first lesson is that, in a world in which 
the  consequences  of  financial  crises  can  be  devastating,  fostering  financial 
stability is a critical part of overall macroeconomic management. Accordingly, 
central  banks  and  other  financial  regulators  must  be  vigilant  in  monitoring 
financial markets and institutions for threats to systemic stability and diligent 
in  taking  steps  to  address  such  threats.  Supervision  of  individual  financial 
institutions,  macro-prudential  monitoring  and  monetary  policy  are  mutually 
reinforcing  undertakings,  with  active  involvement  in  one  sphere  providing 
crucial information and expertise for the others. Indeed, at the Federal Reserve, 
we have restructured our financial supervisory functions so that staff members 
with expertise in a range of areas – including economics, financial markets and 
supervision – work closely together in evaluating potential risks.
Second, the past two years have demonstrated the value of policy flexibility 
and openness to new approaches. During the crisis, central banks were creative 
and innovative, developing programmes that played a significant role in easing 
financial stress and supporting economic activity. As the global financial system 
and national economies become increasingly complex and interdependent, novel 
policy challenges will continue to require innovative policy responses.
Third, as was the focus of my remarks two years ago, in addressing financial 
crises, international cooperation can be very helpful; indeed, given the global 
integration of financial markets, such cooperation is essential. Central bankers 
worked closely together throughout the crisis and continue to do so. Our frequent 
contact, whether in bilateral discussions or in international meetings, permits 
us to share our thinking, compare analyses and stay informed of developments 
around the world. It also enables us to move quickly when shared problems call 
for swift joint responses, such as the coordinated rate cuts and the creation of 
liquidity swap lines during the crisis. These actions and others we have taken 
over the past few years underscore our resolve to work together to address our 
common economic challenges.
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Trichet thanked all panellists. Referring to Strauss-Kahn’s statement, he said he 
would love to fully echo the opinion that the European governance framework 
could be an exemplary model for global governance. However, Europe still has 
some progress to make in internalising the externalities of countries’ policies.
Trichet also agreed with Strauss-Kahn’s views on global governance. Global 
governance  has  changed  dramatically.  It  was  of  great  importance  that  the 
G7 passed the baton to the G20. At the level of central banks, the baton of the 
G10 was passed to the Global Economy Meeting, with the Economic Consultative 
Committees as its “steering group”. 
The  development  of  the  Basel  rules  has  progressed,  with  the  support  of  the 
international community. Trichet remarked that this success is due to the fact 
that all of those gathered – Brazilian, Mexican, Russian and all other colleagues 
included – are working together.
Commenting  on  the  transatlantic  differences  in  policies,  Trichet  highlighted 
the difference in financial structures. The ECB focuses mainly on banks, as 
they  provide  70%  of  financing  in  Europe,  compared  with  about  30%  in  the 
United States. 
Overall,  the  sentiment  in  the  Governing  Council  is  that  the  perception  ten 
years ago that the ECB was somehow peculiar has now largely disappeared.   
The two-pillar strategy is now widely recognised. Also, Trichet was satisfied to 
hear Bernanke talking about an inflation objective of “about 2% or a bit below” 
in a recent speech, since he recalled that the ECB had been criticised for this 
asymmetry in its definition of price stability. He agreed with the panellists that 
times are extremely demanding, so there is no room for complacency, and ended 
by inviting questions from the floor.
Agustín Carstens Carstens (Governor of the Bank of Mexico) agreed with the 
thrust of Meirelles’ panel statement and asked Strauss-Kahn about the IMF’s 
change of stance on capital controls two years earlier – the IMF had adopted 
a less hostile approach to capital controls, in contrast to its absolute rejection 
before. He asked what the IMF had learned about capital controls since its change 
of approach and if these controls worked or not.
Carstens agreed with Bernanke that the world needs a strong US economy and 
also an increase in US savings. He asked what specific policies could be used to 
align US consumption and permanent income, given that the imbalance between 
consumption and permanent income in the United States was at the source of the 
crisis.
Finally, he referred to some euro area governments’ calls to allow defaults or 
haircuts on euro area sovereign debt. He underscored that the financial system 
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likely it is that such an approach will be adopted and went on to query what a 
world without a safe asset would mean. 
Strauss-Kahn answered that, first, there is no doubt that it is better to have 
unrestricted  capital  flows  in  the  long  run,  as  they  are  part  of  the  necessary 
market adjustment. There may, however, be scope for intervention in the short 
run. Second, problems may exist relating to both capital inflows and outflows. 
Managing outflows raises particularly tricky questions about investors’ liberty. 
For  instance,  in  Iceland  the  IMF-supported  program  had  to  handle  capital 
outflows. Third, regarding capital inflows, the first line of defence is to allow an 
increase in the value of the currency. He agreed that, in the short run, disruptions 
may justify temporary capital controls, but such controls are not a solution for the 
medium term and should not be used as a substitute for good policies, including 
structural reform. The IMF is considering a framework for qualifying capital 
controls and identifying those that are less harmful. 
Bernanke  stressed  that  current  account  deficits  and  surpluses  are  general 
equilibrium phenomena, emerging from the interaction of many factors across 
countries. Thus, he rejected the view that the United States can tackle its current 
account deficit on its own while other countries stand aside. The US current 
account deficits preceding the crisis were not primarily caused by a change of 
consumption  behaviour  by  US  households.  Rather,  the  consumption-income 
imbalance partly arose from the export-led strategies of some emerging market 
economies. The evidence for this view is that long-term interest rates at that time 
were low, not high. If the US deficits had been driven by US demand, long-term 
interest rates would have been high. 
But he agreed that deficit countries have to do their part to improve saving relative 
to investment. In the longer run, the United States needs to address its fiscal 
position. Raising households’ savings is difficult, as policy tools are less well 
suited for this task. But Bernanke stated that one thing they have learned from the 
crisis is that credit standards do make a difference. In the United States, credit at 
times was made available to people who were not able to manage it.  Saving rates 
have risen significantly since credit standards have tightened. Exchange rates by 
themselves are unlikely to suffice for rebalancing, and structural adjustments are 
needed on both sides. 
Trichet  remarked  that  the  euro  area  is  too  often  viewed  as  a  collection  of 
individual countries rather than as a single entity. The euro area as a whole 
is approximately in balance with respect to the rest of the world. Regarding 
Carsten’s question, he answered that the ECB is calling for the same framework 
for managing sovereign debt crises in the euro area as the one that exists at 
the global level and has been operating for decades. He hoped that Europe’s 
framework would crystallise soon.
Rania  Al-Mashat  (Central  Bank  of  Egypt)  asked  Strauss-Kahn  if  the  new 
governance  structure  of  the  IMF  will  contribute  to  addressing  the  global 
imbalances more effectively. Will emerging markets take more responsibility 
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their surpluses even if they dampen their growth? Strauss-Kahn answered that, 
by adjusting quotas, the IMF has solved a long-lasting question of legitimacy, 
although this was only one of many important results of the Seoul G20 summit. 
Although  IMF  quotas  may  not  be  the  most  important  factor,  they  do  signal 
the  increasing  recognition  of  big  emerging  market  economies  as  key  global 
players. Strauss-Kahn hopes that this recognition will be associated with more   
globally-oriented economic policies in these countries. For example, China, in 
his view, understands its role in solving global imbalances and is moving its 
policy in the right direction, speed being the only issue.
Sukudhew Singh (Central Bank of Malaysia) first expressed a concern about the 
growth prospects of small open economies currently facing sharply appreciating 
exchange rates and growing commodity prices. Second, he asked Bernanke about 
the benefits of injecting additional liquidity. He pointed out that while the Federal 
Reserve had injected liquidity of about 10% of GDP, credit to the economy had 
increased by only about 2-3% of GDP and financial institutions’ deposits with 
the Federal Reserve had increased by 7.4% of GDP. Fiscal and macro-prudential 
policies are in a contractionary mode and monetary policy is doing all or most 
of the “heavy lifting”. Is monetary policy “pushing on a string”? Aren’t central 
banks  running  the  risk  of  overpromising  and  potentially  compromising  their 
credibility?
Bernanke responded that asset purchases work through portfolio substitutions, 
motivating  investors  to  move  between  assets  and  causing  changes  in  term 
premia and relative prices. Asset purchases are financed by increasing financial 
institutions’ reserves with the central bank, but looking at changes in reserves 
is not a good criterion for judging monetary policy efficacy. Monetary policy 
efficacy  should  be  measured  by  its  impact  on  overall  financial  conditions.   
There is evidence that this impact has been significant. There is concern over 
how much changes in asset prices will impact real activity, and this is not yet 
known. That being said, the fear of “pushing on a string” has come up every 
decade since the 1930s, but retrospectively there is no example of when it was 
true.  For  example,  it  is  now  known  that  monetary  policy  changes  and  gold 
inflows were an important part of the recovery starting in 1933. In the light of all 
the evidence, Bernanke is sceptical about the “pushing on a string” idea. But he 
agreed that central banks should not overpromise; the effects of monetary policy 
are meaningful, but moderate, so any help from the private sector and other 
policies is very useful in the current circumstances.
Geanakoplos said that non-standard tools amount to lending at more favourable 
terms  than  markets  terms  (both  lower  rates  –  a  standard  tool  –  and  lower 
collateral). One lesson from the crisis is that in crisis times the private sector 
asks for too much collateral. By contrast, in normal times the private sector 
may not ask for enough collateral. Therefore, central banks should continuously 
manage  collateral.  Collateral  regulation  should  be  the  additional  policy  tool 
commensurate with the new added responsibility for financial stability. Central 
banks  other  than  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  ECB  are  already  starting  to 
manage loan-to-value ratios. It was mentioned that the US financial regulator 
already manages collateral, but it would be natural for central banks to do this. 277 GENERAL DISCUSSION SESSION 4
The current practice resembles the Soviet Union approach where one bureau 
managed prices, while another bureau managed quantities.
Bernanke said that the Federal Reserve is moving in the direction Geanakoplos 
suggested. To a significant extent, price and quantity departments are both in 
the central bank now: the Federal Reserve implements monetary policy and also 
carries out macro-prudential supervision. For example, under the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the Federal Reserve is involved in the process of setting margin and capital 
requirements for OTC derivatives held by major banks. The Federal Reserve is 
also involved in the Basel III Accord, which not only controls leverage via capital 
requirements, but also includes a time-varying counter-cyclical buffer component. 
The Federal Reserve historically has not formally managed loan-to-value ratios, 
but it is analyzing the costs and benefits of a range of macro-prudential tools. 
This may not go as far as Geanakoplos would like, but the basic principle of 
supervising financial firms with a view to promoting broader financial stability is 
accepted and incorporated in a lot of what the Federal Reserve is doing.
Meirelles remarked that Brazil does have the same entity dealing with both 
macro-prudential  and  monetary  policy  and  this  proved  essential  during  the 
crisis. It is important to take an integrated approach, with the coordination of   
macro-prudential, micro-prudential and monetary policies. He also emphasised 
the importance of global coordination. 
Trichet stressed that the macro-prudential supervisor in Europe – the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – is a separate institution from the ECB. The ECB 
is responsible for delivering price stability. But, given its expertise and its stake 
in stability, it is not surprising that it is called to extensively support the ESRB. 278
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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the implementation of monetary policy during the economic 
and financial crisis of 2007-10. After summarising the different measures adopted 
by the ECB during these turbulent times, we present a stylised theoretical model 
that allows us to focus on the main trade-offs faced in implementing monetary 
policy. We argue that it is the level of key policy interest rates and the width of 
the interest rate corridor set by the standing facilities, and not the quantity of 
liquidity that is provided to the market, that are key to sustaining (some) private 
intermediation in the money market in the presence of increasing credit and 
liquidity risk. The model highlights the trade-offs faced by central banks when 
deciding on the degree and timing of its interventions. The main implications of 
the theory are supported by the empirical evidence.
1  INTRODUCTION
This paper analyses the crisis management tools and monetary policy decisions 
of  the  ECB  and  the  Eurosystem  (hereafter  ‘the  ECB’)  during  the  2007-10 
economic and financial crisis. This crisis exposed widespread market failures in 
various segments of the money and credit markets and an apparent intertemporal 
link between liquidity and credit risks. Against this background, the purpose of 
this paper is as follows. First, it provides a simple theoretical model designed 
to capture the main challenges for monetary policy implementation faced by a 
central bank having an operational framework similar to that of the ECB during 
the financial turmoil. The main focus of our analysis is on the trade-offs faced by 
central banks in setting the levels of key policy interest rates and in choosing the 
width of the interest rate corridor of their standing facilities. We assume that central 
banks may care about both the level of short-term interest rates – in particular, 
the deviation from the target rate – as well as trading activity in the interbank 
market. We argue that, in the presence of increasing credit and liquidity risks,   
a central bank is compelled to change the way it sets its policy rates if it wants 
1  The  authors  would  like  to  thank  Laurent  Clerc,  Philipp  Hartmann,  Paul  Mercier,   
Francesco Mongelli, Huw Pill and the members of the Monetary Policy Committee for 
their helpful comments on previous drafts. We are grateful to Vincent Brousseau and   
Piet Philip Christiansen for their valuable input. The opinions expressed in this paper are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank 
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to prevent a market breakdown. Interestingly, it may be possible to avoid market 
collapse even though the ultimate source of the crisis – increasing credit risk – is 
not directly affected by the actions of a central bank. In our model, the volume of 
liquidity provided by the central bank is determined by the recourse of banks to 
the standing facilities, which in turn depends on market conditions and are not a 
discretionary choice of the central bank. Accordingly, various degrees of central 
bank intermediaton are possible, from total absence to complete replacement of 
the market. The intertemporal structure of credible central bank decision-making 
is emphasised while highlighting key issues related to the exit strategy from non-
standard policies. Second, the paper presents some novel econometric evidence 
for the specific case of the ECB. In particular, it supports the main empirical 
implications of the theory, namely that the volume of credit provided by the ECB 
contributed to a decline in the spreads between unsecured and secured interbank 
market rates and in the liquidity risk premium, albeit at the cost of decreasing 
money market activity.2
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly recalls the 
main market developments since August 2007 and, in parallel, introduces the 
measures implemented by the ECB and the challenges it faced. Section 3 presents 
the theoretical model. Section 4 reports the econometric evidence. After offering 
some concluding remarks in Section 5, Section 6 contains a literature review 
of both theoretical and empirical studies related to the actions of central banks 
during the crisis.
2  THREE PHASES IN THE CRISIS: MAIN CHALLENGES   
TO MONETARY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
To discuss the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area during the 
crisis, it is useful to divide the period between 9 August 2007 and the time of 
writing (October 2010) into three phases, as follows (see Trichet (2010) for a 
similar breakdown of this period).
The first phase, “market turmoil”, runs from 9 August 2007 – the day the French 
bank BNP Paribas announced that it had suspended the redemption of shares in 
the funds they had invested in sub-prime mortgages – until 15 September 2008 – 
the day Lehman Brothers failed following a run by its short-term creditors and 
prime brokerage costumers.
The second phase, “financial crisis”, covers the last quarter of 2008 and the 
first three quarters of 2009. This period was marked by a sharp contraction in 
global output and trade, followed by a sluggish recovery. In fact, in the autumn 
and winter 2008/09, macroeconomic developments very closely tracked those 
observed at the start of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Moreover, it cannot 
2  See Mercier and Papadia (2011) for a comprehensive narrative and analysis of the crisis 
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be overemphasised that the global economy entered its worst contraction since 
the 1930s against a backdrop of dysfunctional money and financial markets and 
severely  weakened  banking  systems.  During  this  phase  the  ECB/Eurosystem 
implemented enhanced credit support measures.
The third phase, from November 2009 onwards, is labelled “phasing-out” and 
“sovereign debt crisis”. During this period the ECB announced and initiated the 
gradual phasing-out of enhanced credit support measures. However, a sovereign 
debt crisis started in late 2009 that reached a climax in the spring of 2010 and 
led to a reassessment of the phasing-out process. This is where the euro area 
stands at the time of writing. It is characterised by tensions in sovereign debt 
markets affecting, for different reasons, four euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and, to some extent, also Spain).
For further reference  3, Chart 1 shows the provision and absorption of liquidity 
by the Eurosystem during the three phases; panel A of Chart 2 shows the EONIA 
rate and trading volume; panel B shows the rate of and activity in the overnight 
repo market; and panel C depicts the EURIBOR-OIS three-month interest rate 
spread. See also Tables 1-3.
2.1  MARKET TURMOIL
On 9 August 2007 severe tensions emerged in the euro interbank market with 
increasing  credit  and  liquidity  risk  premia  and  declining  market  activity.4 
During the period from August 2007 to September 2008, the implementation of 
monetary policy by the ECB was mainly based on the so-called frontloading  5 of 
the fulfilment of the minimum reserve requirements. The main objective of this 
policy was to steer the overnight interest rate (EONIA) close to the key policy 
rate – the minimum bid rate in the main refinancing operations – which was 
achieved also through an increase in the frequency of fine-tuning operations   
(i.e. within the reserve maintenance period) on top of the regular fine-tuning 
operation on the last day of the reserve maintenance period.6 Moreover, during 
the market turmoil phase, the ECB changed the term structure of its refinancing 
operations, increasing the weight of its longer-term refinancing operations (the 
three-month  operation)  from  one  third  of  the  total  outstanding  credit  before 
the crisis to two thirds. Supplementary operations were introduced with three 
and  six-month  maturities.  This  period  was  also  marked  by  the  beginning  of 
unprecedented cooperation among the major central banks on liquidity policy 
measures (in particular between the ECB and the US Federal Reserve).
3  All charts and tables referred to in this paper are presented in the Annex at the end of the 
paper.
4  For a detailed description of the interaction between the Eurosystem’s refinancing operations 
and the functioning of the money market during normal periods (i.e. prior to August 2007), 
see Beaupain and Durré (2008).
5  The frontloading policy consists in allotting significantly more than the strict refinancing 
needs of the banking system – benchmark allotment – at the beginning of the reserve 
maintenance  period,  and  gradually  reducing  the  surplus  until  the  end  of  the  reserve 
maintenance period.
6  See for instance Cassola, Holthausen and Würtz (2008) and Cassola and Huetl (2010) for 
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In  retrospect,  the  main  challenges  faced  by  the  ECB  in  its  monetary  policy 
implementation during this period seem to have been:
how to calibrate the “right” amount and timing of frontloading; (i) 
how  to  steer  the  overnight  interest  rate  without  relying  on  the  ECB  to  (ii) 
intervene “too” frequently, given the preference of the Governing Council of 
the ECB for a “hands-off” market-based approach to steering interest rates;
understanding  why  the  reserve  averaging  mechanism  was  no  longer  (iii) 
sufficient to stabilise money market conditions (e.g. liquidity hoarding by 
banks, enhanced counterparty credit risk, cross-border market segmentation 
and idiosyncratic vs. aggregate liquidity uncertainty);
how  to  split  the  provision  of  liquidity  between  short  and  longer-term  (iv) 
refinancing. 
As Chart 1 shows, this phase was marked by a stable provision of refinancing in 
line with the aggregate liquidity deficit of the banking system, with virtually zero 
net recourse to the standing facilities, occasional fine-tuning operations and an 
increasing diversification of the weight and maturity of longer-term refinancing 
operations. During this phase the ECB managed the tensions in money markets 
arising from the financial market turmoil through a combination of automatic 
stabilisers  and  frontloading.  Indeed,  the  design  of  the  ECB’s  operational 
framework turned out to be crucial for its crisis management in the early stages 
of the crisis.7 However, longer-term money market rates and overnight interest 
swap spreads remained elevated, were continuing to increase and were somewhat 
volatile (see Chart 2, panel C), while term funding markets remained seriously 
impaired. With hindsight, those were signs of the financial storm that was in the 
making (see Chart 3).
2.2  FINANCIAL CRISIS
The  period  between  October  2008  and  March  2009  was  marked  by  a  sharp 
contraction  in  global  output  and  trade,  against  a  backdrop  of  dysfunctional 
money and financial markets and severely weakened banking systems. During 
this period the main objectives of the monetary policy measures were to support 
the banking system and thereby ensure that one key element in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in the euro area was not disrupted, and also 
to prevent a systemic banking crisis. The ECB took several bold steps. First, 
the minimum bid rate was cut in a sequence of steps from 4.25% to a record 
low of 1% (the last rate decrease was implemented on 13 May 2009). Second, 
all refinancing operations were conducted at a fixed rate with full allotment. 
Fine-tuning operations were discontinued, except for the one on the last day of 
the reserve maintenance period. Third, between October 2008 and January 2009 
the interest rate corridor of standing facilities was narrowed to 100 basis points. 
7  See Cassola, Holthausen and Würtz (2008) for a decription and analysis of the automatic 
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The corridor was later restored to 200 basis points, but was narrowed again to 
150 basis points when the minimum bid rate was decreased to 1%, in order to 
ensure that the rate on the deposit facility was above zero (see Chart 4). Fourth, 
the eligibility criteria for collateral was temporarily extended and, in addition, 
the credit threshold for eligibility was lowered from A- to BBB- for marketable 
assets  (except  asset-backed  securities)  and  non-marketable  assets  (with  an 
additional haircut). Fifth, international coordination with other central banks was 
strengthened. For example, on 8 October 2009 the key policy interest rate was 
reduced by 50 basis points in a concerted and historic move with other central 
banks including the Bank of England, the US Federal Reserve System and the 
Swiss National Bank. In addition, the ECB continued to provide liquidity in 
foreign currencies, most notably US dollars.
From April until October 2009 a sluggish economic recovery set in. Money 
market  interest  rates  remained  at  very  low  levels  with  EONIA  reaching  its 
“effective lower bound”, i.e. a level that is close to zero, but still allows some 
interbank market activity (deposit facility rate at 0.25%). Further support to the 
banking system was provided by the ECB through two additional measures. 
First, the ECB announced three refinancing operations with a maturity of one 
year (settled in July, September and December 2009). These operations were 
conducted with full allotment and fixed-rate tender procedures. Second, the ECB 
established its first monetary policy outright portfolio, under the covered bonds 
purchase programme.8 The main objectives of the two measures were to further 
promote the decline in money market term rates; to encourage banks to maintain 
and expand their lending to households and corporations, in particular to small 
and medium-sized enterprises; and to help improve market liquidity, namely in 
the covered bond market (see Charts 3 and 7).9
In retrospect, the main challenges faced by the ECB in implementing its monetary 
policy during this period seem to have been the following.
The  aggregate  liquidity  situation  in  the  banking  system  became  largely  (i) 
driven  by  counterparties’  bidding  behaviour.  This  led  to  a  situation  of 
large and persistent recourse to the deposit facility (i.e. “excess reserves”).   
As  a  result,  EONIA  became  more  volatile,  which  seems  to  have  been 
linked to the size of the time-varying liquidity surplus. In fact, EONIA 
became increasingly volatile when recourse to the deposit facility (“excess 
reserves”) dropped below €50 billion (i.e. the liquidity demand schedule 
became more inelastic in this range). Nevertheless, after the settlement of 
the first one-year refinancing operation, a large “structural” (i.e. longer-
term) liquidity surplus emerged and, as a result, EONIA stabilised at the 
bottom of the interest rate corridor, albeit at the cost of reduced activity   
in the overnight unsecured interbank market.
8  See Beirne, Darlitz, Ejsing, Grothe, Manganelli, Monar, Sahel, Tapking and Vong (2010) 
for a detailed description of the programme and its impact.
9  See also Charts 5 and 6 which are discussed in greater detail in Section 4.285 IMPLEMENTING MONETARY POLICY IN CRISIS TIMES: THE CASE OF THE ECB
The  collateral  framework  became  increasingly  complex,  with  higher  (ii) 
counterparty  risks  for  the  ECB,  notwithstanding  refinements  in  the  risk 
control framework.
Faced with a market meltdown, the ECB had to step in to replace private  (iii) 
financial intermediation. The question is when and at what pace to cease 
such a role. If done too early or too quickly, it may reignite the crisis; if it 
is too prolonged or is discontinued too slowly, it may have a persistent, 
detrimental impact on market functioning and efficiency.
The broad collateral framework and the full allotments interacted and, over  (iv) 
time, tended to generate counterparties’ “dependency” on refinancing from 
the ECB indeed, a significant proportion of the collateral posted with the 
ECB became rather illiquid (e.g. asset-backed securities).
Choosing the exact composition of the bonds to be purchased under the  (v) 
programme  raised  issues  of  a  more  general  nature  related  to  forming  a 
monetary policy outright portfolio in the particular context of the euro area. 
In fact, a monetary policy outright portfolio should be composed of assets 
with  low  risk  and  high  liquidity,  encompassing  all  euro  area  countries   
(e.g.  weighted  by  the  respective  national  central  bank’s  capital  share  in 
the ECB). This proved to be difficult given incomplete financial market 
integration in the euro area, non-homogeneous domestic capital markets 
partially owing to fragmented legislation and standards, and renewed signs 
of market fragmentation across borders. 
As Chart 1 shows, this period was characterised by a marked increase in the 
total  amount  of  outstanding  refinancing  from  the  ECB,  which  stood  above 
the aggregate liquidity deficit of the banking system (autonomous factors plus 
minimum  reserve  requirement)  with  a  compensating  large  and  persistent  net 
recourse to the deposit facility. Interestingly, in spite of full allotment, fixed-rate 
tenders, banks significantly stepped up the frontloading of the fulfilment of their 
minimum reserve requirements. The share of the total amount of outstanding 
refinancing attributed to one-year longer-term refinancing operations increased 
markedly. In fact, the outstanding volume of one-year operations alone stood 
above the aggregate liquidity deficit of the banking system.
2.3  PHASING-OUT AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
The period after October 2009 was, and still is, marked by evidence that the 
economic recovery in the euro area is likely to be gradual, but nevertheless 
sustained.  Therefore,  the  Governing  Council  of  the  ECB  decided  that  the 
“phasing-out” of the non-standard measures should be gradual, which has been 
facilitated, to a large extent, by the very nature of the measures undertaken. 
For example, by not renewing the one-year longer-term refinancing operations 
and  other  supplementary  refinancing  operations  with  three  and  six-month 
maturities, the aggregate liquidity surplus of the banking system was likely to be 
significantly reduced or even eliminated in steps. (This is indeed what happened 
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securities  were  tightened  (in  December  2009)  and  the  other  measures  taken 
(enlargement of the list of assets and reduction of the rating threshold) were 
expected to expire at the end of 2010. In addition, the supply of USD and FOREX 
swaps was discontinued and variable rate tender procedures were reintroduced 
for regular three-month refinancing operations.
In  retrospect,  no  major  challenges  were  faced  in  connection  with  the 
implementation of monetary policy during this period as corporate and covered 
bank bond spreads remained contained and term funding markets continued to 
improve (see Chart 2, panel C, and Charts 3 and 7). Nevertheless, a remaining 
issue  was,  and  continues  to  be,  the  reliance  of  some  counterparties  on  the 
Eurosystem for refinancing illiquid and non-marketable assets (e.g. asset-backed 
securities). The presence of such counterparties – if part of large banking groups, 
or small banks in large numbers – could complicate, somewhat, the return to 
variable rate tenders. In fact, if this procedure were applied to all refinancing 
operations with a sudden reduction in the allotment volumes by the ECB, it could 
lead to a sharp increase in tender rates, both in short and longer-term refinancing 
operations,  and  could  eventually  also  lead  to  higher  than  warranted  money 
market rates – from the point of view of maintaining price stability – thereby 
generating uncertainty about the monetary policy stance of the ECB.
In late 2009/early 2010, spreads of Greek government bonds relative to German 
bonds widened sharply (see Chart 8). Even though these developments could be 
interpreted as a result of the market’s increasing concerns about the sustainability 
of public finances in Greece, clear signs of contagion to other euro area bond 
markets emerged towards the spring of 2010, affecting Ireland and Portugal and, 
to some extent, also Spain.
Liquidity in those segments of the euro secondary debt market dried up. These 
developments triggered a market dynamic that threatened to degenerate into a 
vicious liquidity spiral. In fact, a sequence of sovereign debt rating downgrades 
was accompanied almost in tandem by downgrades of (most) marketable securities 
issued by financial institutions headquartered in those countries affected by the 
sovereign debt crisis, and also led to further downgrades across a broad range of 
assets in the private securities markets. This implied – in some cases from a pure 
risk management perspective – a reduction in investors’ and banks’ exposure to 
a whole range of assets issued by domestic residents in those affected countries, 
triggering distressed sales that led to “one-way” selling markets with a further 
impact on the prices of those assets. The rating revisions and price declines, in 
turn, implied frequent margin calls and downward revaluation of the assets of the 
banking system, leading to sudden and sharp reductions in the value of banks’ 
collateral in the euro area. Eventually, private repurchase markets were affected, 
with some government paper no longer being accepted as collateral when posted 
by banks headquartered in an affected country (meaning that markets attached 
a high positive correlation between sovereign and banks’ default risk). Money 
market spreads widened again, while volumes in the overnight segment declined 
(see Chart 2), bid/ask spreads widened (see Chart 9) and setbacks occurred in 
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At this stage, systemic financial stability in the whole euro area became a matter 
of serious concern and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy became 
seriously impaired.
In response to those events, on 10 May 2010 euro area governments announced a 
comprehensive package of measures, including the European Financial Stability 
Facility.  On  the  same  day  the  ECB  announced  the  launch  of  the  Securities 
Markets Programme. Under this programme, the ECB can intervene in the euro 
area (private and public) debt securities markets to ensure depth and liquidity 
in dysfunctional market segments and to restore the proper functioning of the 
monetary policy  transmission mechanism. In  addition, the  ECB  reintroduced 
some of the non-standard measures that had been withdrawn earlier. In particular, 
the ECB reintroduced the fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment in the 
regular three-month refinancing operations for the period as from the end of May, 
and announced a new six-month refinancing operation with full allotment, which 
took place in May 2010. Moreover, the temporary liquidity swap lines with the 
US Federal Reserve were also resumed.
As  this  phase  is  still  ongoing,  it  is  too  early  to  draw  any  lessons  from  the 
experience. Nevertheless, confidence seems to have been restored, notably in the 
functioning of the money market, as both the liquidity premia and the volatility 
of interest rates have declined (see Charts 10 and 11).
3  LIQUIDITY RISK, CREDIT RISK AND CENTRAL BANK 
INTERVENTIONS: A THEORETICAL MODEL
In this section, a simple theoretical model is derived. The purpose of the model is 
to capture some of the main trade-offs that central banks faced during the financial 
turmoil.  The  model  focuses  on  the  interaction  between  central  bank  policies 
and the money market, and thus does not cover the full range of aspects related 
to central bank decision-making. After the model is presented, possible central 
bank interventions are discussed. Finally, elements of the different phases of the 
financial crisis, as described in Section 2 above, are mapped into the model.
3.1  MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
As the events in 2007 and 2008 showed that both liquidity and credit risk were 
important elements for the functioning of money markets, both types of risk play 
a role in the model. Moreover, we aim to capture some intertemporal aspects of 
central bank decision-making. Time runs from t = 0 until t = 3, i.e. encompasses 
three periods. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that there is 
no private information about credit risk.
3.1.1 BANKS
There is an infinite number of risk-neutral banks. At time 0, these banks collect funds 
of size 1 from claim-holders, such as depositors, with a fixed-term savings contract. 
These funds are promised to be repaid at time 3. For simplicity, we normalise the 
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Credit risk. Banks invest the funds obtained at time zero in a risky project that 
pays off a risky return at time 3, and in a safe, liquid asset, namely central bank 
money. It is assumed that the central bank requires all banks to invest λ in central 
bank funds at this point in time. Then, the amount of investment in the risky 
asset is 1−λ. We assume that the risky project succeeds and yields a return R > 1 
with probability 1−q, but fails with probability q, in which case it yields zero. 
The parameter q characterises credit risk. Information about the potential failure 
of a project is revealed over time in the following way: with probability q1, 
the risky project fails in between t = 1 and t = 2, and with probability q2, the 
project fails between t = 2 and t = 3. Thus, the projects succeeds if and only 
if it has not failed in either period, i.e. 1–  q ≡ (1–  q1)(1– q2) or q ≡ q1+(1– q1)q2. 
We assume that information about whether a project has failed or not before 
time 2 is known at time 2. At this point in time, a bank that is known to default 
is not able to repay any existing payment obligation.
Liquidity needs. For an interbank market to emerge in the interim periods t = 1 
and t = 2, we assume that banks are hit by exogenously given liquidity demands, 
in a very stylised way. At time 1, half of all banks need liquid assets of 2λ, while 
the other half needs 0. This is a temporary demand which only lasts for one 
period, i.e. until time 2. This demand can emerge because of exogenously given 
payment obligations that are not modelled in further detail. Thus, an interbank 
market can emerge in which those with liquidity needs (we call them “type B” 
banks) borrow λ from those with excess liquidity (“type A” banks). These funds 
are repaid at time 2.
At time 2, the situation is reversed: type A banks now have additional liquidity 
needs of λ. We assume that a liquidity shock can occur in the economy as 
follows. With probability 1−p, there is no liquidity shock, and type B banks have 
zero liquidity needs (normal liquidity situation). With probability p, however, 
there is a liquidity shock which implies that type B banks again face liquidity 
needs of λ. The table below summarises the liquidity outflows faced by banks in 
the two interim periods.10 
Notice that the liquidity shock is an aggregate shock – the total demand for 
liquidity of the banking system increases.
10  Another model where repeated (and alternating) transactions between agents can lead to 
contagion of illiquidity from future periods to earlier periods has recently been proposed by 
Moore (2010).
Table Banks’ liquidity outflows
t =1 t =2
Type A 0 λ
Type B 2λ prob  1– p : 0
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We assume for now that credit risk and liquidity risk are independent. This is of 
course a stark simplification – one would expect both to be highly correlated, 
especially in crisis times – but is without loss of generality, and allows us to 
distinguish better the implications of both types of risk. 
The law of large numbers then implies that a fraction q of all type A banks will 
fail, as well as a fraction q of all type B banks.
3.1.2 THE CENTRAL BANK
In the model, the central bank interacts with banks by offering two standing facilities. 
The first is a deposit facility which allows banks to deposit unlimited amounts of 
liquid assets at the central bank at interest rate 1+r D
t , where t is a time index.   
The second is a lending facility, which allows banks to borrow unlimited amounts 
of central bank liquidity at interest rate 1+r L
t . Borrowing from or depositing at the 
central bank always lasts for one period. Contrary to most other theoretical models, 
the level of standing facility interest rates is the main choice variable for the central 
bank in this model – not the quantities injected. We believe that this is the best 
way to characterise central bank interventions. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2, 
the main choice variable of the ECB during the height of the financial crisis was not 
the quantity of liquidity injected, but rather the interest rate at which it intervened. 
This is the case for all open market operations that are conducted as a fixed-rate, full 
allotment tender after October 2008.11 
In  reality,  central  banks  often  conduct  open  market  operations  at  yet  a 
different  interest  rate,  usually  in  between  the  two  standing  facility  rates.   
For model tractability, we abstract from this possibility in the main part of the 
model and assume that the 1+r L is the interest rate for any lending from the 
central bank (i.e. including open market operations). 
The central bank in this model may concern itself with two factors: first, it may 
want to ensure that interest rates in any given period do not deviate too far from 
its target rate. Second, it may aim to have an active interbank market in which 
liquidity is distributed among banks with as little central bank intervention as 
possible.12 The actions taken by the central bank will depend on the weight 
attributed to each of these objectives.
11  Also the very first one-day fine-tuning operations on 9 August 2007 and on the subsequent 
days, or the longer-term operations with a maturity of one year.
12  This objective can be justified on the grounds of some well-established economic principles, 
such as the efficient formation of prices in a competitive environment as well as the benefits 
of peer monitoring by market participants. As an example of the latter, the tensions in 
financial markets, which materialised openly for the first time in August 2007 in money 
markets, might have been noticed much later if this market had been completely under the 
control of central banks. 
  Reflecting these concerns, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
specifies that “the ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy  with  free  competition,  favouring  an  efficient  allocation  of  resources,  [...]”. 
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3.1.3 THE INTERBANK MARKET
The above set-up can give rise to the emergence of an interbank market, both 
at time 1 and at time 2. At time 1, type A banks can lend an amount λ to 
type B banks for one period, while at time 2, type B banks can lend an amount 
λ to type A banks, again for one period. The market interest rates are 1+r1 and 
1+r2, respectively.
Notice that lending in the interbank market is risky: a fraction qt of the borrowing 
banks will go bankrupt before t = 2 and will not be able to repay the loan.
To simplify the analysis, we make a few assumptions:
A1 No diversification in the interbank market.   –  At any one time, banks can 
lend to or borrow from no more than one bank.
A2 Indifference.   –  Whenever banks are indifferent about whether they borrow 
(lend) in the interbank market or from (to) the central bank – i.e. because 
market interest rates are equal to one of the two standing facility rates – banks 
choose to borrow (lend) in the market.
A3 Transaction amounts.   –  Banks can only borrow or lend multiples of λ 
from/to each other or the central bank. 
These assumptions are made for ease of exposition, but are without loss of 
generality.13 
The main results derived from the analysis of the interbank market at time 1 are 
presented below. This is the more general case, in which the agents (banks as well 
as the central bank) take decisions in anticipation of future events. Nevertheless, 
we solve the model by backward induction and start with lending and borrowing 
decisions at time 2.
3.2  THE INTERBANK MARKET AT TIME 2
In this section, we determine under which conditions an interbank market may 
emerge at time 2. Expected liquidity outflows faced by banks are summarised in 
the table. A first condition for an interbank market to emerge is that there is both 
liquidity supply and demand. This, however, depends on the events in time 1: 
if type A banks have deposited their excess funds (λ) at time 1 with the central 
bank, they have these funds available at time 2 and can use them to cover the 
expected outflows λ at time 2. If, however, they have lent in the interbank market, 
a fraction q1 of these banks will be in a situation in which the borrowing bank has 
not repaid them. Depending on interest rates, there may be incentives for these 
banks to borrow in the interbank market at time 2 (if they have not gone bankrupt 
themselves because their own risky project failed).
13  For instance, A3 implies that interest payments made or received at time 2 do not affect the 
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At the same time, type B banks (those that did not go bankrupt in the meantime) 
can face positive or zero liquidity outflows (see table): in the normal state of the 
world, they have zero outflows, and can lend their funds λ in the interbank market. 
If, however, a liquidity shock has occurred, type B banks need their liquidity to 
cover their own outflows λ and they cannot lend in the interbank market.
Thus, in our setting, an interbank market can only be active at t = 2 in the 
following circumstances:
Market continuity •  . There was an interbank market at time 1 (otherwise, all 
type A banks would have sufficient funds at time 2).
Market stability •  . There is no liquidity shock (otherwise none of the banks 
would have excess liquidity to lend out). 
We now characterise interest rates in the interbank market. We assume that times 
are normal, i.e. type B banks face no liquidity outflows. 
Type B banks have the following choice: if they store their excess funds λ in the 
central bank’s deposit facility, they will definitely obtain an interest rate of 1+r  D
2 . 
If they lend this amount in the interbank market, they obtain 1+ r2 with probability 
1– q2, since q2 denotes the probability by which the borrowing bank (type A) may 
go bankrupt and not be able to repay the loan. In both cases, the excess funds will 
have to be paid back by the borrower at time 3. Thus, the type B bank will lend 
his excess funds only if (1 – q2)(1+ r2)≥1+ r  D




(1 + r2  ) 1 + r2 ≥
D
In this equation, the term 1/(1– q2) reflects the credit risk premium: the higher 
the probability that a lending bank will not receive the funds back because of 
a possible bankruptcy, the higher the interest rate it will charge. Notice that 
the rate on the deposit facility provides a lower bound for market interest rates 
(for the case that q2 = 0). 
Let us now turn to the decision of type A banks who are in need of liquidity. 
These have the choice to either borrow λ in the interbank market at rate r2 or to 
borrow from the central bank at rate r  L
  2. It follows that type A banks participate 
in the interbank market as borrowers at time 2 if and only if
(2) 1+r2≤1+r  L
  2
 .
The central bank’s lending rate thus provides an upper bound for market interest 
rates (see Chart 12). Moreover, conditions (1) and (2) together imply the 
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Lemma 1 A necessary condition for an active interbank market to exist at time 2 
is that 
(3)
The  lemma  establishes  a  relationship  between  the  rates  on  the  two  standing 
facilities. Essentially, it says that, depending on the extent of credit risk, the 
interest rate corridor needs to be of a certain minimal width for an interbank 
market to be possible. Suppose, for instance, that there was no credit risk in the 
economy, i.e. q2 = 0. In this case, equation (1) collapses into 1+r2 ≥ 1+r  D
 2  and 
equation (3) into 1+r  D
 2   ≤ 1+r  L
 2 . Without credit risk, the standing facility rates rD 
and r  L could even be equal and this would still not hinder an interbank market 
from emerging in the model (recall assumption 2 above). With increasing credit 
risk (q2↑), however, the corridor between the two standing facility rates would 
need to become larger for an interbank market to emerge. This is because credit 
risk drives a wedge between the deposit rate and the lowest acceptable market 
interest rate from the point of view of lenders.
The liquidity that is in the market at time 2 will determine the equilibrium interest 
rate within this corridor. When there is excess liquidity, banks know that all those 
funds that are not traded in the market can be placed in the deposit facility at   
rate r  D
2 . Given that there is an infinite number of small banks, competition will 
drive down the interbank market rate so that equation (1) holds with equality.14 
By contrast, when there is a liquidity shortage in the banking sector, interest rates 
will be driven up to the level of the central bank’s lending rate.




1 lenders in the market at time 2 (i.e. out of the 50% of banks that 
are of type B, a fraction 1– q1 has not gone bankrupt), while there are  1 − q
2
1 q1 
borrowers (out of the 50% of type A banks, 1– q1 has not gone bankrupt, and of 
those, q1 have not been repaid in the time 1 interbank market). In this case, there 
is excess liquidity in the market at time 2 and interest rates will indeed be driven 
down to 1+ r2
 =  1
1 – q (1+ r D)
2
2 .15 This analysis raises the following conclusions.
The width of the interest rate corridor formed by the two standing facility  (i) 
rates,  r2
D r2
L– , is crucial for the question of whether an interbank market can 
emerge.
The higher the credit risk ( (ii)  q2), the wider the corridor of standing facility 
interest rates needs to be for an interbank market to emerge. 
14  As in standard models with interest rate corridors, any banks that are left with a liquidity 
surplus or a shortage at the end of the trading day have to resort to one of the standing 
facilities to cover their shortfall or deposit their excess funds. The probability of an aggregate 
recourse to either facility ties the interbank market rate to the rates on these facilities.
15  Notice that the structural surplus that is in the market under normal liqudity conditions is 
an assumption – it is not related to a liquidity surplus that results from additional liquidity 
injections by the central bank.
1+ r2
L ≥  1 – q2
1+
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3.3  THE INTERBANK MARKET AT TIME 1
An interbank market can also emerge at time 1, but with reversed roles: some 
of the type A banks now have excess liquidity of λ, while type B banks have a 
liquidity shortage of the same amount. Contrary to t = 2, there is no liquidity risk 
in this period, as the aggregate amount of liquidity is known with certainty. 
We  again  derive  conditions  under  which  an  interbank  market  can  emerge. 
Consider first type A banks, which have excess liquidity at time 1. Chart 13 
displays their decision tree.16 
Again, potential lenders in the market at time 1 have the choice between lending 
in the market at market interest rate 1+r1 or depositing their excess liquidity at 
the central bank at rate  1 + r 1
D. Lending in the interbank market entails credit 
risk, namely the possibility of the borrower’s bankruptcy. The situation is more 
complex than at time 2, however. This is because type A banks know that if they 
are not repaid in the time 1 interbank market, they will have to borrow at time 2 – 
either in the interbank market or from the central bank. This needs to be taken 
into account when deciding on their optimal interbank market participation at 
time 1. Taking into account all possible events (see Chart 13), we find that type 





q1 (1+r 1 ) (1– p) (1+ E (r2 )) D + .
1+E
1– q2
(r2 ) L + p
D
1+ r1
The first term on the right-hand side is the time 1 equivalent of the right-hand 
side of equation (1): lenders participate in the interbank market only if they 
are  compensated  for  credit  risk.  The  second  term  stems  from  the  expected 
cost of borrowing at time 2, should the borrower not repay his/her loan. With 
probability 1−p, there is no liquidity shock, and the bank faces a low cost of 
borrowing, given by the right-hand side of equation (1). With probability p, there 
is a liquidity shock, there will be no interbank lending and the bank will have to 
resort to the lending facility of the central bank at time 2, at the expected interest 
rate 1 + E (r  ) L
2 . Here, the liquidity risk premium denotes the premium that lenders 
will demand at time 1 because of the risk of a liquidity shock, i.e. 
1 – q1




D 1+E (r2 )
.
The higher the risk premium, the higher the minimum interest rate that lenders 
in the t = 1 market are willing to accept. Notice that the liquidity risk premium 
depends on banks’ expectations about future central bank interest rates. 
Consider  now  type  B  banks,  which  are  potential  borrowers  in  the  interbank 
market at time 1. For these banks, the borrowing decision at time 1 does not 
depend on the foreseen events at time 2 and their decision problem is equivalent 
to the one at time 2: type B banks borrow in the interbank market at time 1 only if   
16  Recall that interest payments are only credited to the receiving bank at t = 3.294 CASSOLA, DURRÉ, HOLTHAUSEN
the  interbank  market  interest  rate  does  not  exceed  the  lending  rate  by  the 
central bank, thus only if 1 + r1 ≤ 1 + r L
1. Taken together, these results imply the 
following.
Lemma 2 A necessary condition for the interbank market at time 1 to emerge 
is that 











A first result of lemma 2 is that, as in time 2, the interest rates on the central 
bank’s standing facilities provide upper and lower bounds for the market interest 
rates (see Chart 14). The condition differs from the one in lemma 1, however, 
because now there is the second term on the left-hand side, which represents 
future expected borrowing costs that the lender will have to bear if the interbank 
loan is not repaid. This links financial conditions at time 1 to those at time 2. To 
summarise, the analysis in this section has shown the following.
The conditions for the existence of an interbank market become stricter if  (i) 
market participants are concerned about liquidity in future periods.
There is an interaction between credit and liquidity risk: in the absence of  (ii) 
credit risk (q1 = 0), time 2 liquidity risk would not play a role for the level 
of activity in the interbank market at time 1.
For a given pair of standing facility rates, if either time 1 credit risk or  (iii) 
liquidity risk increase, conditions for the existence of an interbank market 
may no longer be met. 
Equilibrium interest rates at time 1 will again depend on aggregate liquidity 
conditions. Recall that the supply of liquidity by type A banks at time 1 is λ 
and equals the demand for liquidity by type B banks. With this equality, the 
probability that one bank will have to resort to one of the standing facilities to 
either deposit or lend excess funds is equal. In this case, the risk-free market 






Finally, let us consider a scenario in which credit and liquidity risk are perfectly 
correlated. In this case, the middle branch of the event tree in Chart 13 would 
disappear and equation (4) would reduce to.
1 + r1≡ 1 – q1
1
1 – q1
q1 (1 + r 1   )  +
D 1 + E (r2)
L
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This implies that, for the same level of credit and liquidity risk, conditions for 
the emergence of an interbank market can only become stricter (as the left-hand 
side of this equation is at least as large as the left-hand side in the equation in 
lemma 2). Therefore, correlation of credit and liquidity risk would exacerbate the 
problem of a possible market breakdown.
3.4  CENTRAL BANK DECISION-TAKING
The design of central bank operational frameworks is usually geared towards 
the efficient and smooth transmission of monetary policy signals to the financial 
sector. In normal times, the objective is usually to steer interest rates without 
dominating trading in the money market. In the case of the ECB, interest rates 
and the provision of liquidity were chosen with the aim of steering short-term 
money market rates close to the midpoint of its standing facilities rates (which 
was the minimum bid rate of the main refinancing operation). In crisis times, 
when tensions introduce distortions in the money market that might hamper the 
transmission  of  monetary  policy,  the  central  bank’s  objectives  become  more 
complex. This section does not aim to derive the optimal policy for a central 
bank, but instead intends to illustrate some of the main trade-offs that many 
central banks faced during the financial turmoil. We focus on the central bank’s 
choice at time 1 because it is the more general case where the dynamic nature of 
decision-making comes into play. 
Consider first, as a benchmark, a situation in which all agents expect tranquil 
financial conditions. We take this to be a situation in which credit risk is rather 
low (q low) and liquidity risk p is zero. With a corridor that is not too narrow, 
there will be some interbank market lending at t = 2. The credit risk component 
of interest rates at time 2 will be very small, so that time 2 market rates will be 
very close to the deposit facility rate. For p = 0 there is no liquidity risk premium 
for time 1 interest rates. Owing to balanced liquidity conditions, time 1 interest 
rates will be close to the midpoint of standing facility rates (plus a negligible 
credit  risk  premium).  That  is,  the  central  bank  can  choose  standing  facility 
rates symmetrically around the target interest rate. The corridor can be wider 
or narrower, depending on how far the central bank is willing to allow rates to 
deviate from the target rate. 
Consider now a sudden increase in credit risk (ceteris paribus). This will imply 
an upward shift of market rates both at time 1 and at time 2, since the credit risk 
component would increase. The central bank in this model has no tools available 
that could induce a reduction in credit risk.17 Instead, the central bank could 
adjust the rates on its standing facilities: if it was primarily concerned about 
trading activity in the interbank market, it could widen the corridor formed by 
standing facility rates by increasing the level of the lending rate and reducing the 
one on the deposit rate. If it was also concerned with the level of rates, it could 
choose to change the corridor in an asymmetric way primarily by lowering the 
deposit rate. 
17  Also, in reality, a high level of credit risk in a financial crisis could be addressed by other 
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Next, consider a sudden increase in liquidity risk when there is a non-negligible 
credit risk.
Time 2. If a liquidity shock has materialised at time 2, the interbank market, by 
assumption, breaks down at time 2. All banks in need of liquidity will have to 
resort to the central bank’s lending facility. This significantly increases the cost 
of liquidity for banks. In order to stabilise rates closer to their original level, the 
central bank could lower the rate on the lending facility rL
2. 
Time 1. Suppose that liquidity risk has increased (p↑) so that the time 1 interest 
rate increases significantly. The central bank could affect market conditions by 
changing standing facility rates both at time 1 and at time 2 as follows.
First, it could change time 1 standing facility rates. As in the analysis of  (i) 
time 2, the central bank could widen the corridor (by a reduction of the 
deposit rate rD
1 or an increase in the lending rate rL
1) to ensure continued 
interbank trading. To stabilise the level of interest rates, it should primarily 
lower the level of the deposit facility rate.
Second, it could commit to lowering the lending rate for the next period  (ii) 
(time  2),  as  a  tool  to  mitigate  the  expected  cost  of  a  liquidity  crisis.   
A reduction of future lending facility rates would reduce the liquidity risk 
premium in today’s interbank market. However, the central bank needs to 
be aware that this will influence future market conditions and make the 
emergence of an interbank market in the future less likely. 
Notice that liquidity “injections” play no role whatsoever in this model. Banks’ 
liquidity demand is purely a result of the central bank’s access conditions for 
standing facilities. This scenario is, in our view, closer to capturing the “real” 
institutional environment in which the money market functions and the central 
bank interacts with the banking system.18 
These  considerations  illustrate  several  key  trade-offs  faced  by  central  banks 
during the financial turmoil. First, a central bank faces a trade-off when deciding 
on the level of intermediation it deems necessary: the more favourable it chooses 
banks’ conditions for access to central bank refinancing (and depositing), the 
higher the level of central bank intermediation will be. In this way, on the one 
hand, it ensures that all banks have access to the necessary liquidity, but on the 
other hand, this strategy can reduce market activity.
Second, it faces a trade-off along an intertemporal dimension. If the central bank 
chooses to promise a narrower corridor in the near future (at time 2) with the 
aim of allowing for more interbank trading at time 1, it can, at the same time, 
negatively affect the extent of interbank trading at time 2. This feature can be 
problematic especially in a situation in which economic conditions are expected 
18  Indeed, the financial press often referred to the ECB’s “liquidity injections” implying that 
it had deliberatly chosen these particular amounts. Instead, they were the outcome of the 
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to improve: in this case, a forward-looking central bank policy should aim to 
reduce future support measures, i.e. by committing to a widening of the corridor. 
However, if it does so, it might cut banks off from refinancing today. 
Such decisions are further complicated in real life because of a series of other 
factors. To name a few, financial crises are typically characterised by a high 
level of uncertainty about future market conditions; market participants’ credit 
risk differs across banks and tends to contain private information; and central 
banks may not be able to change their interest rates frequently owing to concerns 
regarding the predictability and credibility of their policies. Extensions of the 
model along those dimensions could further improve its ability to capture the 
main dilemmas faced by central banks in the crisis.
3.5  THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
Section 2 described the various phases of the 2007-10 financial turmoil from the 
ECB’s perspective. In this section, we attempt to map the measures taken during 
these phases (at least those parts related to money markets) into the theoretical 
model. 
Phase 1: Frontloading. During the initial phase of the turmoil, higher credit   
and/or liquidity risk implied higher spreads between short-term interest rates 
in  the  euro  area  and  the  midpoint  of  the  corridor  of  standing  facility  rates.   
There was no need to adjust interest rates on standing facilities as the money 
market  continued  to  function.  Instead,  the  higher  spreads  between  overnight 
rates  and  the  midpoint  of  the  corridor  were  addressed  by  the  ECB  through 
frontloading,  in  order  to  steer  rates  towards  the  middle  of  the  corridor.   
The details of this adjustment process (volume of liquidity supplied, frequency 
of interventions) posed the main challenge to the ECB during this phase. In the 
model, this corresponds to a situation with a moderate increase in credit and 
liquidity risk, which did not imply the collapse of the interbank market. 
Phase  2:  Fixed-rate,  full  allotment  tenders.  During  the  second  phase  of 
the crisis, trading in the interbank market all but collapsed. With the aim of 
ensuring that the banking sector continued to have access to liquidity, the ECB 
introduced tenders at a fixed rate and with full allotment. In terms of the model, 
the full allotment at the fixed rate of the refinancing operations (which was the 
midpoint of the corridor of standing facility rates) was the de facto equivalent of 
halving the corridor (in all periods): now the price of unlimited lending from the 
central bank was reduced from the standing facility rate to the rate applied to all 
refinancing operations. As would be predicted by the model, the interbank market 
interest rates somewhat declined and activity in the interbank market was low.   
Thus, the ECB took on a more prominent role as an intermediary in the money 
market. The alternative to this type of intervention would, however, have been to 
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Phase  2:  One-year  refinancing  operations.  Later  on  in  the  second  phase, 
market conditions were still not yet expected to improve. Low trading activity in 
interbank markets might have been related to the uncertainty about future market 
conditions, as highlighted in the model. In this environment, the introduction of 
open market operations with a one-year maturity increased certainty for banks as 
regards their liquidity situation and gave a strong signal that short-term money 
market rates should stay at low levels for a long period of time. In fact, the 
liquidity surplus in this period caused market rates to move towards the lower 
bound given by the corridor of standing facility rates. However, at the same 
time, it negatively affected money market activity throughout the maturity of the 
longer-term operations. 
Phase 3: Phasing-out. The intertemporal nature of the model highlights that 
the question regarding the appropriate time to exit is not a trivial one. On the 
one hand, once conditions in the market improve, the central bank would like to 
immediately scale down the measures that were taken to alleviate the tensions. 
On the other hand, it might have made promises during earlier periods of the 
crisis on its support measures in later periods, which it should keep if it does 
not want to lose credibility. As a result, support measures might be in place 
longer  than  optimal  ex  post,  so  that  they  imply  a  long-run  cost  of  implicit   
pre-committing to certain policies.
4  THE MARKET IMPACT OF THE MONETARY POLICY MEASURES
As mentioned in the previous section, the central bank can influence liquidity 
demand by banks via the level at which it sets the key policy rates and the width 
of the interest rate corridor. Such an influence materialised in the case of the 
ECB as the introduction of the fixed-rate, full allotment procedure has de facto 
endogeneised central bank liquidity provision. The main goal of this section is 
thus to assess briefly the impact of the monetary policy measures taken during 
the first two phases of the crisis and to present an econometric analysis of the 
interaction between the ECB measures and money market dynamics.
4.1  ASSESSMENT
4.1.1 MARKET TURMOIL PHASE
The  monetary  policy  measures  taken  during  the  market  turmoil  phase  were 
effective in the sense that EONIA was kept close to the key policy rate (minimum 
bid rate) and trading volumes increased (see Chart 2, panels A and B), without 
a  significant  increase  in  the  number  of  fine-tuning  operations  (see  Chart  1). 
However, longer-term money market rates and overnight interest swap spreads 
remained elevated, were increasing and were somewhat volatile (see Chart 2, 
panel C), while unsecured term funding markets remained seriously impaired.
4.1.2 FINANCIAL AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS PHASES
The  enhanced  credit  support  policies  were  successful  in  reducing  the  levels 
of market interest rates, including longer-term interest rates (see Chart 4), in 
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in  bringing  down  the  costs  of  refinancing  for  households  and  firms  as  well 
as  in  supporting  the  liquidity  flow  to  the  banking  system  and  individual 
institutions.  However,  the  EONIA  transaction  volume  declined  significantly 
(see Chart 2, panel A). Interestingly, activity in the overnight repo market was 
less significantly affected (see Chart 2, panel B). Thus, the decline in activity in 
the unsecured overnight interbank market may have been due, at least partially, 
to its substitution by increasing activity in the secured segment. The policies 
pursued were successful in narrowing corporate and covered bank bond spreads 
(see Charts 3 and 7). Eventually, funding costs in the term markets improved 
significantly  and  forward  term  EURIBOR  volatility  declined  (see  Chart  2, 
panel C and Chart 11).
During this period, money market rates were declining rapidly and were generally 
below the fixed rate in the main refinancing operation, thereby implying that 
further  provision  of  liquidity  via  shorter-term  refinancing  operations  was 
relatively costly when compared with prevailing market conditions (see Chart 4). 
The fact that these operations were still persistently bid with volumes at around 
€100 billion suggests that some banks (or banking groups) remained distressed 
throughout  this  phase.  In  this  respect,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  three-month 
EONIA swap rate index has remained below 1% (the level of the fixed-rate 
tenders) since 12 February 2009 with an average of 50 basis points (minimum of 
33 basis points and a maximum of 98 basis points); however, it remained below 
50 basis points between 7 July 2009 and 6 July 2010, i.e. roughly throughout the 
life of the first one-year longer-term refinancing operation.
Panel A of Chart 5 shows the average behaviour of EONIA during the last   
28 days of the reserve maintenance period in two different phases of the crisis. 
Panel B shows the corresponding average daily reserve surpluses of the banking 
system. It is worth noting that, before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the 
EONIA was steered very close to but above the minimum bid rate, except on the 
last day when it dropped owing to surplus liquidity not being totally absorbed by 
the fine-tuning operation on that day. After the settlement of the first one-year 
refinancing operation, EONIA was steered close to but above the deposit facility 
rate, except on the last day when it increased owing to some surplus liquidity 
being absorbed by the fine-tuning operation on that day. Panel B shows the sharp 
increase in the frontloading pattern after the switch to fixed-rate, full allotment 
tenders.
Chart 6 illustrates the non-linear daily “liquidity effect” in the euro overnight 
interbank market. The spread of EONIA over the deposit facility rate (at the 
bottom of the interest rate corridor) is plotted against the daily net recourse to the 
deposit facility on all days in the reserve maintenance period, except the last two. 
Chart 6 (panels A and B) refers to the full allotment period. Before the settlement 
of  the  first  one-year  refinancing  operation  (Chart  6,  panel  A),  the  demand 
schedule had two “kinks”: one kink giving rise to strong daily liquidity effects 
owing to rigidity in demand (i.e. interest rate elasticity = 0) at around €25 billion 
(or below €50 billion); the other giving rise to a segment of perfectly elastic 
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demand, roughly above €25 billion and below €100 billion. During the life of the 
first one-year refinancing operation, there were no visible daily liquidity effects, 
as demand was perfectly elastic (Chart 6, panel B).
4.2  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
To analyse the interaction between the ECB measures and the dynamics of money 
market interest rates, we estimate an unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
    Yt=A(L) Yt
 +B(L) Xt + ηt
where the vector of endogenous variables is as follows: ois3m is the spread 
between the euro interbank offered rate (EURIBOR) and the overnight interest 
swap (OIS) rate for a maturity of 3 months; prem_6m in 6m is a term liquidity 
premium; qs3mdepo is the quoted (bid/ask) spread for the three-month EURIBOR 
interest rate; orp is the accumulated volume of the ECB monetary policy outright 
portfolio; total_refi is the total outstanding volume of ECB refinancing operations; 
eonia_vol is the daily EONIA volume; and repo_vol is the daily volume in the 
overnight repo market. The vector of exogenous variables Xt contains an intercept 
and the changes in the minimum bid rate (policy rate).19 The number of lags in 
the VAR (2) was selected in accordance with two information criteria (HQIC 
and SBIC) following the discussion in Verbeek (2004).20 Generalised impulse 
response  functions,  originally  proposed  by  Pesaran  and  Shin  (1998),  were 
computed for one standard deviation shock over a period roughly equivalent to 
one reserve maintenance period  21 and are reported in Charts 15-17.
4.3  THE DATA
The main data sources are Reuters and the ECB. The sample covers the period 
from 1 January 2007 to 19 October 2010 with daily frequency (993 observations 
in  total).  However,  we  restrict  the  analysis  to  the  crisis  period,  i.e.  as  from   
9 August 2007.
The variables related to the ECB actions are displayed in Chart 1. The money 
market variables deserve a bit more explanation.
19  Alternative  specifications  of  the  exogenous  vector  with  various  dummies  that  capture 
special events have also been tested. These additional materials are available on request to 
the authors or at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/conferences/html/cbc6.en.html.
20  Other information criteria tend to suggest a VAR(5) or a VAR(6). However, the results 
appear independent of the lag structure chosen. Furthermore, standard misspecification tests 
suggest that both specifications are stable and that VAR residuals are not auto-correlated. 
ARCH effects of order 3 are present, however. For space reasons, the misspecification 
tests are available on the ECB website. Granger-Causality tests point out the importance 
of feedback effects between the variables in the vector Yt. All these tests can be found at   
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/conferences/html/cbc6.en.html.
21  The estimations were made using the software Eviews 6. For the variable relating to total 
refinancing, this amounts to around €25 billion and the response unit of spreads is defined 
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As  regards  the  variables  related  to  market  activity,  available  information  is 
limited given the over-the-counter (OTC) nature of the money market. Volume 
transactions are only available for the overnight (both secured and unsecured) 
segments. By contrast, we need a proxy for the term segments. The proxy for 
market activity in the term segment, qs3mdepo, is the quoted spread (i.e. the 
difference between the ask price and bid price) for the three-month deposit rate.22 
It is reported in Chart 9. In practice, this variable denotes the implicit transaction 
cost that a trader would pay when buying at the displayed ask price and directly 
selling at the quoted bid price. This variable is related to market activity in the 
sense that the more borrowers and lenders are able to trade in the market, the 
more competitive prices will be and the narrower the quoted spread should be.   
In this situation, the market will be more liquid in the microstructural sense. 
Given the OTC nature of transactions in these segments, this is the best available 
proxy for activity in the term segments of the money market.
The proxy for market tensions is defined as the spread between the EURIBOR 
and the OIS rate at a three-month horizon (hereafter referred to as “ois3m”).   
Chart 2 (Panel C) provides this value for other maturities as well. By construction, 
this spread includes both a liquidity risk component (uncertainty about access 
to  market  liquidity  in  the  future,  which  is  applicable  to  all  money  market 
segments) and a credit risk component (provided by the uncollateralised nature 
of EURIBOR transactions). It may also include a “confidence” factor. Although 
the EURIBOR and OIS curves are expected to move very closely by arbitrage 
in normal times (as used to be the case until August 2007), evidence from the   
2007-10 financial crisis suggests significant changes to the dynamics of both 
interest  rates,  probably  reflecting  fluctuations  in  the  credit  risk  premium   
(see Brousseau, Chailloux and Durré (2009)).23
As  regards  the  liquidity  premium,  it  is  generally  suggested  that  it  can  be 
estimated indirectly by removing the credit risk premium usually approximated 
by  the  credit  default  swap  (CDS)  premium  from  the  EURIBOR-OIS  spread   
(see, for example, McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008) or Taylor and Williams 
(2009)).  Although  CDS  premia  may  be  good  proxies  of  credit  risk,  they 
present a drawback in terms of maturity with respect to the money market.24 
For the purpose of this exercise, a liquidity risk premium is calculated for the   
six-month horizon  25; it is extracted from the below combination of spreads using 
a decomposition technique explained in Brousseau, Nikolaou and Pill (2010): 
   12  ∗   spread12m
   –   6   ∗   spread 6m
     – 6   ∗   spread6m 6m
22  We focus the analysis of the unsecured term segment on the three-month maturity given the 
important role played by the EURIBOR in futures contracts and pricing in retail banking.
23  Brousseau, Chailloux and Durré (2009) show, in particular, that the two interest rates do 
not Granger-cause each other anymore in the financial crisis phase, in contrast with the 
dynamics observed in the pre-crisis sample period.
24  It is indeed evidenced that the market for CDS premia with a maturity closer to the maturity 
of the money market (i.e. one-year maturity) is much less liquid than the CDS market at the 
five-year horizon.
25  A six-month horizon is chosen to limit overlapping information with the three-month spread 
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where  spread  i,j  denotes  the  spread  to  the  forward  OIS  of  the  forward  rate 
agreement for a j−month maturity in i−month, while spreadj denotes the spread 
to the OIS of the deposit for a j−month maturity. Chart 10 presents this liquidity 
premium measure for a variety of maturities.
4.4  RESULTS
The generalised impulse response functions of the money market variables to 
shocks to orp and total_refi suggest the following. First, shocks to total_refi 
lead to a decrease in the spread between the EURIBOR and the OIS three-
month  rates  and  in  the  liquidity  premium  (see  right-hand  side  of  Chart  15).   
These effects show some persistence even after 25 business days. Second, shocks 
to the monetary policy outright portfolio do not seem to have a significant impact 
on the spreads and the liquidity premium (see left-hand side of Chart 15). Third, 
shocks to orp and total_refi tend to increase the quoted spread (see Chart 16). 
Fourth, shocks to total_refi tend to decrease EONIA volumes but not repo market 
volumes (see right-hand side of Chart 17). Fifth, shocks to orp do not seem to 
have a significant impact on EONIA volumes, although they have a positive, 
very short-term impact on the repo market (see left-hand side of Chart 17).
Although some caution is needed before making any firm conclusions, these 
preliminary empirical findings may be interpreted as follows. On the one hand, the 
combined effect of the decrease in the key policy rates and the full accommodation 
of liquidity demand by banks contributed to the decline in the liquidity premium. 
These  measures  contributed  to  improving  market  participants’  confidence.   
At the same time, the apparent absence of any impact from the monetary policy 
outright portfolios on money market spreads and the term liquidity premium 
in the money market is not necessarily surprising since these measures were 
not directly targeting the money market per se, but rather the tensions in other 
market segments which were negatively affecting the liquidity position of banks.   
At the same time, this measure seems to have produced positive effects beyond 
those covered by the VAR specification. For instance, there is evidence that 
the covered bonds purchase programme has significantly helped to reactivate 
activity in both the primary and secondary market segments.26 Still, following 
the establishment of this portfolio, it is interesting to note that the trading volume 
in  the  overnight  (both  secured  and  unsecured)  market  has  increased,  while 
the spreads between the EURIBOR and the OIS interest rates have tended to 
decrease (see Chart 2). 
As regards the impact on market activity, the following observations can be made. 
First, a persistent negative impact on the trading volume in the EONIA market 
confirms the implications of our theoretical model, according to which increased 
intermediation by a central bank reduces market activity.27 A similar picture is 
26  See in particular Beirne, Darlitz, Ejsing, Grothe, Manganelli, Monar, Sahel, Tapking and 
Vong (2010).
27  Such an impact seems to have also materialised in the overnight segment of the electronic 
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obtained for the term segment. In short, these empirical findings broadly support 
the implications of our theoretical model discussed in Section 3.28
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The financial crisis of 2007-10 represented a difficult challenge for the ECB and a 
test of its operational framework. Several features of the operational framework –   
such as the large number of counterparties, the broad range of assets that were 
already accepted as collateral in ECB refinancing operations before the crisis, 
as  well  as  the  flexibility  to  quickly  adjust  operational  procedures  –  proved 
extremely valuable in addressing those challenges and significantly alleviated the 
ECB’s task of ensuring the transmission of its monetary policy.
This paper has highlighted the challenges that the ECB faced during different 
phases of the financial crisis, both from a practical and a theoretical perspective. 
The paper argues that, while too little intervention could imply high deviations 
of market interest rates from their target and a severe hampering of the monetary 
transmission mechanism, too much intervention could introduce too strong an 
intermediation role for the central bank, which would replace interbank trading 
activity to a large extent. One implication of the theoretical model is that, while 
credit risk and liquidity risk are clearly interlinked, monetary auhtorities mostly 
have an impact on the liquidity risk contained in money market spreads. This 
main finding seems to be supported by the empirical evidence, which shows that 
the ECB’s non-standard measures led to a reduction in money market spreads 
through a reduction of the liquidity premium.
In  the  light  of  the  aforementioned  considerations,  central  banks  may  need 
to  significantly  increase  the  extent  to  which  they  intermediate  in  financial 
markets, where necessary, to compress the liquidity risk component of spreads, 
even  if  this  may  lead  to  a  temporary  substitution  of  the  interbank  market.   
In  extreme  circumstances  like  those  observed  around  September  2008,   
this would not necessarily be problematic if the interbank market were on the 
verge of collapse. By contrast, the key questions are rather the duration and extent 
of the liquidity measures and the extent to which the central bank wishes and is 
able to affect the credit risk component of the market spreads. Although these 
questions are not tackled in this paper, they certainly deserve further research. As 
regards the trading dynamics in the interbank market observed before and during 
the 2007-10 financial crisis, the main risk could be that easy access to certain 
central bank funding may reduce the incentives of market participants to actively 
manage liquidity, as well as other potential problems such as moral hazard. To 
avoid  the  materialisation  of  these  risks  without  compromising  the  economic 
recovery, the key challenge for central banks in the near future will be to phase 
28  This result is certainly mostly related to the proper microstructure effect of the unsecured 
segments of the money market. Indeed, there is evidence that the more uncertain lenders 
are, the larger the quoted spreads, which in turn are updated less frequently. In the presence 
of liquidity hoarding and reluctance by cash-rich banks to lend in the unsecured market, 
larger quoted spreads simply reflect decreased market activity. This is also in line with the 
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out the non-standard measures in due time, while adjusting, when necessary, their 
operational framework to accommodate possible changes in how the interbank 
market functions.
6  RELATED LITERATURE
With the emergence of non-standard measures conducted by major central banks 
in response to the 2007-10 financial crisis, several recent academic papers have 
studied the possible impact of these measures.
A first set of papers tries to assess the macroeconomic impact of the central 
bank actions (both standard and non-standard), notably Lenza, Pill and Reichlin 
(2010)  and  Curdia  and  Woodford  (2010)  among  others.  Lenza,  Pill  and 
Reichlin (2010) mainly focus on the possible impact of the ECB’s non-standard 
measures in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in relation to 
the evolution of money and credit developments (hence banks’ balance sheet).   
These  authors  provide  empirical  evidence  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  ECB’s 
actions in supporting financial intermediation, credit expansion and economic 
activity. In particular, one of their key findings is that the fluctuations in financial 
and monetary aggregates during the recent crisis did not deviate from the historical 
regularities observed in the pre-crisis sample period (i.e. before 9 August 2007), 
despite the distortions observed in the interbank market. On the other hand, 
Curdia and Woodford (2010) compare the impact of both quantitative easing and 
“targeted asset purchases” by a central bank on the aggregated demand, based 
on an extended New Keynesian model. Although quantitative easing is seen as 
ineffective, even at the zero lower bound on the policy rate  29, they conclude 
that central bank credit policies in the form of targeted asset purchases may be 
effective when private financial intermediation is severely disrupted.
Closer to the issue discussed in our paper, a second strand of literature offers a 
more theoretical discussion on central bank actions in response to the recent crisis 
and makes empirical assessments of the impact of central bank actions during 
the crisis on the dynamics of financial markets and, in particular, the money 
markets. Based on theoretical modelling, Heider and Hoerova (2009) and Heider, 
Hoerova and Holthausen (2009), for example, provide a rationale to explain 
market frictions and disrupted market activity in the presence of credit risk. 
Using a structural model of unsecured and secured lending, Heider and Hoerova 
(2009) propose a three-period model, where banks’ trade-off between liquidity 
and return on the one hand and banks’ heterogeneity in terms of liquidity shocks 
on the other hand, justifies the existence of an interbank market. Following the 
specifications contained in Freixas and Holthausen (2005), Heider and Hoerova 
(2009)  offer  a  compelling  explanation  based  on  the  counterparty  risk  of  the 
developments observed in the money market since the onset of the financial crisis 
on 9 August 2007 and, in particular, the decoupling of interest rates between the 
29  This is especially the case if: (i) the increase in reserves leads to an increase in central bank 
holdings of Treasury securities rather than an increase in central bank lending to the private 
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unsecured and secured money market segments. Since the volatility of the repo 
rate can be increased notably by the scarcity of collateral, one of the natural policy 
conclusions of their paper is that the enlargement of the list of collateral eligible 
in central bank refinancing operations may help reduce tensions in the secured 
segment of the money market. At the same time, these authors suggest some 
limitations that such a policy has in resolving the underlying problems of the 
distortions in the unsecured segment when they are driven by credit risk concerns. 
In the same vein, Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2009) discuss a model where 
the existence of asymmetric information and concerns about the solvency of 
specific banks can lead to the breakdown of trading activity in the money market. 
Interestingly, the three different regimes they propose (namely (i) a situation of 
low spreads and an active money market; (ii) a market with increased spreads 
and continued trading, but lower trading activity owing to adverse selection; and 
(iii) a breakdown of market activity) nicely reflect the developments observed 
in the money market in the recent pre-crisis and crisis periods. These authors 
demonstrate the important role played by counterparty risk. It is shown that when 
higher average counterparty risk is combined with a high dispersion of risk in the 
presence of asymmetric information in the market, hoarding of (possibly excess) 
reserves emerges and trading in the interbank market breaks down. Eisenschmidt 
and Tapking (2009) also justify banks’ hoarding of liquidity in a model where 
lenders are not concerned about their counterparties’ credit risk, but about the 
risk that they may need liquidity themselves in future periods. The implications 
of  both  models  seem  to  be  supported  by  the  empirical  findings  reported  by 
Keister  and  McAndrews  (2009)  for  the  United  States.  Among  the  possible 
policy  responses  to  these  developments,  Heider,  Hoerova  and  Holthausen 
(2009) emphasise the importance of structural measures (like regulatory rules on 
transparency and liquidity requirements) beyond pure liquidity measures such 
as refinancing operations by central banks, asset purchases of illiquid assets or 
interbank loan guarantees.
Having demonstrated the need for central banks to step in to cope with illiquid 
banks, the question on the appropriate operational tools to be used remains.   
In this respect, Perez Quiros and Rodriguez Mendizabal (2010) and Cassola and 
Huetl (2010) offer an interesting theoretical discussion on the effectiveness of 
an asymmetric interest rate corridor and of the frontloading liquidity measure, 
respectively. Extending the model described in their 2006 paper by incorporating a 
specification for fine-tuning operations, Perez Quiros and Rodriguez Mendizabal 
(2010) discuss to what extent the use of asymmetric standing facilities could 
be a powerful policy tool for controlling prices and quantities in the overnight 
interbank market where the preference of banks is driven by the expectations 
of tight liquidity conditions in the future. In their model, the demand for funds 
by banks is a function of the marginal cost of funds, which is in turn equal to 
the interest rate on the main refinancing operation and to the marginal expected 
value of those funds throughout the reserve maintenance period. Consequently, 
the probability of having recourse to the standing facilities is included in the 
marginal cost of funding, i.e. the rate of the main refinancing operation, and 
thus the only way to affect banks’ demand for excess reserves is to change the 
relative price of the regular refinancing operations with respect to the interest 
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of fine-tuning operations at the end of the reserve maintenance period decreases 
the elasticity of demand at the regular main refinancing operations.
In  the  light  of  the  liquidity  measures  chosen  by  the  ECB  between  August 
2007 and September 2008, Cassola and Huetl (2010) offer a rationale for the 
so-called frontloading policy which consists in shifting the timing of the supply 
of funds available during the reserve maintenance period. These authors also 
extend the model of Perez Quiros and Rodriguez Mendizabal (2006) in three 
main respects: (i) by casting it into a regime-switching model in which banks 
change  their  liquidity  management  from  a  backward-looking  liquidity  shock 
correction  mode  into  a  forward-looking  reserve  management  regime;  (ii)  by 
incorporating  the  end-of-period  fine-tuning  operations,  the  impact  of  some 
calendar effects on the overnight interest rate and banks’ daily excess liquidity; and   
(iii) by considering three different types of market distortions, namely credit 
rationing,  market  segmentation  and  aggregate  negative  liquidity  shock.   
By calibrating their theoretical model, Cassola and Huetl (2010) show that to 
replicate the trading patterns observed during the turmoil period, it is necessary 
to combine increasing market segmentation and lending constraints (i.e. credit 
rationing) as, in contrast to the pre-crisis period, increasing liquidity volatility 
does  not  appear  sufficient  or  indeed  necessary  to  explain  the  developments 
under the crisis mode. As a result, they also show that market segmentation 
and  credit  rationing  were  not  significantly  important  before  August  2007.   
To evaluate the impact of possible liquidity measures, they also simulate different 
scenarios regarding the frontloading and liquidity operations on the last day of 
the reserve maintenance period. Their simulation exercises show that the absence 
of frontloading during the turmoil would have led to significantly higher EONIA 
levels and lower trading volumes in the interbank market. Their assessment of the 
frontloading policy appears to be in line with the evidence reported in Cassola, 
Holthausen and Würtz (2008).
On the empirical side, recent studies provide mixed evidence as regards the 
impact of central bank actions on the dynamics of money markets during the 
2007-10 financial crisis. Using simple linear econometric regressions for the 
daily change of the LIBOR-OIS spreads, McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008) 
find that a cumulative reduction of more than 50 basis points in the spreads 
can be associated with the Term Auction Facility launched by the US Federal 
Reserve. By contrast, when estimating the level of the LIBOR-OIS spreads on 
the basis of a no-arbitrage model of the term structure, Taylor and Williams 
(2009) do not support this finding and conclude that the most influential factor on 
these spreads is the counterparty risk. In their model, the absence of any impact 
of the Term Auction Facility on spreads is explained by the fact that it has no 
impact on total liquidity, expectations regarding future overnight interest rates 
or credit risk. Estimating a six-factor, arbitrage-free, Nelson-Siegel joint model 
of US Treasury yields, financial corporate bond yields and term interbank rates, 
Christensen, Lopez and Rudebusch (2009) find empirical evidence, however, 
that  central  bank  liquidity  operations  (like  the  Term  Auction  Facility)  have 
lowered  LIBOR  rates  in  the  period  spanning  December  2007  to  July  2008.   
More specifically, the shift in model estimates after the announcement of the 
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the money market and the bank bond market) suggests that central bank actions 
like the Term Auction Facility have helped lower the liquidity premium in term 
money market interest rates. From a broader perspective, Aït-Sahalia, Andritzky, 
Jobst,  Nowak  and  Tamirisa  (2010)  propose  an  event  study  approach  using 
parametric and non-parametric means tests to estimate the market reaction to 
(fiscal and monetary) policy announcements in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan and the euro area. Concerning the specific case of central banks’ 
actions, these authors report the following empirical findings. They first conclude 
that monetary policy rate cuts are clearly associated with significant declines 
in the LIBOR-OIS spreads, while announcements of liquidity support do not 
appear to have such a clear-cut effect on spreads. By contrast, announcements 
of liquidity provision in US dollars through swap arrangements between the   
US Federal Reserve and other major central banks are associated with statistically 
significant, but small reductions in spreads, which is also reported in Chailloux, 
Gray, Klüh, Shimizu and Stella (2008). Similarly, these authors also find that 
announcements of FOREX swaps by the ECB and the Bank of England have 
significant positive spillover in the United States and global money markets. 
In the specific case of the asset purchase programmes, they observe an initial 
decline followed by a subsequent increase in credit and liquidity risk premia, 
although these effects do not appear statistically significant.
In the light of the aforementioned studies, two main observations can be made. 
On the one hand, both the liquidity and credit risk components play an important 
role in the fluctuations of the interest rate spreads without necessarily co-moving 
over time. Indeed, despite mixed empirical findings, the current (both theoretical 
and empirical) analyses tend to suggest that while it may be obvious that the 
liquidity risk component is affected by central bank actions, it is less obvious for 
the credit risk component, should this be desirable. On the other hand, none of the 
studies highlight the trade-off that a central bank may face in a crisis situation, 
potentially on account of the difficulty of disentangling the liquidity from the 
credit  risk  component  in  the  money  market  spreads.  However,  this  question 
appears of crucial importance to help central banks consider the optimal limits of 
its intervention. In this respect, Chailloux, Gray, Klüh, Shimizu and Stella (2008) 
remark that, although pure liquidity measures by central banks are clearly justified 
(which should in turn have decreasing effects on the liquidity risk component), 
it is less clear, if not questionable, whether central banks should embark on 
operations going beyond the unique objective of supporting a resumption of market 
functioning to ensure a smooth distribution of liquidity in the money market.   
For these authors, “the central bank cannot come to be seen as the market maker 
of last resort in all markets nor the lender of last resort for all institutions”. In this 
respect, Chailloux, Gray, Klüh, Shimizu and Stella (2008) notice that a central 
bank which accepts illiquid assets as eligible collateral may encourage banks to 
retain tradable collateral to be used in more restrictive markets such as the repo 
market and to see the central bank as a liquidity provider of first resort. In sum, 
if there are limits to central bank intervention, notably to contain moral hazard, 
there should also be conditions under which the central bank should not expect to 
influence the interest rate spreads beyond the liquidity risk premium.308 CASSOLA, DURRÉ, HOLTHAUSEN
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Chart 2   Activity and prices in the euro money market
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Chart 2   Activity and prices in the euro money market (cont’d)
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Chart 4   Levels of key ECB interest rates, EURIBOR 3-month rate and 
3-month OIS interest rate
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Chart 5   EONIA-Minimum Bid Rate (MBR) spreads (Panel A) and average daily 
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Chart 6   EONIA against the deposit facility rate and net recourse to 
marginal lending facility before and after September 2008















-300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
y-axis: EONIA spread over the deposit facility rate  (basis points)
Panel A















-300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
y-axis: EONIA spread over the deposit facility rate  (basis points)
Panel B
(with full allotment tenders during the life of the ﬁ  rst 1-year LTRO)















-500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300
y-axis: EONIA spread over the deposit facility rate (basis points) 
Source: ECB.315 STATISTICAL ANNEX
Chart 7   Corporate bond spreads for financial (Panel A) 












































Source: Reuters.316 CASSOLA, DURRÉ, HOLTHAUSEN













Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July































Source: Reuters.317 STATISTICAL ANNEX
















July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July
2007 2008 2009 2010
premium 3M in 3M
premium 3M in 6M
premium 6M in 6M
32 per. Mov. Avg. (premium 3M in 3M)
32 per. Mov. Avg. (premium 3M in 6M)
32 per. Mov. Avg. (premium 6M in 6M)
Source: Reuters. Authors’ calculations.












July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July
3M Euribor volatility in 3M
3M Euribor volatility in 6M
3M Euribor volatility in 9M
3M Euribor volatility in 12M
2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: Reuters. Authors’ calculations.318 CASSOLA, DURRÉ, HOLTHAUSEN



















0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
x-axis: q (credit risk)
y-axis: interest rates
r L
r D interbank market is possible 
lowest interest rate that cash-rich 
banks are willing to accept 
highest interest rate that cash-poor 
banks are willing to pay










= λ  
Repayment
= λ  






























0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
rL
rD
highest interest rate that cash-poor 
banks are willing to pay
interbank market is possible 
lowest interest rate (at time 1) that cash-rich
banks are willing to accept
y-axis: interest rate
x-axis: q1 (credit risk)
Chart 15   Generalised Impulse Response Functions of spreads and liquidity 
premium to shocks to ECB liquidity policy measures
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Chart 16   Generalised Impulse Response Functions of quoted (bid/ask) 
spread to shocks to ECB liquidity policy measures
(response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.)
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Chart 17   Generalised Impulse Response Functions of trading volume in the 
overnight market to shocks to ECB liquidity policy measures
(response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.)
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Table 1 Ad-hoc refinancing operations in EUR
 
Providing FTOs Absorbing FTOs Total
1-day 3-day 5-day 6-day 1-day 2-day 3-day 5-day 6-day 7-day
Phase I
(09 August 2007- 
14 September 2008) 6 1 1 - 17 2 1 2 1 - 31
Phase II
(15 September 2008- 
31 October 2009) 20 - - 1 16 - - - - - 37
Phase III
(1 November 2009- 
30 September 2010) - - - 2 11 - - - - 21 34
Total 26 1 1 3 44 2 1 2 1 21 102





























(09 August 2007-  
14 September 2008) - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Phase II
(15 September 2008- 
31 October  2009) 1 52 - - 4 1 1 10 1 1
3 + 1 
TAF 1 3 79
Phase III
(1 November 2009-  
30 September 2010) - 11 - 14 - - - - - - - - - 25
Total 1 63 - 14 4 1 1 10 1 1 4 1 3 104
Table 3 Liquidity-providing operations in USD
































(09 August 2007- 
14 September 2008) - - - - - - - - - 16 1 - 2 - - 19
Phase II
(15 September 2008- 
31 October 2009) 16 3 1 1 1 51 - - 1 12 - 1 13 1 1 102
Phase III
(1 November 2009- 
30 September 2010) - - - - - 8 2 1 - - - - - - - 11
Total 16 3 1 1 1 59 2 1 1 28 1 1 15 1 1 132322 HILTON, MCANDREWS
CHALLENGES AND LESSONS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE’S MONETARY POLICY OPERATIONS 
DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS1
BY SPENCE HILTON, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK  
JAMES MCANDREWS, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
1  INTRODUCTION
The  Federal  Reserve  has  undertaken  a  large  number  of  policy  initiatives  in 
response to the financial crisis. In the span of little more than one year, from 
August 2007 until December 2008, its conventional monetary policy instrument – 
the overnight federal funds rate target – was lowered from 5.25% to a range of 
0-0.25%, its effective lower bound. Even more noteworthy have been a number 
of so-called unconventional or non-standard policy actions that have dramatically 
altered the size and composition of its asset holdings, which in total expanded 
from USD 874 billion in August 2007 to USD 2.3 trillion as of March 2010. This 
significant expansion only hints at the range and number of individual policy 
actions taken over this period.
This paper reviews the experiences of the Federal Reserve during the crisis and 
identifies some of the major lessons learned for the future design of its policy 
implementation framework. But rather than an exhaustive review of the actions 
taken by the Federal Reserve and their various motivations, in the first part of 
this paper we discuss three key challenges it faced in fashioning its responses 
and how they were addressed, namely: (i) constraints on the use of its balance 
sheet  imposed  by  its  traditional  operating  framework;  (ii)  stigma  associated 
with  borrowing  from  its  traditional  lending  facilities;  and  (iii)  the  need  for 
new collateral arrangements to support non-traditional forms of lending. In the 
second part of this paper, we consider the lessons learned during the crisis for 
the design of the future operating framework, focusing on three components 
of  the  framework:  (i)  policies  for  administered  and  market  interest  rates;   
1  The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily reflective 
of  views  at  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  or  the  Federal  Reserve  System.   
We wish to thank Jim Clouse, Michael Fleming, Antoine Martin, Susan McLaughlin, Josh 
Rosenberg, and Brian Sack for their helpful comments. Dennis Kuo and Michael Walker 
provided excellent research assistance. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the 
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(ii)  the  structure  of  the  portfolio  of  domestic  assets;  and  (iii)  the  role  and 
objectives for reserve balances in the framework.2
2  CHALLENGES IN RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
In this overview, we will focus on three key challenges faced by the Federal 
Reserve  in  its  response  to  the  crisis,  some  of  which  could  apply  to  central 
banks  more  broadly  while  others  were  specific  to  the  circumstances  faced 
by the Federal Reserve. Among the many challenges encountered by Federal 
Reserve policy-makers, those relating to the inflexibility of the balance sheet 
size, the stigma of discount window borrowing and risk management challenges 
when lending to an expanded set of counterparties and/or when lending on a   
non-recourse basis provide particular insight into the range of policy options for 
and policy designs of the Federal Reserve’s response to the crisis.3
2.1  BALANCE SHEET CONSTRAINTS
The implementation of interest rate policy by the Federal Reserve at the time 
of  the  crisis  depended  on  close  control  of  the  supply  of  reserves  and  other 
balances made available to banks (as explained, for instance, in Bernanke (2005)) 
to maintain the market’s effective federal funds rate close to the target rate.   
That method of monetary policy implementation conferred only a limited degree 
of flexibility on the size of the Federal Reserve’s asset holdings, so long as the 
target federal funds rate was above zero. Because of this, the Federal Reserve 
faced  limits  on  the  amount  of  lending  to  banks,  primary  dealers  and  others 
it could conduct (until it received the authority to pay interest on reserves in 
October 2008). 
As  an  example  of  the  limited  flexibility  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  balance 
sheet,  for  each  Term  Auction  Facility  (TAF)  operation,  the  Open  Markets 
Desk (hereinafter “the desk”) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was 
2  Following some brief concluding observations, two appendices are provided. In the first 
appendix, we review the recent literature on the effectiveness of various Federal Reserve 
lending facilities during the crisis. In the second, we provide an outline of the many policy 
actions taken by the Federal Reserve from August 2007 to March 2010. Following Appendix 
B are two figures. Figure 1 provides a graphical timeline of significant policy actions with a 
graphical depiction of the growth in the assets and liabilities of the Federal Reserve during 
the same time period. Figure 2 plots the federal funds and interest on reserves rates over this 
period. In-depth treatment of select liquidity facilities and other Federal Reserve responses to 
the crisis can be found in various articles in Economic Policy Review and in Current Issues 
in Economics and Finance, both of which are Federal Reserve Bank of New York research 
publications and are available online at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/2010.html. 
For an overview and theoretical treatment of the different forms of “credit easing” provided by 
the Federal Reserve, see the speech given by Chairman Bernanke on 13 January 2009 entitled 
“The Crisis and Policy Response” , available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20090113a.htm.
3  This list of major challenges faced by the Federal Reserve in crafting responses to the 
crisis is not intended to be exhaustive. For example, devising strategies to provide further 
monetary stimulus when near the zero bound on short-term interest rates was another 
considerable challenge encompassing many dimensions, which we do not address in this 
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required to take countervailing actions to offset the injection of reserves that 
would otherwise occur as reserve funds were awarded to winning TAF bidders.   
Had the Federal Reserve not taken these offsetting actions, the quantity of reserve 
balances would have increased, putting downward pressure on market interest 
rates in the money markets. 
Other operations that were introduced or changed to mitigate the disruptions 
in financial markets were also constrained. In addition to the TAF, the Federal 
Reserve had implemented Reciprocal Currency Arrangements, or FX Swaps, 
with a number of other central banks, in which it lent dollar funds to those 
central banks which, in turn, lent funds to commercial banks in their jurisdictions 
(Board of Governors (2007d)). The Federal Reserve had also made changes to its 
securities lending facility (Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2007a, 2007b)), 
reducing the effective lending rate and increasing the supply of Treasury securities 
made available to lend to primary dealers. As part of its response to stresses in 
the repo market, on 7 March 2008 the Federal Reserve announced a series of 
special open market operations made against mortgage-backed securities, called 
Single-Tranche Repo operations, intended to improve conditions in term funding 
markets (Board of Governors (2008d)). A consequence of these actions was 
that the Federal Reserve was increasingly constrained in the amount of further 
lending in which it could engage.
Offsetting (or sterilising) a TAF loan essentially required the desk to sell Treasury 
securities. The ability of the Federal Reserve to engage in offsets of this type 
was constrained by the amount of securities it had at the start of the crisis, the 
amount of lending it was engaged in, and the amount of securities it had lent out. 
Furthermore, the desk had to organise a significant amount of data and calculate a 
large number of factors when deciding on its daily operations. As a result of these 
considerations, the Federal Reserve focused on ways to reduce the reserve effects 
of its lending operations. TAF auctions settled three days following the auction 
and this delayed settlement was helpful as the desk had a few days to arrange the 
countervailing operations, which could vary in amount depending on the amount 
of funds awarded in a particular auction.
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), announced on 11 March 2008 
(Board  of  Governors  (2008e)),  was  designed  to  be  reserve  neutral  as  a 
consequence  of  the  balance  sheet  constraints  faced  by  the  Federal  Reserve. 
Operated as a periodic auction, primary dealers bid for a loan of general collateral 
Treasury securities (rather than for balances that would increase the amount of 
reserves outstanding) in exchange for collateral that included all collateral eligible 
for tri-party repurchase agreements arranged by the Open Market Trading Desk 
as well as investment grade corporate securities, municipal securities, mortgage-
backed securities and asset-backed securities. This design had two significant 
advantages  given  the  operational  framework  used  for  the  implementation  of 
interest rate policy at the time. First, the operation of the TSLF did not affect the 
quantity of reserves outstanding, so no offsetting operations by the desk were 
required to implement interest rate policy. Second, the predictability of reserve 
balances was not impaired, which allowed the settlement of auctions to proceed 
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case with TAF auctions. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding its lack of impact on 
reserve balances, the TSLF did “consume” some of the balance sheet capacity 
of the Federal Reserve, in that Treasury securities that were lent out to dealers 
were not available for sale, if need be, to offset other lending carried out by the 
Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve, as a consequence of its operational framework, its policy 
to target a positive federal funds rate and the initial size of its balance sheet, was 
constrained in the overall size of its lending programmes. The size of all of its 
programmes was equal to the size of the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities 
at the time of the crisis. For example, by selling its holdings of Treasury securities, 
the Federal Reserve could have announced much larger sizes of auctions for the 
TAF and FX Swaps; however, the Federal Reserve did not have the capacity to 
offset auctions that would award more funds than its outstanding holdings of 
other securities while still maintaining its interest rate policy. Consequently, it is 
possible, as a theoretical matter, that the Federal Reserve’s response to the crisis 
could have been inefficiently constrained, prior to it being given the authority to 
pay interest on reserves, by the accident of the size of its holdings of Treasury 
securities when entering the crisis.4
To help address this limitation, later in the crisis, the creation of the Supplementary 
Financing Program (SFP) was announced on 17 September 2008 (U.S. Department 
of the Treasury (2008)), the day following the large loan made to AIG (Board 
of Governors (2008j)). The SFP consisted of a series of sales of Treasury bills 
by the Treasury, the proceeds of which were deposited with the Federal Reserve, 
thereby draining reserves. This device was intended to allow the Federal Reserve 
to maintain its interest rate policy even as its asset holdings soared well beyond 
their level immediately prior to September 2008; in the absence of the SFP, 
reserve balances would also have increased even more significantly and even 
greater downward pressure would have been placed on the federal funds rate. 
The SFP better enabled the Federal Reserve to continue to support its target rate, 
which was 2% on 16 September 2008 and was reduced to 1.5% on 8 October 2008. 
However, the SFP has limitations of its own. Importantly, the sales of Treasury 
securities are limited by the statutory debt ceiling established by Congress and 
altered only periodically. In addition, SFP operations are set by the Treasury 
and must accommodate their auction schedule, rather than timed for deposits to 
occur synchronously with loans or asset purchases made by the Federal Reserve.   
As  a  result,  the  Federal  Reserve  needed  additional  flexibility  to  manage  its 
interest rate policy during intervals in which the SFP was fixed in size.
2.2  STIGMA OF DISCOUNT WINDOW BORROWING
Stigma, a perception that a suspected borrower from the discount window is 
of  low  credit  quality,  has  long  been  a  concern  of  potential  borrowers  from 
the discount window (Peristiani (1991, 1998)). Many analysts have regarded 
4  Also important in limiting the operational response may have been the fact that, at the time, 
the Federal Reserve did not have effective temporary tools for draining large amounts of 
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the Federal Reserve’s policies prior to 2003 as potentially reinforcing stigma.   
The pre-2003 discount window policy was to lend to depository institutions at 
a rate below the target federal funds rate, but with amounts and frequencies that 
were at least widely perceived to be rationed. Following the failure of Continental 
Illinois, banks became even more reluctant to borrow at the discount window.   
In 2003 the Federal Reserve changed its administration and set the borrowing 
rate at the discount window above the federal funds target rate and made other 
changes to eliminate any perception of rationing, but a reluctance to borrow 
persisted (Furfine, 2003). The reluctance to borrow from the discount window 
was seen as a constraint during the crisis, as it impeded the policy objective of 
distributing funds widely against available collateral. 
The main explanation for banks’ reluctance to borrow at the discount window 
is that such borrowing will be inferred by market participants as a sign that a 
borrower is financially weak. In addition to Furfine (2003), more recent work 
by  Armantier,  Ghysels,  Sarkar  and  Shrader  (2010)  and  Ennis  and  Weinberg 
(2010)  documents  that  stigma  remains  a  current  problem.  The  studies  show 
that banks are willing to pay higher interest rates in the interbank market than 
the interest rate at which they could borrow directly from the discount window.   
This is evidence that banks are willing to pay to avoid the stigma associated with 
discount window borrowing. 
The abrupt rise in term funding rates on 9 August 2007 led the Federal Reserve 
to intervene quickly on 10 August to reassure markets that it stood ready to 
supply liquidity, intervening an unprecedented three times that day with open 
market operations to maintain the effective federal funds rate close to the target 
rate (Board of Governors (2007a)).5 On 17 August 2007 the Board of Governors 
announced  changes  in  the  Primary  Credit  Program  of  the  discount  window.   
It lengthened the period over which credit could be extended from overnight to 
30 days and reduced the spread of the primary credit interest rate over the federal 
funds target rate from 100 to 50 basis points. The following day the Federal 
Reserve encouraged borrowing from the discount window during a conference 
call  with  major  banks  organised  by  The  Clearing  House  (Lanman  (2007)). 
During the call, Vice Chairman Kohn and Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
President Geithner counselled that use of the discount window would be viewed 
by the Federal Reserve as a sign of strength (Smith, Mollenkamp, Perry and Ip 
(2007)). Although some initial borrowing occurred after these moves, discount 
window  borrowing  was  negligible  during  the  second  half  of  2007  despite 
widespread recognition that money markets were impaired and the availability 
of term funding was scarce. 
Stigma  essentially  prevented  the  Federal  Reserve  from  following  Bagehot’s 
dictum of lending freely against good quality collateral. Stigma also seemingly 
prevented banks from borrowing from the Federal Reserve even when it was in 
their economic interest because the interest rate offered by the Federal Reserve 
was below the market rate for a loan of the same term. In December 2007 the 
5  See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Temporary Open Market Operations”, available 
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Federal Reserve announced the creation of the TAF, in part to overcome the 
problem of discount window stigma, pointing out that “this facility could help 
promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank 
markets are under stress” (Board of Governors (2007d)).
The TAF had several design features that served to reduce the stigma associated 
with  borrowing  from  the  primary  credit  facility  of  the  discount  window.   
Its principal feature was that it was organised as an auction, in which banks 
bid simultaneously on the date of the auction. In addition, the minimum rate of 
interest at which banks could bid was set equal to a market standard, namely 
the overnight index swap (OIS) rate. The one-month OIS rate is the rate market 
participants are willing to swap for a stream of variable payments, for the same 
principal amount, where the variable payment is equal to the effective federal 
funds rate each day over the month. As the swap is settled at the end of the 
period with a net payment between the fixed and variable legs, there is very little 
counterparty credit risk relative to a loan of the same size. Consequently, the OIS 
rate would, in most cases, be an advantageous rate at which to borrow. 
A second feature of the TAF is that the rate at which the winners in the auction 
would pay for borrowed funds was a uniform price. This feature was designed, 
in part, to encourage wide participation by healthy banks: even a healthy bank 
with access to interbank markets would face little cost in submitting a bid at the 
minimum bid rate and could get a bargain were it to be awarded funds. Moreover, 
awarding a number of banks funds at the auction-determined rate would make it 
more difficult to infer who had borrowed from the Federal Reserve from public 
reports on the breakdown of weekly lending by district. A third feature of the 
TAF was the delayed settlement of the auction, in which funds were delivered to 
winning bidders three days after the auction; as a result, borrowing via the TAF 
did not signal an immediate need for funding.
In  sum,  the  auction  format  enabled  banks  to  approach  the  Federal  Reserve 
collectively rather than individually to obtain funds, with a delay of a few days, 
at a competitive rate set by auction rather than at an administered rate premium 
set by the Federal Reserve. Thus, institutions might attach less of a stigma to 
TAF auctions than to traditional discount window borrowing.6 The paper by 
Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar and Shrader (2010) tests this by examining individual 
bank bids in the TAF, showing that banks bid at considerably higher rates in the 
TAF than the current discount rate, suggesting that banks faced significantly less 
stigma in the TAF than at the window.
The auction method of reducing the risk of stigma in its lending facilities carried 
over to the TSLF, which allocated Treasury securities to primary dealers against 
specific types of collateral. Primary dealers are broker-dealer firms, financial 
intermediaries  that  depend  heavily  on  short-term  money  markets  and  face 
concerns of stigma, much as do banks (see Fleming, Hrung and Keane (2009) 
on this point).
6  See the paper by Armantier, Krieger and McAndrews (2008) for more on the TAF design.328 HILTON, MCANDREWS
For many other lending facilities implemented by the Federal Reserve, certain 
limitations of the auction method of distributing funds – such as the difficulty of 
collecting bids in a timely and secure fashion, the necessity of auctions occurring 
periodically rather than continuously, and the greater certainty of borrowing costs 
provided by fixed-rate facilities – led to alternative types of allocation methods. 
Nonetheless,  the  method  of  auctioning  funds  to  banks  for  discount  window 
purposes proved feasible and, judging from the widespread participation alone, 
effective in reducing banks’ concerns about stigma.
2.3  APPROPRIATE COLLATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
In their normal course of operations, Federal Reserve Banks extend discount 
window  loans  only  on  a  collateralised  basis  and  only  with  full  recourse  to 
the  borrower.  During  the  crisis,  however,  the  Federal  Reserve  lent  to  many 
counterparties with whom it had no prior relationship, and who did not maintain 
deposit accounts nor collateral pledged at the Federal Reserve. As a result, the 
Federal Reserve had to design new ways to manage its credit risk and to secure 
its lending to a wide variety of counterparties against a wide variety of collateral. 
We  refer  to  this  broad  risk  management  challenge  as  finding  appropriate 
collateral arrangements.
Banks  regularly  maintain  large  amounts  of  collateral  pledged  to  the  Federal 
Reserve Banks in case they need to request a discount window loan at short 
notice. During the most severe phase of the financial crisis after the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve created a number of lending facilities 
to improve conditions in a wide variety of short-term funding markets, with 
most of these facilities authorised under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act. That section states that “[i]n unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not 
less than five members, may authorize any Federal Reserve bank, during such 
periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with 
the provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to discount for any 
individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when 
such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are endorsed or otherwise secured to the 
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any 
such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an individual, partnership, or corporation 
the Federal Reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, 
or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other 
banking  institutions.”7  Because  the  Federal  Reserve,  in  the  lending  facilities 
it created, was lending to borrowers with whom it often had no pre-existing 
relationship, and because the Federal Reserve was attempting, in many cases, 
to  improve  funding  conditions  broadly  rather  than  focusing  on  the  funding 
conditions of individual market participants, it faced significant challenges in 
designing appropriate collateral arrangements: ones that secured its lending to its 
satisfaction while, at the same time, achieving its broad objective of lending.
7  Federal Reserve Act, Section 13(3), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/
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A review of all the lending facilities initiated by the Federal Reserve during the 
crisis is beyond the scope of this paper, but a look into some of the arrangements 
fashioned by the Federal Reserve reveals some of the difficulties it encountered 
in designing its facilities. Good examples are provided by the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and 
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).8
The  AMLF  was  announced  on  19  September  2008  (Board  of  Governors 
(2008l)), just four days after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and two days 
after the Reserve Primary Fund, a large money market mutual fund (MMMF), 
was disbanded after its net asset value fell below 99.5% of the par value of its 
liabilities (i.e. it “broke the buck”). The failure of the Reserve Primary Fund led 
to a widespread withdrawal from “prime” MMMFs. Prime MMMFs are large 
investors in commercial paper, both asset-backed commercial paper and non-
asset-backed  commercial  paper.  Faced  with  the  severe  withdrawal  pressures 
during the week of 15 September 2008, MMMFs had to raise funds, often by 
selling commercial paper below its amortised cost. Selling pressures that led 
to  these  fire  sale  prices  threatened  MMMFs  generally,  as  well  as  issuers  of 
commercial paper.
To  accommodate  the  withdrawal  requests  of  MMMF  shareholders  without 
putting significant sales pressures on commercial paper and to quickly respond 
to the widespread withdrawals, the Federal Reserve designed and implemented 
the AMLF. Under the terms of the AMLF, the Federal Reserve lent to banks 
and bank holding companies against pledges of asset-backed commercial paper. 
The specific asset-backed commercial paper must have been purchased from 
a MMMF after 19 September; been purchased at the fund’s acquisition costs 
adjusted for amortisation; been highly rated and issued by a US issuer and be of 
short-term maturity; and, in addition, the selling MMMF must have experienced 
significant withdrawal pressures. Under these conditions, the Federal Reserve 
would advance a loan equal to the amount of the amortised cost of the asset-
backed commercial paper that collateralised the loan. The loan was made on a 
non-recourse basis. That is, at the maturity of the loan, the Federal Reserve Bank 
would have no recourse to the bank to which it lent funds for the repayment 
of the loan; instead, the collateral itself would assure repayment of the loan. 
This  programme  relied  on  the  assets  backing  the  asset-backed  commercial 
paper to provide satisfactory security to collateralise the extension of credit, 
rather  than  the  creditworthiness  of  the  borrowing  bank.  This  was  consistent 
with the objectives of the programme. The objectives of the AMLF included 
“assist[ing] money funds … in meeting demands for redemptions by investors 
and  foster[ing]  liquidity  in  the  asset-backed  commercial  paper  markets  and 
broader money markets” (Board of Governors (2008l)). The non-recourse feature 
of the programme was vital to provide good incentives for bank participation as, 
without it, banks would have been at risk of non-performance of the commercial 
paper they had purchased from the MMMF. As banks were needed to purchase 
8  The terms and conditions for the AMLF are available at http://www.frbdiscountwindow.
org/mmmftc.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID  ;  the  paper  by  Adrian,  Kimbrough,  and  Marchioni 
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commercial paper at amortised cost from MMMFs to accommodate withdrawal 
requests, relieving the banks from this risk exposure was important to facilitate 
rapid and widespread participation by banks and to achieve the programme’s 
goals of providing funds to MMMFs facing heightened withdrawal demands. 
Were this feature of the facility absent, banks likely would not have been willing 
to purchase the commercial paper from MMMFs at amortised cost, leading to 
little participation. This programme was carefully structured both to meet its 
objectives and to provide satisfactory collateral to the Federal Reserve Banks; 
however, it was limited in size to the availability of the asset-backed commercial 
paper held by qualifying MMMFs.
In addition to causing extraordinary disruptions to the operations of MMMFs, 
the widespread withdrawal demands from MMMFs  also resulted in severely 
strained circumstances for issuers of commercial paper, as the typical demands 
for commercial paper from MMMFs evaporated as their shareholders withdrew 
from  MMMFs.  To  address  this  stress,  the  Federal  Reserve  announced  the 
CPFF on 7 October 2008 (Board of Governors (2008p)) as a backstop to the 
commercial paper market. The CPFF had an unusual structure in that lending by 
the Federal Reserve Bank was to a special purpose vehicle that purchased eligible 
commercial paper directly from issuers of commercial paper.9 Lending was made 
on a non-recourse basis to the corporation that issued the commercial paper; the 
lending was secured by a combination of features of the programme. 
As explained by Adrian, Kimbrough and Marchioni (2010), a combination of 
assets held by the special purpose vehicle served as the collateral in the facility. 
Much of the commercial paper purchased in the facility was non-asset-backed 
paper, so alternative means of collateralising the lending to the facility had to 
be fashioned rather than relying on the commercial paper itself. For some of 
the issuers of commercial paper eligible to issue to the facility (those that were 
either financial companies or bank holding companies), the issuer could pledge 
financial assets to provide collateral or could participate in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance  Corporation’s  Temporary  Liquidity  Guarantee  Program  to  provide 
a  guarantee  on  paper  issued  to  the  facility,  which  substituted  for  collateral.   
As some non-financial companies could not easily pledge non-financial assets to 
collateralise their issuance of commercial paper (and as the operational difficulty 
of doing so was enormous), further alternatives were fashioned. In particular, an 
“unsecured credit surcharge” of 100 basis points was imposed on any issuance 
of commercial paper to the facility that was not otherwise secured. In addition 
to both a facility fee of 10 basis points of the maximum amount an issuer could 
issue to the facility and the accrual of interest earnings, over time these fees built 
up a significant cushion of earnings above the value of commercial paper in the 
facility. When this margin above the value of commercial paper in the facility 
was measured on a portfolio basis, it provided satisfactory security to the Federal 
Reserve Bank. In operation, the CPFF experienced no defaults, and substantial 
earnings accrued to the Federal Reserve and, consequently, to the US Treasury 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2010)).
9  Another source of information on the design of the CPFF can be found at http://www.
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Similar  challenges  were  encountered  in  the  designs  of  the  Money  Market 
Investors  Funding  Facility  (MMIFF)  and  the  Term  Asset-Backed  Securities 
Loan Facility (TALF), and so are more general than the examples we reviewed.10 
The need to fashion appropriate collateral arrangements reflected, in part, the 
objectives of the Federal Reserve to address market-wide disruptions in particular 
funding markets. The financial system has moved from one that is heavily bank 
dependent to one that is more dependent on securitisation markets.11 The funding 
of the expanded set of intermediaries in the shadow banking system can become 
impaired in a financial crisis, in part because markets become more segmented 
during crises (see Saito and Shiratsuka (2001) for an example). Furthermore, 
once funding problems arise in one area of the shadow banking system, other 
parts of the system are affected as well. For example, problems encountered 
by the heavy withdrawals from MMMFs, part of the assets of which consist of 
the commercial paper issued by other financial intermediaries, caused funding 
problems in the commercial paper market.
While banks have regular access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, 
intermediaries  in  the  shadow  banking  system  do  not,  nor  do  “individuals, 
partnerships and corporations.”12 Consequently, if the policy objectives of the 
central bank call on it to lend to this wider set of entities, fashioning satisfactory 
collateral arrangements will likely be a challenge. The risk that such collateral 
arrangements might result in losses is remote for the general lending facilities 
designed by the Federal Reserve, but was certainly more elevated in the lending 
to  specific  firms,  specifically  the  lending  to  support  the  acquisition  of  Bear 
Stearns by J.P. Morgan Chase and the lending to AIG (although the Federal 
Reserve is not expected to incur any losses associated with these loans (Board of 
Governors (2010b)). In these cases, significant concentration risks were involved 
with the exposures in the facilities designed to house the assets, namely the 
Maiden Lane facilities. In light of this, the US Treasury expressed its intention 
that “[i]n the longer term and as its authorities permit, the Treasury will seek to 
remove from the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, or to liquidate, the so-called 
Maiden Lane facilities made by the Federal Reserve as part of efforts to stabilize 
systemically critical financial institutions.”13
3  LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OPERATING FRAMEWORK
The size and composition of the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, including 
its holdings of domestic financial assets and supporting operations, are likely to 
10  For TALF, part of the collateral was provided by funding from the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP), administered by the US Treasury, which assumed a “first loss” portion of 
funding of the special purpose vehicle for the facility.
11  The paper by Adrian, Ashcraft, Boesky and Pozsar (2010) provides a good guidebook to 
these changes.
12  Under the Dodd-Frank Act 2010, individuals, partnerships and corporations would have 
access to Federal Reserve lending under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which, as 
previously noted, requires that conditions are unusual and exigent and that adequate credit 
accommodations are not available in the market. In addition, such lending would only be 
available through a market-wide lending facility, and not to a single institution. 
13  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury (2009).332 HILTON, MCANDREWS
be influenced for some time by the unconventional measures taken in response to 
the extraordinary financial and economic strains over the past few years. There is 
still considerable uncertainty regarding what the monetary policy implementation 
framework will look like when financial and economic strains have receded 
and operating conditions have normalised. However, policy-makers recognise 
that the future operating framework could differ in important respects from the 
framework in place at the onset of the financial crisis, by incorporating important 
lessons from the financial crisis and utilising authority to pay interest on reserves 
in its design. In this section, we identify what we perceive as the crisis’s major 
lessons  for  managing  the  Federal  Reserve’s  balance  sheet  to  achieve  policy 
objectives and for the design of the future operating framework. This discussion 
considers three components of the operating framework: (i) interest rate policies, 
including  operating  objectives  for  market  rates  and  use  of  the  authority  to 
pay interest on reserve balances; (ii) the portfolio of domestic financial assets 
and related operations; and (iii) objectives for the supply of reserve balance 
liabilities of the Federal Reserve. Interest rate policies, especially those related 
to the payment of interest on reserves, are closely related to the balance sheet 
constraints that were a challenge during the crisis. The lessons that concern the 
portfolio of assets held by the Federal Reserve and related operations relate to the 
balance sheet constraint challenge, as well as to the risk management challenges 
associated with collateral arrangements. The objectives for the supply of reserve 
balance liabilities relate in various ways to all the challenges we reviewed faced 
by the Federal Reserve during the crisis.
3.1  INTEREST RATE POLICIES
Payment of interest on reserves
On 1 October 2008, the Federal Reserve received authority to pay interest on 
balances held by depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks, and it began 
to use that authority almost immediately.14 Payment of interest on balances held 
by financial institutions has been a longstanding practice at many central banks. 
This authority has typically been incorporated into the design of the operating 
framework for the purpose of enhancing control over short-term market interest 
rates or to improve the efficiency of discretionary operations and of banks, and 
in some cases an interest rate paid on reserves has served as an official policy 
rate.15 We fully anticipate that payment of interest on reserves will remain a 
permanent feature of the Federal Reserve’s operating framework that will be 
used to improve its control over short-term market interest rates, whatever the 
particular design elements of that framework.
However, a key lesson from the crisis is that remuneration of reserves can enable 
the central bank to pursue policy objectives that entail changing the size and 
14  The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 originally authorised the Federal 
Reserve to begin paying interest on balances held by depository institutions beginning   
1  October  2011.  The  Emergency  Economic  Stabilization  Act  of  2008  accelerated  the 
effective date to 1 October 2008 and the Federal Reserve began to pay interest on banks’ 
required and excess reserve balances on 9 October 2008.
15  These purposes include the avoidance of an implicit “tax” on reserves held to satisfy reserve 
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composition of its balance sheet while still achieving conventional objectives for 
short-term interest rates. This was the foremost reason that the Federal Reserve 
sought to accelerate the effective date for receiving authority to pay interest on 
reserves.16 In its announcement that it would start to pay interest on reserves, 
the Federal Reserve stated that “the payment of interest on excess reserves will 
permit the Federal Reserve to expand its balance sheet as necessary to provide 
the liquidity necessary to support financial stability” and “while also maintaining 
the federal funds rate close to the target established by the Federal Open Market 
Committee” (Board of Governors (2008r2008n). Experiences of other central 
banks, both during and outside of the recent crisis period, also demonstrate that 
operating frameworks can be quickly and fundamentally reconfigured to achieve 
assorted  policy  objectives  without  sacrificing  control  over  short-term  rates.   
For these reasons, any future operating framework of the Federal Reserve should 
utilise its authority to pay interest on reserves to preserve this ability to adopt, 
as needed, other policies that have implications for the size and composition of 
its balance sheet, including the level of reserves, even when not operating at the 
zero bound for short-term rates.
Behaviour of and operating objective for short-term market 
interest rates
Some of the behaviour of the overnight federal funds rate and other short-term 
rates immediately after the Federal Reserve began to pay interest on reserves in 
October 2008 was not fully anticipated. As reserve levels began to swell, rates on 
federal funds and Eurodollar transactions, the most common forms of unsecured 
overnight bank borrowing, fell below the interest on excess reserves (IOER) rate. 
Non-bank lenders in short-term funding markets ineligible to earn interest on 
reserves – including both government sponsored entities (GSEs), which can hold 
balances at the Federal Reserve, and money market funds and other institutional 
lenders, which cannot – found that in order to invest all their cash holdings they 
had to lend a portion to banks that had already accumulated large excess reserve 
positions.17  Most  surprising  was  how  far  rates  in  overnight  funding  markets 
fell  below  the  IOER  rate  and  how  volatile  these  rates  were.  This  behaviour 
is  believed  to  have  been  largely  an  outgrowth  of  the  exceptionally  illiquid 
markets at the time.18 In the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, trading 
relationships were severely disrupted as lenders in funding markets dramatically 
cut or suspended credit and trading lines. At the same time, competition among 
bank borrowers to earn a spread between the IOER rate and funding costs relied, 
16  The ability to set an objective for the portfolio independent of targeting short-term rates 
that paying interest on reserves can provide is also a central theme in Keister, Martin, and 
McAndrews (2008).
17  Paying interest on excess reserves did remove incentives that banks have to lend at rates 
below the IOER rate, as expected. As a result, lending activity by banks in these markets 
fell dramatically and borrowing rates fell below the IOER rate once the point was reached 
where banks with structural reserve deficiencies could cover their overdraft positions by 
borrowing solely from non-bank entities.
18  In response, between October 2008 and December 2008, when the target for the federal 
funds rate was reduced to its effective lower bound, the Federal Reserve made several 
adjustments to narrow the spread between the rate paid on required reserves, which was 
always aligned with the target federal funds rate, and the IOER rate in an attempt to keep 
the funds rate closer to its target. This spread was eventually eliminated entirely.334 HILTON, MCANDREWS
in  part,  on  established  relationships  among  counterparties.  Risk  aversion  by 
lenders reduced their incentives to sell funds on the basis of rate competition 
alone. Rate volatility quickly damped after the IOER rate was reduced to a mere 
25 basis points in December 2008, although since then some observers have 
continued to question why competition has not established an even tighter spread 
between the IOER rate and overnight bank funding costs.19 
The behaviour of market rates relative to the IOER rate since the Federal Reserve 
began to pay interest on reserves to banking institutions has underscored a notable 
feature of US financing markets – the important role that non-bank institutional 
lenders  play  in  unsecured  bank  funding  markets,  such  as  federal  funds  and 
Eurodollars, as well as in collateralised funding markets.20 However, we do not 
believe that this feature undermines the importance of paying interest on reserves 
as a key component of the operating framework for controlling short-term interest 
rates, even with an elevated level of excess reserves. Competitive forces should 
ordinarily maintain a link between the rate paid directly to banks on reserves and 
their borrowing costs, even at higher interest rate levels and with elevated excess 
reserve levels, so long as funding markets are operating reasonably efficiently. 
Nonetheless, to ensure that it has the tools to control short-term market rates to 
its satisfaction under all circumstances, even while its balance sheet and excess 
reserves are exceptionally large, the Federal Reserve has developed the capacity 
to operate directly with non-bank lenders active in bank funding markets, using 
temporary reverse repos on which those non-banks can earn interest.21 
For many years, the Federal Reserve has used the overnight federal funds rate 
as a guide to its policy stance – in effect, this rate has served as a target for open 
market operations directed by the FOMC.22 The measure used to monitor this rate 
is based on overnight federal funds transactions collected from several brokers 
active  in  bank  funding  markets  and  published  daily  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank of New York. As a by-product of the very large volume of reserves in 
the  banking  system,  the  level  of  federal  funds  trading  activity  has  declined 
considerably and the GSEs are believed to account for most of the remaining 
19  For many months after the IOER rate was cut to 25 basis points, the spread over the overnight 
federal funds rate averaged about 10 basis points. More recently the spread has been close to 
5 basis points.
20  For this reason it is not accurate to refer to these as being interbank markets, even when 
discussing the period before the crisis when interbank activity was a much larger share of 
total activity.
21  This approach has been likened to use of both a “belt and suspenders” to ensure control of 
monetary policy. See “The Economic Outlook and the Fed’s Balance Sheet: The Issue of 
‘How’ versus ‘When’”, a speech by William Dudley, 29 July 2009, available at http://www.
newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/dud090729.html. Also, the Federal Reserve has 
explored ways in which it could encourage more competition among banks to borrow from 
non-banks so as to narrow the spread between the interest rate paid on excess reserves and 
banks’ funding costs when excess reserve levels are elevated. 
22  For an example of how the federal funds rate historically has been used as a target, see 
“Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, June 27-28, 2007,” which can be found 
at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20070628.htm.  The  operating  directive 
from this meeting reads, in part: “To further its long run objectives, the Committee in 
the immediate future seeks conditions in reserve markets consistent with maintaining the 
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federal funds lending to banks. This reduction in trading activity has raised some 
concern that the funds rate could become a less reliable indicator of conditions 
in short-term money markets in a high excess reserves environment. However, 
correlations between short-term movements in the federal funds rate and other 
overnight  money  market  rates  have  remained  around  pre-crisis  levels  since 
December 2008. These relationships appeared to have been only temporarily 
disrupted amid the exceptional trading conditions immediately after the Lehman 
Brothers failure. This suggests not only that the federal funds rate remains an 
effective operating target for policy even with much reduced trading volumes, 
but  also  that  alternative  market-based  overnight  interest  rate  measures  could 
serve as effective policy guides if circumstances were to cause federal funds 
trading activity to decline even further.23 
Expanded objectives for interest rates
It has been a longstanding practice at many central banks, including the Federal 
Reserve,  to  change  the  stance  of  monetary  policy  by  fostering  changes  in  a 
nominal short-term interest rate, whether these are expressed as a change in 
an  explicit  target  for  a  short-term  rate  or  are  just  the  expected  outcome  of 
discretionary reserve operations and changes in central bank administered rates. 
The conventional view is that changes in short-term rates, and associated changes 
in  the  expected  future  path  of  these  rates,  can  have  an  important  influence 
on  macroeconomic  conditions  operating through  their  impact  on  longer-term 
interest rates and other financial variables. 
An important lesson of this past crisis is that even when operating at or near the 
zero bound for short-term rates, the central bank can still provide additional policy 
accommodation for achieving its macroeconomic objectives by fostering lower 
long-term private borrowing rates through a reduction in the term premium.24 
The large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programmes of the Federal Reserve were 
seen as having been effective in this way, operating through a number of possible 
channels, including a “portfolio balance” channel, although they were also partly 
motivated by other considerations.25 However, central banks have relatively little 
experience with operations designed to influence the term premium in long-term 
rates. Unlike arrangements needed to achieve particular outcomes for short-term 
interest rates, which are generally well developed and understood, the balance 
sheet adjustments needed to achieve particular outcomes for long-term rates, 
which  are  not  easily  calibrated.  Moreover,  the  implications  for  the  size  and 
composition of assets on the balance sheet of such operations can place practical 
restrictions on their use and require the central bank to accept greater financial 
23  In practice, availability of timely and representative measures of overnight interest rates 
in wholesale funding markets is somewhat limited. In part to address this deficiency, on 
1 November 2010 the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation began to publish average 
daily  interest  rates  for  General  Collateral  Finance  repos  against  Treasury,  agency  and 
agency mortgage-backed securities collateral. 
24  Enhanced communication that affects the anticipated future path of short-term interest rates 
can also affect longer-term rates through an expectations channel. 
25  An independent impact of LSAPs operating through the expansion of bank reserves by itself 
cannot be entirely discounted, although we do not believe this to have been an important 
transmission channel. For a further discussion of the Federal Reserve’s LSAP programmes, 
including its transmission mechanisms, see Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010). 336 HILTON, MCANDREWS
risk. Nonetheless, operations designed to influence long-term interest rates by 
acting on their term premium remain a useful supplement to operations aimed at 
controlling short-term rates.
3.2  DOMESTIC PORTFOLIO AND OPERATIONS
Structure of the portfolio and operations
Over the years, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the policy-making 
body that directs open market operations, has consistently expressed a strong 
preference for minimising the extent to which the Federal Reserve’s portfolio 
and its market operations affect the allocation of credit among private borrowers 
and sectors of the economy. This preference has been reflected in a portfolio 
that historically has consisted predominantly of outright holdings of Treasury 
securities.26 A  portfolio consisting primarily of outright Treasury holdings is 
also  seen  as  having  several  other  favourable  characteristics.  Their  plentiful 
supply and well-developed secondary markets afford considerable balance sheet 
liquidity and flexibility, and credit risk is minimal.27 The acquisition of a sizable 
amount of agency mortgage-backed securities and agency debt from 2008 to 
2010, as well as the extension of a substantial amount of shorter-term credit 
through a variety of lending programmes earlier, represented major departures 
from this norm, ones designed to address severe financial and economic strains.   
But policy-makers have reaffirmed the desire to eventually restore the portfolio 
to its historical composition of essentially all Treasury securities.28
The  structure  and  use  of  temporary  open  market  operations,  most  notably 
short-term repurchase agreements, historically has also reflected a preference 
to minimise the role of the Federal Reserve in allocating credit and has served 
to limit its role as an intermediary in funding markets during normal periods 
to  the  regular  provision  of  a  modest  amount  of  relatively  short-term  credit.   
26  The Federal Reserve Act limits the types of financial assets that may be acquired in open 
market operations by the Federal Reserve. Included are all US Treasury securities, as well 
as securities fully guaranteed by the United States, securities issued by US GSEs, and those 
securities fully guaranteed by GSEs. In 2001 the FOMC considered the management of the 
Federal Reserve’s asset portfolio in light of the rapid declines at that time in the amount 
of Treasury debt outstanding. Two alternatives considered were purchases of Ginnie Mae 
securities, which are fully guaranteed by the United States and thus eligible for open 
market purchases under the Federal Reserve Act, and large-scale extensions of term loans, 
similar in many ways to the later TAF programme, which could be arranged under discount 
window lending authority provided in the Federal Reserve Act. Both alternatives were seen 
as enabling the Federal Reserve to realise its monetary policy objectives. But these, and the 
other alternatives considered, were viewed as less desirable than maintaining a portfolio of 
outright Treasury holdings so long as the supply of Treasury debt remained sufficient.
27  The degree of liquidity and flexibility is partly a function of the maturity composition of 
these holdings, a topic that is not addressed in this paper.
28  See “Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, April 27-28, 2010,” which can be 
found  at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20100428.pdf. 
At this meeting, policy-makers also expressed the desire to reduce the size of the balance 
sheet and reserve balances “to amounts consistent with more normal operations of money 
markets and monetary policy”. However, this would not preclude making changes to the 
operating framework that could leave reserve levels much higher than their historical norms 
in order to improve the functioning of the framework. We consider such possibilities later 
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For many years eligible collateral has been limited to US government securities, 
with counterparties – securities dealers capable of meeting the business needs 
of the Federal Reserve – being relatively few in number. The use of temporary 
operations  has  been  structured  to  avoid  routine  reliance  on  standing  lending 
facilities that are available to the wider set of banking institutions against broad 
pools of collateral.
Many aspects surrounding the use of temporary operations for when the balance 
sheet  has  been  normalised  remain  undetermined  and  could  depend  on  other 
design features of the operating framework. Indeed, the Federal Reserve has 
developed the capability to arrange large-scale reverse repurchase agreements 
with an expanded set of counterparties, although this has been done with the 
smooth  exit  from  the  period  of  exceptional  policy  accommodation  in  mind.   
Also, the structure of money markets is likely to evolve significantly in the 
wake of the financial crisis and subsequent financial reform efforts. However, 
we believe that use of temporary operations in normal operating environments 
should continue to be structured to limit the Federal Reserve’s role in credit 
allocation and as an intermediary in funding markets.29
Whatever the exact form of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio once conditions have 
normalised, a key lesson reinforced by the recent period of financial turmoil is 
the need for the central bank to be able to alter the size and composition of its 
balance sheet quickly and effectively in support of unconventional policies during 
extraordinary episodes. This support could take the form of any of the market-
wide, credit-easing measures (outside of lending to individual entities) that were 
adopted by the Federal Reserve during the crisis – purchasing longer-term or 
alternative types of assets, various forms of lending to financial institutions, or 
providing liquidity directly to key credit markets.30 The Federal Reserve was able 
to devise new types of operations and facilities fairly quickly amid the financial 
crisis  because  many  of  these  newer  activities  leveraged  settlement  practices, 
collateral management arrangements and transactional relationships utilised in 
its normal open market operations or discount window lending programmes.   
In the future, this ability to transition from a normal to an exceptional operating 
mode will be enhanced by the experiences gained during the period of financial 
turmoil  and  from  the  continued  availability  of  some  operational  tools  and 
procedures  that  were  developed  to  support  certain  unconventional  activities. 
29  To some degree this has been ensured because temporary operations outstanding have 
typically been a small share of the total balance sheet and of activity in the markets in which 
intervention has occurred. However, other considerations or circumstances can sometimes 
result in temporary operations representing a much greater share of each. Even in these 
circumstances, however, restricting lending activity to operations with Treasury or other 
high quality collateral should limit the extent to which the Federal Reserve allocates credit 
to individual borrowers. 
30  Where an expansion of assets is involved, specific circumstances will determine whether 
this also involves a corresponding reduction in existing holdings of Treasury securities, an 
expansion of reserve liabilities, or some other balance sheet offset.338 HILTON, MCANDREWS
For these reasons, we do not believe that ensuring the ability to adopt credit-
easing policies quickly and effectively in the future requires regular use of these 
techniques during normal times.31
Capacity to manage risk in potential lending operations 
The  Federal  Reserve  has  gained  experience,  through  operating  the  lending 
facilities during the crisis, in evaluating the credit quality of collateral pledged 
to it. The Federal Reserve Banks employ staff to examine and test the credit 
quality of collateral that is pledged, and which could be pledged, to the discount 
window. The Federal Reserve has established acceptance criteria and approaches 
to valuations, as well as margins for discount window collateral (available at 
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/discountmargins.cfm?hdrID=21&dtlID=83). 
These practices have served the Federal Reserve and the public well in both 
publicising the Federal Reserve’s policies and in managing its risks.
During the crisis, the Federal Reserve expanded the set of collateral against 
which it lent, and managed the risks in its lending in ways different from its 
usual practices at the discount window (of overnight lending, with recourse, 
to supervised depository institutions, collateralised by a pre-announced set of 
collateral with preset margins and valuation criteria). In the future, circumstances 
could result in the Federal Reserve lending for terms longer than overnight, 
against collateral that has not been previously accepted at the discount window, 
and possibly on a non-recourse basis. Because of this, a lesson from the crisis 
is the need for an expanded credit risk management approach in normal times, 
in which the Federal Reserve evaluates the credit risk characteristics of broad 
classes of securities that could potentially serve as collateral in a lending facility 
in unusual and exigent circumstances.
3.3  RESERVE BALANCES 3 2
Historical role of reserves in the monetary policy 
implementation framework
For years prior to September 2008, the level of reserve balances had been largely 
an  outgrowth  of  the  reserve  accounting  framework  adopted  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  for  monetary  policy  implementation  and,  particularly,  the  reserve 
31  Under the set of arrangements envisioned here, only the primary credit facility would be 
a permanent standing facility. Use of other tools would by triggered by discrete decisions 
made by policy-makers. Under the legal framework of the Federal Reserve Act, some 
types of lending arrangements, including several of the facilities adopted during the recent 
financial turmoil, can only be invoked if conditions are found to be “unusual and exigent”. 
The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 made several amendments 
to the Federal Reserve’s lending authorities, including new disclosure requirements.
32   Throughout this section, the term “reserve balances” is used to refer to all balances held 
by depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks, including the balances held to meet 
contractual clearing balance agreements, although technically these are not considered to be 
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requirement ratios set by the Board of Governors.33 The primary function of the 
reserve accounting framework had been to facilitate control of the overnight 
federal funds rate, in part by providing a predictable level of reserve demand. 
In  many  ways  the  design  details  of  this  operating  framework  were  a  relic 
inherited  from  an  earlier  era,  when  reserve  requirements  were  viewed  as  a 
tool that could be used to directly control certain money aggregates. But long 
after this had ceased to be an important concern of policy-makers, the basic 
reserve requirement structure remained a serviceable arrangement for targeting   
short-term  interest  rates.  The  exact  level  of  reserve  requirements  needed  for 
this purpose proved to be somewhat irrelevant.34 And from 1989 to 2000 the 
level of reserve requirements and balances steadily fell as a direct consequence 
of the fact that the Federal Reserve could not pay interest on required reserves. 
During that period, the Federal Reserve cut reserve requirement ratios close to 
their statutory minimums in order to lighten the implicit cost they imposed on 
depository  institutions.35  Depository  institutions  also  subsequently  developed 
mechanisms for effectively circumventing most remaining reserve requirements by   
employing  retail  sweep  account  programmes.  As  a  result,  reserve  balances 
averaged  around  only  USD  15  billion  in  2007  compared  with  about   
USD 40 billion at their peak in 1988.36 
33  More specifically, it was the level of reserve requirements not satisfied by banks’ holdings 
of vault cash, plus the level of contractual clearing balances, that was most critical for 
determining the supply of reserve balances that the Federal Reserve would provide. A brief 
description of reserve requirements and links to other materials that describe the Federal 
Reserve’s reserve accounting framework in more detail and provide some history can be 
found on the public website of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm.  Further  information, 
including an overview of contractual clearing balances and the Federal Reserve’s broader 
role in the payments system, is found in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2005), “The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions”, available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pf/pf.htm.
34  The flexibility around maintenance period average requirements that carry-over privileges 
provided was more critical for dampening the volatility of short-term interest rates than the 
level of reserve requirements.
35  The statutory minimum reserve requirement ratio was 8% on transaction deposit liabilities 
and 0% on all other bank deposits. The same legislation that authorised the Federal Reserve 
to pay interest on reserves also reduced the statutory minimum reserve requirement ratio to 
0% on all bank deposit liabilities.
36  These amounts include between USD 1 billion and USD 2 billion of excess reserves in 
both years. They also include USD 2 billion in contractual clearing balances in 1988 and 
USD 7 billion in 2007. Measured as a proportion of bank deposit liabilities, the decline in 
reserve balances would appear much more dramatic, especially if the growth in clearing 
balances over that interval were excluded. Note that an implicit form of interest could 
be earned on contractual clearing balances, with practical limits on their use set by the 
programme, and to some degree their growth was a direct response to the decline in reserve 
requirements. It had been feared that the decline in reserve balances associated with the 
advent of retail sweep account programmes might lead to a loss in control over the federal 
funds rate. But while this decline did contribute to more daily volatility in the overnight 
rate, it did not undermine the ability to control average levels of the rate around its target. 
More discussion of the growth in retail sweep accounts and its impact on rate behaviour can 
be found in Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1998), “Open Market Operations during 
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Lessons from the crisis for the role of reserves in the design  
of a new operating framework
Largely absent from the historical operating framework was an ability to provide 
reserve balances, at reasonable cost and consistent with the Federal Reserve’s 
operating objectives for short-term interest rates, for purposes other than enabling 
banks to meet their reserve requirements.37 These other purposes include the 
potential  value  of  reserve  balances  for  improving  efficiency  and  reducing 
risks associated with banks’ wholesale payment and settlement activities, and 
satisfying banks’ demands for highly liquid risk-free assets at competitive rates. 
The importance of the ability to supply reserve balances for these other purposes 
was highlighted during the financial crisis and the ability to pay interest on 
reserves should allow the Federal Reserve to design an operating framework that 
explicitly recognises the value of reserve balances to banks for these economic 
purposes.
Reserve balances play a key role in Fedwire, the major large-value payment 
system in the United States owned and operated by the Federal Reserve, where 
their transfer is used to settle transactions between participants, to settle net 
obligations on ancillary payment systems such as CHIPS and to settle obligations 
that arise from the operation of equity, bond and money markets.38 The Federal 
Reserve provides uncollateralised daylight overdrafts to depository institutions 
under  certain  conditions  to  promote  the  efficient  functioning  of  Fedwire.   
Thus, there is a small risk that a Fedwire participant could access uncollateralised 
credit  before  the  Federal  Reserve  realises  that  its  financial  condition  has 
deteriorated. The Federal Reserve applies a fee for the daylight overdrafts it 
extends, but its level must balance objectives of managing risk with maintaining 
payment system efficiency. Also, participants can manage their risks and costs to 
some degree by choosing the time at which to send payments over Fedwire.
Historically, the net effect of payment system policies and institutional practices 
combined with low levels of reserves had been a relatively high level of daylight 
overdrafts and a high proportion of payments settled late in the day. In early 2007 
the daily average and peak daylight overdrafts averaged about USD 45 billion 
and USD 125 billion, respectively. In addition, roughly 60% of the value of 
funds transfers made over Fedwire was settled after 3.30 pm, with about 30% 
settled after 5 pm.39 However, the expansion of reserve balances since September 
2008 has led to a substantial decrease in daylight overdraft credit extended by 
the Federal Reserve and a quickening of settlements. During the first quarter 
of 2010, average and peak daylight overdrafts were USD 3 billion and USD   
37  To some degree the contractual clearing balance programme was an exception. As its name 
suggests, it was intended to support clearing activities of banks whose reserve requirement 
levels were low and, in fact, it could be used by banks to satisfy demands for reserve 
balances for any purpose. But an inability to pay explicit interest on these balances greatly 
limited the effectiveness of this programme. 
38  For an overview of the key wholesale payment systems operated by the Federal Reserve, 
Federal Reserve System payment systems policies and the experience in the high reserve 
environment, see Bech, Martin and McAndrews (2010).
39  Fedwire’s operating day begins at 9 pm Eastern Time on the preceding calendar day and 
ends at 6.30 pm. Transfers between banks on behalf of third parties are scheduled to be 
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13 billion respectively, and the share of payments settled after 3.30 pm and   
5 pm had fallen to less than 45% and 20%, respectively. These developments 
have reduced the intermediary role of the Federal Reserve and the associated 
credit  and  operational  risks,  as  well  as  contributed  to  other  less  measurable 
efficiency  gains  in  payments.40  Symptomatic  of  reduced  strains  and  risks  in 
payment systems, there has also been noticeably less volatility in and upward 
pressure on interest rates in short-term bank funding markets on days that are 
characterised by relatively high and uncertain payment flows. 
Beyond meeting reserve requirements and facilitating payments activities, banks 
demand reserve balances as a highly liquid asset bearing no credit risk to help 
manage their balance sheet risks, provided they are available at a competitive 
rate. The need for such assets can swing substantially, as was demonstrated 
at several points during the financial crisis when banks’ desire to reduce risk 
exposures was apparent or when banks faced the abrupt need to finance the 
liabilities of conduits and structured investment vehicles they had sponsored.   
The ability to supply reserve balances in a flexible manner that is still consistent 
with  maintaining  objectives  for  short-term  rates  would  have  been  helpful  at 
several  points  during  the  financial  crisis  prior  to  September  2008  to  meet 
heightened demands by depository institutions for risk-free liquid assets and to 
help moderate rate pressures seen in short-term funding markets. 
The design of a new operating framework should support the supply of reserve 
balances in a manner that recognises their various attributes described in this 
section, while also providing a mechanism for the Federal Reserve to achieve 
operating objectives for short-term interest rates. At the same time, the framework 
should allow the Federal Reserve to pursue other policy objectives that could 
entail  changing  the  size  or  composition  of  the  assets  on  its  balance  sheet.   
This was not feasible so long as the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves 
was kept relatively high, or other mechanisms were not available to adjust the 
supply of reserve balances for other purposes in a way consistent with targeting 
short-term interest rates. But not all frameworks that pay interest on reserves will 
necessarily satisfy all these objectives. For example, frameworks built around a 
traditional reserve requirement structure in which there exists a relatively high 
marginal opportunity cost to holding excess reserves are unlikely to support all 
these goals. The resulting level of reserve balances would likely be somewhat 
arbitrary,  reflecting  the  level  of  the  requirements  rather  than  their  economic 
value. And even if reserve requirement ratios were deliberately set to generate 
a high level of reserve balances in the aggregate, they are not a flexible tool for 
meeting large shifts in demand or supply arising from various sources and their 
incidence is unlikely to align with individual bank preferences for holding reserve 
40  Coincidentally,  both  of  these  improvements  were  objectives  for  other  revisions  to  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  Payment  System  Risk  policy  adopted  in  late  2008,  but  initiated 
much earlier, and to be implemented in early 2011. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/other/20081219a.htm  and  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
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balances. More promising are approaches in which either the reserve accounting 
structure is sufficiently flexible to accommodate even large and frequent changes 
in  individual  bank  demands  for  holding  reserve  balances,  or  which  dispense 
with a reserve accounting structure altogether and sufficient reserve balances are 
provided to align market rates with the interest rate paid on reserves.
4  CONCLUSIONS
We outlined three key challenges that the Federal Reserve confronted in pursuing 
its  responses  to  the  financial  crisis:  (i)  constraints  on  the  use  of  its  balance 
sheet  imposed  by  its  traditional  operating  framework;  (ii)  stigma  associated 
with  borrowing  from  its  traditional  lending  facilities;  and  (iii)  the  need  for 
new collateral arrangements to support non-traditional forms of lending. In the 
second part of this paper, we considered the lessons learned during the crisis 
for the design of the future operating framework, focusing on three components 
of  the  framework:  (i)  policies  for  administered  and  market  interest  rates;   
(ii)  the  structure  of  the  portfolio  of  domestic  assets;  and  (iii)  the  role  and 
objectives for reserve balances in the framework. 
Among the lessons we drew are that: (i) any future operating framework of the 
Federal Reserve should utilise its authority to pay interest on reserves to preserve 
the ability to adopt, as needed, other policies that have implications for the size 
and composition of its balance sheet, including the level of reserves, even when 
not operating at the zero bound for short-term rates; (ii) there is a need for an 
expanded credit risk management approach in normal times, in which the Federal 
Reserve evaluates the credit risk characteristics of broad classes of securities that 
could potentially serve as collateral in a lending facility in unusual and exigent 
circumstances; (iii) there is a need for the central bank to be able to alter the 
size and composition of its balance sheet quickly and effectively in support of 
unconventional policies during extraordinary episodes; and (iv) that the design 
of a new operating framework should support the supply of reserve balances in a 
manner that recognises their various attributes, while also providing a mechanism 
for the Federal Reserve to achieve its operating objectives for short-term interest 
rates.
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APPENDIX A: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S   
LENDING FACILITIES
The  literature  that  examines  the  effects  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  various 
responses to the financial crisis is growing quickly. Here we provide a brief 
summary. Overall, the facilities examined in the literature to date have been 
judged to have effects on market interest rates in a way consistent with their 
objectives, with some notable exceptions. Many of the studies rely on an event 
study methodology, which limits the extent to which one can make judgments 
about the appropriate size of a facility or the responsiveness of market interest 
rates to changes in the size of the programme, largely as a result of the difficulty 
of precisely identifying the moment at which information was released to the 
market, or gauging the pace of information releases about programmes whose 
parameters were released over time.
A number of papers examine effects of the TAF. The TAF was intended to 
provide access to term funding for depository institutions that were constrained 
in their access to term funds. Most papers proxy for access to term funding by 
examining whether the TAF had any effects on the USD term LIBOR (as the 
LIBOR is an imperfect proxy, finding no effect on LIBOR does not suggest that 
the TAF reduced constraints on many banks’ access to term funds). Papers by 
Christensen  (2009),  Christensen,  Lopez  and  Rudebusch  (2009),  McAndrews, 
Sarkar and Wang (2008), Taylor and Williams (2009), Wright (2008) and Wu 
(2008) all analyse the TAF’s effects on the USD LIBOR. Taylor and Williams is 
an outlier, finding no effects for the TAF on LIBOR when testing for perfectly 
transitory effects, while the other papers find economically significant reductions 
in  LIBOR  when  using  test  designs  that  allow  for  persistent  effects  of  TAF 
auctions on the LIBOR. These papers are consistent with the view that the TAF 
ameliorated stress in the term bank funding market, but they provide little guide 
to suggest whether an expanded programme, such as that pursued by the Federal 
Reserve in the autumn of 2008, would have had large effects if pursued in late 
2007 and early 2008.
Several  evaluations  of  the  FX  Swaps  have  been  conducted.  Aizenman  and 
Pasricha  (2009),  Baba  and  Packer  (2009),  Fleming  and  Klagge  (2010b), 
Goldberg,  Kennedy  and  Miu  (2010)  and  Obstfeld,  Shambaugh  and  Taylor 
(2009) consider a number of aspects of the programme. Fleming and Klagge 
provide a good overview of the programme and look at the USD LIBOR, the 
dollar basis for foreign exchange swap trades and the stop-out rates for foreign 
central banks’ auctions of dollars; movements in these variables were generally 
supportive of the hypothesis that the FX Swaps reduced stress in USD funding 
markets. Baba and Packer conduct a careful econometric evaluation of deviations 
in  covered  interest  rate  parity  during  the  period  between  the  US  dollar  and 
three other currencies, namely the pound sterling, the euro and the Swiss franc.   
They find that both the level and volatility of deviations from covered interest 
parity declined with announcements of increases in the FX Swap programme. 
Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu caution that it is hard to isolate announcement 
and operations effects during the volatile periods under study. Those authors 
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significant credit tiering remained pervasive in these funding markets. Aizenman 
and  Pasricha  and,  separately,  Obstfeld,  Shambaugh  and  Taylor  examine  the 
relationships between the FX Swap facilities and various features of the countries 
with which they were established.
Fleming, Hrung and Keane (2009, 2010) examine the effects of the TSLF on repo 
rates. They find that the TSLF auctions that swapped the least liquid collateral 
types for Treasury securities had significant effects in increasing repo rates for 
Treasury, agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities rates, suggesting 
these asset classes were reasonably close substitutes. They also find that the 
spread  between  agency  debt  and  agency  mortgage-backed  securities  rates  to 
Treasury rates narrowed following those auctions, suggesting that the TSLF had 
some beneficial effects in reducing market illiquidity (repo rates for less liquid 
collateral types are not well reported; consequently, the authors could not directly 
test the effect of TSLF on those markets). 
Adrian, Kimbrough and Marchioni (2010) and Curdia and Woodford (2010) 
examine the effects of the CPFF on issuance of commercial paper and commercial 
paper rates. Both papers point out that interest rates on eligible commercial paper 
fell quickly with implementation of the programme, while ineligible paper did 
not experience the same fall in rates. In addition, commercial paper issuance of 
eligible issuers increased markedly after the implementation of the programme.
Artuc and Demiralp (2010), Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2010) and Armantier, 
Ghysels,  Sarkar  and  Shrader  (2010)  analyse  various  aspects  of  the  discount 
window.  Artuc  and  Demiralp  calibrate  a  model  to  the  period  between  1998 
and 2007. They find that the changes to the discount window in 2003 caused 
a significant decline in stigma costs of borrowing from the discount window. 
Out-of-sample predictions from the model under-predict the spread between the 
daily high federal funds rate and the target rate during the crisis. They perform 
various experiments in varying parameters of the model, finding that a return to 
the pre-2003 regime would increase volatility significantly. Ashcraft, Bech and 
Frame point out the role played by the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system 
during the period from August 2007 to September 2008 in complementing the 
discount window, a time when the FHLBs expanded the provision of term credit 
to banks significantly. They speculate that had the FHLBs not been available, 
the Federal Reserve would have had to have requested the operation of the SFP 
or the authority to pay interest on reserves much sooner in the crisis. Armantier, 
Ghysels, Sarkar and Shrader perform a structural test of stigma in borrowing at 
the discount window by using the bids submitted in TAF auctions, finding that 
the realised cost of stigma is in the order of 20 to 40 basis points. Borrowing at 
the discount window increases a bank’s funding costs in the federal funds market, 
but no such effect is found for TAF borrowing, suggesting that TAF was largely 
free of stigma.
Cecchetti  (2008),  Fleming  and  Klagge  (2010a)  and  Kuttner  (2008)  examine 
the asset holdings of the Federal Reserve and focus on the income effects of 
the Federal Reserve’s actions during the crisis. Cecchetti reviews the Federal 
Reserve’s  actions  early  in  the  crisis  and  expresses  concern  with  the  lending 351 THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S MONETARY POLICY DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
to  assist  the  acquisition  of  Bear  Stearns  by  J.P.  Morgan  Chase,  suggesting 
that  it  could  threaten  the  Federal  Reserve’s  independence  by  stepping  into 
fiscal policy. Fleming and Klagge measure the income effects of the Federal 
Reserve’s liquidity facilities between 2007 and late 2009. Given the low credit 
risks in the programme, it was fairly straightforward to show the considerable 
income generated by the facilities. Kuttner focuses on this question, in part, and 
expresses concern about credit losses in the Maiden Lane facilities associated 
with the lending related to Bear Stearns and the lending to AIG. He points out 
that such facilities had significant credit risk embedded and that losses in those 
programmes would likely have exposed the Federal Reserve to reduced political 
independence as it would likely have sought recapitalisation.
The effects of the purchase programmes of the Federal Reserve are examined 
by  D’Amico  and  King  (2010),  Gagnon,  Raskin,  Remache  and  Sack  (2010), 
Stroebel and Taylor (2009) and Thornton (2009). D’Amico and King examine 
the  purchase  programme’s  effects  using  a  daily  panel  data  set  of  securities 
prices  and  find  significant  effects  both  upon  announcement  and  with  each 
purchase operation. Gagnon et al. consider announcement effects and construct 
a measure of the amount of long-duration securities removed from the public as 
the programme operated. Stroebel and Taylor find little effect of the mortgage-
backed securities purchase programme after controlling for the co-movement 
of various risk factors that are correlated with mortgage-backed security prices. 
Using their measures they find results that confirm the announcement effects of 
the purchase programmes. Moreover, their measure allows them to calculate an 
interest rate sensitivity to the size of the purchases, suggesting that, in sum, the 
large-scale asset purchase programme reduced the ten-year term premium by 
between 28 and 82 basis points, similar to the measures of the announcement 
effects of the programme. Thornton measures the slope of the yield curve and 
finds that the early part of the programme, through the spring of 2009, did not 
appear to permanently flatten the Treasury yield curve.
This brief review of the effects of some of the policy responses by the Federal 
Reserve to the financial crisis suggest that the early analyses of the policies 
generally found evidence in support of the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve’s 
policies  were  effective  in  reducing  stress  in  financial  markets  by  reducing 
elevated costs of borrowing. However, many of the studies rely on reviewing 
interest rates around programme announcement dates. This approach is limited 
in many dimensions, but is being supplemented as researchers find alternative 
methods to test the persistence of the effects found and to measure the sensitivity 
of interest rates to changes in programme sizes.352 HILTON, MCANDREWS
APPENDIX B: AN OUTLINE OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM, AUGUST 2007-MARCH 2010
August 2007 up to September 2008  1. 
  August  to  December  2007:  traditional  tools  of  monetary  policy  –  the  a. 
target and primary rates and open market operations
Pre-crisis: i. 
On 7 August 2007, the eve of the crisis, the FOMC “reiterated that the  1. 
predominant policy concern remained the risk that inflation would 
fail to moderate as expected” (Board of Governors (2008c)).
No change in policy, just more standard liquidity provision: ii. 
On 10 August 2007, amid disruptions in the overnight federal funds  1. 
market, the Federal Reserve states that: “The Federal Reserve will 
provide reserves as necessary through open market operations to 
promote trading in the federal funds market at rates close to the 
Federal Open Market Committee’s target rate of 5-1/4 percent... 
As always, the discount window is available as a source of funding.” 
(Board of Governors (2007a))
Reductions in rates: iii. 
On  17  August  2007  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  announces  a    1. 
“temporary” cut of the spread between the primary credit rate and 
the target rate to 50 basis points and increased the term to 30 days.   
It states that “these changes are designed to provide depositories 
with greater assurance about the cost and availability of funding” 
(Board of Governors (2007b)).
On 18 September 2007 the FOMC cuts the federal funds rate by  2. 
50 basis points to 4.75%, the first of 3 cuts in 2007 that would 
take the target to 4.25% by 11 December 2007. The FOMC states 
that this “action is intended to help forestall some of the adverse 
effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the 
disruptions in financial markets and to promote moderate growth 
over time” (Board of Governors (2007c)).
  December  2007  to  September  2008:  auctions.  Liquidity  programmes:    b. 
TAF, Swap lines, TSLF, Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).
At  2007  year-end,  “financial  strains  were  exacerbated  by  concerns  i. 
related  to  year-end  pressures  in  short-term  funding  markets,  and 
similar stresses were evident in the financial markets of major foreign 
economies” (SBoard of Governors (2008c)).
As such, on 12 December 2007, the Board of Governors-approved  1. 
Term Auction Facility is announced. The goal: “By allowing the 
Federal Reserve to inject term funds through a broader range of 
counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open 
market  operations,  this  facility  could  help  promote  the  efficient 
dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank markets 
are under stress.” (Board of Governors (2007d)) The first auction 
is scheduled for 17 December 2007, allocating USD 20 billion in 
funds. 353 THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S MONETARY POLICY DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
In  addition,  also  on  12  December  2007,  the  FOMC-approved  2. 
swap lines with the ECB – USD 20 billion – and SNB – USD   
4 billion – are announced, for up to six months (Board of Governors 
(2007d)).
In January 2008 the FOMC reacts to financial market stress, tightening  ii. 
credit, deteriorating housing and softening labour by cutting the target 
twice in nine days (22 and 30 January 2008), making a cumulative drop 
of 125 basis points (Board of Governors (2008a, 2008b)).
Bear Stearns events: iii. 
7 March 2008: The TAF is increased to USD 100 billion outstanding.  1. 
Single-tranche open market operations are announced with 28-day 
maturity, accepting conventional open market operation collateral 
(Board of Governors 2008d).
11  March  2008:  “In  light  of  the  sharp  deterioration  of  some  2. 
key  money  and  credit  markets,  the  Committee  approved  the 
establishment of the Term Securities Lending Facility, under which 
primary dealers would be able to borrow Treasury securities from 
the System Open Market Account for a term of approximately one 
month against any collateral eligible for open market operations and 
the highest-quality private residential mortgage-backed securities.” 
(Board of Governors (2008h)).
11 March 2008: The FOMC announces that swap lines with the  3. 
ECB and SNB are increased to USD 30 billion and USD 6 billion, 
respectively, and the end date extended until the end of September 
2008 (Board of Governors (2008e)).
14  March  2008:  “The  Board  voted  unanimously  to  approve  the  4. 
arrangement announced by JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns this 
morning.” (Board of Governors (2008f)).
16 March 2008: The Board announces the creation of the PDCF,  5. 
cuts the spread between the primary credit rate and the target rate 
to 25 basis points and extends primary credit loans to as much as   
90 days (Board of Governors (2008g)).
18 March 2008: “All in all, most members judged that a 75 basis  6. 
point reduction in the target federal funds rate, to 2.25 percent, was 
appropriate to address the combination of risks of slowing economic 
growth, inflationary pressures, and financial market developments.” 
(Board of Governors (k2008h))
Summer of 2008: iv. 
30  April  2008:  “Participants  expressed  significant  uncertainty  1. 
concerning  the  appropriate  stance  of  monetary  policy  in  these 
circumstances. Some participants noted that the level of the federal 
funds target… was relatively low by historical standards. Others 
noted that financial market strains and elevated risk spreads had 
offset much of the effects of policy easing on the cost of credit to 
borrowers. On balance, most members agreed that the target for the 
federal funds rate should be lowered 25 basis points, to 2 percent.” 
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30 April 2008: Swap lines with the ECB and SNB are increased to  2. 
USD 50 billion and USD 12 billion, respectively, and extended until 
the end of January 2009. The TSLF Schedule 2 list is increased to 
include all AAA-rated asset-backed securities. “Bernanke announced 
his intention to expand the Term Auction Facility to $150 billion.” 
(Board of Governors (2008h)).
30 July 2008: PDCF and TSLF are extended until the end of January  3. 
2009. The TSLF Options programme is announced. 84-day TAF 
auctions are introduced. The ECB swap line is increased from USD 
50 billion to USD 55 billion (Board of Governors (2008i)).
September 2008 to March 2010 2. 
  Unconventional lending a. 
Lehman and AIG: i. 
16  September  2008:  “Financial  strains  had  increased  over  the  1. 
intermeeting period, although the consequences of the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers Holdings on September 15 were not yet clear at 
the time of the meeting. Indeed, the substantial easing of monetary 
policy over the previous year, combined with ongoing measures to 
foster market liquidity, was seen as likely to support activity going 
forward.  Thus,  members  agreed  that  keeping  the  federal  funds 
target rate unchanged at 2 percent at the September meeting was 
appropriate.” (Board of Governors (2009b)).
16 September 2008: “The Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday, with  2. 
the full support of the Treasury Department, authorized the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American 
International Group (AIG) under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act . The AIG facility has a 24-month term. Interest will accrue on 
the outstanding balance at a rate of three-month Libor plus 850 basis 
points. AIG will be permitted to draw up to $85 billion under the 
facility… The U.S. government will receive a 79.9 percent equity 
interest in AIG and has the right to veto the payment of dividends 
to  common  and  preferred  shareholders.”  (Board  of  Governors 
(2008k)).
Money market mutual funds:  ii. 
17  September  2008:  The  Treasury  announces  a  temporary  1. 
Supplementary  Financing  Program  to  fund  the  Federal  Reserve 
(Board of Governors (2009b)).
19 September 2008: The AMLF is announced. Plans to purchase  2. 
agency  discount  notes  from  primary  dealers  are  also  announced 
(Board of Governors (2008l)).
24 September 2008: The first of several post-Lehman swap line  3. 
expansions are announced (Board of Governors (2008m)).
6 October 2008: The Board announces IOR and IOER to begin on  4. 
9 October 2008. IOR is set at the average target over a maintenance 
period less 10 basis points, and IOER is set at the lowest target over 
a maintenance period less 75 basis points. “The payment of interest 
on  excess  reserves  will  permit  the  Federal  Reserve  to  expand 
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to  support  financial  stability  while  implementing  the  monetary 
policy that is appropriate in light of the System’s macroeconomic 
objectives of maximum employment and price stability.” (Board of 
Governors (2008n)).
6 October 2008: The 28 and 84-day TAF auctions are both increased  5. 
to USD 150 billion in size, which brings the amount outstanding 
under  the  TAF  to  USD  600  billion.  The  two  forward  auctions 
for 2008 year-end are also boosted to USD 150 billion each, to 
bring the amount outstanding in the TAF over year-end to USD   
900 billion (Board of Governors (2008o)).
6 October 2008: An exemption is granted to section 23A of the  6. 
Federal  Reserve  Act  and  the  Board’s  Regulation  W  to  allow  a 
depository  institution  to  “purchase  assets  from  affiliated  money 
market  mutual  funds  under  certain  circumstances”  (Board  of 
Governors (2008n)).
7  October  2008:  The  CPFF  is  announced  and  set  to  begin  on    7. 
27 October 2008. “The CPFF will provide a liquidity backstop to 
U.S. issuers of commercial paper through a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) that will purchase three-month unsecured and asset-backed 
commercial  paper  directly  from  eligible  issuers…  The  Treasury 
believes this facility is necessary to prevent substantial disruptions 
to the financial markets and the economy and will make a special 
deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in support of this 
facility.” (Board of Governors (2008p)).
The height of the crisis: iii. 
8  October  2008:  In  an  unscheduled  meeting,  the  target  rate  is  1. 
lowered  by  50  basis  points  to  1.5%.  “The  Bank  of  Canada, 
the  Bank  of  England,  the  European  Central  Bank,  the  Federal 
Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank, and the Swiss National Bank are today 
announcing reductions in policy interest rates. The Bank of Japan 
expresses  its  strong  support  of  these  policy  actions.”  (Board  of 
Governors (2009b, 2008q)).
13 October 2008: Swap line quantities with the Bank of England,  2. 
ECB and Swiss National Bank are uncapped (Board of Governors 
(2008r)).
21 October 2008: The Board announces the creation of the Money  3. 
Market Investor Funding Facility (Board of Governors (2008s)).   
It is never used.
22 October 2008: The Board changes the IOER rate to the lowest  4. 
target over a maintenance period less 35 basis points. “The Board 
judged that a narrower spread between the target funds rate and the 
rate on excess balances at this time would help foster trading in the 
funds market at rates closer to the target rate.” (Board of Governors 
(2008t)).
29 October 2008: The FOMC cuts the target by 50 basis points to  5. 
1% (Board of Governors (2008u)).
5 November 2008: The Board changes the IOR rate to the average  6. 
target over the maintenance period and changes the IOER rate to 
the lowest target over the maintenance period, both effective as of   
6 November 2008 (Board of Governors (2008v)).356 HILTON, MCANDREWS
25  November  2008:  “The  Federal  Reserve  Board  on  Tuesday  7. 
announced the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF), a facility that will help market participants meet the 
credit needs of households and small businesses by supporting the 
issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) collateralized by student 
loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the Small 
Business Administration (SBA).” (Board of Governors (2008w))
  LSAPs b. 
Zero-bound: i. 
25 November 2008: The Federal Reserve announces the intention  1. 
to purchase up to USD 100 billion in agency debt and up to USD 
500  billion  in  agency  mortgage-backed  securities,  taking  place 
over  several  quarters.  “This  action  is  being  taken  to  reduce  the 
cost  and  increase  the  availability  of  credit  for  the  purchase  of 
houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster 
improved conditions in financial markets more generally.” (Board 
of Governors (2008x)).
16  December  2008:  The  target  is  set  by  the  FOMC  at  a  range  2. 
of 0-0.25%, with Board setting IOR and IOER rates at 25 basis 
points. The FOMC reiterates plans to purchase agency debt and 
agency  mortgage-backed  securities  and  “is  also  evaluating  the 
potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities.” 
“The Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote 
the  resumption  of  sustainable  economic  growth  and  to  preserve 
price stability. In particular, the Committee anticipates that weak 
economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels 
of the federal funds rate for some time. The focus of the Committee’s 
policy going forward will be to support the functioning of financial 
markets and stimulate the economy through open market operations 
and other measures that sustain the size of the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet at a high level.” (Board of Governors (2008y)).
28 January 2009: The target is kept at a range of 0-0.25%. “The  3. 
Federal Reserve continues to purchase large quantities of agency 
debt  and  mortgage-backed  securities  to  provide  support  to  the 
mortgage  and  housing  markets,  and  it  stands  ready  to  expand 
the quantity of such purchases and the duration of the purchase 
program as conditions warrant. The Committee also is prepared to 
purchase longer-term Treasury securities if evolving circumstances 
indicate  that  such  transactions  would  be  particularly  effective 
in  improving  conditions  in  private  credit  markets.”  (Board  of 
Governors (2009a)).
7  February  2009:  The  FOMC  and  Board  agree  in  a  conference  4. 
call to expand the TALF using capital from the Treasury’s TARP 
(Board of Governors (2009e)).
3 March 2009: The Treasury and Federal Reserve Board announce  5. 
the TALF. “The TALF has the potential to generate up to $1 trillion 
of lending for businesses and households. The TALF is designed 
to  catalyze  the  securitization  markets  by  providing  financing  to 
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backed securities (ABS). These markets have historically been a 
critical component of lending in our financial system, but they have 
been virtually shuttered since the worsening of the financial crisis in 
October. By reopening these markets, the TALF will assist lenders 
in meeting the borrowing needs of consumers and small businesses, 
helping to stimulate the broader economy.” (Board of Governors 
(2009c)).
18 March 2009: The target range is kept at 0-0.25%. The FOMC  6. 
increases the 2009 target for purchases of agency mortgage-backed 
securities up to USD 1.25 trillion and agency debt up to USD 200 
billion.  In  addition,  it  commits  to  purchase  USD  300  billion  in 
Treasuries over the next six months (Board of Governors (2009e)).
23 March 2009: The Treasury and Federal Reserve release a joint  7. 
statement to the effect that the Treasury will respect the Federal 
Reserve’s independence and its ability to carry out its monetary 
policy objectives (Board of Governors (h2009e)).
Gradual normalisation: ii. 
25 June 2009: The Board of Governors extends the AMLF, CPFF,  1. 
PDCF  and  TSLF  (which  also  required  FOMC  approval)  until   
1 February 2010. The FOMC approves an extension of the swap 
lines to 1 February 2010. The Board reduced TAF auction sizes 
from USD 150 billion to USD 125 billion starting 13 July 2009, 
tightened  the  criteria  for  use  of  the  AMLF,  and  decided  not  to 
extend the MMIFF beyond 30 October 2009. The Board and FOMC 
discontinued the TSLF Schedule 1 auctions and Options programme 
while halving the frequency of the Schedule 2 auctions (Board of 
Governors (2009d)).
12 August 2009: The target range is kept at 0-0.25%. “The Federal  2. 
Reserve  is  in  the  process  of  buying  $300  billion  of  Treasury 
securities.  To  promote  a  smooth  transition  in  markets  as  these 
purchases  of  Treasury  securities  are  completed,  the  Committee 
has decided to gradually slow the pace of these transactions and 
anticipates that the full amount will be purchased by the end of 
October.” (Board of Governors (2009f)).
23  September  2009:  The  target  range  is  kept  at  0-0.25%.  “To  3. 
promote a smooth transition in markets as these programs concluded, 
the Committee decided to gradually slow the pace of both its agency 
MBS and agency debt purchases and to extend their completion 
through  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  2010.  To  keep  inflation 
expectations well anchored, policymakers agreed on the importance 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  continuing  to  communicate  that  it  has 
the tools and willingness to begin withdrawing monetary policy 
accommodation at the appropriate time and pace to prevent any 
persistent increase in inflation.” (Board of Governors (2010a)).
24 September 2009: The Board of Governors announces a gradual  4. 
curtailing of the TAF programme (Board of Governors (2010a)).
4 November 2009: The target range is kept at 0-0.25%. “Because  5. 
of the limited availability of agency debt and concerns that larger 
purchases  could  impair  market  functioning,  the  Committee  also 358 HILTON, MCANDREWS
agreed to specify that its agency debt purchases would cumulate 
to about $175 billion by the end of the first quarter, $25 billion 
less than the previously announced maximum for these purchases.” 
(Board of Governors (2010a)).
17 November 2009: The Board reduces the maximum maturity of  6. 
primary credit to 28 days.
1 February 2010: The PDCF, TSLF, CPFF and AMLF expire. Swap  7. 
lines are also closed (Board of Governors (2010a)).
18  February  2010:  The  primary  credit  rate  is  increased  8. 
to  0.75%,  effective  as  of  19  February  2010.  The  maximum 
maturity is shortened to overnight, effective as of 18 March 2010.   
The TAF minimum bid rate on the final 8 March auction is raised 
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COMMENT 
BY MARVIN GOODFRIEND, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY
1  INTRODUCTION
Operating  procedures  are  often  treated  as  an  afterthought  at  central  banking 
conferences.  Operational  matters  rarely  get  the  attention  they  deserve, 
relegated instead to specialists instructed to make interest rate policy decisions 
effective in markets. This is like plumbers and electricians fitting a home for 
water and electrical service based on narrow engineering considerations alone, 
with only the vague direction of architects and builders.
The  credit  turmoil  put  operational  matters  at  the  heart  of  central  banking. 
Central  bank  officials  around  the  world  worked  closely  with  operational 
specialists to create and manage an extraordinary array of new initiatives designed 
to stabilise credit markets. The papers by Cassola, Durre and Holthausen and 
Hilton and McAndrews provide a valuable overview of a variety of extraordinary 
operational initiatives undertaken by the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve 
System during the credit turmoil.
This comment classifies central bank operations broadly into “monetary policy” 
and “credit policy” in order to explain the nature of these extraordinary operational 
initiatives in terms of their fundamental money and credit components. It explains 
that “expansive credit policy” invades the territory of the fiscal authorities and 
puts  central  bank  independence  in  jeopardy.  It  observes  that  an  ambiguous 
boundary of support for the financial system between the central bank and the 
fiscal authorities helped destabilise the US economy in the autumn of 2008, 
and that a similar “no man’s land” of responsibility for stabilising financial 
markets exits in the euro area today.1
2   FISCAL ASPECTS OF MONETARY AND CREDIT POLICY
Pure monetary policy consists of open market operations that expand or contract 
bank reserves or currency by buying or selling Treasury securities. Pure monetary 
policy works by varying the scarcity of bank reserves to manage the spread between 
the interbank interest rate and interest paid on reserves, whether or not interest is 
paid on (excess) reserves. In the United States, the Federal Reserve chooses the 
scarcity of bank reserves to manage the spread between the federal funds rate 
and interest on reserves; in the euro area, the Eurosystem chooses the scarcity of 
reserves to manage the spread between EONIA and the deposit rate.
Until  the  recent  credit  turmoil  the  Federal  Reserve  satisfied  virtually  all  of 
its  asset  acquisition  needs  in  support  of  monetary  policy  by  purchasing  US 
1  The analysis employed throughout this comment draws heavily on Goodfriend (2011).363 COMMENT SESSION 5
Treasuries, a policy known as “Treasuries only”. The Federal Reserve followed 
this policy to avoid carrying credit risk on its balance sheet.
“Treasuries only” has had two important virtues in relation to fiscal policy. First, 
it has transferred Federal Reserve interest earnings (net of expenses) directly to 
the US fiscal authorities to allocate as they see fit. Second, US Treasury securities 
held by the Federal Reserve disappear on the consolidated balance sheet of the 
Federal Reserve and the US fiscal authorities, leaving only bank reserves and 
currency. In other words, US monetary policy has been implemented without 
the acquisition by the public sector of private liabilities or those of sub-national 
government entities. Hence, the Federal Reserve’s expansion of bank reserves or 
currency by acquiring US Treasuries is pure monetary policy.
Pure credit policy involves lending to private sector entities or acquiring private 
or sub-national government securities with funds obtained by selling Treasury 
securities  from  the  central  bank  portfolio.  In  contrast  to  monetary  policy, 
credit policy does not change currency or bank reserves outstanding and so has 
no effect on the spread between the interbank rate and interest on reserves.
In an expansionary credit policy action executed by a central bank, the fiscal 
authorities receive interest on the credit assets acquired by the central bank in 
place of interest on the Treasuries sold by the central bank to fund its credit 
initiative. Thus, credit policy involves the allocation of public funds in a way 
that monetary policy does not. For instance, credit assets acquired by the Federal 
Reserve  do  not  disappear  in  the  consolidated  balance  sheet  of  the  Federal 
Reserve and the US fiscal authorities. Credit policy involves the acquisition by 
the Federal Reserve and the US fiscal authorities taken together of private sector 
liabilities or those of sub-national government entities.
Fiscal policy involves the use for any purpose of public funds acquired with 
current  taxes  or  by  borrowing  against  future  taxes,  including  the  lending  of 
public funds to particular borrowers financed by selling Treasuries against future 
taxes. Therefore, credit policy executed by a central bank is debt-financed fiscal 
policy.
Unlike  monetary  policy,  credit  policy  interposes  taxpayers  between  private 
borrowers and lenders and exploits the government’s power to borrow against 
future taxes to facilitate flows to distressed or favoured borrowers. Doing so 
involves a fiscal policy decision to put taxpayer funds at risk.
3  CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
Independent central banks such as the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve are 
not authorised to make fiscal policy decisions. A healthy democracy requires 
full  public  disclosure  and  discussion  of  the  expenditure  of  public  funds. 
The  legislative  appropriations  process  enables  society  to  evaluate  competing 
budgetary programmes and to establish priorities for the allocation of public 
resources. Hence, the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve − precisely because 364 GOODFRIEND
they are exempted from the appropriations process − should avoid, to the fullest 
extent possible, taking actions that can properly be regarded as within the domain 
of fiscal policy and the fiscal authorities.
That said, credit policy as “last resort lending” has long been a valued part of 
independent central banking around the world. Moreover, there are no equivalents 
to US Treasury securities in the euro area because there is no euro area-wide 
fiscal authority. Of necessity, loans to depositories have accounted for virtually 
all assets acquired by the Eurosystem in the management of monetary policy.   
In other words, the Eurosystem has pursued monetary policy in combination 
with credit policy.
Credit  policies  are  reasonably  compatible  with  independent  central  banking 
if  they  are  well-protected  against  losses.  For  instance,  short-term  lending  to 
supervised, solvent depositories against good collateral carries multiple layers of 
protection against ex ante distortions and ex post fiscal losses.
It is important to appreciate the problems that a central bank incurs when it 
engages  in  expansive  credit  policy  beyond  supervised,  solvent  depositories 
at longer term and against weaker collateral. A central bank must decide how 
widely to extend its lending reach. Lending farther afield creates an implied 
promise in the future with its moral hazard implications. Central bank presence 
in one credit market can drain funds from nearby credit channels and prompt calls 
for support in nearby credit classes. The central bank must determine relative 
pricing,  eligible  collateral  and  haircuts.  Above  all,  expansive  credit  policies 
put taxpayer funds at increasing risk, properly draw the scrutiny of the fiscal 
authorities and jeopardise central bank independence.
4  THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S TERM AUCTION FACILITY
Consider the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) as described by 
Hilton and McAndrews. The Federal Reserve financed TAF credit at 28 and 
84 days with the proceeds from the sale of Treasuries from its portfolio with 
no effect on bank reserves. In effect, the TAF interposed the US government’s 
creditworthiness between lenders  and  borrowers  in  the dollar term interbank 
market to improve the flow and reduce the cost of dollar term credit to persistent 
borrowers  in  the  United  States  and  abroad.  Hence,  the  TAF  was  a  pure 
credit policy.
The TAF was fully collateralised and well protected against losses from the 
Federal Reserve’s point of view. Nevertheless, the TAF exposed US taxpayers 
to losses as follows. If TAF lending financed the exit of uninsured or unsecured 
lenders to a bank that failed with TAF loans outstanding, the Federal Reserve 
would get its collateral and strip the failed bank of collateral that would have 
been available otherwise to cover the cost of insured deposits or other government 
guarantees if the bank had been closed more promptly. Extending TAF credit to 
28 and especially to 84-day terms in the midst of the credit turmoil thereby 
significantly elevated risk to US taxpayers.365 COMMENT SESSION 5
5  THE EUROSYSTEM’S LONG-TERM, FIXED-RATE REFINANCING 
OPERATIONS WITH FULL ALLOTMENT
At  the  peak  of  the  credit  turmoil  the  Eurosystem  announced  refinancing 
operations in which it would accommodate whatever funding banks asked at 
various fixed interest rates and terms up to one full year. For instance, by offering 
banks unlimited credit for one year at 1% together with a 0.25% rate at the 
deposit facility, the Eurosystem set the “term spread” between liquid reserves and 
one-year credit. A bank could acquire whatever euro reserves it demanded for a 
year at a net pecuniary cost of 0.75%. The Eurosystem presented banks with an 
arbitrage opportunity – subject to meeting collateral requirements, banks could 
borrow reserves until they drove their marginal implicit liquidity convenience 
yield on reserves down to 0.75%.
Panel B of Chart 6 in the paper by Cassola, Durre and Holthausen shows that 
EONIA was pressed nearly down to the deposit rate (interest on reserves) floor 
throughout the first period of long-term, fixed-rate, full allotment refinancing 
operations. The perfectly elastic demand for reserves was fully accommodated at 
just above the 0.25% deposit rate floor during the period. In other words, banks 
took advantage of the arbitrage opportunity offered by the Eurosystem to satiate 
themselves with reserves.
The Eurosystem’s long-term, fixed-rate refinancing operations with full allotment 
combined credit and monetary policies because they financed loans to banks 
with  newly  created  reserves.  These  initiatives  satisfied  two  important  policy 
objectives: they pulled down term premia in interbank markets and satisfied 
the demand for reserves. However, because such refinancing operations were 
partly credit policies, they achieved these aims at an elevated risk to euro area 
taxpayers. Specifically, any losses on lending to banks owing to defaults and 
impaired collateral would deprive euro area fiscal authorities of interest earnings 
(net of expenses) that would have been transferred on a pro rata basis otherwise. 
Moreover, if long-term refinancing operations financed the exit of uninsured 
or unsecured lenders to a bank that failed with long-term refinancing operation 
loans outstanding, the Eurosystem could get its collateral but strip the failed 
bank of collateral that would have been available otherwise to cover the cost 
of insured deposits or other government guarantees if the bank had been closed 
more promptly.
6  THE “NO MAN’S LAND” OF CREDIT/FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
In May 2010 euro area governments announced a package of measures including 
the  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  (EFSF)  to  help  stabilise  financial 
markets. Among other things, the Eurosystem launched the Securities Market 
Programme, under which it has purchased sovereign bonds of euro area member 
states to help stabilise markets.366 GOODFRIEND
In recent months, businesses and other institutions are reported to have pulled 
deposits out of banks in peripheral euro area countries deemed at financial risk 
to place them with safer-seeming banks in the United Kingdom and continental 
Europe. The Eurosystem is reported to have stepped in to recycle funding to 
peripheral  banks.  The  16  November  2010  Wall  Street  Journal  reported  that 
Ireland accounted for 24% of borrowing from the Eurosystem, Greece accounted 
for 17% and Portugal accounted for 7.5%, even though each of these countries 
accounts for only around 2% of euro area GDP.
The evidence suggests that expansive Eurosystem credit policies are providing 
fiscal support for banks in the euro area periphery having difficulty funding 
themselves in interbank markets and otherwise.
To sum up, the paper by Hilton and McAndrews documents how the Federal 
Reserve was drawn into expansive credit policy in 2007 to facilitate private credit 
flows in the wake of the collapse of the shadow banking system in the United 
States. Likewise, the paper by Cassola, Durre and Holthausen documents how 
the Eurosystem expanded its initiatives as the credit turmoil spread to Europe. 
More recently, expansive Eurosystem credit policy has facilitated the flow of 
credit to weak banks in peripheral countries in the euro area.
The  credit  turmoil  has  unearthed  a  problem  with  expansive  credit  policy 
initiatives undertaken by the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve. There is a 
limit to what an independent central bank is authorised to provide in credit/fiscal 
policy support for the financial system. At some point, the fiscal authorities must 
take responsibility for authorising such support.
The Federal Reserve reached its limit with the support of AIG in the autumn 
of 2008. The US Congress then took the lead with the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program  (TARP).  The  lack  of  clarity  in  the  boundary  of  credit/fiscal  policy 
support  for  the  financial  system  created  a  “no  man’s  land”  of  responsibility 
between the Federal Reserve and the US Congress in the autumn of 2008 that 
then contributed to the destabilisation of financial markets in the United States.
Likewise, at some point the Eurosystem may be pushed to its limit. One hopes 
that the boundary of responsibility for credit/fiscal policy support of the financial 
system in the euro area today can be clarified before too long.
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COMMENT
BY RAFAEL REPULLO, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS MONETARIOS   
Y FINANCIEROS (CEMFI)
MONETARY POLICY OPERATIONS EXPERIENCES DURING THE CRISIS 
AND LESSONS LEARNT
1  INTRODUCTION
The papers by Cassola, Durré and Holthausen and Hilton and McAndrews offer 
two  complementary  perspectives  on  how  the  ECB  and  the  Federal  Reserve 
responded to the crisis, and the lessons that these experiences provide for the 
future design of the operational framework of monetary policy on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
I would like to start by noting that both central banks shared the same fundamental 
structure, based on a separation between the decisions on the policy rate – taken 
by the Governing Council of the ECB and the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) of the Federal Reserve respectively – and the decisions on liquidity 
provision  designed  to  keep  very  short-term  interest  rates,  such  as  EONIA 
and the Federal Funds rate, close to the policy rate. In the case of the ECB,   
this separation principle has its institutional correspondence in the allocation of 
tasks between the Governing Council, which is responsible for the formulation 
of the monetary policy of the Eurosystem, and the Executive Board, which is 
responsible  for  its  implementation.  In  the  case  of  the  Federal  Reserve, 
it corresponds to the allocation of tasks between the FOMC and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.
However, prior to the crisis there were very important differences between the 
ECB and the Federal Reserve in terms of implementation of monetary policy. 
First, the open market operations of the ECB were conducted in a decentralised 
manner,  through  the  national  central  banks  of  the  Eurosystem,  normally 
once a week and with a large number of counterparties, whereas the Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  traded  every  day  with  a  few  primary  dealers. 
Second,  minimum  reserves  were  fairly  small  in  the  United  States,  and  until   
October  2008  they  were  not  remunerated,1  while  the  Eurosystem  had  large 
reserve requirements remunerated at market rates. Third, until January 2003 the 
Federal Reserve’s discount window rate was below the policy rate, and using the 
window carried a stigma that made it a last-resort source of liquidity. In contrast, 
the ECB’s marginal lending facility rate had always been above the policy rate 
and  carried  no  stigma.  Finally,  the  ECB  had  a  deposit  facility,  whereas  the 
Federal Reserve had none. 
1  The 2006 Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act contemplated the payment of interest on 
reserves from October 2011, but the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act advanced 
this date to October 2008. 368 REPULLO
The changes adopted by the Federal Reserve in January 2003 and October 2008 
moved the US framework toward the Eurosystem framework in two important 
respects: first, a lending facility was introduced with a discount rate (renamed 
the primary credit rate) set initially at 100 basis points above the policy rate, and 
second, an “automatic” deposit facility was introduced as a result of the decision 
to pay interest on excess reserves. 
Still  some  important  differences  remained.  First,  working  with  a  very  small 
number of counterparties meant that when the normal functioning of the money 
markets broke down, it was much more difficult for the Federal Reserve to get 
the liquidity flowing to the banks that needed it, as compared to a system where 
these banks could directly access the central bank. Second, using a restricted 
set of collateral assets – basically US Treasury securities – meant that when 
the primary dealers ran out of these assets the Federal Reserve did not have the 
instruments to inject the required liquidity into the system. Finally, despite the 
changes in the US discount window policy, the stigma problem lingered, so many 
banks were reluctant to use the window.2 These differences help to explain how 
in many of its operational decisions the Federal Reserve seemed to be a more 
“innovative” central bank, but the fact is that the ECB had at its disposal a better 
set of tools to handle a liquidity crisis.
During the crisis, investors withdrew large amounts of funds from some financial 
institutions and placed them in other institutions, and/or purchased financial assets 
such as government securities. Thus, some institutions had liquidity deficits and 
others had liquidity surpluses. In normal conditions, such portfolio shifts could 
have  been  managed  by  deficit  institutions  either  by  selling  assets  to,  or  by 
borrowing from, surplus institutions. The problem was that deficit institutions 
ran out of government securities and credit markets stopped functioning, owing 
to a lemons problem, so there was a major problem in redistributing liquidity 
from surplus to deficit institutions. In response to this situation, central banks 
stepped in as intermediaries (or market makers) of last resort, taking funds from 
surplus institutions (via excess reserves in the United States and via the use 
of the deposit facility in the euro area) and lending them to deficit institutions 
(via the Term Auction Facility in the United States and via the various extensions 
of the refinancing operations in the euro area). 
As  a  result  of  these  actions,  both  central  banks  significantly  increased  their 
balance sheets. In particular, the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve System 
grew from 6.5% of the US GDP at the end of 2006 to 15.8% at the end of 2009, 
while the balance sheet of the Eurosystem grew from 13.6% of the euro area GDP 
at the end of 2006 to 21.2% at the end of 2009. The increase in the relative size of 
the Federal Reserve over these three years was of 9.3 percentage points, whereas 
that of the Eurosystem was of 7.6 percentage points. Although this corresponds 
2  As noted by Ben Bernanke in a speech on 3 April 2009, “Banks were reluctant to rely on 
discount window credit to address their funding needs. The banks’ concern was that their 
recourse to the discount window, if it became known, might lead market participants to infer 
weakness. (…) The perceived stigma of borrowing at the discount window threatened to 
prevent the Federal Reserve from getting much-needed liquidity into the system.” 369 COMMENT SESSION 5
to the widespread perception that the Federal Reserve has been a more “active” 
central bank, the difference in terms of the increase in their balance sheets was 
not that large (and the relative size of the Federal Reserve at the end of 2009 was 
still 5.4 percentage points below that of the Eurosystem). 
In the next two sections I will provide some specific comments on the two 
papers, which I will refer to as the ECB paper and the Federal Reserve paper, 
before going on to conclude in Section 4 with some preliminary thoughts about 
monetary policy implementation after the crisis.
2  COMMENTS ON THE ECB PAPER
The paper by Cassola, Durré and Holthausen has three main sections. It starts 
with a description of the three phases of the crisis, then it presents a theoretical 
model of the interbank market that tries to capture the main trade-offs faced by 
the ECB, and finally it provides some econometric evidence on the effect of the 
refinancing operations. 
From the perspective of the monetary policy operations of the ECB, the first 
phase of the crisis, from August 2007 to September 2008, was characterised 
by the frontloading of liquidity provision and the increase in the amount of   
longer-term  refinancing.  The  second  phase,  from  September  2008  to   
October  2009,  was  characterised  by  the  implementation  of  non-standard 
monetary policy measures and the abandonment of the separation principle. The 
third phase started with the decision to gradually phase out the non-standard 
measures, which was reversed by the arrival of the European sovereign debt 
crisis in the spring of 2010. 
My  first  comment  on  this  part  of  the  paper  is  that  the  decisions  before   
September  2008,  and  in  particular  the  frontloading  of  liquidity  provision, 
represented  a  straightforward  application  of  the  separation  principle  in  light 
of the change in banks’ bidding behaviour. In fact, this principle was not fully 
followed,  since  the  ECB  allowed  the  marginal  rate  of  the  main  refinancing 
operations to increase above the policy rate (the minimum bid rate) – see the 
blue  line  in  Chart  1.  This  was  a  signal  of  tighter  liquidity  provision,  and  it 
would be interesting to know why the ECB did it. Was it perhaps to tighten the 
monetary policy stance through the back door (i.e. without moving the policy 
rate) in a situation in which inflation in the euro area was heading towards a level 
significantly above the 2% target? 
My second comment is that I do not understand why from September 2008 
interbank rates such as EONIA were allowed to fall way below the policy rate – 
see the red dotted line in Chart 1. If the ECB wanted to lower rates by 50 basis 
points, why did it not lower the rate of the main refinancing operations by this 
amount? Why abandon the separation principle and introduce this element of 
confusion in the stance of monetary policy at this critical stage of the crisis? 370 REPULLO
The official justification referred to the preservation of the functioning of the 
interbank  markets.  In  the  words  of  Bini  Smaghi  (2009),  “bringing  the  main 
policy rate too close to zero would risk hampering the functioning of the money 
markets”. And this is what the theoretical model in the paper is supposed to 
illuminate. 
The  model  has  four  dates  (t=0,  1,  2,  3)  and  a  large  number  of  risk-neutral 
banks that are identical ex ante but are different ex post in that they may suffer 
idiosyncratic  liquidity  and  solvency  shocks  at  t=1  and  t=2.  In  addition,  the 
system  may  experience  an  aggregate  liquidity  shock  at  t=2.  Apart  from  the 
private banks, the model has a central bank that offers a deposit and a lending 
facility. The main issue analysed in the paper is this: under what conditions 
would there be an active interbank market in which banks that do not suffer 
a liquidity shock (surplus banks) lend their excess liquidity to those that do 
(deficit banks)? The alternative would be that surplus banks place their excess 
liquidity at the central bank’s deposit facililty and deficit banks borrow from the 
central bank’s lending facility. 
To review the analysis in the paper, consider a (type A) bank that has a unit of 
liquidity surplus at t=1 and a unit of liquidity deficit at t=2. Let rt denote the 
interbank rate at date t, dt the deposit facility rate at date t, lt the lending facility 
rate at date t and qt the probability that an interbank loan will not be repaid 
at date t+1. At t=1 the bank can either use the deposit facility, which yields 
1+d1 at t=2, or lend the unit of liquidity surplus in the market, which yields 
1+r1 with probability 1−q1 or 0 with probability q1 at t=2. On the one hand, if 
the bank uses the deposit facility, it will have the principal to meet the payment 
due at t=2 and the interest d1 to invest (say, in the interbank market) which will 
yield d1(1+r2) at t=3. On the other hand, if the bank goes to the market and the 
interbank loan is not repaid, it will have to borrow one unit of liquidity (say, 
in the interbank market) at t=2, and if the loan is repaid it will have the principal 
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to meet the payment due at t=2 and the interest r1 to invest (say, in the interbank 
market). Then its net expected payoff at t=3 will be r1(1+r2)(1−q1) − (1+r2)q1.   
The bank will lend its surplus liquidity in the interbank market at t=1 if the net 
expected payoff of lending exceeds the net payoff from using the deposit facility, 
that is if 
r1(1+ r2)(1 − q1) − (1 + r2) q1 ≥ d1(1 + r2),
which simplifies to 
1+r1 ≥ 1+ d1
1− q1
.
Since  borrowing  (type  B)  banks  will  go  to  the  interbank  market  at  t=1  if 
it  is  cheaper  than  using  the  central  bank’s  lending  facility,  that  is  if  l1 ≥  r1,   




which simplifies to 
l1 d1 q1 1 l1 ( ) q1. - +
In  other  words,  the  spread  between  the  central  bank’s  lending  and  deposit 
facilities must be large relative to the credit risk in interbank lending. 
It should be noted that this condition does not depend on the interbank rate at   
t=2, so contrary to what is stated in the paper there is no interaction between 
credit risk and liquidity risk (the risk that there is an aggregate liquidity shock at 
t=2). This shows that there is a problem with lemma 2 in the paper. 
Apart from this, it is important to note that if the condition for having an active 
interbank market were to be violated, that is if l1−d1<q1, the central bank would 
be losing money with its intermediation activity, because it would be charging 
a spread over the deposit facility rate that would not cover the credit risk of its 
lending. In other words, we have an active interbank market if the central bank 
does not provide a subsidy to the borrowing banks. Could this be why the ECB 
cared about “not hampering the functioning of the money markets”?
However, it should be noted that in models in which banks have either structural 
liquidity surpluses or structural liquidity deficits, such as the model presented 
in Bruche and Suarez (2010), central bank intermediation may be an efficient 
way to deal with money market freezes. In such situations, narrowing the spread 
between the lending and the deposit facility rates could be desirable. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that more work needs to be 
done in order to provide a rationale for abandoning the separation principle in 
terms of “not hampering the functioning of the money markets”. 372 REPULLO
The ECB paper concludes with an econometric estimation of a VARX model 
with  seven  endogenous  variables,  in  which  changes  in  the  policy  rate  are 
taken to be exogenous. The model is estimated using daily data for the period 
August 2007 to October 2010. The results show that shocks to the outstanding 
volume of refinancing operations decrease trading and spreads in the interbank 
market. Although the results are interesting, there is some concern regarding the 
empirical strategy, which is based on a model that has too many endogenous 
variables, some of which have a trend, and which takes as exogenous a variable 
like  changes  in  the  policy  rate  that  is  clearly  endogenous.  The  question  is: 
why not estimate a standard structural VAR, with a proper discussion of the 
identification restrictions?
3  COMMENTS ON THE FEDERAL RESERVE PAPER
The paper by Hilton and McAndrews is divided into two parts: challenges in 
responding to the crisis and lessons for the future. The three key challenges were 
how to increase the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet in order to tackle 
the liquidity crisis, how to deal with the stigma of discount window borrowing, 
and how to arrange collateral requirements for lending to an expanded set of 
counterparties. 
With  respect  to  balance  sheet  constraints,  the  obvious  thing  to  note  is  that 
liquidity injections increase reserves, so maintaining a policy rate above the zero 
lower bound requires either mopping up reserves via open market operations or 
paying positive interest on excess reserves. In fact both avenues were taken by 
the Federal Reserve, by means of the creation of the Supplementary Financing 
Program in September 2008 and the provisions in the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of October 2008 respectively. 
The problem of the stigma attached to discount window borrowing was inherited 
from a long tradition of setting the discount rate below the policy rate and adding 
non-pecuniary penalties (in the form of stigma) to restrict its use. Interestingly,   
no stigma was attached to borrowing from the ECB, neither in the refinancing 
operations nor at the lending facility. The way out found by the Federal Reserve 
was to resort to a liquidity auction system, the Term Auction Facility, in which a 
potentially large number of banks bid simultaneously on the date of the auction. 
In conducting these operations the Federal Reserve had to set up new lending 
arrangements with banks without Treasury securities to be posted as collateral, 
as  well  as  with  other  key  institutions  such  as  money  market  mutual  funds.   
In doing this the Federal Reserve assumed an unprecedented amount of credit 
risk, which was justified by the need to address unprecedented disruptions in 
financial markets and institutions. 
The  three  lessons  for  the  future  operating  framework  for  monetary  policy 
discussed in the paper by Hilton and McAndrews relate to the payment of interest 
on reserves, the structure of the Federal Reserve’s securities portfolio, and the 
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The  payment  of  interest  on  (excess)  reserves  solves  the  balance  sheet 
problem  noted  above,  and  allows  the  running  of  monetary  policy  with  a 
structural  liquidity  surplus.  It  also  facilitates  acting  on  the  term  premium, 
via  quantitative  easing  (QE),  even  outside  the  zero  lower  bound.  However,   
it naturally reduces the level of trading activity in the federal funds market,   
which may (or may not) be a source of concern. 
In dealing with the crisis, the Federal Reserve acquired a large amount of non-
Treasury securities. This will eventually be reversed, since there should be no 
need  to  buy  or  take  as  collateral  such  securities  in  normal  times.  However,   
the Federal Reserve should be ready to act in future crises by, among other 
things, lending for terms longer than overnight, against non-Treasury securities, 
and possibly on a non-recourse basis – so the authors argue for an expanded 
credit risk management approach in normal times. 
Finally, the third lesson is to note the potential value for the wholesale payment 
system (Fedwire) of operating with higher reserve balances. This would not only 
improve the efficiency of payments, but also reduce the risks posed by daylight 
overdrafts.  Achieving  this  would  require  much  higher  reserve  requirements, 
which should be remunerated at market rates to avoid any distortions. It should 
be noted that for this purpose, and as the case of the ECB illustrates, there is no 
need to pay interest on excess reserves, only on required reserves. 
Summing up, this paper contains a very good summary of the challenges faced 
by the Federal Reserve during the crisis, but I think that it is somewhat weaker 
on the lessons for the future. In particular, the paper takes a piecemeal approach 
focusing  on  three  specific  issues,  when  a  more  systematic  approach  would 
have been desirable. Ideally, this would require a description of the relevant 
environment, a specification of the central bank’s objectives, a list of the possible 
instruments,  and,  to  conclude,  an  analysis  of  the  optimal  implementation  of 
monetary policy. This should be the subject of an ambitious research project for 
the next few years. 
4  MONETARY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AFTER THE CRISIS
In broad terms, there are three ways in which monetary policy can be implemented. 
First, as in the case of the Eurosystem, one may have a structural liquidity deficit, 
and operate monetary policy with a regime under which the central bank lends 
reserves to the private banks. In this case, the policy rate would be the central 
bank’s lending rate (like the ECB’s minimum bid rate in the main refinancing 
operations). Second, as in the case of the Federal Reserve prior to the crisis, one 
may have an approximate liquidity balance, and operate monetary policy by 
conducting open market operations designed to compensate the daily movements 
in the autonomous liquidity creation factors. In this case, the policy rate would 
be the target short-term money market (Federal funds) rate. Finally, as perhaps 
in the case of the Federal Reserve after the crisis, one may have a structural 
liquidity surplus, and operate monetary policy with a regime under which the 
private banks lend reserves to the central bank. In this case, the policy rate would 
be the interest rate paid by the central bank on excess reserves. 374 REPULLO
Since it is unclear which system is best, studying this issue should be a high 
priority for all central banks. I would like to conclude with some preliminary 
thoughts on these alternatives. 
First, having a structural liquidity deficit is good for distributing liquidity broadly, 
since there is no stigma attached to borrowing from the central bank (everybody 
does it). However, if the deficit is too large, the central bank has to be willing 
to take non-government paper as collateral. Thus, a large structural liquidity 
deficit requires some careful management of credit risk, which in principle is not 
the comparative advantage of the central bank. Also, a system with a structural 
liquidity deficit will penalise banks under the future Basel III regime,3 since the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio will require them to hold additional liquid assets to 
back their short-term borrowing from the central bank. 
Second,  having  a  structural  liquidity  surplus  is  bad  for  distributing  liquidity 
broadly, since the stigma of having to borrow from the central bank may remain. 
It also requires that there is a large pool of suitable assets that the central bank 
can hold (something that should not be a problem in the foreseeable future). 
However,  if  the  central  bank  were  forced  to  hold  longer-term  government 
securities (or private securities) in its portfolio, it could incur losses that might 
endanger its independence.4 Insofar as this is would be anticipated, it could imply 
an undesirable constraint on monetary policy decisions. 
3   See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010). 
4  In particular, the situation of the central bank could resemble that of the US Savings and 
Loans institutions in the 1980s, with a combination of low-return, long-term assets and 
high-cost, short-term liabilities. The difference, of course, is that the central bank could 
control the cost of its liabilities via the setting of the policy rate. 375 COMMENT SESSION 5
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Charles Goodhart (London School of Economics) supported Repullo’s view 
that more research is needed on the optimal spread between central bank deposit 
and lending rates. He asked why Holthausen was taking for granted that it is good 
to have more activity in the interbank market. He also questioned the rationale for 
keeping the interest rate corridor symmetric. 
Holthausen argued that an active interbank market is important for aggregating 
information and for maintaining banks’ incentives to engage in peer monitoring, 
both  in  good  times  and  bad.  As  stressed  by  Goodfriend,  too  great  a  degree 
of  central  bank  intermediation  in  the  interbank  market  presents  a  further 
disadvantage: it implies that the central bank is assuming more credit risk, even 
with an appropriate collateral framework in place. Therefore, to the extent that 
the central bank can continue to control interest rates, the optimal move is for it 
to step back from the market.
According to McAndrews, the most important reason for having a symmetric 
corridor  is  that  the  middle  of  the  corridor  is  the  most  elastic  portion  of  the 
demand curve. Therefore, placing the target rate in the middle of the corridor 
diminishes interest rate variability.
Francesco  Papadia  (ECB)  distinguished  between  two  variants  of  monetary 
policy  implementation:  the  ECB’s  broad  variant  and  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
narrow  variant.  The  ECB  deals  with  many  counterparties  and  accepts  many 
different  categories  of  collateral,  while  the  reverse  applied  to  the  pre-crisis 
Federal Reserve. Before the crisis it was difficult to tell which variant was better. 
They were both equally successful in controlling the short-term rate. During the 
crisis, however, the broad approach performed better. Thus the Federal Reserve 
substantially broadened its framework, and the ECB also further broadened its 
framework  somewhat.  This  broadening  was  necessary  because  central  banks 
took over part of the financial intermediation that the private sector was no 
longer able to perform. Papadia asked if the speakers agreed with characterising 
one framework as broad and the other as narrow. Second, he asked if the broad 
frameworks will be retained after the crisis ends.
In Hilton’s view, what is important is not whether the framework is permanently 
broad  or  narrow,  but  whether  it  can  be  broadened  in  the  event  of  a  crisis.   
The Federal Reserve has built on its experience of responding to a crisis and has 
developed tools with which to respond to future similar crises. But in normal 
times there is no need to operate with such a broad framework.
Repullo remarked that Papadia’s classification of operational frameworks into 
broad and narrow is not exhaustive. In addition, the narrow framework could be 
accompanied by flooding the market with reserves so that the interest rate on 
excess reserves becomes the policy rate.377 GENERAL DISCUSSION SESSION 5
For  welfare  reasons,  Goodfriend  favoured  satiating  the  financial  system 
with reserves, so that the interbank rate falls to the interest-on-reserves floor. 
Electronic reserves can be produced for free so they should be supplied without 
limit. Therefore, central banks should seriously consider the floor system. In this 
system, the central bank can hedge its interest rate risk by holding short-term 
securities such as Treasury bills, since Treasury bill rates will fluctuate with the 
interest rate that the central bank pays on reserves.
McAndrews remarked that Goodfriend’s “no man’s land” of responsibility for 
stabilising financial markets was, in his view, navigated well by the Federal 




BY JEAN-CLAUDE TRICHET, PRESIDENT OF THE ECB
Ladies and gentlemen, 
Hosting all of you has been a great privilege for us – and I am speaking on behalf 
of my colleagues on the Executive Board of the ECB and the Governing Council. 
I think that at a certain point, the majority of the Governing Council and the 
majority of the “team” from the Global Economy Meeting in Basel were here. 
So thanks to all those colleagues who accepted our invitation. The presentations 
have been outstanding, and I wish to extend my thanks to all of the speakers.   
I have learnt a lot during these two days.
I  am  very  grateful  to  Ben  Bernanke,  Henrique  Meirelles  and  Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn  for  being  open  to  your  questions,  remarks  and  observations.   
We have always believed in a frank and candid exchange of views. We trust in 
the benefits of being totally open. At times in the past we were considered too 
open in accepting all kinds of criticism. But it is essential that we exchange views 
and maintain this openness.
I have the feeling that, especially with hindsight, much of our monetary policy 
concept, which we have followed from the very beginning, has proven its worth.   
I  am  speaking  particularly  of  our  attention  to  the  information  contained   
in  monetary  aggregates.  As  has  been  explained,  we  take  into  account  the 
dynamics  of  all  of  the  various  components  and  counterparts  of  monetary 
aggregates. The issue of the dynamics of credit has come up again and again 
during this conference and is an issue that is an absolutely essential part of our 
monetary analysis.
During this conference I have been struck by the importance of some of the 
luminaries  of  economics  –  Charles  Kindleberger,  Milton  Friedman,  Hyman 
Minsky, Frank Knight. We have once again been reminded in this crisis that we 
not only have to live with risk, but also with significant Knightian uncertainty.
One thing we lacked in this crisis was a good analytical understanding of the 
unfolding sequence of events. Therefore, in this conference, I was particularly 
interested in the perspectives on exploring non-linear, highly complex, transitory 
phenomena. This seems to be an immense field for research – both academic 
research  as  well  as  applied  research  in  central  banks.  However,  we  should 
not underestimate the analytical difficulty of this research. Even in the natural 
sciences we are still lacking a complete understanding of the phase transition in 
physics, of the modelling of turbulence itself, of the transition from laminar flow 
to turbulent flow. Dannie Heineman, one of the greatest luminaries in physics 
who made incredible progress in the quantum theories, once said that turbulence 
is much more complicated than quantum physics. I think that we have to work 
on this area much more than we had imagined before the crisis. I am saying   
this because, again, I was fascinated by the wealth of discussion that we have 
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I again extend my warm thanks to you all. We have benefited a lot from your 
presence here. This conference is our flagship event and in two years’ time the 
ECB will again hold this conference. Thank you for having spent these last   
two days with us.382
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet and Christian Thimann with 30 graduate students from 
across Europe383
MEDIA COVERAGE384
A REVIEW OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE 
The proceedings of the Sixth ECB Central Banking Conference were covered 
extensively  by  media  across  Europe  and  beyond.  International  newspapers, 
including  the  Financial  Times,  the  Wall  Street  Journal  and  the  International 
Herald Tribune, reported on the conference, as did national media in more than 
a dozen countries. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Handelsblatt (Germany), 
Les Echos (France), Il Sole 24 Ore (Italy), Expansión (Spain) and many others 
followed  the  two-day  event  closely.  The  reporting  focused  primarily  on  the 
policy panel discussion entitled “Emerging from the crisis: where do we stand?”, 
and, in particular, on the comments made by ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, 
US  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Ben  Bernanke  and  IMF  Managing  Director 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn. 
Mr  Trichet’s  opening  remarks  were  the  main  focus  of  press  reports  on  the 
first day of the conference. Several newspapers quoted Mr Trichet’s call for 
political  decisions  to  strengthen  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  emphasising 
his “grave concerns” about the path that economic and fiscal governance of the 
euro area was taking. In this regard, Mr Trichet’s comment that “the situation 
is very difficult” and his call to governments to pay attention to “preserving 
and strengthening their credit merit” were widely quoted by many newspapers. 
“Taking into account the lessons of the global crisis, in particular as regards its 
impact on the European single market and in the single currency area, we have 
called, and are still calling, for a quantum leap of governance.” This was another 
of Mr Trichet’s statements that featured prominently. The newspapers also had 
extensive coverage of the President’s warning regarding the risk of an increased 
reliance by over-indebted countries on ECB support measures put in place during 
the crisis. “The central bank must guard against the danger that the necessary 
measures  in  a  crisis  period  would  evolve  into  a  dependency  as  conditions 
normalise”, Mr Trichet concluded.
News  coverage  of  the  second  day  of  the  conference  was  largely  dominated 
by reports on Mr Bernanke’s remarks made during the panel discussion with 
Mr Trichet and Mr Strauss-Kahn. In particular, the Federal Reserve Chairman 
explained that the Federal Reserve deemed a second round of quantitative easing 
necessary  in  order  to  keep  the  US  economy  growing  and  to  fuel  the  global 
recovery. Mr Bernanke was quoted as saying “the best way to continue to deliver 
the strong economic fundamentals that underpin the value of the dollar, as well 
as to support the global recovery, is through policies that lead to a resumption of 
robust growth in a context of price stability in the United States”. 
Another focal point was Mr Bernanke’s warning that undervaluations of some 
emerging market currencies were at the root of “persistent imbalances” in trade 
and that these imbalances “represent a growing financial and economic risk”. 
“Currency undervaluation by surplus countries is inhibiting needed international 
adjustment and creating spillover effects that would not exist if exchange rates 
better reflected market fundamentals”, Mr  Bernanke was  reported  as  saying. 
Newspapers interpreted his remarks to the effect that unless countries like China 
allow their currencies to rise naturally to reflect their faster pace of growth, others 385 A REVIEW OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE
would suffer disproportionately from the imbalances that can be traced to the 
trade effect of undervalued currencies. 
The media reported Mr Trichet’s statement that “we strongly share the view that a 
strong dollar, credible vis-à-vis the major floating currencies, is very important”. 
They also reflected on the ECB President’s point that some economies with 
current account surpluses have exchange rates “that are not sufficiently flexible” 
and warned that failure to solve global imbalances would “pave the way for 
future  major  difficulties”.  IMF  Managing  Director  Dominique  Strauss-Kahn 
was quoted as saying that he believed that “wherever it’s possible…the support 
to growth is still something which is absolutely necessary” and he called upon 
Europe  to  adopt  “a  strategy  of  common  growth”.  He  was  furthermore  cited 
as saying that “the currency question is only part of the problem” and that, 
in general, there was a need to “restore confidence” by tackling debt problems. 
Media coverage of this topic also included remarks made by Henrique Meirelles, 
the Governor of Brazil’s central bank, who said that “it’s simply a fact that there 
are global imbalances” and appealed to his counterparts that “we should work 
toward global coordination”.
Several media reported Jürgen Stark’s remarks made during his keynote address 
entitled “In search of a robust monetary policy framework”, in which he said that 
the financial crisis had bolstered the case for central banks taking a longer-term 
view when setting interest rates. Some articles used the occasion to highlight 
the ECB’s medium-term orientation. In coverage of Mr Stark’s closing remarks, 
newspapers  reported  his  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  some  fundamental 
features  of  central  banking,  namely  the  overriding  task  of  maintaining  price 
stability,  the  independence  of  central  banks  in  pursuing  their  mandate  and 
the prohibition of monetary financing of government expenditure. Mr Stark’s 
statement that the ECB’s monetary policy strategy embodies elements which 
provide  “a  suitable  and  robust  framework  for  an  occasional,  but  appropriate 
‘leaning-against-the-wind’” type of monetary policy was also widely mentioned 
by the media as a concluding element of their reporting of the event.386 PROGRAMME
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THURSDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2010
1.30 p.m. -2.30 p.m.  Registration and welcome coffee 
2.30 p.m. -3 p.m.  Introductory speech 
  Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Central Bank 
3 p.m. -5.45 p.m.  Session 1  
Monetary policy strategies: experiences during the crisis 
and lessons learnt 
  Chair: José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive 
Board, European Central Bank 
  Paper: Lessons for monetary policy strategy from the 
recent past 
  Stephan Fahr, Roberto Motto, Massimo Rostagno, Frank Smets 
and Oreste Tristani, European Central Bank 
  Paper: Monetary policy strategy: lessons from the crisis 
  Frederic Mishkin, Professor, Columbia University 
  Discussants: Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director, Bruegel; Guido 
Tabellini, Rector, Bocconi University; and William White, Chair 
of the Economic and Development Review Committee, OECD 
5.45 p.m. -7.15 p.m.  Session 1I  
Panel -The financial crisis: what did central bankers 
forget and what did they learn? A historical perspective
  Chair: Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board, 
European Central Bank 
  Panellists: Marc Flandreau, Professor, Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies; Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, 
Professor, Freie Universität Berlin; and Harold James, Professor, 
Princeton University 
7.15 p.m.  Transfer to the dinner venue 
8 p.m.  Reception and Conference dinner 
  Dinner address 
  Personal reflections on EMU by the President of the 
EMI
  Alexandre Lamfalussy 
  Capitol Theater, Konzert-und Veranstaltungshaus, Offenbach 
am Main 387 PROGRAMME
FRIDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 2010
8 a.m. -8.45 a.m.  Registration and welcome coffee 
8.45 a.m. -9.15 a.m.  Keynote speech  
In search of a robust monetary policy framework 
  Jürgen Stark, Member of the Executive Board, European Central 
Bank 
9.15 a.m. -10.45 a.m.  Session III 
  Panel -What shortcomings in macroeconomic  
and finance theory has the financial crisis revealed,  
and how should they be addressed? 
  Chair: Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive 
Board, European Central Bank 
  Panellists: Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Professor, École 
Polytechnique; Martin Eichenbaum, Professor, Northwestern 
University and John Geanakoplos, Professor, Yale University 
10.45 a.m. -11.15 a.m.  Coffee break 
11.15 a.m. -11.45 a.m.  Keynote speech 
Speaker: Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board 
11.45 a.m. -1.15 p.m.  Session IV  
Policy panel -Emerging from the crisis: where do we 
stand? 
  Panellists: Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Central 
Bank; Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director, IMF; 
Henrique Meirelles, Governor, Central Bank of Brazil  
and Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board
1.15 p.m. -2.45 p.m.  Buffet lunch 
2.45 p.m. -4.45 p.m.  Session V  
Monetary policy operations: experiences during the 
crisis and lessons learnt 
  Chair: Jürgen Stark, Member of the Executive Board, European 
Central Bank 
  Paper: Implementing monetary policy in crisis times: 
the case of the ECB 
  Nuno Cassola, Alain Durré and Cornelia Holthausen, European 
Central Bank 
  Paper: Challenges and lessons of the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy operations during the financial crisis 
  Spence Hilton and James McAndrews, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York 
  Discussants: Marvin Goodfriend, Professor, Carnegie Mellon and 
Rafael Repullo, Professor, Center for Monetary and Financial 
Studies 
4.45 p.m. -5 p.m.  Concluding remarks 
  Jean-Claude TrichetApproAches to monetAry policy 
revisited – lessons from the crisis
sixth 
ecB centrAl BAnking 
conference
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